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PART IV.

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

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January to June 1920.



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# TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
1 To Law Officers ...	1919. Dec. 10	Turkey. Jurisdiction (Inter-Allied Tribunal). (a) Difficulties arising from present position; asks for their views as to provision of requisite courts. (b) Law officers consider Ottoman Government should be pressed into accepting establishment of an inter-allied tribunal ...	1
2 Political Resident, Aden ...	" 18	Arabia. Situation report. Encloses copy of letter to High Commissioner, Cairo, as to. Deals with Imam-Jacob Mission. Idrisi and Aden protectorate ...	4
3 Armenian Peace Delegation ...	1920. Jan. 1	Caucasus. Note on Armenian claims to Karabagh, and Tartar counter-claims to it and to Zangezur ...	6
4 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 232. Tel.	1919. Dec. 24	Caucasus. Azerbaijan. Cabinet—names of new Ministry...	7
5 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 237. Tel.	" 27	Caucasus. Bolshevik activities in Transcaspia. Turkomans appear to be anti-Bolshevik. Suggests a British mission to them for enquiry and report ...	7
6 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 2. Tel.	1920. Jan. 3	Caucasus. Georgia. Government seeks advice of Great Britain in view of expected Bolshevik proclamation of Soviet Republic in North Caucasus...	8
7 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 3. Tel.	" 3	Caucasus. With Denikin's collapse crushing of Transcaucasia by Bolsheviks would follow. Suggests urgent measures for averting this danger ...	8
8 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 2384. Secret	1919. Dec. 23	Turkey. Allied strength. Only strength lies in Greek troops. Necessity for strong force if peace terms unacceptable in view of nationalist opposition ...	9
9 India Office ...	1920. Jan. 7	Caucasus. Bolshevik activities in Transcaspia. Recommends British control of the Caspian Sea and union of interests of Caucasian republics, especially Azerbaijan, with those of Great Britain ...	10
10 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 5. Tel.	" 6	Caucasus. Georgia. Refers to No. 6. Government considers Bolsheviks and Turks have agreed together to attack Great Britain. It asks for recognition of independence, return of parts of Batum province and material aid ...	11
11 To the Earl of Derby ... No. 67	" 8	Palestine. Administrative boundary. British Government, while accepting Supreme Council decision of the 15th September, 1919, as basis, insist on maintenance of present boundary pending final decision ...	11
12 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 7. Tel.	" 7	Caucasus. Georgia. Refers to No. 10. Georgia will resist Bolsheviks if we support her. In Armenia there is danger that Dashnaks party may make terms with Bolsheviks ...	12
13 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 9. Tel.	" 8	Caucasus. Azerbaijan. Transmits message from Colonel Stokes. Situation serious owing to collapse of Denikin. Immediate action is necessary to save Azerbaijan from Bolshevik domination. Also Daghestan, if assisted by us with money, would fight the Bolsheviks ...	12
14 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 11. Tel.	" 8	Caucasus. Azerbaijan. Continuation of No. 13. Government must make terms with Bolsheviks, who are menacing, if we do not assist them. Colonel Stokes advocates recognition and immediate aid ...	13
15 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 2391	1919. Dec. 24	Turkey. Jurisdiction (Capitulations). Future judicial régime must be provided for in the treaty. Proposal to re-establish capitulations pending new régime ...	14
16 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 13. Tel.	1920. Jan. 8	Caucasus. Daghestan. It must succumb to joining with Bolsheviks, failing help within a fortnight ...	15

## TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
17 To War Office ...	1920. Jan. 10	Caucasus. Transmits Mr. Wardrop's recent telegram. Proposes some measure of assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan and their <i>de facto</i> recognition ...	15
18 The Earl of Derby No. 19. Tel.	" 10	Caucasus. Transmits message from Lord Curzon. Supreme Council have accorded <i>de facto</i> recognition to Georgia and Azerbaijan. Eastern Committee should meet to discuss future policy in Caucasus and Transcaspia ...	16
19 Sir P. Cox ... No. 14. Tel.	" 11	Caucasus. Georgia and Azerbaijan. Persian Prime Minister emphasises enormous importance to Persia and British interests if Caucasian States be recognised and enabled to hold the Batum-Baku line and South Caspian ...	16
20 To Mr. Wardrop No. 23. Tel.	" 11	Caucasus. Georgia and Azerbaijan. Refers to No. 18. Announces <i>de facto</i> recognition ...	17
21 The Earl of Derby No. 24. Tel.	" 10	Caucasus. Georgia and Azerbaijan. Refers to No. 18. <i>De facto</i> recognition does not prejudice question of boundaries ...	17
22 To Mr. Wardrop No. 27. Tel.	" 12	Caucasus. Repeats to him No. 21 ...	17
23 To India Office ...	" 12	Caucasus. Three Caucasian republics. Admiralty desire to take over fleet in Caspian Sea. Asks for proposals as to the suggested union of interests of republics with those of Great Britain ...	17
24 To the Earl of Derby ... No. 44. Tel.	" 13	Caucasus. Refers to No. 18. Eastern Committee favours eventual withdrawal from Caucasus, but provisional retention of troops at Batum ...	18
25 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 20. Tel.	" 11	Caucasus. Azerbaijan. Baku Government ask for authorisation to despatch troops to Daghestan to counter Bolsheviks ...	19
26 Mr. Mackinder ... No. 3. Tel.	" 13	Caucasus. Caspian Sea. Bolsheviks advancing from Astrakan. Recommends Enzeli may be used to shelter Denikin's flotilla ...	19
27 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 131.	1919. Dec. 20	Caucasus. Transcaspia. Transmits despatch from Colonel Stokes as to Bolshevik activities. Suggests aid to the Turkomans ...	20
28 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 2399. Secret	" 26	Turkey. Pan-Islamic activities. Forwards report on Mustafa Kemal's efforts to effect co-operation between Turks, Kurds and Arabs. Growing tendency in Near and Middle East towards "self-determination" ...	21
29 Mr. Vansittart ... No. 2. Conf.	1920. Jan. 12	Turkey. Peace terms. Encloses M. Berthelot's memorandum as to principles of settlement of Eastern question. Discusses three of the four chief problems that Turkey offers: (a) Constantinople and the Straits, (b) Anatolia and Asia Minor, (c) Armenia, (d) Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia ...	23
30 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 38. Tel.	" 13	Turkey. Ottoman Parliament. Reopened 12th January. Speech from Throne colourless ...	29
31 To Mr. Wardrop Private and Secret. Tel.	" 15	Caucasus. Georgia and Azerbaijan. Refers to No. 25. Warns him that military assistance is most improbable and that we discourage the republics from any aggressive action ...	30
32 Political Resident, Aden No. C. 12.	1919. Dec. 31	Arabia. Situation report. Deals with iman, Idrisi, Aden Protectorate and Mokalla ...	30
33 Political Resident, Aden	1920. Jan. 1	Arabia. Describes fighting at Upper Yafa. Advises that some troops be moved up to Nobat Dakim to counter the Zeidis ...	31



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
34 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck ... No. 45. Tel. Secret	1920. Jan. 17	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Shows reason why he is demanding from Porte removal of Jemal and Jevad Pashas from Ministry of War ...	33
35 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck ... No. 47. Tel. Secret	" 17	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 34. Text of note agreed upon after much reluctance by Italian High Commissioner ...	33
36 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 31. Tel. Private and Secret	" 18	Caucasus. Georgia and Azerbaijan. Both these countries have declared their absolute neutrality in Russian affairs ...	34
37 The Earl of Derby ... No. 68. Tel.	" 20	Caucasus. Three republics. Supreme Council accept in principle despatch to them of munitions and food. Means are now to be discussed ...	34
38 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb ... No. 60. Tel. Secret	" 20	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 35. Note handed to Grand Vizier on 20th January ...	35
39 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb ... No. 61. Tel.	" 20	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Alleged understanding between Porte and Nationalists by which latter will declare their independence and former promise them support if Smyrna is given to Greece ...	35
40 To Mr. Wardrop ... No. 41. Tel.	" 21	Caucasus. Three republics. Informs him of action taken by Supreme Council under No. 37 ...	35
41 Sir. P. Cox ... No. 30. Tel.	" 21	Caucasus. Caspian Sea. Persian Government accept transfer of Denikin's fleet to Enzeli on certain conditions ...	35
42 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb ... No. 64. Tel.	" 21	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 38. The Pashas resigned on 21st January ...	36
43 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 44. Tel. Secret	" 22	Caucasus. Batoum. Considers several matters need searching investigation, e.g., Bolshevik activities, inadequacy of garrison and Turkish intrigues ...	36
44 The Earl of Derby ... No. 105. Tel.	" 26	Caucasus. Armenia. United States concurs in the recognition of the republic. <i>De facto</i> recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan may be viewed with suspicion by Moscow ...	37
45 Note communicated to Foreign Office ...	" 27	Arabia. Imam of Sanaa. Summary of events leading to despatch of mission to him under Colonel Jacob ...	37
46 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck ... No. 74. Tel.	" 25	Turkey. Greek troops. Turkish Government, hearing rumour that Greek troops may be sent to Constantinople to maintain order, declare consequences would be deplorable. Sir J. de Robeck concurs in this view ...	41
47 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb ... No. 17. Conf.	" 4	Turkey. Bolshevism and Pan-Islamism. Encloses memorandum by Commander H. C. Luke, R.N.V.R. The Bolsheviks are converting Moslems to the belief that the British are the enemies of Islam. Commander Luke suggests that His Majesty's Government make a public pro-Islamic pronouncement. Mr. A. Ryan commenting thereon considers our aim in dealing with Pan-Islam should be to divide, to conciliate and to rule ...	41
48 Political Resident, Aden	" 14	Arabia. Situation report. Iman. Aden protectorate ...	41
49 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 45. Tel.	" 22	Caucasus. Armenia. Prime Minister states agreement reached with Georgia and Azerbaijan for collective resistance to Bolsheviks. He begs for settlement of Armenian question ...	47
50 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 52. Tel.	" 28	Caucasus. In Azerbaijan pro-British attitude adopted. He has called on Armenian Premier to withdraw troops from Zangezur, where they have attacked Azerbaijan ...	47
51 The Earl of Derby ... No. 277	Feb. 2	Palestine. Administrative boundary. Refers to No. 11. Discusses the British point of view and agrees that the Supreme Council must decide ...	48

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
52 Mr. Vansittart ... No. 9	1920. Feb. 2	Turkey. Peace terms. Economic clauses. Forwards draft articles by Mr. Fountain and memoranda on our discussions with Allied representatives ...	48
53 Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby ... No. 81	Jan. 25	Arabia. Imam Yahya. Encloses report by the Arab Bureau on the detention by the Imam of Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob's mission at Bajic and the closing stages of the negotiations conducted through Major Meek ...	62
54 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck ... No. 102. Tel.	Feb. 4	Turkey. Nationalist movement. French believe Nationalists are moving troops on Marash ...	68
55 War Office ... Secret	" 5	Turkey. Supreme command. General Milne has been instructed to withdraw his troops from Batoum to replace the French troops removed from his command at Constantinople, and informed that command at Constantinople shall not pass from his hands ...	69
56 Dr. Weizmann ...	" 4	Palestine. Encloses report on (1) Arab position in Palestine, (2) land question, (3) public works, (4) education, (5) possibilities of Palestine, (6) Transjordan, (7) immediate programme ...	69
57 War Office ...	" 6	Turkey. Supreme command. Refers to No. 55. Forwards copy of telegram to General Bridges instructing him to make clear to General Franchet d'Espérey the grave dissatisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the creation by him of an impossible situation ...	79
58 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 64. Tel. Conf.	" 2	Caucasus. Georgia. Transmits message from Government to Georgian delegation. Country is ready to defend its independence. Asks for favourable solution of Batoum question ...	80
59 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 84. Tel.	" 6	Caucasus. Batoum. Evacuation by British would be regarded by Republics as abandoning them to their fate. Requests decision may be revoked pending submission of detailed reasons against it ...	81
60 Acting High Commissioner, Constantinople ... No. 102	Jan. 18	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Considers report of General Staff, A.B.S., issued on 10th January, unduly belittles importance of movement ...	81
61 Rear-Admiral Webb ... No. 89	" 17	Turkey. Jurisdiction. Capitulations. Status of Hellenes. Transmits notes exchanged with the Porte. High Commissioners insist that Capitulations are still in force ...	82
62 Political Resident, Aden	" 28	Arabia. Situation report. Iman and Turkish intrigue Aden protectorate ...	83
63 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck ... No. 107. Tel.	Feb. 6	Turkey. Jurisdiction. Inter-Allied Tribunal and Capitulations. Refers to No. 1. Formation of Inter-Allied Tribunal is being proceeded with. Italian Consular Court has been opened; French soon will be. Requests ruling as to opening of British Court ...	86
64 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck ... No. 118. Tel.	" 10	Turkey. Ottoman Cabinet. Nationalist leaders have complete hold on Government ...	87
65 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck ... No. 119. Tel.	" 10	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Refers to No. 54. Mr. H. Buxton reports Marash still besieged; towns in vicinity endangered; many Americans massacred; two American relief workers murdered. Armenians demand formation of an Armenian militia ...	87
66 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck ... No. 127. Tel.	" 12	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Peace terms. High Commissioners wish to make a tranquillising announcement as to the future of Constantinople and Smyrna ...	88
67 Mr. A. Williams, M.P. ...	" 13	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Refers to No. 65. Marash massacres confirmed. Armenians throw responsibility for massacres on French ...	88



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
68 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 129. Tel.	1920. Feb. 13	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Fear in Konia district. Porte informed in view of its identity with Nationalists it would be held responsible if troubles occur ... ..	89
69 To Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 123. Tel.	" 16	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 66. Announcement that Constantinople will be left to Turkey may be made with the rider that this is conditional on cessation of massacres of Armenians and attacks on Allies ... ..	89
70 Lieut.-Colonel Jacob ...	" 16	Arabia. Forwards report on his mission to the imam and his captivity, showing the situation between the rival Arab leaders. Discusses the action of Major Meek, who was sent to negotiate his release ... ..	90
71 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 148. Tel.	" 19	Turkey. Jurisdiction. Inter-Allied Tribunals. Refers to No. 63. Enquires in whose name judgments should be given ... ..	129
72 To Mr. Wardrop No. 89. Tel. Conf.	" 20	Caucasus. Batoum. Evacuation. Refers to No. 59. No further action will take place pending a decision as to the despatch of a joint Allied force ... ..	130
73 Foreign Office note ...	May 14	Arabia. Imam Yahya. Proposed treaty with. Refers to No. 45. Major Young and Colonel Jacob discuss the form of our future relations with the rulers in Arabia ... ..	130
74 The Earl of Derby No. 200. Tel.	Feb. 21	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Marshal Foch is summoning Allied Military Committee in Paris to enquire into Nationalist activities ... ..	136
75 To Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 149. Tel.	" 21	Turkey. Jurisdiction. Treaty of Peace. Refers to No. 76. Requests criticisms on text of French scheme of judicial reform ... ..	136
76 To Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 150. Tel.	" 21	Turkey. Jurisdiction. Treaty of Peace. Refers to No. 75. Text of French scheme ... ..	137
77 Mr. Wardrop ... No. 28	Jan. 22	Caucasus. Transmits report by Colonel Stokes on Azerbaijan reply to the Bolshevik proposal for an attack on the Volunteer Army ... ..	141
78 Major-General Sir J. Stewart No. 4	Feb. 5	Arabia. Transmits report by Major Meek on his negotiations resulting in the release of Colonel Jacob's mission, and emphasises Major Meek's able conduct in this affair ... ..	143
79 Professor Nallino ...	" 16	Turkey. Meaning of Caliphate. Notes on nature of Caliphate based on historical aspect showing falseness of theoretic premiss as to Caliph ... ..	164
80 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 152. Tel.	" 21	Turkey. Peace terms. Communication as to future of Constantinople has been made to Porte. Reinforcement of army of Black Sea appears desirable ... ..	177
81 Consul-General Wratisslaw No. 18. Tel.	" 21	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Refers to No. 67. Victims in and around Marash, 5,000. Remainder there and those at Aintab doomed ... ..	177
82 To Mr. Wardrop No. 95. Tel.	" 27	Caucasus. Batoum. Refers to No. 72. Supreme Council has decided to maintain an Allied garrison at Batoum ... ..	178
83 Political Resident, Aden ...	" 12	Arabia. Situation report. Imam Idrisi. Aden Protectorate ... ..	178
84 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 176. Tel. Very Secret	" 29	Turkey. Peace terms. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 80. Nationalists grow increasingly defiant. If peace terms are to be very drastic, concerted measures, including occupation of Constantinople, must be taken to forestall serious developments ... ..	182
85 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 184. Tel.	Mar. 2	Turkey. Jurisdiction. Treaty of Peace. Refers to No. 76. Mr. Ryan's opinion on French scheme of judicial reform ... ..	183

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
86 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 184. Tel.	1920. Mar. 2	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Refers to No. 81. Marash victims possibly number 15,000. French have sufficient troops around Adana ... ..	184
87 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 270	Feb. 22	Turkey. Jurisdiction. Capitulations. Refers to No. 61. Opening of French and Italian Consular Courts ... ..	184
88 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 273	" 23	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 80. Grand Vizier informed of deplorable results entailed for Turkey if Nationalists attack Allies or massacre Armenians ... ..	185
89 Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby No. 182. Tel.	" 28	Turkey. Treaty of Peace. Transmits Lord Milner's views as to the Egyptian chapter ... ..	187
90 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 183. Tel.	Mar. 2	Turkey. Peace terms. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 88. Nationalists will oppose drastic peace. Discusses situation and recommends peace terms be made irrespective of Cilician situation, for which Turks and French must share moral responsibility ... ..	188
91 Consul-General Wratisslaw No. 19. Tel.	Feb. 29	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Refers to No. 86. Marash victims estimated at 12,000 in town, exclusive of neighbourhood. Adana in no danger ... ..	188
92 To Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 184. Tel.	Mar. 4	Turkey. Jurisdiction. Capitulations and Inter-Allied Tribunals. Refers to No. 63. Consular Court may be reopened. Inter-Allied Tribunal proposal. No action to be taken unless our Allies approach us ... ..	189
93 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 188. Tel.	" 5	Turkey. Ottoman Cabinet. Refers to No. 64. Reports resignation ... ..	189
94 To Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby No. 196. Tel.	" 6	Turkey. Treaty of Peace. Refers to No. 89. Enquires how to frame clauses relating to Soudan ... ..	189
95 To Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 187. Tel.	" 6	Turkey. Peace terms. Supreme Council contemplate terms involving cession of Thrace and Smyrna to Greece, creation of an independent Armenia with Erzeroum, probable recognition of Kurdistan, international control of Straits and financial control of Turkey. Enquires what measures will be necessary to enforce terms. Military occupation of Constantinople is to proceed forthwith, as also dismissal of Mustapha Kemal ... ..	189
96 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 191. Tel.	" 5	Turkey. Peace terms. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 90. Drastic peace terms are calculated to lead to massacre of Christians, unless Nationalist resistance be forestalled ... ..	190
97 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 192. Tel.	" 5	Turkey. Ottoman Cabinet. Refers to No. 93. Great difficulty in forming new Government owing to impossibility of satisfying both Allies and Nationalists ... ..	191
98 Consul-General Wratisslaw No. 7	Feb. 18	Turkey. Peace terms. Forwards protest of Moslem Syrian Reform Party against ejection of Turkish State, as representing the Caliphate, from Constantinople ... ..	191
99 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 201. Tel.	Mar. 7	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 95. French High Commissioner also deprecates measures proposed by Supreme Council; peace terms as foreshadowed entail necessity for Allies to adopt severe measures at once, including effective occupation of Constantinople, and these measures may carry Allies very far ... ..	192
100 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 204. Tel.	" 8	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 95. Is ready to proceed with occupation whenever so instructed ... ..	193
101 To Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 197. Tel.	" 9	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 95. Enquires what action is being taken ... ..	193



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
102 Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby No. 226. Tel.	1920. Mar. 9	Turkey. Treaty of Peace. Refers to No. 94. Delegate has been sent to Khartoum to prepare concrete proposals. Requests treaty may be framed so as to recognise them if approved ... ..	194
103 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 210. Tel.	" 10	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 100. Method and preparations discussed. General Milne could occupy on 13th March, but French and Italian High Commissioners both await definite instructions before consenting ... ..	194
104 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 211. Tel.	" 10	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 99. Three High Commissioners address identic telegram pointing out that the severe peace terms may entrain (1) refusal to execute treaty, (2) creation of new Government in Asia and massacre of Christians, (3) union of Turks and Bulgarians against Greeks, (4) combined action of Turks, Arabs and Bolsheviks ... ..	194
105 To Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 207. Tel.	" 10	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 103. Occupation is to take place at once, but administration is not to be taken over. Enquires what steps are necessary for the protection of Christians ... ..	195
106 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 189	Feb. 5	Turkey. Ottoman Cabinet. Refers to No. 97. Nationalists are in control ... ..	195
107 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 196	" 5	Turkey. Armenian-Greek relief. Reports on present situation ... ..	196
108 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 203	" 9	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Recent activities in Dardanelles-Gallipoli area, including the theft of Allied munitions at Ak Bashi Lima ... ..	198
109 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 222. Secret	" 11	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Refers to No. 91. Forwards military intelligence report. Turks lay responsibility on Armenians and French owing to their excesses against Moslems. Situation in Syria ... ..	200
110 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 226	" 13	Turkey. Review of recent political events. Fall of Ferid Pasha. Reopening of Parliament; changes within the Cabinet ... ..	202
111 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 228	" 14	Turkey. Pan-Islamic activities. Moslem agent reports Nationalists had so far refused Bolshevik money offer, but were communicating with Moslems in Syria and India (see also No. 28) ... ..	204
112 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 235	" 17	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Informs Grand Vizier of Anglo-French solidarity against Nationalists. Encloses notes exchanged between Porte and French and British High Commissioners dealing with Cilician incidents ... ..	205
113 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 209. Tel.	Mar. 9	Turkey. Ottoman Cabinet. Refers to No. 106. Gives list of new Cabinet under Salih Pasha ... ..	213
114 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 287	Feb. 26	Turkey. Greek troops. Porte calls attention to growing activity of Greek army in Asia Minor, and requests High Commissioner to prevent any offensive move (see No. 46) ... ..	214
115 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 292. Secret	" 26	Turkey. Italian activities. Agent reports Italian High Commissioner received letter of thanks from Sultan and letter from Foreign Minister relative to secret financial help (see also No. 96) ... ..	215
116 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 220. Tel.	Mar. 12	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 103. Preparations complete, but French High Commission has received instructions to defer action. Requests instructions ... ..	215

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
117 To the Earl of Derby ... No. 325. Tel.	1920. Mar. 12	Caucasus. Armenia. Transmits message for president, League of Nations. Supreme Council wishes to place Armenia under the protection of the League, and enquires if the League will accept the obligation ... ..	216
118 To Mr. Lindsay ... No. 269. Tel.	" 12	Turkey. Peace terms. Reports interview with American Ambassador. Lord Curzon explains Cilician events, decision to occupy Constantinople and present situation <i>vis-à-vis</i> Nationalists, and informs him that it was still believed that America would shoulder a share of responsibility in the Near East... ..	217
119 Baron Moncheur ...	" 12	Turkey. Financial Commission. Expresses desire of Belgian Government to be represented thereon ... ..	218
120 To Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 221. Tel.	" 13	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 116. Requests information as to delay, and authorises to act alone if his colleagues have received no instructions ... ..	218
121 To the Earl of Derby ... No. 901	" 13	Syria. Proclamation of Emir Feisal as King by the Damascus Congress. Describes the manner in which the situation was brought about, and states he is sending a telegram to Viscount Allenby to the effect that England and France were united in refusing to recognise the authority of the congress ... ..	218
122 Political Resident, Aden No. 7	Feb. 28	Arabia. Situation report. Position and rule of Imam and Idrisi. Imam's advance in Aden protectorate ... ..	221
123 Baron Moncheur ...	Mar. 15	Turkey. Public Debt Council. Expresses desire of Belgian Government to be represented thereon ... ..	225
124 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 238. Tel.	" 16	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Occupation by Allies took place on 16th March. Ministries of War and Marine occupied. Posts and telegraphs and police placed under control. Several arrests effected. Communiqué issued by High Commissioners explaining they support Sultan's authority, and hold Constantinople as pledge for good behaviour of Nationalists ... ..	226
125 To the Earl of Derby ... No. 955	" 17	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Refers to No. 57. French Ambassador stated French Government must maintain standpoint that French were in command of all Allied forces on the European side of the Straits, while the British were in charge on Asiatic side. Lord Curzon points out that Constantinople had been specially reserved for British command ... ..	226
126 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 303. Secret	" 2	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Encloses report of Lieutenant-Colonel Butler. French position in Syria under General Gouraud. The Marash massacres. He estimates 100,000 men as the minimum French forces required for the pacification of Northern Syria and Cilicia ... ..	227
127 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 306	" 2	Turkey. Kurdistan. Transmits memorandum by Mr. Ryan on its future, and discusses view of Seid Abdul Kadir, who urges the advisability of a British protectorate ... ..	237
128 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 307. Secret	" 1	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Secret information shows that Turkish War Office instructed Ottoman commanders in provinces to render assistance to Nationalists ... ..	239
129 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 316	" 4	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Refers to No. 126. Transmits reports of Dr. Chambers on the Marash massacres, and also the diary of Dr. Crathern ... ..	239
130 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 245. Tel.	" 17	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Thrace. Colonel Jaffar Tayar heads movement in Thrace to resist peace terms ... ..	249
131 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 247. Tel.	" 18	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 124. Grand Vizier protests against it. He disclaims responsibility of Sultan's Government for any excesses committed by Nationalists ... ..	249



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
132 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 249. Tel.	1920. Mar. 19	Turkey. Jurisdiction in Turkey. Treaty of Peace. Refers to No. 76. Criticises French scheme drafted in Paris, and recommends an Anglo-French scheme drafted in Constantinople forwarded in despatch No. 1990 of 12th June, 1919 ... ..	250
133 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 258. Tel.	" 20	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 124. Names of eleven Nationalist leaders arrested in Constantinople...	250
134 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 262. Tel.	" 21	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 124. Text of Allied communiqué ... ..	251
135 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 263. Tel.	" 21	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 134. Explains why High Commissioners considered issue of communiqué to be imperative ... ..	252
136 M. Paravicini ... ..	" 23	Turkey. Public Debt Council. Requests that Swiss Government may be represented thereon (see also No. 123)	252
137 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 276. Tel. Secret	" 24	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Question of control in Turkish War, Marine and Postal Ministries causes dissension among Allies ...	253
138 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 277. Tel.	" 24	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 132. High Commissioners all agree controls should be Inter-Allied, but British General Officer Commanding-in-chief insists that each president shall be British. This situation is recognised provisionally, but under protest by French and Italian High Commissioners ... ..	253
139 Sir G. Grahame No. 367. Tel.	" 25	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. French are making enquiries as to Armenians besieged at Hadjin ... ..	254
140 Mr. Lindsay ... .. No. 231. Tel. Conf.	" 25	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 141. United States views on treaty ... ..	254
141 Mr. Lindsay ... .. No. 232. Tel.	" 25	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 140. United States consider Bulgaria should receive Adrianople, Greece the rest of Thrace, and Armenia generous boundaries, including Trebizond. Turkey should be deprived of Constantinople ... ..	254
142 To Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 254. Tel.	" 26	Turkey. Kurdistan. Refers to No. 127. Policy of His Majesty's Government is formation of an autonomous State severed from Turkey. Asks for advice as to how to approach leaders ... ..	256
143 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 372	" 17	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Thrace. Refers to No. 130. Memorandum from Muslem Thracian deputies points out that population is by a large majority Moslem. The High Commissioner states that if Greek troops take over Thrace at once a massacre will ensue ... ..	256
144 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 285. Tel.	" 25	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 141. Considers delay in announcing terms will be most unfortunate. Smyrna and Adrianople alone are the stumbling-blocks ... ..	258
145 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 290. Tel.	" 26	Turkey. Jurisdiction in Turkey. Treaty of Peace. Refers to No. 132. Turkish judges in proposed Mixed Courts ...	259
146 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 295. Tel.	" 27	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 133. Names of four undesirables arrested ... ..	259
147 Political Resident, Aden	" 10	Arabia. Situation report. Imam, Idrisi, Aden protectorate. Idrisi's statement of policy in Tihama. Conversation with Lieutenant-Colonel Saleh Bey, the Turk ... ..	259

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
148 The Earl of Derby ... No. 377. Tel.	1920. Mar. 29	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Hadjin situation disquieting. French inform Sublime Porte it will be held responsible if untoward events occur (see No. 139) ... ..	264
149 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 299. Tel.	" 29	Turkey. Nationalist movement. National Council to meet at Angora ... ..	264
150 To Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 260. Tel.	" 30	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 144. Conference is hastening completion of treaty. Final terms will depend on power of Allies to enforce them. It is not possible to act on suggestion in Sir J. de Robeck's telegram No. 285 ... ..	264
151 Political Resident, Aden	" 18	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 147. Discusses imam's Tihama policy and his oppressive rule in Yemen. Imamic forces at Taiz ... ..	265
152 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 309. Tel.	" 30	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Allied High Commissioners press Porte to disavow Nationalist leaders. Porte's intended announcements are unacceptable... ..	269
153 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 310. Tel.	" 30	Turkey. Ottoman Cabinet. Discusses alternative Cabinets in connection with the policy of disavowal of the Nationalists ... ..	270
154 To War Office ... ..	Apr. 1	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 138. Forwards for concurrence telegram to Sir J. de Robeck, proposing each commission should be Inter-Allied ... ..	270
155 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 317. Tel.	" 1	Turkey. Safety of Christians. If Thrace or Smyrna be assigned to Greeks, massacres will follow. If Greeks advance, danger for Christians will increase. To avert this, Allies should take military measures or, at least, station men-of-war in sea-coast towns ... ..	271
156 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 327. Tel.	" 3	Turkey. Ottoman Cabinet. Refers to No. 153. Cabinet resigned ... ..	271
157 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 328. Tel.	" 3	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 152. Cabinet, unable to draft a disavowal acceptable to the High Commissioners, resigned. Ferid Pasha may be next Grand Vizier ... ..	271
158 To War Office ... ..	" 3	Turkey. Occupation of Thrace. Refers to No. 155. Asks what number of troops would be necessary to effect this, and what are available locally ... ..	272
159 To M. Cambon ... ..	" 4	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Refers to No. 125. Asks what proposals the French Government have to make, and repeats that the true solution would be to confine General Franchet's authority to Thrace ... ..	272
160 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 340. Tel.	" 5	Turkey. Ottoman Cabinet. Refers to No. 157. Ferid Pasha has taken office as Grand Vizier. Cabinet is on non-party lines and has issued outspoken disavowal of Nationalists ... ..	272
161 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 373	Mar. 18	Turkey. Occupation of Constantinople. Refers to No. 120. Forwards texts of High Commissioners' decisions, note and communiqué with General Wilson's proclamation ...	273
162 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 395	" 22	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Refers to No. 148. Transmits documents from Dr. W. A. Kennedy of Lord Mayor's committee at Adana regarding gravity of situation at Hadjin and massacres in neighbourhood ... ..	276
163 Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 341. Tel.	Apr. 5	Turkey. Ottoman Cabinet. Refers to No. 160. Names of members of new Cabinet ... ..	282



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
164 War Office ...	1920. Apr. 7	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Refers to No. 159. Forwards telegram from General Milne, who presses for an early decision ...	282
165 Political Resident, Aden	Mar. 25	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 151. Political officer, Hodeida, states population are contented under British rule, but desire return of Turks. Hodeida imports and exports. Movement against Imam in Yemen ...	283
166 M. Cambon ...	Apr. 5	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Will inform Lord Curzon of French proposals later ...	285
167 To Baron Moncheur ...	" 8	Turkey. Financial and Public Debt Commissions. Refers to No. 123. On the former commission only the representatives of the three Great Powers will sit, while the latter commission is shortly to disappear ...	285
Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force No. 38	Mar. 27	Palestine. Transmits protest of the General Palestine Congress. It declares determination of the Syrian nation to secure the unity of Syria and Palestine and prevent Zionist immigration ...	285
169 Prince Sapieha ...	Apr. 7	Turkey. Capitulatory rights of new States. Urges recognition of juridical situation of Polish subjects in Turkey, and encloses memorandum as to historical aspect of question ...	286
170 War Office ...	" 9	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 166. Encloses telegram from General Milne which appears to show that a <i>modus vivendi</i> has been established ...	288
171 To Mr. Wardrop No. 156. Tel.	" 11	Caucasus. Armenia. Relates Lord Curzon's protest to the Armenian deputation against outrages by Armenians in Azerbaijan. Proposal to delimit boundaries with Georgia and Azerbaijan after signature of the Turkish treaty ...	288
172 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 372. Tel.	" 11	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 157. Grand Vizier proposes repressive measures against Nationalists. High Commissioner proposes help should be limited to furnishing military equipment ...	289
173 Sir H. Samuel ...	" 2	Palestine. Reports on situation, especially the movement for union of Syria and Palestine under Emir Feisal. On anti-Zionist movement. On proposal to establish a confederation of Arab-speaking States. Encloses his communication to the press on economic, financial and political situation ...	289
174 To War Office ...	" 13	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 170. <i>Modus vivendi</i> does not appear established. Concessions should be made to the French. Requests views at an early date... ..	295
175 " " ...	" 13	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 172. Forwards Sir J. de Robeck's telegram No. 372, and proposes to approve it subject to the observations of the Army Council ...	295
176 To M. Cambon ... To Signor Preziosi	" 14	Turkey. Public Debt Commission. Refers to No. 167. Swiss seek representation on this. Requests views of the French and Italian Governments ...	295
177 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 416	Mar. 28	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Transmits High Commissioner's note in which Porte is called upon to make a public disavowal of the Nationalist leaders ...	296
178 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 390. Tel.	Apr. 15	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Porte has issued strong proclamation condemning movement. Parliament dissolved on 12th April... ..	297
179 M. Gavrilovitch ...	" 15	Turkey. Capitulatory rights of new States. Refers to No. 169. Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister requests assistance in securing Turkey's recognition of the capitulatory rights of his ex-enemy fellow-countrymen... ..	297

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
180 War Office ...	1920. Apr. 17	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 175. Army Council concur in distribution of military material to anti-Nationalist forces, provided it be to Turkish regular troops ...	298
181 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 413. Tel.	" 18	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Refers to No. 162. Dr. Kennedy describes Cilician situation as desperate. French troops are black and of poor quality. Turks deride them and Armenians have no confidence in them. French wish to evacuate Armenians. Hadjin, Sis, Bozanti, Marash and Aintab all invested ...	298
182 War Office ...	" 19	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 174. Transmits telegram sent to General Milne enjoining him to share presidencies of Ministries with French and Italians, provided High Commissioner agrees. War Office, however, must have British president ...	299
183 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 355. Tel.	" 20	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 172. Approves of proposal to support present Government subject to (a) Use of regulars, and (b) Clear explanation to Grand Vizier that treaty will not be lenient ...	300
184 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 420. Tel.	" 20	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Anti-Nationalist movement in Panderma has collapsed ...	300
185 Lord Hardinge... No. 26. Tel.	" 21	Caucasus. Batoum. Bolsheviks have attacked Cossacks. Suggests His Majesty's Government should inform Soviet Government that they will protect White Russian elements in Caucasus. Defence of Batoum. Discusses despatch of arms to Caucasian republics ...	300
186 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 362. Tel.	" 21	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Concurs in commissions being Inter-Allied, provided president at War Office is British. See No. 182 ...	301
187 Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby No. 360	" 9	Palestine. Transmits report of Mr. Samuel on Palestine and on policy His Majesty's Government should adopt if mandatory. Refers to No. 173 ...	301
188 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 421. Tel.	" 20	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Armenian massacres. Refers to No. 181. Armenian Protestant community leader stated situation in Cilicia most grave. He suggested evacuation of Christians, but Sir R. Webb deprecated this ...	306
189 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 463	" 3	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 178. Transmits correspondence in connection with Porte's disavowal ...	306
190 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 482	" 7	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 150. Transmits memorandum by Commander H. C. Luke, in which latter urges that proposed peace terms will be unacceptable to all Turks and will be incapable of application throughout the areas to which they refer unless force be used; that the hostility of the Turks may produce an alliance with the Bolsheviks against us, and that this is too big a price to pay for Greek friendship. He suggests terms for placating the Turkish Nationalists mainly at the expense of Greece, which, during the war, was equally divided into pro- and anti-Entente factions. Admiral de Robeck states his agreement with most of the arguments advanced ...	311
191 Political Resident, Aden	" 7	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 165. Activities of Idrisi and imam in Tihamah and around Hodeida. Aden-Imam forces likely to withdraw ...	315
192 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 496	" 8	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 175. Grand Vizier proposes repressive measure and emphasises his desire to work on lines approved by the British ...	316
193 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 494	" 9	Turkey. Ottoman Cabinet. Refers to No. 163. Comments on members of the new Cabinet ...	318



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
194 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 429. Tel.	1920. Apr. 23	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Anti-Nationalist movement of Azavour Pasha has suffered a reverse. Nationalist Jaffar Tayar in Thrace now appears submissive ...	320
195 To Lord Hardinge ... (San Remo) No. 23. Tel.	" 23	Caucasus. Batoum. Refers to No. 185. Repeats telegram to Sir J. de Robeck asking his views on holding Batoum; informing him French and Italian battalions are ready for despatch, but authorising withdrawal of British troops if in danger ...	321
196 Memorandum of Agreement between M. Berthelot and Sir John Cadman	" 24	Turkey. Anglo-French Oil Agreement of San Remo. Memorandum signed by M. Berthelot and Sir J. Cadman setting forth an Anglo-French agreement as to oil based on co-operation and reciprocity, relating to Roumania, Mesopotamia, territories of the old Russian Empire, Galicia, French colonies, and British Crown colonies. Its scope by consent may be extended to other countries ...	321
197 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 439. Tel.	" 26	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 186. Considers that his position as senior naval officer will be impossible if commission at Ministry of Marine be presided over by a French or Italian officer ...	323
198 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 447. Tel.	" 27	Caucasus. Batoum. Refers to No. 195. Defence of Caucasus against Bolsheviks. Large reinforcements would be necessary. General Milne advises holding Batoum town only. States number of forces necessary. No immediate danger ...	323
199 To Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 383. Tel.	" 27	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 197. Emphasises view that scheme as outlined should not place Admiral de Robeck in a false position, and urges necessity of making some concession to French ...	324
200 War Office ...	" 27	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Refers to No. 166. Forwards report dated 25th March of British officer on Military Mission to General Franchet d'Esperey. Report describes in detail the misunderstandings with General Franchet ...	324
201 To Mr. Wardrop No. 185. Tel.	" 28	Caucasus. Batoum. Efforts made at San Remo to secure agreement between three Caucasian States re future of Batoum failed through Georgia's unconciliatory attitude...	331
202 Political Resident, Aden	" 15	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 191. Activities of Idrisi and Imam in Tihama district. Imam's intrigues in Aden protectorate...	332
203 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 513. Tel.	" 29	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 194. Anti-Nationalist movement gaining ground around Ismid. Porte's control of Thrace in process of re-establishment...	333
204 Commander H. Luke ... No. 223. Tel.	" 29	Caucasus. Azerbaijan, Georgia. Resignation of Azerbaijan Government on 27th April and formation of Soviet administration. Bolshevik proposals to Georgia. Feared Turco-Bolshevik attack on Armenia ...	334
205 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 315	" 30	Turkey. Capitulatory rights of new States. Refers to No. 179. Transmits copy of note received from Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister, and asks what the position of those nationals is in practice ...	334
206 To M. Gavrilovitch ...	" 30	Turkey. Capitulatory rights of new States. Refers to No. 179. Informs him that the view of His Majesty's Government is that subjects of States which were Allied belligerents should not be amenable to Turkish jurisdiction during armistice, and that High Commissioner has been so instructed ...	334
207 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 519. Tel.	" 30	Turkey. Peace terms. Grand Vizier urges gravity of domestic situation should terms be drastic and Greeks invade Thrace. In latter case even women and children would be armed to resist ...	335

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
208 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 523. Tel.	1920. May 1	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 146. Names of two undesirables arrested ...	335
209 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 530. Tel.	" 1	Caucasus. Azerbaijan and Georgia. Refers to No. 204. Tiflis message states Bolsheviks occupied Baku on 28th April. Georgia preparing for defence. Urges necessity of Allied aid. Georgia advised to co-operate with Armenia ...	335
210 Signor Preziosi No. 889	Apr. 19	Turkey. Public Debt Commission. Refers to No. 176. Senator Scialoja requests question of Swiss participation may be discussed at the San Remo Conference ...	336
211 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 409. Tel.	May 6	Caucasus. Batoum. Refers to No. 198. Cabinet consider Batoum should be held, and have asked French and Italian Governments to despatch promised battalions ...	336
212 To Sir G. Buchanan ... No. 184. Tel.	" 6	Caucasus. Batoum. Repeats substance of No. 211. Requests despatch of Italian battalion ...	336
213 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 575	Apr. 22	Turkey. Review of recent political events. Describes events since 13th February. Ali Riza Pasha resigns, to be succeeded by the colourless Salih Pasha, and he in turn by Ferid Pasha, who assumed office on 5th April and introduced violent measures against the Nationalists, but his chances of ultimate success appear doubtful (see No. 110) ...	337
214 Political Resident, Aden No. 13	" 21	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 202. Aden protectorate. Postponement of imamic advance. Taxation imposed by imam's agents ...	340
215 M. Cambon ...	May 8	Turkey. Public Debt Commission. Refers to No. 176. French Government concur that Swiss should not participate ...	341
216 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 565. Tel.	" 11	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 207. Sublime Porte could not cede Smyrna and Thrace to Greece without summoning Parliament. Nationalists would probably proclaim independence. Grand Vizier stated French and Italians both favour revision of the Treaty to Turkey's advantage. Sir R. Webb requests further guidance as to attitude of His Majesty's Government ...	341
217 M. Cambon ...	" 11	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Considers that His Majesty's Government have not carried out the assurances given. M. Millerand insists on their fulfilment (see No. 199) ...	342
218 Sir A. Geddes ... No. 336. Tel. V. Conf.	" 11	Turkey. United States mandate. Reports rumoured intention of President and M. Colby to undertake mandate for Turkey and possibly to participate in control of Dardanelles and Bosphorus. He considers movement will fail, and may be only for internal political effect ...	343
219 M. Cambon ...	" 12	Syria. Palestine. Transmits protest of Hedjaz against mandates for Syria. Palestine and Mesopotamia, and French draft reply in justification and in protest against disorder in Syria. Reply threatens occupation of Homs-Aleppo Railway. Note urges Franco-British action in respect of Emir Feisal ...	343
220 Mr. Davis No. 317	" 12	Turkey. Mandates. United States propose agreement re economic resources of mandated regions providing for equal treatment of all nations. Proposal is due to rumours of monopolistic oil aims of Great Britain ...	346
221 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 581. Tel.	" 13	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 203. Situation practically unchanged, but Nationalists have occupied some towns on Guemlek Peninsula ...	348



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
222 His Majesty's representatives at— Paris No. 609. Tel. Rome No. 254. Tel.	1920. May 13	Caucasus. Batoum. Colonel Stokes is being sent to Batoum to conclude an agreement with Georgia for its transference. Troops will be withdrawn. In the meantime arms are to be sent to Georgia and Armenia ... ..	348
223 Political Resident, Aden	Apr. 29	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 214. Idrisi has success in Tihamah, but is in financial difficulties. Hodeida March trade figures. Aden protectorate. Resident's refusal to receive Zeidi's mission ... ..	349
224 Sir A. Geddes ... No. 364. Tel. Secret	May 16	Turkey. United States mandate in Turkey. Refers to No. 218. Proposal to be discussed is possibility of devising a method of Governmental aid to Armenian people, without incurring Congressional opposition ... ..	350
225 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 596. Tel.	" 17	Turkey. Peace terms. Nationalist movement. Reception of Allied peace terms in Constantinople has been calm. At Angora Nationalist Government has been set up under Mustafa Kemal. Central Government has no power over Nationalists, but drastic nature of peace terms may throw Porte into the arms of Nationalists (see No. 216)... ..	351
226 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 446. Tel.	" 17	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 217. French Ambassador complains that War and Post Commissions are under British presidents, while Marine has no president, despite assurances of His Majesty's Government. An urgent report is requested ... ..	352
227 To Sir G. Buchanan ... No. 465	" 17	Turkey. Tripartite agreement. Italian Chargé d'Affaires pleaded on behalf of Signor Nitti that His Majesty's Government should at once sign this agreement concerning the zones of economic preference in Asia Minor. I pointed out that premature signature would lead to forced publication. It would be well to await the signature of the treaty in case any modifications in the agreement had to be conceded. The Italian Chargé d'Affaires then asked for assistance in opening operations at the Heraclea coalfields. I replied we could do nothing prior to the signature of the agreement ... ..	352
228 Memorandum by Major H. W. Young	" 17	Turkey. Future control of the Middle East. This note studies the whole problem of our relations with Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia with its many independent rulers, and the protectorate of Aden, Persia, Syria and the Hedjaz. It sets forth the multiplicity of authorities now dealing with these countries, and concludes by maintaining that our best interests will be served if they are all controlled through a Middle East Department under the Foreign Office, staffed partly by officials with local administrative experience of the countries in question. It emphasises the necessity of preserving in most cases foreign relations with these countries and reducing our rôle of administrators to a strict minimum, especially in view of the awakening Nationalistic sentiment in the East ... ..	354
229 To M. Cambon...	" 18	Syria. Palestine. Refers to No. 219. Advises joint communication to Emir Feisal summoning him to attend the June Peace Conference, but postponement of occupation of Homs-Aleppo Railway. Approves draft reply to Hedjaz. Transmits Emir Feisal's telegrams with Viscount Allenby as to union of Syria and Palestine ... ..	361
230 To War Office ..	" 18	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 226. Transmits copy of telegram No. 446 addressed to High Commissioner and requests War Office to issue similar instructions to General Milne ... ..	365
231 Sir A. Geddes ... No. 373. Tel.	" 18	Turkey. United States mandate in Turkey. Refers to No. 224. Secretary of State asked if Supreme Council would reopen Turkish question if America assumed responsibility for Constantinople. Government is doubtful how far it can act without the consent of Congress ... ..	365

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
232 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 608	1920. Apr. 27	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 230. Explains divergence of views between Allies and General Milne as to functions and powers of controls. French High Commissioner in a memorandum maintains that as controllers the Inter-Allied officers must have all questions submitted to them before execution ... ..	366
233 To Sir A. Geddes ... No. 465. Tel.	May 21	Turkey. United States mandate in Turkey. Refers to No. 231. His Majesty's Government would warmly appreciate American co-operation in support of the Armenian republic ... ..	368
234 Political Resident, Aden	" 6	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 223. Aden protectorate. Imam's actions. Zeidis' mission ... ..	369
235 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 621. Tel.	" 24	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Control of Ministries. Neither Admiral de Robeck nor General Milne can admit that junior Allied officers on Commission of Control should be independent of authority of supreme Allied commander. Suggests continuation of present situation (see No. 232) ... ..	370
236 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 624. Tel.	" 25	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 221. Nationalist forces have taken Adabazar, and anti-Nationalists are dispersing. Former now contemplate advance on Haidar Pasha and Bosphorus. There is much anti-British propaganda among Nationalists, and it is bearing fruit. A decision is requested as to our attitude if Nationalists attack. Should Greek troops be used, although their employment may lead to massacres in the interior? ... ..	370
237 Sir G. Buchanan ... No. 371	" 18	Turkey. Italian forces in Turkey. Major-General Duncan's report is transmitted. It states Italian Government intend to despatch an infantry division to Constantinople. The Italian command will be politically under the Italian Government. The Batoum battalion will not be despatched as intended ... ..	371
238 M. de Fleuriau...	" 22	Syria. Feisal. French will cease all further payments to Feisal until an agreement with British Government is reached ... ..	372
239 War Office	" 25	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 235. Asks for exact terms of French complaint. Suggests Admiralty concurrence regarding presidency of Naval Commission should be obtained ... ..	372
240 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 651	" 9	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Thrace. Muhieddin Bey, selected by Central Government to replace Jaffar Tayar Bey, has telegraphed declaring allegiance to the Sultan and determination to oppose Greek occupation by armed force. Under pressure of peace terms Thrace may declare itself independent (see No. 207) ... ..	373
241 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 662	" 12	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Transmits letter from General Milne. See also No. 239 ... ..	374
242 Political Resident, Aden No. 16	" 13	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 234. Idrisi occupied Jebel Bura. Major Gordon considers him incapable to hold extended territory without British subsidies. Aden protectorate. Refusal to receive Zeidis' mission is approved by the population ... ..	375
243 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 627. Tel.	" 27	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 236. Grand Vizier requests permission of Supreme Council to equip and use a force not exceeding 10,000 men, who would suppress the rebel movement, and asks High Commissioner to transmit a telegram from the Sultan to the King entreating him to mitigate the treaty ... ..	377



No. and Name.	Date	SUBJECT.	Page.
244 To Signor Preziosi ...	1920. May 27	Turkey. Public Debt Commission. Refers to No. 215. Requests reply of Italian Government as to Swiss participation ...	377
245 Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb No. 680	" 14	Turkey. Indian Moslems and Turkey. Transmits telegram of Indian Khalifate Delegation to Sultan expressing inflexible loyalty to the Khalifate and the cause of Islam (see also No. 111) ...	378
246 Consul Morgan... No. 3. Tel.	" 26	Turkey. Capitulations in Smyrna zone. Are they abolished under the provisions of the treaty? ...	379
247 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 628. Tel.	" 27	Turkey. Peace terms. Sultan addresses a telegram to His Majesty the King entreating him to intervene to alleviate severity of treaty (see No. 243) ...	379
248 To War Office ...	" 28	Turkey. Italian forces in Turkey. Refers to No. 237. Transmits General Duncan's report and asks for observations ...	380
248* The Earl of Derby No. 1603	" 25	Caucasus. Armenian frontiers. Transmits copy of letter from United States Ambassador announcing acceptance by President Wilson of rôle of arbitrator in the question of Armenian frontiers ...	380*
249 Director Military Intelligence	" 28	Turkey. Italian forces in Turkey. Military attaché, Rome, is being asked to give the probable date of departure of the Italian troops for Constantinople ...	380
250 War Office Secret	" 28	Turkey. Post-war international forces in demilitarised zone. Considers organisation might now be taken in hand, and discusses aspects of the question ...	380
251 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 631. Tel.	" 28	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 243. Allied High Commissioners support Ottoman Government's request for one month's extension of time limit ...	381
252 Consul Morgan... No. 5. Tel.	" 29	Turkey. Capitulations in Smyrna zone. Forwards collective note requesting that Capitulations be not suppressed at least during transitional period of five years provided for in treaty (see No. 246) ...	382
253 War Office ...	" 29	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 241. Transmits correspondence with General Milne, and emphasises necessity of War Office president being British ...	382
254 M. Cambon ...	" 31	Syria. Refers to No. 229. Transmits M. Millerand's reply pointing out danger of Feisal's intrigues and necessity for a firm policy. Encloses draft joint declaration to Feisal threatening him with non-recognition as Hedjaz delegate ...	383
255 Political Resident, Aden No. 17	" 20	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 242. Considerable hostilities between Idrisi and Imam probable. Aboos ask our help against Imam. Doubtful report as to support of people of Sakaa for Idrisi ...	386
256 Sir A. Geddes ... No. 687	" 21	Turkey. Mandates. Refers to No. 220. Oil resources. Advises reply be made in Parliament to message to Senate of United States President on 17th May as to British restrictions on development of oilfields by Americans. Discusses connection between Administration and oil interests in United States of America ...	387
257 War Office Secret	June 1	Caucasus. Batoum. Refers to No. 211. Transmits telegram from General Milne which declares Georgia and Armenia unable to resist Bolshevik advance. Batoum situation serious. Fourteen days' warning is necessary for evacuation, which War Office propose to order ...	388
258 To Sir G. Buchanan No. 235.	" 2	Turkey. Peace terms. Suggests concurrence ...	389
259 To War Office ...	" 2	Caucasus. Batoum. Refers to No. 257. Considers likelihood of military disaster not imminent, and withdrawal of	

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
	1920.	Allied garrison impossible without French consent. Issue of evacuation warning would anticipate a decision not yet taken by His Majesty's Government ...	389
260 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 649. Tel.	June 2	Turkey. Capitulations in Smyrna zone. Will Capitulations be abolished when Greece takes over Smyrna? (See No. 252) ...	390
261 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 733. Secret	May 22	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Transmits reports on Angora. The idea of setting up a deputy Sultan was mooted but abandoned. The Nationalists invest their proceedings with a cloak of legality. The Grand Vizier's position becomes increasingly difficult; in effect his policy and that of the Nationalists are identical (see No. 243) ...	390
262 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 651. Tel.	June 3	Turkey. Italian forces in Turkey. Refers to No. 249. Points out political difficulties that would result from advent of Italian troops in Constantinople area ...	397
263 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 654. Tel.	" 4	Turkey. Nationalist movement. French armistice. General Gouraud has arranged an armistice with Mustafa Kemal lasting twenty days as from the 1st June. He is also reported to have sent an envoy who stated that French intend to abandon Cilicia ...	397
264 Sir G. Grahame No. 663. Tel. Very Secret	" 4	Turkey. Nationalist movement. French armistice. President of Council states French troops being surrounded, and Feisal having refused railway facilities, M. de Caix agreed at Angora to a twenty days' armistice, as it was feared French troops might be massacred unless safely withdrawn (see No. 263) ...	397
265 War Office ...	" 4	Turkey. Italian forces in Turkey. Refers to No. 249. Transmits correspondence from military attaché, Rome, from which it appears that Italians will only recognise British commander-in-chief until peace is signed. War Office approves, provided that General Milne's freedom to dispose of them shall be complete. Requests Foreign Office to ascertain the expected date of their arrival in Turkey ...	397
266 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 506. Tel.	" 5	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 247. His Majesty the King replies to the Sultan that the future of Turkey is in the hands of the Allied Governments, who may be trusted to act with justice ...	400
267 To the Earl of Derby No. 632. Tel.	" 5	Turkey. Peace terms. Refers to No. 251. Requests him to suggest concurrence to French Government ...	400
268 The Earl of Derby No. 676. Tel.	" 7	Turkey. Nationalist movement. French armistice. Refers to No. 263. French troops in Marash and outlying posts are being concentrated into Cilicia. Negotiations proceeding are expected to ensure safety of Armenians ...	400
268* War Office ...	" 7	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 243. Army Council consider it undesirable to accede to Grand Vizier's request ...	401
269 To War Office ...	" 8	Turkey. Italian forces in Turkey. Refers to No. 265. Agrees with the High Commissioner as to the undesirability of the Italians occupying an Asiatic sector on the Bosphorus and requests observations ...	401
270 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 672. Tel.	" 8	Turkey. Peace terms. Tewfik Pasha, now in Paris, is reported to have informed Grand Vizier that French and Italians regard terms as unacceptable and requiring modification, and consider maintenance of a strong Turkey a necessity for themselves ...	401
271 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 755	" 25	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Transmits note from Turkish Nationalist Congress to French foreign Minister. It stigmatises occupation of Constantinople as unjustifiable, and states that Ottoman nation, considering the Khalif and his Government are prisoners, has elected a Supreme National Assembly who will watch over the destinies of Turkey ...	402



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
272 Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby No. 559	1920. May 28	Arabia. Subsidies to rulers. Points out advantages to Great Britain in present critical Middle East situation of a friendly Arabia, but our predominance cannot be secured without financial aid. Advises, in return for concessions, stipends and loans to individual rulers rather than subsidies ... ..	403
273 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 677. Tel.	June 9	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. French and Italian High Commissioners consider War Office Commission is not under General Milne. Admiral de Robeck informed them question must be referred for solution to the respective Governments (see No. 253) ... ..	405
274 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 679. Tel.	" 10	Turkey. Capitulations in Smyrna zone. Refers to No. 252. Warmly supports Allied delegates' appeal ... ..	406
275 To Admiralty ... ..	" 10	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Only question remaining is that of Marine Commission. Lord Curzon trusts Admiralty will instruct Admiral de Robeck to conform to the instructions sent him by the Foreign Office in telegram No. 362 of the 21st April (see No. 186) ... ..	406
276 To War Office ... ..	" 10	Turkey. Supreme command at Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 275. Lord Curzon considers question can only now be settled by first arriving at a decision regarding the Marine president, and transmits a copy of his letter to the Admiralty setting forth his views ... ..	407
277 Political Resident, Aden	May 27	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 255. Kaid Saleh, owing to Imam's demand for surrender of his son, has fled to country of Haushabi, whose Sultan considers this a Zaidi ruse to enable them to invade his territory. Sultan advised not to harbour refugees ... ..	408
278 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 681. Tel.	June 10	Turkey. Peace terms. Grand Vizier again made urgent appeal for modification of terms and laid stress on her need of a strong supporting hand. Would England hold that out to her? Peace now contemplated could bring no stable equilibrium (see No. 270) ... ..	409
279 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 682. Tel.	" 10	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 243. Loyal Turkish troops in Ismid area intend to withdraw. British will now be face to face with Nationalists. One division is necessary to defend Ismid quadrilateral and Bosphorus, and French co-operation is essential, while Italians should take over Asiatic Dardanelles. Matter is urgent, and definite orders must be given if we are to remain in occupation of Constantinople ... ..	410
280 To Signor Preziosi ... ..	" 11	Turkey. Italian forces in Turkey. States that His Majesty's Government agrees with proposals of Italian Government, provided that (1) until peace General Milne remains in supreme command; (2) the Italian Government's orders to the Italian commander shall not interfere with General Milne's freedom to dispose of Italian troops in his capacity of Inter-Allied commander-in-chief. Asks whether Italian Government will not reconsider their decision not to send a battalion to Batoum (see No. 269) ... ..	411
281 To War Office ... ..	" 11	Turkey. Italian forces in Turkey. Post-war international forces in demilitarised zone. Transmits copy of No. 280. Refers to No. 250. Considers question should be postponed ... ..	411
282 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 690. Tel.	" 11	Turkey. Consular jurisdiction. Smyrna representative asks for general authority to deal with probate cases ... ..	412
283 To Mr. Vansittart No. 20. Tel.	" 12	Caucasus. Batoum. Refers to No. 222. Colonel Stokes is proceeding to Batoum to hand over town to Georgia ... ..	412

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
284 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 788	1920. June 4	Turkey. Capitulatory rights of new States. Refers to No. 205. Serbs actually enjoy same privileges as the Allies. The capitulatory régime has not been reintroduced since the armistice ... ..	412
285 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 701. Tel.	" 13	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 243. Grand Vizier has proposed forces of from 7,000 to 50,000 to suppress Nationalists. General Milne considers treaty should be signed before a force is authorised ... ..	412
286 Memorandum by Mr. Max Muller Confidential.	" 14	Turkey. (1) Position of General Officer Commanding-in-chief vis-à-vis Allied High Commissioner. (2) Supreme command. Control of Ministries. (1) Recapitulates correspondence and points out that there has never been laid down any clear line of demarcation between their respective authorities. Suggests War Office memorandum setting forth their respective spheres should be communicated to Constantinople. (2) Relates the history of the controls, and concludes that, as the overriding authority of General Milne has been admitted, the three presidencies should at once be divided among the three Allies (see No. 275) ... ..	413
287 To Sir G. Grahame No. 710. Tel.	" 15	Turkey. Nationalist movement. French armistice. Refers to No. 268. Describes conditions by which French are allowed to withdraw to Tarsus and Aleppo and remain outside Aintab, guarantees being given for safety of Armenians there. French soldiers recently captured to be released ... ..	417
288 To War Office ... ..	" 15	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Commissions of control. Transmits telegram in No. 273 ... ..	417
289 Political Resident, Aden	" 2	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 277. Fighting between Idrisi and Imam in Tihama district is slight. Aden protectorate. Imam has ordered withdrawal of his forces ... ..	417
290 Signor Preziosi ... ..	" 12	Turkey. Public Debt Commission. Refers to No. 244. Concurs in undesirability of admittance of a Swiss representative ... ..	418
291 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 706. Tel.	" 15	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 279. British forces are now engaged in hostilities with Nationalists near Ismid. Retirement towards the Bosphorus would create an impossible position, and to carry out Peace Treaty immediate and strong reinforcements are necessary ... ..	418
292 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 708. Tel.	" 16	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 291. In view of present hostilities certain decisions seem necessary. To wage a new war reinforcements are necessary, and possibly Greek army at Smyrna should advance ... ..	419
293 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 553. Tel.	" 16	Turkey. Capitulations in Smyrna zone. Refers to No. 274. They will lapse on coming into force of Treaty. A special régime during transitional period is unnecessary ... ..	419
294 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 555. Tel.	" 16	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 285. Concurs in General Milne's view ... ..	419
295 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 765	May 27	Turkey. Peace terms. Forwards resolution of <i>Entente libérale</i> Party urging reconsideration of terms ... ..	419
296 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 766	" 27	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Peace terms. Grand Vizier unfolds his plans for combating Nationalists (see No. 285). He condemns excessive severity of Peace terms ... ..	420
297 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 713. Tel.	June 17	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Forwards identic telegram of the three High Commissioners describing gravity of situation arising from offensive movement of Nationalists towards Constantinople and the Straits (see No. 292) ... ..	423



No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
298 To Sir H. Samuel	1920. June 19	Palestine. Information of his appointment by His Majesty the King as High Commissioner and Commander-in-chief in Palestine for the purpose of instituting a civil administration. Transmits message from His Majesty to the people of Palestine ...	424
299 Sir G. Grahame No. 1908. Conf.	" 17	Turkey. Middle East affairs. French deputation. Commission for Foreign Affairs of Chamber of Deputies accepted proposal to send deputation of investigation to Syria, Cilicia and Constantinople. Proposal is probably attempt of M. Briand to damage reputation of M. Clemenceau ...	425
300 Admiralty	" 19	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 275. Upholds the views expressed in Admiral de Robeck's telegram No. 621 of 24th May (see No. 235) ...	425
301 To the Earl of Derby No. 722. Tel.	" 21	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Urges French and Italian Governments to issue instructions for co-operation with General Milne in face of present danger from Nationalists (see No. 291). Repeated to Rome, No. 265, and to Constantinople, No. 559 ...	426
302 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 822	" 11	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to No. 273. Encloses correspondence exchanged with his colleagues ...	426
303 Political Resident, Aden	" 10	Arabia. Situation report. Refers to No. 289. Aden protectorate. Report of Imam's withdrawal has not been confirmed, and there are no signs of evacuation ...	428
304 War Office	" 22	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Controls of Ministries. Refers to Nos. 276 and 288. Forwards copy of telegram to General Milne instructing him to agree to Allied presidents of controls under his own executive command ...	429
305 The Earl of Derby No. 752. Tel.	" 23	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to No. 301. French Government consider defence of Constantinople should be in British hands on Asiatic and in French hands on European side... ..	430
306 To M. Cambon...	" 23	Turkey. Public Debt Commission. Refers to No. 215. Informs him of reply made to Swiss Minister (see No. 308) ...	431
307 To Signor Preziosi	" 23	Turkey. Public Debt Commission. Refers to No. 290. Informs him of reply made to Swiss Minister (see No. 308) ...	431
308 To M. Paravicini	" 23	Turkey. Public Debt Commission. Refers to No. 136. Informs him that Swiss representation cannot be provided for on the Council ...	431
309 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 736. Tel.	" 23	Turkey. Peace terms. Relates conversation with delegates previous to their departure ...	432
310 To M. Gavrillovitch	" 24	Turkey. Capitulatory rights of new States. Refers to No. 179. Sublime Porte has been informed that Serbs are to enjoy the same rights as other Allies ...	432
311 Sir G. Buchanan No. 264. Tel.	" 23	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Refers to No. 301. Italy is unable to send troops to face the Nationalist menace ...	433
312 To the Earl of Derby No. 741. Tel.	" 25	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Refers to No. 305. Transmits personal message from Mr. Lloyd George to the French Premier. Divided command is impossible and opposed to all sound strategy. Suggests command should be British ...	433
313 Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 751. Tel.	" 26	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Points out grave disadvantages of French military control in Constantinople ...	434

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
314 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 581. Tel.	1920. June 26	Turkey. Nationalist movement. Refers to Nos. 297 and 301. Pro-Nationalist political developments must be forcibly suppressed ...	435
315 The Earl of Derby No. 770. Tel.	" 27	Turkey. Supreme command in Constantinople. Refers to No. 312. French Premier agrees in principle that British general should be in supreme command of Allied forces in Constantinople zone on certain conditions ...	435
316 The Earl of Derby No. 776. Tel.	" 30	Turkey. Nationalist movement. French Premier concurs in proposed withdrawal of Allied officers in Nationalist zone ...	436
317 To Admiral Sir J. de Robeck No. 491	" 30	Turkey. Consular jurisdiction. Refers to No. 282. Transmits order granting authority for the Smyrna Court to grant probate... ..	436

## SUBJECT INDEX.

[The references denote the numbers of the documents *passim*.]

## TURKEY.

ALLIED STRENGTH—		NATIONALIST MOVEMENT ...	34, 35, 38, 39, 42, 54, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 74, 81, 84, 86, 90, 91, 96, 108, 109, 112, 126, 128, 129, 130, 133, 139, 143, 146, 148, 149, 152, 157, 162, 172, 175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 183, 184, 188, 189, 192, 194, 203, 208, 221, 225, 236, 240, 243, 261, 263, 264, 268, 268*, 271, 279, 285, 287, 291, 292, 294, 296, 297, 305, 314, 316
(i.) Present ...	8, 279, 292, 297		
(ii.) Post-war forces ...	250		
ARMENIAN-GREEK RELIEF ...	107		
ARMENIAN MASSACRES ...	54, 65, 67, 68, 81, 86, 88, 91, 96, 109, 112, 126, 129, 139, 148, 162, 181, 188, 268, 287		
BOLSHEVISM AND PAN-ISLAMISM ...	47		
CALIPHATE. Meaning of ...	79		
CAPITULATIONS (see also JURISDICTION)—			
(i.) Smyrna zone ...	246, 252, 260, 274, 293		
(ii.) Rights of new States ...	169, 179, 205, 206, 284, 310		
CHRISTIANS. Safety of ...	104, 143, 155		
CONSTANTINOPLE. Occupation of ...	95, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 116, 120, 124, 131, 134, 135, 161		
CONTROL. Commissions of. (See SUPREME COMMAND.)			
FINANCIAL COMMISSION ...	119, 167		
GREEK TROOPS ...	46, 114, 236, 292		
INDIAN MOSLEMS AND TURKEY ...	245		
ITALIAN FORCES IN TURKEY ...	237, 248, 249, 262, 265, 269, 280, 281, 311		
ITALIAN ACTIVITIES ...	115		
JURISDICTION—			
(i.) Capitulations ...	15, 61, 63, 87, 92		
(ii.) Consular ...	87, 282, 317		
(iii.) Inter-Allied Tribunal ...	1, 63, 71, 92		
(iv.) Treaty of Peace ...	75, 76, 85, 132, 145		
KURDISTAN ...	127, 142		
		OTTOMAN CABINET... ..	64, 93, 97, 106, 113, 153, 156, 157, 160, 163, 193
		OTTOMAN PARLIAMENT ...	30
		PAN-ISLAMIC ACTIVITIES ...	28 111
		PEACE TERMS ...	29, 52, 69, 80, 84, 88, 90, 95, 96, 98, 99, 104, 118, 140, 141, 144, 150, 190, 207, 216, 225, 247, 251, 258, 266, 267, 270, 278, 295, 296, 309
		POLITICAL SITUATION. Review of ...	110, 213
		PUBLIC DEBT COUNCIL ...	123, 136, 167, 174, 210, 215, 244, 290, 306, 307, 308
		SUPREME COMMAND—	
		In Constantinople ...	125, 159, 164, 200, 286, 301, 305, 311, 312, 313, 315
		Commissions of Control ...	55, 57, 137, 138, 154, 166, 170, 174, 182, 186, 197, 199, 217, 226, 230, 232, 235, 239, 241, 253, 273, 275, 276, 286, 288, 300, 302, 304
		THRACE. Occupation of ...	143, 158, 194, 203, 240
		TREATY OF PEACE ...	75, 76, 85, 89, 94, 102, 132, 145
		TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ...	227
		UNITED STATES MANDATE IN TURKEY (see also Mandates, under heading "Middle and Near East (General)") ...	118, 218, 224, 231, 233



## CAUCASUS.

## Armenia.

AGREEMENT—					
(i.) With Georgia ...	...	49	MUNITIONS...	...	37, 222
(ii.) With Azerbaijan ...	...	49	OUTRAGES BY ARMENIANS	...	171
BRITISH AID ...	...	19	PROTECTION OF ...	...	117, 233
DASHNAKS ...	...	12	RECOGNITION OF ...	...	19, 44, 49
FOOD ...	...	37	RELATIONS WITH—		
FRONTIERS ...	...	171, 248*	(i.) Bolsheviks ...	...	12, 49, 204, 257
KARABAGH ...	...	3	(ii.) Turks ...	...	204
LEAGUE OF NATIONS ...	...	117	UNITED STATES ARBITRATION AND		
			MANDATE ...	...	224, 233, 248*
			ZANGEZOUR ...	...	3, 50

## Azerbaijan.

AGREEMENT WITH ARMENIA ...	49	GOVERNMENT ...	4, 14, 204
ARMENIA (see AGREEMENT).		MUNITIONS...	37
BAKU ...	209	NEUTRALITY ...	36
BOLSHEVIKS (see also RELATIONS).		RECOGNITION OF ...	17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 44
BRITISH AID — ...	13, 14, 17, 19, 31	RELATIONS WITH—	
DAGHESTAN (see MISCELLANEOUS).		(i.) Bolsheviks ...	13, 14, 25, 36, 77, 204, 209
FOOD ...	37	(ii.) Great Britain ...	9, 50
FRONTIERS ...	21, 22	ZANGEZOUR ...	50

## Batum.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THREE CAU-		GARRISON ...	43, 82, 185, 195, 198, 211
CASIAN REPUBLICS AS TO ...	201	ITALIAN BATTALION ...	195, 211, 212
BOLSHEVIK ACTIVITIES ...	43	TRANSFER TO GEORGIA ...	10, 58, 222, 283
EVACUATION ...	59, 72, 222, 257, 259	TURKISH INTRIGUES ...	43

## Georgia.

AGREEMENT WITH ARMENIA ...	49, 209	INDEPENDENCE ...	58
BATUM. Transfer to Georgia ...	58	MUNITIONS...	37, 222
BOLSHEVIK ACTIVITIES ...	6, 7	NEUTRALITY ...	36
BRITISH AID ...	12, 17, 19, 31, 209	RECOGNITION OF ...	10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 44
FOOD ...	37	RELATIONS WITH BOLSHEVIKS ...	12, 36, 204, 209, 257
FRONTIERS ...	21, 22		

## Miscellaneous.

ANTI-BRITISH ACTIVITIES ...	10	PERSIAN GOVERNMENT ...	19, 41
BOLSHEVIK ACTIVITIES ...	5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16, 19, 25, 26, 185, 198	THREE REPUBLICS. Suggested union of interests ...	23
CASPIAN SEA FLEET ...	9, 23, 26, 41	TRANSCASPIA ...	5, 9, 18, 24, 27
CAUCASUS. Defence of ...	18, 24, 198	TURKOMANS ...	27
DAGHESTAN ...	12, 16, 25	ZANGEZOUR ...	3
DENEKIN'S FORCES...	7, 13, 26, 41, 77		

## ARABIA.

ABOOS ...	255	IDRISI OF ASIR ...	2, 32, 83, 122, 147, 191, 202, 223, 242, 255, 289
ADEN PROTECTORATE ...	2, 32, 48, 62, 83, 122, 147, 202, 214, 223, 234, 242, 289, 303	IMAM OF SANAA ...	32, 48, 62, 73, 122, 147, 151, 165, 191, 202, 214, 234, 255, 277, 289, 303
HAUSHABI ...	277	COLONEL JACOB'S MISSION...	2, 45, 53, 70, 78
HEDJAZ ...	219, 229	MOKALBA ...	32
HODEIDA ...	165, 191, 223		

## ARABIA—(continued).

RELATIONS WITH ARAB RULERS ...	73, 272	SUBSIDIES ...	242, 272
SITUATION REPORT ...	2, 32, 48, 62, 83, 122, 147, 151, 165, 191, 202, 214, 234, 242, 255, 277, 289, 303	TIHAMA ...	147, 191, 202, 223, 239
		TURKISH ACTIVITIES ...	62, 147
		ZEIDIS ...	33, 223, 234, 242, 277

## MESOPOTAMIA, SYRIA AND PALESTINE.

## Mesopotamia.

MANDATES ...	219, 220, 256	OIL ...	195, 256
--------------	---------------	---------	----------

## Syria.

FEISAL PROCLAIMED AS KING ...	121	MANDATE ...	219
FRENCH THREATS ...	219, 229, 238, 254	PALESTINE. Absorption of ...	168, 173, 229

## Palestine.

ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARY ...	11, 51	MANDATE ...	187, 219
ANTI-ZIONIST MOVEMENT ...	168, 173	TRANSJORDANIA ...	56
HIGH COMMISSIONER. Appointment of ...	298	SYRIA. Absorption into ...	168, 229
PROBLEMS. Current ...	56, 173, 187		

## MIDDLE AND NEAR EAST (GENERAL).

MANDATES ...	218, 220, 224, 231, 233, 256	OIL. Anglo-French San Remo Agreement (see also MANDATES) ...	196, 256
MIDDLE EAST—		SAN REMO AGREEMENT (see OIL).	
(i.) Future control of ...	Memorandum on 228		
(ii.) Affairs of. Debate in French Parlia-ment ...	299		



CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART IV.

[172545/ME 44]

No. 1.

(File 3006/1919.)

*Foreign Office to Law Officers of the Crown.*

Gentlemen,

*Foreign Office, December 10, 1919.*

I HAVE the honour, by direction of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, to request you to be so good as to favour him at your early convenience, in view of the urgency of the matter, with your opinion on the following question :—

Administra-  
tion of  
Justice at  
Constanti-  
nople.

In the Armistice terms with Turkey of the 30th October, 1918, there was no express provision entitling the Allies to occupy Constantinople and the adjacent region. Clause 7 of the terms is as follows :—

"The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies."

Admiral Calthorpe, who conducted the negotiations, in transmitting home the terms of the Armistice, made the following observations on clause 7 :—

"It will be observed that there is nothing in this clause, or elsewhere in the Armistice, which permits Constantinople to be occupied unless the security of the Allies is threatened."

"The Turkish Delegates endeavoured to obtain an exemption for Constantinople even in the above circumstances and were most obstinate on the point but finally gave way."

Since the date of this communication there has been no modification of the status of Constantinople, and the British High Commissioner, in a despatch dated the 6th September last, remarked that the contention always put forward by him to the effect that Constantinople was not in the occupation of the Allied troops still held good, and that were it not to do so, the good faith of the Allies would be liable to be impugned by the Turks. In fact, however, British forces under the command of General Milne have been in Constantinople since the time of the Armistice. This force with the French and Italian contingents is under the supreme command of the French General Franchet d'Esperey, the Commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies of the Orient. The offices of the British High Commission were established at the former British Embassy at Constantinople shortly after the Armistice.

The position being as above stated, a serious problem has arisen with regard to the administration of justice in Constantinople and the other regions within the sphere of the High Commissioner. Shortly before the declaration of war between Turkey and Great Britain, the Capitulations were declared by the Turks to be abrogated. The legality of this action by the Turks has never been admitted by His Majesty's Government, but the effect of this declaration and the subsequent war has been that the consular courts which administered civil and criminal justice between foreigners in Constantinople have ceased to function. Recently the former judge of the consular court held a court for the transaction of urgent business, but the period of the sitting of the court was not prolonged and Lord Curzon is advised that the legality of the



learned judge's action cannot be upheld. His decisions, so far as they affect British subjects, must be validated by subsequent legislation or by a clause to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty. For over a year, however, there has been no appropriate jurisdiction over British subjects in civilian or criminal matters, either in respect of their relations between themselves, with other foreigners or with Ottomans. The Ottoman courts are understood to be functioning, but as it was thought to be undesirable in time of peace for British subjects to resort thereto, it is considered impossible to admit the jurisdiction of the Ottoman courts over British subjects at the present time when the Turks are still actually enemies. On the other hand, the need for a tribunal of undoubted jurisdiction is becoming more and more urgent every day. To meet the situation it was recommended to the High Commissioner on the 2nd April last that civil offenders who were British subjects should be dealt with by martial law, but Lord Curzon has been advised that unless Constantinople has actually been placed under the authority of the Allied Armies and can therefore be considered to be in actual military occupation, it is questionable whether the rule of martial law carried out by means of court-martial is valid in accordance with international doctrine. In this connection I am to draw your attention to articles 42 and 43 of The Hague Regulations, which are as follows:—

Article 42 says that "Territory is considered to be occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation applies only to the territories where such authority is established and can be exercised."

Article 43 provides that "The authority of the legitimate Power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and ensure as far as possible public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."

To alleviate the situation it was proposed earlier in this year to establish an inter-Allied tribunal in Constantinople as a temporary expedient. The Legal Advisers to the Peace Conference at Paris, who were consulted, were in favour of such a course. It was pointed out, however, by Mr. Balfour in his despatch of the 8th August last, that as a condition precedent to the establishment of such a tribunal, the High Commissioner must be satisfied, *inter alia*, that the Turkish Government consented to the creation of such a tribunal, and to its exercising jurisdiction over Ottoman subjects, to the extent proposed, *i.e.*, in respect of all civil and commercial disputes between Allied subjects and Ottomans. At this time it was also proposed to revive the jurisdiction of the Consular judges up to the limits of their former powers in order that they might deal with crimes committed by British subjects against other British subjects or against Ottoman subjects or against foreign subjects of another Power, or *vice versa*. The Turks have not agreed to this proposal.

To sum up the situation, a quotation from a telegram from the High Commissioner of the 10th November last illustrates the position:—

"The situation is quite unparalleled. Ottoman Courts judge Ottoman subjects, and Allied troops are subject to Allied courts-martial. Beyond this no courts of law exist at the moment of writing. The Turkish Government are reluctant to adopt proposed temporary international tribunal, and even this would be a quite inadequate palliative. Criminal charges are dealt with in a rough and ready way by the Inter-Allied Police, but with no real legal sanction; offenders are often arrested and then released after a few days, as there is no prison accommodation and no tribunal which can deal with, say, a case of fraud. There are measures which it is most desirable to enforce in the public interest, such as the prevention of profiteering, or the speculation in roubles and shipping, passport or customs regulations. Whilst we can, more or less impose our decisions on the Porte, we have no legal authority over foreigners. This absence of law courts, tolerable as it was for a time, presents every day greater disadvantages."

Lord Curzon, therefore, would be glad if you would take these matters into consideration and favour him with your opinion on the following questions:—

1. Whether the circumstances in which the Allied forces are at Constantinople are, in view of the difficulty of contending that there is an actual military occupation, such as to justify a general system of martial law.

2. If the answer to (1) is in the affirmative, is it then possible to set up tribunals with a general jurisdiction over all cases criminal and civil irrespective of the nationality of the parties concerned?

3. If the answer to (1) is in the negative, what steps can be taken by the High Commissioner to provide—

- (a.) For the safety and security of members of the Allied forces;
- (b.) For the trial and punishment of criminal offences committed (1) by British civilians; (2) by Ottoman subjects against British civilians; (3) by foreigners other than Ottoman subjects against British civilians;
- (c.) For the trial of civil litigation between (1) British subjects; (2) British subjects and Ottoman subjects; (3) British subjects and foreigners other than Ottoman subjects;
- (d.) Generally on the situation.

I have, &c.

H. MONTGOMERY.

#### List of Papers.

- (A.)—Armistice terms signed with Turkey.
- (B.)—Admiralty to Foreign Office, November 11, 1918.
- (C.)—Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Foreign Office, April 2, 1919. (Telegraphic.)
- (D.)—Foreign Office to Admiral Calthorpe (Constantinople), April 12, 1919. (Telegraphic.)
- (E.)—Admiral Calthorpe (Constantinople) to Foreign Office, July 23, 1919. (Telegraphic.)
- (F.)—British Delegation, Paris, to Foreign Office, No. 1552, August 8, 1919.
- (G.)—Admiral Webb (Constantinople) to Foreign Office, September 6, 1919.
- (H.)—Admiral de Robeck (Constantinople) to Foreign Office, November 10, 1919. (Telegraphic.)

#### Report.

1. In our opinion this question must clearly be answered in the negative. A general system of martial law can only be established by an army in actual military occupation, and it is clear that the Allies are not in actual military occupation of Constantinople.

2. Does not arise.

3. The only course we can suggest is that pressure should be put on the Turkish Government to compel them to agree to the establishment of an inter-Allied tribunal to exercise jurisdiction in the various classes of cases mentioned. Such a tribunal would derive its jurisdiction from the Turkish Government and could be given jurisdiction over foreigners other than Ottoman subjects, as well as over British and Ottoman subjects. The Turkish Government might be coerced by a threat that if they did not consent to the establishment of the tribunal the Allies would occupy Constantinople, on the ground that the security of the Allies is threatened by the failure of the Turkish Government to maintain order and protect the persons and property of Allied subjects.

We have, &c.

GORDON HEWART.

ERNEST M. POLLOCK.

Law Officers' Department,  
December 23, 1919.

P.S.—The additional papers received by us on the 31st ultimo do not appear to affect the opinion already given. They emphasise the necessity for the establishment of an inter-Allied tribunal. The telegram (No. 2145) from Admiral de Robeck is not quite easy to follow. It shows the urgency of the matter, but does not indicate what the step is which it is desired to take, though it appears to be some form of pressure to be applied to induce the Turkish Government to consent to the establishment of the tribunal.

GORDON HEWART.

ERNEST M. POLLOCK.

Law Officers' Department,  
January 20, 1920.



[167402/ME 44 A]

No. 2.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1920.)*

My Lord,

Aden, December 18, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of my letter dated the 18th instant to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 2.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to the High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret)

My dear Field-Marshal,

Aden, December 18, 1919.

THE following is a brief summary of events reported since the despatch of my letter dated the 10th December, 1919:—

*Imam.*(a.) *Tihama*

Zaranik activity continues in favour of the Idrisi. Sheikh Munassar Sagheer, who had at first refused to sign the agreement referred to in paragraph 1 of my last letter, is now reported to have signed it. Mahomed Ibrahim Mekkawi, the Beit-el-Fakih merchant, who is now apparently unable to do anything locally, is said to have written to the Idrisi advising him not to rely on the Zaraniks, who are untrustworthy, and that they are only playing a game to get money out of him.

2. On the other hand, the imam's amil at Zabeed, Syed Ahmed-el-Ambari, appears to be actively busy organising a local corps to oppose the Idrisi, who is said to have promised the Zaraniks 2,000 men fully equipped with guns, &c., to operate against Zabeed. Under the orders of the imam, men have been sent to Mokha to bring a gun from there to Zabeed, and the forts at the latter place are being repaired.

At the same time it is reported that the garrison of Zabeed is being gradually reduced and men withdrawn sent to Masareka and Beni Marwan, where conflicts are said to have occurred between the imam and the Idrisi.

3. The imam has directed merchants in Zabeed to deal direct with Sana merchants, and has issued a ratification prohibiting trade with the Zaraniks, Marawa and Hodeida. One Al Izzi Amar has been appointed Rais-al-Baladiya (municipal officer) at Zabeed.

4. In paragraph 4 of my last letter, I referred to the fighting at Jebel Milhan between the Idrisi and imam. The Political Officer, Hodeida, reports that the Idrisi is now supreme in Jebel Milhan, the imam's force having been driven off. The Idrisi had the support of the people.

5. Major Meek gathered the following information from a Syrian deserter employed in the Turkish ammunition factory in Sana. He states that 50 men (Arabs) now work in the imam's factory. They were taught by the Turks. They turn out 2,500 cartridges and from 50 to 90 shells, shrapnel and percussion for field guns, daily. The powder is made in Sana. He does not know where the metals come from. An Austrian named George is the manager of the factory. He repairs guns and rifles, and made one small gun himself. He gets 60 reals, 4 tins grain and 4 tins raisins monthly. There are no other Europeans in Sana save Turks.

6. The deserter further states that there are only about 50 Arab soldiers in Sana, and about 200 Turkish soldiers: the latter are forced to serve and half starved. Arabs constantly come in, are armed and sent off to various places. He knows nothing of the imam's intentions.

*Jacob Mission and Hodeida.*

7. As reported officially, the mission was released on the 12th and arrived at Aden on the 15th instant. All the members of the mission are well.

8. Referring to the use of aeroplanes in connection with the negotiations for the release of the mission, Major Meek remarks that the effect of two flights by a single plane over the hostile tribal area was so great that men, women and children were

filled with alarm, and brought to bear immediately the whole weight of their influence against continued hostility to Government.

9. Major Meek writes that Sheikh Munassar Sagheer wrote to Sheikh Abu Hadi some time back urging the retention of the mission. Later Sheikh Munassar professed friendship, sent his people to Hodeida, and begged for money. Major Meek repeatedly asked him to come to Hodeida in response to his frequent letters, but he did not do so. He is said to have written lately to Bajil again urging the retention of the mission. This sudden change to hostility is due to Major Meek's refusal to accept Abu Hadi's brothers as hostages whom Sheikh Munassar offered to hand over. He is depicted as a very bad specimen of a very bad type of Arab. He is also said to have written to Sheikh Abu Hadi demanding a share of the arms and ammunition which Abu Hadi was expected to get from the British Government.

10. Major Meek, under date the 6th December, reported the arrival of an Idrisi deputation at Bajil. It was well received by the sheikhs and people. It demanded the release of the mission on pain of assault on Bajil by the Idrisi force, which was in position only three hours' distance from Bajil. Mahmud Nadhim, who was present at the meeting held, declared that the mission would be released at once.

11. The Idrisi wrote to Major Meek on the 3rd December to say that he was deputing Syed Mustafa to the port of Ibn Abbas (Bunder Abbas) via Kamaran to negotiate with the Quhras for the release of the mission. Syed Mustafa's arrival at Kamaran coincided with the release of the mission.

12. A concentration of an imamic force is reported in the Wadi Har, north-east of Bajil, and about four hours' march from the latter place. It has four guns and two machine-guns. The number of men is given as 6,000, all the officers being Turks. The commander, however, is an Arab, Sherif Abdulla-al-Thumaim. There is every indication of an assault by the imam on Bajil, in which case a conflict between the imam and the Idrisi is feared. The Idrisi's force (strength unknown) is only three hours' distance from Bajil.

13. Major Meek thinks that such a conflict would bring in the Quhra-Aboos-Zaranik confederation against the imam.

14. Major Meek says that Bajil merchants favour British protection, but failing that that of the Idrisi. In fact, the question of an Idrisi kaimakam for Bajil has been discussed, and the people have expressed in favour of it.

*Idrisi.*

15. According to the information received by the Political Officer, Hodeida, King Hussein appears to be active in stirring up trouble against the Idrisi in Asir. I have heard nothing from the Idrisi himself.

16. A Zaidiya report states that about the 27th November an aeroplane passed over the villages of Hushabira, in Zaidiya, in consequence of which the people are very much frightened.

*Aden Protectorate.*

17. It is reported that the Zaidis are building court-houses in Dala, Jabal Jihaf and Jalila. The villagers are made to pay for the building materials and labour.

There is a party of Zaidis with Bin Noman, of Al Hujaria, on the border of Shab. Bin Noman demands revenue through Sheikh Amin-bin-Casem-al-Absi, of Al Aboos. Further enquiries are being made to ascertain the truth of this report.

The Zaidis are proceeding against Juban, Nawa and Ruocaten, and have had skirmishes with the Shaibis.

Some villages on the border of our stipendiary the Muflahi Sheikh of Upper Yafa, have been occupied by the Zaidis, and some set on fire.

During the last week fifty Zaidis came as far as Ruocaten. They are commanded by Cadi Mahomed-al-Iryain. Of that number—

- 10 are in Husn Bani Kais.
- 10 „ Hu-n-al-Kulla.
- 10 „ Al Husain-al-Karia.
- 10 „ Aresh.
- 10 „ Al Qabra.

There are also 30 men in Nawa and 100 men in Juban proper.



Saiyid Ali Mahomed-al-Muta'an, imamic muccadum, has summoned all the sheikhs of Juban, Hajjaj, Al Hubeshia, Ar Riyashia and other districts under Zaidi control, and warned them to produce fighting men from their respective districts.

It is reported that it is the intention of the Zaidis to occupy Jabal Hareer and use it as a base for their attack against Shaib.

I have addressed a letter to the imam, in accordance with your telegraphic instructions, asking him to withdraw all the Zaidi troops from our Protectorate.

*Yemen Infantry.*

18. Zaidi recruits are not coming in now for the Yemen infantry here. There are indications that the imam's officials are obstructing our recruiting agents.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[167223/ME 58]

No. 3.

*Delegation of the Armenian Republic to the Peace Conference.—(Received at Foreign Office January 3.)*

#### THE QUESTION OF KARABAGH.

AMONG the subjects of conflict between the Armenian Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan there is none more burning, and none thornier, than the question of Karabagh. Both parties are ready to spring to arms, and the tension cannot cease until the question has been settled on an equitable basis, due consideration being given to the ethnical, historical, geographical and strategical conditions of the disputed territory.

Karabagh, considered as a former Armenian province of Transcaucasia, consists of two distinct parts; the mountains and the plain. In the first, Armenians form a big majority, while the second is inhabited chiefly by Tartars. This topographical position lends itself readily to an equitable solution on an ethnical basis. The Armenians should be left in position of the mountainous region, where they have dwelt for twenty-five centuries, the plains being given to the Tartars, who have made their homes there since the Mongol invasions. This is the solution desired by Armenians. The Tartars, however, wish to annex the Armenian portion of Karabagh, on the ground that they need it for grazing purposes. If this pretext did not disguise other aims, an arrangement could be come to without much difficulty, and, if necessary, the required pasturage could be placed at the disposal of the Tartars in conditions ensuring security for both them and the Armenians. But, as we have observed, the aims of the Tartars are much vaster, and constitute the first step towards the realisation of their pan-Turanian ambitions: their junction with Turkish territories. Their tenacious efforts to obtain possession of a country that is essentially Armenian is an evident proof of these designs.

When in June last the Armenian mountaineers were obliged by the lack of arms and munitions to abandon their long resistance, and to accept a provisional Tartar administration pending the decision of the Peace Conference, it might have been expected that the Tartars, having gained possession of the grazing lands, would welcome a cessation of strife and would be ready to live peaceably with their neighbours. On the contrary, directly they had established themselves in Karabagh they sent their agents to foment disturbances in the adjacent regions of Nakhichevan and incite the Mussulman inhabitants to revolt against the Armenian Government. A few months later, in the month of November, the Turk-Tartar army of Azerbaijan moved forward from three directions with the object of seizing the district of Zanguezur, where there is a population of 100,000 Armenians compared with 50,000 Mussulmans. The possession of Zanguezur would have made it possible for the Tartars to outflank the Armenian capital, Erivan, cross the River Arax, bring about a rising of the Mussulmans of Sourmalou, and to advance towards Kaghisman, Kars and Ardahan, thus enveloping Caucasian Armenia and isolating it completely from Turkish Armenia, before reaching the Black Sea.

All this corresponds exactly with the claims put forward by the Tartars at the Peace Conference, and to the markings of the map which they presented at the

same time, as well as with the project conceived by the young Turks at the time of their advance in the spring of 1918.

Fortunately the Armenians, by brilliant victory, have frustrated these plans, and at the present moment the beaten Tartars find themselves forced to open negotiations with the Armenian Government and to abandon their claims to Zanguezur. On the other hand, Nakhichevan is being provisionally administered by Colonel Haskell's representative in the name of the Allies. These facts prove incontestably how fallacious are the arguments of the Tartars in regard to the grazing lands of Karabagh. Nevertheless, whatever arrangement may be made between the Armenian and Tartar Government, it is certain that Karabagh, with its population of 300,000 Armenians against 113,000 Tartars, and the bravery and love of independence of its inhabitants, who for centuries have defended their liberty against formidable invaders, only submitting to the Russians in the last century, will not support the yoke of a people whom it considers inferior in every respect. Peace will never be definitive in these regions until this thorny question is settled.

For centuries past Karabagh has constituted the natural frontier of Armenia and a bulwark against the invasions of Asiatic hordes; it will continue to serve those purposes in the future. In possession of Karabagh an enemy could easily descend the valley of the Arax towards the plain of the Ararat and imperil the very existence of Armenia, of which Karabagh is an integral and indivisible part.

*London, January 1, 1920.*

[167230/ME 58]

No. 4.

*Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1920.)*

(No. 232.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tiflis, December 24, 1919.*

NEW Cabinet Azerbaijan.

1. Prime Minister without portfolio, Nassibek U-subbekoff.
2. Foreign Affairs, Khan Khoisky.
3. War, General Melmandarov.
4. Interior, Mahmed Hassan Gadjiusky.
5. Justice, Khasmamedov.
6. Welfare, Musa Bey Rafiv.
7. Communications, Trade, Industry, Khudadat Bek Melik Aslanov.
8. Finance, Kaplanov.
9. Education, Hamid Bek Hahtinsky.
10. Labour, Agriculture, Pepinov.
11. Postmaster, Djamo Bek Gadjiusky.
12. Controller, Eivat Kuli Mam-dhekov.

Numbers 1, 4, 5, 6, Mussavet; 9, 12, Ittihad; 10, 11, Socialist; remaining four Independent.

[167584/ME 58]

No. 5.

*Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—Received January 4, 1920.)*

(No. 237.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tiflis, December 27, 1919.*

FOLLOWING is repetition of my telegram No. 218:—

“(Secret.)”

“Situation in Transcaspi and its bearing on Transcaucasus causes me some anxiety.

“Bolsheviks evidently intend to take Krasnovodsk. They are sending numerous agents to Caucasus and Persia with large funds, including forged Bradburys, and are trying to buy over the Turkomans. He has seen their two leaders, who are co-operating with Volunteer Army, but inefficiency of latter and ill-treatment of troops have alienated their sympathy. They ask British support for their claims of future independence, and declare they could form anti-Bolshevik barrier from Caspian to Merv threatening enemy's communications. He says His Majesty's Government refused four months ago to entertain proposals for British protectorate or small British mission, but



thinks matter worthy of reconsideration in view of present danger to Persia and Caucasus.

"Saïd Zia Uddin considers threat to Persia serious, and says several commissaries at Askabad are Persians, and Bolsheviks are active in Persia. Colonel Stokes could get into touch with Turkomans through Saïd, Persian Commissioner in Baku, if authorised, and he has suggested present telegram as matter is urgent.

"Small vessels have resumed regular sailings from Baku to Enzeli and Krasnovodsk.

"I do not feel competent to express decided opinion on above, especially as I am not thoroughly aware of extent of Afghan activity in Central Asia. I could not go further than to submit that sending British Mission to Turkomans to enquire and report might have temporary good effect in Transcaspia.

"See my telegram No. 160 and your Lordship's reply No. 110."

(Sent to Constantinople, No. 73 and Tehran No. 12.)

[167875/ME 58]

No. 6.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, January 3, 1920.

IMMEDIATELY on my return from Novorossisk, 3rd January, Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs asked for an interview. He urgently requested advice of His Majesty's Government as to attitude that Georgians should adopt towards North Caucasus.

Georgian Government are convinced that within a fortnight or three weeks Soviet Republic will be proclaimed in North Caucasus, where volunteer force is weak and ill-equipped, and there are only about 300 Cossacks in Vladikavkas. Transcaucasia is rife with imminent danger, and appeals for help to resist Bolsheviks and enable support to be given to anti-Bolshevik party in Daghestan. Most urgent need is bread, of which supplies in Tiflis will only give ration of  $\frac{1}{3}$  pound for three days hence. If there were food in view, danger of internal trouble would be removed at once, and minimum of 70,000 to 80,000 Georgians would be ready to fight Bolsheviks in Caucasus, provided that they could count on supplies of cartridges, &c.

Will His Majesty's Government help to get bread and cartridges and encourage Caucasian Bloc to keep out Bolsheviks? It would be necessary to form, in that case, confederation including Daghestan, where such a prospect would unite mountaineers under some moderate ruler.

I told Minister for Foreign Affairs that I should urgently communicate his message to your Lordship.

My opinion is that some such assistance is only means of saving situation, and I need not point out how seriously our interests would suffer from Bolshevik absorption of Transcaucasus. I was glad to find from my conversation with Mr. Mackinder on 1st January that there was no prospect of any hostile action against Daghestan on the part of General Denikin, and as regards Georgia I can assure you that there is a strong desire on the part of Government here that a volunteer army should be successful in holding back Bolsheviks.

[167947/ME 58]

No. 7.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, January 3, 1920.

It would be prudent to consider possibility of complete collapse of Denikin at an early date.

This would immediately be followed by vigorous Bolshevik attack on Transcaucasus.

I suggest following action to protect our communications with Persia:—

We should endeavour to raise strong barrier in Transcaucasus.

Batoum requires at least a division of thoroughly equipped troops.

Civil administration should be strengthened by addition of trained civilians, and undesirable refugees should be expelled; present population includes numerous Bolshevik

agents or sympathisers. Energetic measures should be taken to supply food, for there will be no bread in a few days, and hunger riots are impending.

North Persian Force should be strengthened and fitted to assist Baku against Bolshevik attack, and to detach troops to North-West Persia and perhaps North-East Asiatic Turkey, to prevent ingress of C.U.P. agitators and armed forces.

Two breech-blocks for guns at Baku should be at once available to make possible some resistance to a naval attack. Aircraft should be sent to Enzeli. Submarines could be sent in sections and put together in Baku. Transcaucasian Railway needs material long ago indented for. Some at least of Caspian flotilla should be taken over by our naval authorities.

Georgia and Azerbaijan, with encouragement from us, would make a good fight, but they need material and financial and moral support. Daghestan also could be induced to expel Nuri and Turks, who have made themselves very unpopular.

It would seem necessary from point of view of our interests to recognise *de facto* existence of Daghestan as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and promise support for their future claims of self-determination.

Unless some speedy action is taken there is a grave risk of the crushing of Transcaucasus by Bolsheviks, who will then work their will in Persia and Transcaspia and beyond.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 3, and Mackinder, No. 2.)

[168780]

No. 8.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 8, 1920.)

(No. 2384. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to communicate to your Lordship certain details which the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, has recently given me on the subject of the present strength of the British forces under his command.

2. The Black Sea Army has steadily diminished in strength during the past twelve months. Whereas its responsibilities are as great as ever and may be immensely increased if difficulties should arise in connection with the execution of terms of peace with Turkey, its numbers are now so reduced that I venture to suggest to your Lordship that it is desirable that when the Turkish peace settlement is being discussed in London or Paris, the military situation of the Allies in this country should be clearly understood and due weight given to the change which has taken place since the armistice.

3. The figures communicated by General Milne show that on the 5th December the fighting strength of the Army of the Black Sea (exclusive of two brigades of artillery) was as follows:—

	Bayonets.
In the Batoum area ... ..	1,874
At Salonica ... ..	562
In the Constantinople area ... ..	4,469
Along the Anatolian Railway from Ismidt to Afion Karahissar ... ..	2,272
Dardanelles area ... ..	657
	<hr/> 9,834

4. Your Lordship will observe that the total in Turkey amounts to 7,398 bayonets, of which 2,929 are employed in garrisons and detachments along the railway or at the Dardanelles, and 4,469 are in the Constantinople area.

5. Besides these British troops there are, in Constantinople and Thrace, French troops, consisting of six battalions, attached to the Allied Corps under the command of General Sir Henry Wilson at Constantinople, as well as a division under the direct orders of General Franchet d'Esperey. In Adalia and South-West Asia Minor the Italian troops number between 6,000 and 7,000 men, and in the Aidin vilayet there are some 75,000 Greek troops.

6. The Turkish Army has an authorised armistice establishment of 57,000, and, inclusive of the "National" bands, probably does not at present exceed this figure.

[4370]

C



7. Whilst the Anatolian provinces are not now in open revolt against the authority of the Central Government, as was the case when Damad Ferid Pasha was in power, the present Cabinet, except in Constantinople, governs only by and with the consent of Mustafa Kemal and his C.U.P. adherents, and all real power in the provinces is still in the hands of the Nationalists. The latter have undoubtedly been losing ground and arousing the hostility of the peasantry during the last few months; it is, however, to be anticipated that they will renew their agitation when the Allied peace terms are made known, and, should these terms involve the loss of any of the predominantly Turkish provinces, with greatly increased support from the people as a whole. The possibility must be considered, in view of the chauvinist and anti-European sentiments of the leaders of the movement, that, should the Turkish Government, under the threat of the Allied forces at Constantinople, agree to accept the terms proposed, Anatolia may break away and come under the rule of a military junta. Recent events on the Euphrates have shown the danger of military adventurers obtaining control and substituting their sway for that of the responsible Government, and there is much in the present condition of affairs throughout the whole of the former Turkish Empire to induce the Turk and Arab to make common cause against the foreigner.

8. It is because of the possibility of events taking the course which I have indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph that I have thought it desirable to invite your Lordship's attention to the present military situation of the Allies in this country. The Italian troops in the south-west of Asia Minor are few in number, of low morals, and scattered throughout a large area. The disadvantages and dangers of associating the Hellenic troops of Aidin in combined operations with our own forces in order to impose peace on the Anatolian provinces are so clear that I need not enlarge upon them. It therefore appears that, should such action become necessary, it is upon the British and French troops that this duty would fall. I cannot believe that His Majesty's Government has any intention of committing itself to undertaking further extensive military operations in Turkey, but the possibility remains of a deadlock arising through the refusal of the Asiatic provinces to be party to a peace which may be accepted by the Government at Constantinople.

9. Experience in the Near East points to the fact that provided demands when made are backed by an overwhelming force in evidence, they are conceded—but great difficulty, if not failure, is to be expected should the support be weak. It would therefore appear essential that the Allies be prepared to show the necessary strength at the decisive point (Constantinople) when the terms of peace are handed to Turkey.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
High Commissioner.

[168553/ME 58]

No. 9.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 8.)*

Sir,

*India Office, January 7, 1920.*

THE attention of the Secretary of State for India has been drawn to Mr. Wardrop's telegram No. 235 of the 27th December forwarding a message from Colonel Stokes regarding the policy of the new Government in Azerbaijan. Mr. Montagu would submit for the earnest consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the two most effective means of stabilising the situation in the Middle East are (1) to regain control of the Caspian Sea whether by the means suggested in Mr. Wardrop's telegram No. 234 of the 26th December, or by the despatch of British boats and personnel, if that be practicable; (2) to unite the interests of the three Caucasian republics, and especially of Azerbaijan, to those of Great Britain. It seems clear that, unless this can be done, there is grave risk of the formation of a combination between Bolsheviks and Turkish Nationalists and extremists, which will greatly increase the military difficulties of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

I am, &c.

J. S. SHUCKBURGH.

[168506/ME 58]

No. 10.

*Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 8.)*

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tiflis, January 6, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 2.

Acting Prime Minister and Minister of War came to me to-night and spoke at length on present situation. On behalf of Government and people, they handed over to me a note, of which following is substance:—

Bolsheviks, having failed to upset Europe, have made agreement with Mussulmans to attack Great Britain. Both Turks and Bolsheviks have adopted this as a policy of despair. Lenin has taken Wilhelm's place.

Denikin's early collapse is probable, and Transcaucasus becomes the bridge which Great Britain must defend to prevent union of two hordes. It, and especially Georgia, is natural barrier separating two forces hostile to Allies.

At present, in consequence of impending advance of Red Army towards the Caucasus, the situation in Georgia becomes complicated. Without effective aid, Georgia, which is passing through painful economic crisis, will be unable to resist attack from both north and south, and crushing of Georgia will have serious consequences for Allies, and especially for Great Britain. But if Allies help her, Georgia will have sufficient courage and strength to defend her frontiers.

Georgian Government therefore consider in its own interests that British Government should help Georgia in her struggle against men from south and north. They consider that it is essential for needs of present time that following effective aid should be granted:—

1. Recognition of independence.
2. Restitution of outlying parts of province of Batoum to Georgia, so that she may fortify southern frontier, which is quite unprotected, while British garrison, supported by British navy, hold port and vicinity as a naval base, in accordance with offer repeatedly made by Georgia.
3. Powerful aid in arms and ammunition, provisions and finance; most urgent needs are bread, cartridges, boots.

If such aid be given in time, it will rouse extraordinary outburst of enthusiasm and national energy, rendering quite feasible safeguarding of interests of Great Britain and Georgia, which are absolutely united at this historical moment.

But if, despite her interests, Great Britain denies this indispensable aid, Georgian people, being deprived of all hope of British support, may unwillingly be forced to some desperate course to save their existence.

I should most strongly impress His Majesty's Government of necessity of taking immediate steps to hold Transcaucasus against Bolsheviks and Turks. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan have now Governments which I believe to be prepared to do their best to defend their frontiers against invasion, and if help be given without delay, there is reason to hope that defence would be successful.

I urgently beg that at an early date I may be enabled to give some encouraging message to Transcaucasian republics, and that I may remind your Lordship that it was only five days before fall of Batoum (9th April, 1917) that Colonel Pike was authorised to offer financial aid, which came too late.

(Repeated to Mackinder, No. 3, and Constantinople, No. 4.)

[165674]

No. 11.

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).*

(No. 67.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 8, 1920.*

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's despatch No. 1235 of the 27th December, enclosing copy of a note from the French Government on the subject of the boundary between the spheres of temporary British and French military occupation in Palestine and Syria.

The French Government maintain that the only decision to which appeal can be made in this matter is that of the Supreme Council of the 15th September, 1919, and

[4370]

C 2



this decision His Majesty's Government have no desire to dispute. By it the Supreme Council took note of the fact that "M. Clemenceau, on behalf of the French Government, accepted Mr. Lloyd George's proposal for the evacuation of the British army of Syria . . . . and their replacement by French troops . . . . in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line."

His Majesty's Government have loyally carried out this agreement; but they cannot accept the position that the French conception of Syria must of necessity be allowed to prejudice the question of the northern boundary of Palestine. Upon this point His Majesty's Government have never concealed their opinion. Indeed, it was explicitly stated by the Prime Minister in the *aide-mémoire* to which reference is made, and although the French Government withheld their acceptance of those parts of the *aide-mémoire* which did not relate to the exchange of British and French troops, this could not be held to involve the abandonment by the Prime Minister or the British Government of the views with regard to the borders of Palestine which they have repeatedly expressed and which they have once again defined.

In these circumstances, and in view of the improved prospect of an early settlement of the whole question and the purely temporary character of whatsoever military administration may be installed in the small area concerned, His Majesty's Government express the hope that the French Government will agree to the maintenance of the present administrative boundary pending the final decision of the Peace Conference.

You should reply to the French note of the 26th December in the above terms.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[169174/ME 58]

No. 12.

*Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 9.)*

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tiflis, January 7, 1920.*

DURING last few days I have had long conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs (who is also Acting Prime Minister) and with War Minister and Minister of Interior.

Government is to be depended on to offer vigorous resistance to Bolsheviks if supported by us, but, if we refuse to assist, food situation will create anarchy shortly. I am informed no proposals have been made to Georgia by German or other enemies, and most solemn assurances have been given to me that no such overtures would be considered, even if made. Support of Allied cause is now admitted to be essential to Georgia's existence. Government beg me to show towards them same confidence they have in me, and tell me they will have no secrets from me and will follow my advice.

As to basis for an agreement with Denikin given in your Lordship's telegram No. 142, I have discussed matter with Mr. Mackinder and General Keyes, and feel sure I could secure Georgia's acceptance as soon as I am authorised to negotiate. I might even arrange some unofficial recruiting for Volunteer Army if it were thought absolutely necessary by His Majesty's Government, but I strongly recommend that all available troops be kept here and not sent to join a partially demoralised force.

As to Armenia, fact that Bolsheviks are allied with Turks and Germans is in our favour, but unless we act promptly and efficaciously in supplying moral and material aid there is grave danger that Dashnaks party might make terms with enemy.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 5 [group omitted] 4.)

[169242/ME 58]

No. 13.

*Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 9.)*

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tiflis, January 8, 1920.*

FOLLOWING from Colonel Stokes, No. 54 of 5th January:—

"I regard situation in Azerbaijan as serious, and think that it soon will become dangerous. Government is anti-Bolshevik, but collapse of Denikin—for his assumed failure is so regarded here—has thrown it into a state of alarm owing to danger of Bolsheviks. On the other hand, Government almost despair of any assistance from Great Britain. It has no hope whatever of assistance from Turks.

"If His Majesty's Government appear to secure friendship or even to control Azerbaijan and eliminate Turkish influence and avert Bolshevism, it is essential that some obvious sign of our support should be given immediately.

"Best sign would be return of breech-blocks of the two 6-inch guns and sale to Azerbaijan of uniforms, or material for them, and boots for 6,000 men. If this be done, ground will be prepared for removal of all Turks from service of Azerbaijan Government. Later it will be possible to get Azerbaijan to accept British instructors for its army, and gradually our influence could be built up in such a way as to obtain any concessions we wish, as evidently Government is anti-Bolshevik. I may mention that they anxiously desire the removal from their prisons in Baku of 100 to 200 Bolsheviks, and would welcome our taking charge of them. Danger of Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan can be, in my opinion, averted only by one of two methods: (a) friendly support of Azerbaijan immediately; (b) despatch of British troops to Baku. If Bolshevism is to be kept out of Azerbaijan, immediate steps on one or other of these lines suggested is, in my opinion, imperative.

"Daghestan situation also demands immediate serious attention. Hostilities between Daghestan and Volunteer Army continue. Many Russian Bolsheviks and Nuri Pasha are assisting Denikin. Latter regard impending elimination of Volunteer Army as a factor of [group undecipherable] account, but have not any desire for Bolshevism in their country.

"In return for our support in shape of arms and ammunition and loan of 20,000*l.* per month for five or six months, they are willing to get rid of all Bolsheviks and Turks, to form Government to be nominated by us, and to give us large quantity of wool and any concessions we may desire.

"I have had no dealings with Denikin personally. Attitude of Denikin was communicated to me by Persian Commissioner, now in Baku, who states that Denikin did not make any special appeal for British support, but said that they would welcome such support in form of, and on terms given, above."

I recommend above to your Lordship's serious consideration.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 5; Constantinople, No. 7; and Mackinder, No. 5.)

[169209/ME 58]

No. 14.

*Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 9.)*

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tiflis, January 8, 1920.*

FOLLOWING received from Colonel Stokes, dated 7th January:—

"In continuation of my despatch of 5th January, I beg to submit the following:—

"I to-day saw Minister for Foreign Affairs at his request. He expressed greatest anxiety at rapid decision by Allies as to fate of Azerbaijan. He gave me a copy of wireless message, dated Moscow, 2nd January, received at Baku, 6th January, from Norwcherin, addressed to Azerbaijan and Georgia, inviting them to attack Volunteer Army and then assist in giving it *coup de grâce*. He pointed out that successful advance of Bolsheviks on both sides Caspian Sea has brought Bolshevik danger to door of Transcaucasia, and Azerbaijan must decide very soon her policy towards Bolsheviks; indeed, in my opinion that decision may not improbably be taken out of hands of his Government by Bolshevik revolt in Baku itself. He stated that his Government is entirely anti-Bolshevik, but if Great Britain will not come to its assistance it may be compelled to make terms with Bolsheviks.

"It had been decided after mature consideration that it must look to Great Britain alone of all Powers for assistance to safeguard the interests and very existence of Azerbaijan. He did not pretend that this decision was due to any sentimental reasons. It was dictated by self-interest, but, in his opinion, in supporting Azerbaijan we would best serve our own interests in safeguarding our shortest route to Persia. He urged strongly that, owing to demoralised Volunteer Army, if Azerbaijan is to be saved from Bolshevism an immediate decision to support Azerbaijan is imperative.

"In my opinion Minister for Foreign Affairs did not overstate his case. Unless we are willing to see Bolsheviks rampant in Azerbaijan, a decision to support that country cannot be taken too soon. I have previously recommended provisional ultimatum, but in view of gravity of situation created by failure of Volunteer Army, I now recommend immediate grant of full independence and whole-hearted support to Azerbaijan, despatch



of arms and equipment, including uniforms for her army and of breech-blocks and ammunition for two 6-inch guns at Baku, and prompt payment of all sums due by us to Azerbaijan in connection with our military occupation. These measures would, I consider, place the Government in a position to suppress Bolshevik organisations within its borders and enable it to prevent Bolsheviks obtaining control of country.

"I have already drawn attention to Bolshevik danger on Caspian Sea and in Transcaucasia, and to situation in Daghestan, which form part of same problem as safeguarding of Azerbaijan, and I submit that the replacement of British naval personnel on armed ships in Caspian, and adoption of policy towards Turcos and Daghestan similar to that advocated for Azerbaijan, are equally urgently required. Admiralty would doubtless demand safe line of communication before undertaking control of Caspian. Recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan as independent States would, in my opinion, secure this.

"In regard to question of recognition of independent Transcaucasian States, I wish to state my conviction that no promise of autonomy in any shape given by any existing Russian Government, even if guaranteed by Allies, will carry any weight.

"Policy advocated above may be regarded as drastic, but in my opinion half-measures would be of no avail, and delay would mean disaster."

I entirely concur.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 6; Constantinople, No. 9; Mackinder, No. 6.)

[169416/ME 44]

No. 15.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1920.)*

(No. 2391.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, December 24, 1919.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 672 of the 7th November, I have the honour to enclose for your Lordship's information a note presenting certain considerations with regard to the provision which will doubtless be made in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey for the future judicial régime of that country.

2. This note, which has been prepared by the technical judicial advisers of the High Commissioners, was examined at our meeting on the 19th December, when my Italian colleague expressed considerable apprehension that the difficulty, which is disposed of in the last paragraph of the note, might not in reality arise and create undesirable complications. In view of this it was decided that the High Commissioners, in transmitting the note to their several Governments, should explain that it embodies the technical opinion of their judicial advisers.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 15.

*Draft Note for communication to the Peace Conference.*

LES Hauts-Commissaires alliés à Constantinople, après avoir pris connaissance de l'échange de vues qui a eu lieu entre les Gouvernements alliés, ainsi qu'à la Commission économique de Paris, au sujet de l'extension éventuelle des Capitulations à toutes les Puissances alliées, laissant de côté la question du statut juridique des Yougo-Slaves, Tchéco-Slovaques et Polonais, pendant la période actuelle d'armistice, croient de leur devoir d'attirer l'attention de la Conférence de Paris sur l'intérêt majeur qui s'attache à propos du futur Traité de Paix avec la Turquie aux points suivants:

1. Nécessité de déterminer dans le traité le futur régime judiciaire de la Turquie;
2. Nécessité de rétablir, jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur de ce régime, le régime capitulaire tel qu'il existait antérieurement à sa prétendue abolition par le Gouvernement ottoman, en précisant qu'il ne subsisterait plus, après l'entrée en vigueur du nouveau régime, que dans celles de ses parties qui n'auraient pas été abolies par le nouveau régime ou ne seraient pas en contradiction avec lui.

3. Nécessité d'examiner s'il n'y aurait pas lieu, pour cette période transitoire et dans les limites ainsi fixées, d'accorder le bénéfice du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée à ceux de nos Alliés qui ne jouissaient pas antérieurement en Turquie du

régime capitulaire, ou dont les États ont été formés de dépendances de l'ancien Empire austro-hongrois, Yougo-Slaves (comprenant les Serbes et Monténégrins), Tchéco-Slovaques et Polonais.

Tous les étrangers devant, après l'établissement du futur régime judiciaire, être soumis à ce régime, il semble qu'il n'y aurait aucun inconvénient à accorder ce bénéfice provisoire aux États susvisés, cette faveur limitée et conditionnelle ne pouvant, d'autre part, créer à ces États un droit susceptible de contrarier en quoi que ce soit les décisions des Puissances alliées concernant le futur régime judiciaire de la Turquie, au sujet duquel il y aurait lieu seulement d'obtenir le consentement des Puissances neutres, qui, en effet, ne paraît guère douteux.

*Le 18 décembre 1919.*

[169546/ME 58]

No. 16.

*Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10.)*

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tiflis, January 8, 1920.*

INFORMATION received privately from mountaineers to-day states Daghestan will, unless promised help speedily, be forced unwillingly to join Bolsheviks within a fortnight. Colonel Gaba, of Italian Mission, previously offered to supply arms.

Fall of Bokhara and impending fall of Krasnovodsk make rapid decision imperative. Mountaineers' educated leaders meeting at Baku this week.

Hundreds of mountaineers returning home from Volunteer Army with abundant money.

Daghestan decidedly anti-Bolshevik, despite vigorous propaganda, but unaided they cannot resist.

(Sent to Constantinople, No. 10; Tehran, No. 7; and Mackinder, No. 7.)

[168506/ME 58]

No. 17.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 10, 1920.*

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit herewith, for the information of the Army Council, copies of Mr. Wardrop's telegrams Nos. 2, 3 and 5 of the 3rd and 6th January (which have already been communicated to the Director of Military Intelligence) relating to the situation created in Transcaucasia by General Denikin's recent reverses, together with copy of a letter from the India Office.

Lord Curzon does not desire to endorse all the recommendations put forward by Mr. Wardrop, which would entail military intervention by His Majesty's Government on a large scale, but he attaches great importance to strengthening the position of Georgia and Azerbaijan by any means possible, so as to enable them, should occasion arise, either to resist attack by the Bolsheviks, or to make terms on conditions which, as in the case of the recent Estonian agreement, will leave them outside the Soviet system. With this end in view, his Lordship proposes to raise in Paris the question of according *de facto* recognition to these republics.

In Foreign Office letter of the 6th January the Army Council were requested to return to Baku the breech-blocks of the 6-inch guns left there at the time of the British evacuation last summer, and Lord Curzon would now recommend that everything possible should be done to meet the most urgent requirements of the Georgians.

Lord Curzon presumes that the Army Council will take into serious and immediate consideration the question of the defence of Northern Persia and the maintenance of the British garrison in Batoum, the former of these problems having been rendered more acute by the reported Bolshevik capture of Krasnovodsk, which no doubt opens the most serious possibilities.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Admiralty, and the Director of Transport is being consulted verbally as to the possibility of diverting food cargoes,



the delivery of which in South Russia may already be, or may in the future become impossible, owing to Bolshevik successes, to Poti or Batoum for the use of the Georgians.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[169528/ME 58]

No. 18.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord Hardinge.—(Received January 11.)*

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Paris, January 10, 1920.

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon:—

"Supreme Council decided this morning, in reconstituting Inter-Allied Military Council at Versailles under the presidency of Marshal Foch, to refer to it anxious situation in Black Sea, Caucasus and North Persia, described in Wardrop's telegram No. 5 and Sir P. Cox's telegram No. 10, with a view of seeing whether any inter-Allied action is possible for settlement of situation.

"Simultaneously I proposed to Council that *de facto* recognition should be given by Allied Powers to Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments, Armenia being omitted as falling within purview of Peace Treaty with Turkey. This proposition was carried unanimously with consent of French and Italian Governments, and you may announce it at once in case of Governments concerned.

"At the same time, Secretary of State for India and I have agreed in consultation that military aspect of situation, which in main affects ourselves, should be considered at home.

"We think meeting of Eastern Committee should be held on Monday under chairmanship of Lord Hardinge, at which responsible representatives of India Office, War Office and Admiralty should be present to discuss following points:—

- "1. Retention of British forces at Batoum.
- "2. Possibility of aid to Georgian forces.
- "3. Diversion to Caucasus of any balance of Denikin's 'packet.'
- "4. Protection of Baku in the event of Bolshevik menace from Krasnovodsk.
- "5. Recovery from Denikin of Caspian fleet and possible reconstitution of British marines, or in alternative, if this be impossible, destruction of Denikin's fleet.
- "6. Possible strengthening of advanced British force at Kazvin.
- "7. Despatch to Caucasus or Persia of aeroplanes from any other theatre of action.
- "8. Steps to be taken for watching or protecting Khorassan frontier.
- "9. Despatch of British officers to that quarter.
- "10. Strengthening and transferring to War Office of Anglo-Indian force at Meshed.
- "11. Prolongation of railway to Neh."

[169530/ME 58]

No. 19.

*Sir P. Cox to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 11.)*

(No. 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, January 11, 1920.

PRIME Minister is receiving from Persian Mission in Caucasus reports and views to much the same effect as those which are reaching His Majesty's Government from our representatives. These reports refer to primary desire of South Caucasian principalities to resist subjection to Bolshevism, and active inclination of Baku Government to enter into close relations with Persia with object of strengthening its position to that end.

In latter connection Prime Minister begs me to urge upon His Majesty's Government what an enormous advantage it would be to Persia and to British interests in Persian commerce and politics if independence of Azerbaijan Government could now be recognised and it were to place itself under friendly guidance of Great Britain and ally itself in some definite way with Persia. He emphasises that, should Great Britain or Allies in conference decide (as he hopes they will) to assist Caucasian principalities to hold the Batoum-Baku line and Caspian against Bolshevik aggression,

the present moment is obviously most favourable for bringing about arrangement above indicated. Not only would it put an end to pan-Turanian idea of combining two Azerbaijan [group undecipherable] under Turkish auspices, but it would also help to solve in a way favourable to Persia and Great Britain the future control of Southern Caspian.

In theory Prime Minister's arguments seem to point [group omitted]. How far his proposals are compatible with our policy and practical necessities of present situation I must leave to wise consideration [one group undecipherable].

[169528/ME 58]

No. 20.

*Lord Hardinge to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis).*

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 11, 1920.

LORD CURZON proposed to-day to Allied Supreme Council in Paris that *de facto* recognition should be given by Allied Powers to Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments, Armenia being omitted as falling within purview of Peace Treaty with Turkey.

This proposition was carried unanimously with consent of French and Italian Governments, and you may announce it at once to Governments concerned.

(Repeated to Tehran, No. 16.)

[169629/ME 58]

No. 21.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord Hardinge.—(Received January 12.)*

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Paris, January 10, 1920.

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon:—

"My telegram of to-day.

"Recognition of *de facto* independence of Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments does not of course involve any decision as to their present or future boundaries, and must not be held to prejudice that question in smallest degree."

[169629/ME 58]

No. 22.

*Lord Hardinge to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis).*

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 12, 1920.

MY telegram No. 23 of yesterday.

Recognition of *de facto* independence of Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments does not, of course, involve any decision as to their present or future boundaries, and must not be held to prejudice that question in the smallest degree.

Please repeat to Tehran, Constantinople, and Mr. Mackinder.

[168553/ME 58]

No. 23.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 12, 1920.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of India Office letter No. P. 181 of the 7th January, regarding the desirability of stabilising the situation in the Middle East, and suggesting as means thereto, firstly, that His Majesty's Government should again take over the control of the Caspian Sea, and, secondly, that the interests of the three Caucasian Republics, and especially of Azerbaijan, should be united to those of Great Britain.

2. With regard to the first suggestion, I am to state that the Admiralty have recently expressed themselves as being strongly in favour of taking over the fleet in the Caspian Sea, and the final decision of the Cabinet on this point is now awaited.

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3. With regard to the second proposal, I am to point out that it is by no means clear what practical means are suggested for achieving the union of interests in question, and I am to state that Lord Curzon would be glad to receive an exact definition of the line of action proposed.

4. The whole question of meeting the threat of united action by the Bolsheviks and the pan-Islamic party in an attack on British interests in the East has for some time past been receiving the attention of this Office as well as of the Director of Military Intelligence and Admiralty. It is now receiving the attention of the Cabinet. Copies of recent telegrams from Mr. Wardrop in Tiflis have been submitted to the War Office\* in the letter of which a copy is enclosed herein,† with a request for the immediate consideration of the whole question of defence against the Bolshevik menace.

5. The question of the recognition by His Majesty's Government of the three Caucasian Republics, which is strongly advocated by Mr. Wardrop, will be raised by Lord Curzon in Paris.

I am, &c.  
E. PHIPPS.

[169528/ME 58]

No. 24.

*Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Derby (Paris).*

(No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Foreign Office, January 13, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 19.

Following for Lord Curzon:—

"Eastern Committee meeting was held yesterday afternoon.

"Chief Imperial General Staff said that War Office had been considering three alternative lines of defence against possible Bolshevik aggression:—

"(a.) Constantinople, Batoum, Baku, Kraznovodsk, Merv. This would entail command of Black Sea and Caspian, two divisions in Caucasus, and five divisions from Kraznovodsk to Merv.

"(b.) Constantinople, Batoum, Baku, Enzeli, Tehran, Meshed. This would entail command of Black Sea, but not necessarily of whole of Caspian. Approximately same total of seven divisions would be required.

"(c.) Northern Palestine, Mosul. Some point about 100 or 50 miles from Khanikin. Meshed force, if attacked, to fall back upon Birjand. This was only alternative considered practicable by War Office, and even in this case it was not certain that we could retain Mosul or Meshed.

"Figures for alternatives (a) and (b) were for British troops only. Co-operation of Allies would entail larger forces still, whose support and maintenance would become increasingly difficult as numbers increased. In any case War Office representatives were strongly of opinion that if there was to be any question of employment of considerable forces, even if only of two divisions, to hold the Batoum-Baku line, they would be more effectively employed in some such manner as an advance on Moscow through Poland with consequent heartening effect on anti-Bolshevik elements on all fronts, or in support of Denikin in Southern Russia.

"Admiralty stipulated retention of Baku essential to command of Caspian, though existing stocks of oil at Enzeli might render maintenance of Caspian fleet possible for a limited time. They were prepared to control Caspian if Baku were held, and pointed out that opportunity was unlikely to recur.

"Air Ministry could not contemplate provision of aircraft, as they were reluctant to release machines now available in Egypt and India.

"Committee were of opinion that in view of our inability to find the force entailed in the holding of line (a) or (b), of the difficulties of reinforcing troops in areas south and east of Caspian, and of military argument that such a force would be more profitably employed in aggressive action elsewhere, it was inevitable that we should fall back on alternative (c).

"At the same time it was not suggested that any immediate withdrawal should take place. It must first be established beyond question that there was no prospect of remnant of Denikin's force remaining in being as a screen against the Bolsheviks.

\* See Nos. 6, 7 and 10.

† No. 17.

"Committee suggest following reply to the eleven queries in your telegram:—

"1. Troops to remain for time being at Batoum, but to be evacuated before they are forced into a position similar to that of the French at Odessa.

"2. No military, naval or aerial assistance to the Georgian forces could be provided.

"3. So long as Denikin remained in being, only such small part of his packet as could be regarded as diverted in his own interests by lessening the possibility of republics throwing in their lot with the Bolsheviks should be diverted to Caucasus. If he were to collapse altogether, supplies given to the republics would be merely a present to the Bolsheviks.

"4. Protection of Baku could not be contemplated unless alternatives (a) or (b) were to be adopted.

"5. Though Denikin would undoubtedly welcome return of British naval personnel to Caspian, this could not be done unless Baku were to be held. He would almost certainly not agree to the destruction of his fleet, nor could we well insist on such destruction.

"6. Advanced British force at Qazvin to fall back when threatened, but not until forced to do so.

"7. Despatch of aeroplanes impracticable.

"8 and 9. General Malleson to be asked whether he could make use of additional officers to watch the Khorassan frontier.

"10. Strengthening of force at Meshed only desirable if alternatives (a) or (b) were adopted, in which case control should pass to War Office. In case of alternative (c) Malleson to fall back to Birjand if and when threatened. Transfer to War Office in this case unnecessary.

"11. Prolongation of railway to Neh only justifiable if Malleson to be reinforced. If he is to fall back on Birjand it will not be required."

Full report follows by bag to-day.

[170159/ME 58]

No. 25.

*Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 14.)*

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tiflis, January 11, 1920.*

FOLLOWING telegram from Colonel Stokes:—

"Azerbaijan Government ask if His Majesty's Government would authorise the sending of immediate help to Daghestan to prevent Bolshevik predominance.

"I suggest withdrawal of Volunteer Army and affirmative answer to Azerbaijan request. Please instruct me urgently."

I am replying that question has been urgently referred to His Majesty's Government, and that meanwhile, though I cannot authorise crossing of lines, I see no objection to Azerbaijan taking immediate steps on frontier to prevent invasion of Bolsheviks, and give moral support against Bolsheviks pending your Lordship's answer.

(Sent to Mackinder, No. 9; Constantinople, No. 14; and Tehran, No. 9.)

[170466/ME 58]

No. 26.

*Mr. Mackinder to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 14.)*

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Batoum, January 13, 1920.*

RELIABLE reports received that Bolsheviks are pushing down in some strength from Astrakan on Kisliyar.

Even if Cossacks hold firm, Bolsheviks must inevitably endanger communications with Petrovsk, which is Denikin's only available base for Caspian flotilla. Crews, from motives of self-preservation, would have to yield to Bolsheviks when ice breaks. Denikin has informed General Holman that he would now welcome flotilla being transferred to Enzeli.

[4370]

D 2



I understand already a month ago Azerbaijan Government were anxious lest flotilla should turn Bolshevik, join Bolsheviks on shore of Caspian and attack Baku. Their fears must be increased by Bolsheviks' advance from Astrakan.

From telegrams from Wardrop it appears situation generally in Transcaucasia is critical. In view of immense importance of shore of Caspian to Bolsheviks, I trust immediate steps will be taken to receive flotilla at Enzeli temporarily pending my fulfilment of proposals.

(Repeated to Constantinople, Commander-in-chief afloat.)

[170789/ME 58]

No. 27.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 15, 1920.)

(No. 131.)

My Lord,

Tiflis, December 20, 1919.

ENCLOSED I have the honour to transmit copy of a despatch No. 19 of the 18th December from Colonel Stokes, which forms the subject of my telegram of to-day, dealing with the situation in Transcaspia, its bearing on Persian and Transcaucasian affairs, and the attitude of the Turkomans.

I have, &c.

O. WARDROP.

Enclosure in No. 27.

Colonel Stokes to Mr. Wardrop.

(No. 19.)

Sir,

Baku, December 18, 1919.

ALL recent reports indicate that the Bolsheviks in Transcaspia mean to make every effort to capture Krasnovodsk, and to establish themselves on the Caspian Sea. They are further despatching numbers of agents to Transcaucasia and Persia to spread Bolshevik propaganda and form organisations with a view to making these countries Bolshevik. For some time past they have been endeavouring, though so far, I gather, with little success, to win over the Turkomans to their ideas. Mussulmans generally, and the Turkomans are no exception, do not take kindly to Bolshevism, and it appears to me that, in view of the serious danger to Transcaucasia and Persia which would follow a Bolshevik success in Transcaspia, the question whether the Turkomans cannot be utilised as an effective barrier, at any rate the most effective available, to stem the flow of the tide of Bolshevism in those parts, demands our serious and prompt consideration. The Turkomans, I was assured by Khan Yamutski and Orda Sirdar, their two leaders, are united, and, stretching as they do from Krasnovodsk to Merv, are in a position to take effective action against the Bolsheviks. The treatment meted out to the Turkomans under the old Russian régime resulted in their harbouring a deep hatred of Russia, but despite this they willingly co-operate with the Volunteer Army against the Bolsheviks. The inefficiency of that army and its senseless maltreatment of its Turkoman allies has, however, driven the Turkomans to look for some other solution to their difficulties. They appealed to us for a British protectorate, but this was refused, as was also a request for a small British mission. What they ask for is our support to their claims to be independent of Russia in the future. If promised our support in this respect they would, there is reason to believe, combine to take action against the Bolsheviks, and should be able to render the existence of the latter, with their long line of communication across Transcaspia, precarious, if not impossible.

His Majesty's Government were not some four months ago prepared to hold out any hopes to the Turkomans of their gaining their independence of Russia, but in view of the daily increasing danger to Persia and Transcaucasia I venture to suggest that the problem demands reconsideration, and that without delay.

The Persian Commissioner now at Baku, Saiyid Zia-ud-Din, informs me that he regards the danger to Persia as serious. He states that at Askhabad, where the Bolsheviks are powerful, there are several Persians amongst their commissars, and Bolshevik agents are active also in Persia.

I am not at present in direct touch with Turkoman leaders, but, if authorised to do so, can get into touch with them through Saiyid Zia-ud-Din or the Azerbaijan

Government. I would suggest that a telegraphic reference be made to His Majesty's Government, as, if it be decided to take action, it appears to me to be very important to do so without delay.

I am, &c.

C. B. STOKES, Lieutenant-Colonel.

[170729]

No. 28.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 15, 1920.)

(No. 2399. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 26, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 2127 of the 8th December on the subject of the proposed assembly, under the auspices of the Turkish Nationalists, of a Pan-Islamic Congress at Sivas, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a report giving some further information on this matter, which has been received from a secret source by the General Staff, Army of the Black Sea.

2. As Pan-Islamic activities are doubtless engaging the attention of His Majesty's Government, I venture to express the opinion that this proposed congress at Sivas is but one example of the efforts now being made in Turkey and other Mahomedan countries to develop and direct Islamic sentiment, which are at the present time more than ever deserving of serious investigation and consideration.

3. The Nationalists and Committee of Union and Progress elements in Turkey have realised the extent to which the country has been enfeebled by the war, both in men and resources, and how much it is at the mercy of the victorious *Entente* Powers it is but natural that they should endeavour to draw fresh strength from other Moslem countries, such as Persia, Egypt, India, and the Arab world. Moreover, both the Bolsheviks and the Turkish Nationalists have this in common, that they may both expect to profit from the arousing of an anti-British and Pan-Islamic sentiment amongst the Mahomedans of the Central States, and it is therefore to be anticipated that efforts are being made with this end in view.

4. Generally speaking, there would appear to be in varying degrees throughout all the Moslem countries of the Near and Middle East a growing tendency to react against European domination and control. This is perhaps a natural development, consequent on the growth of a political sentiment amongst the dominant classes, which becomes more active as the power of absolutism diminishes and is replaced by that of the political organisations which exercise control under the cloak of democratic institutions. Pan-Islamism may well be the framework upon which will be built up, on the grounds of community of religious and political interests and ideas, and with the object of making a stand against European intervention and exploitation, a general movement in these countries to get rid of foreign control and develop along their own lines. The expression "self-determination" has echoed throughout the Near East, and though perhaps naturally imperfectly understood, it yet forms the theme of every political scribbler and leader of public opinion. All measures tending to co-ordinate Islamic activities must therefore be of first importance to Great Britain during the next ten or twenty years, and require to be carefully followed up.

5. The activities of political parties or associations which are working to unite a direct Islamic sentiment for political ends should, I venture to think, be considered not as affecting only the country in which they manifest themselves, but more generally as being in relation to the activities of similar organisations in other Moslem countries and therefore having an important bearing upon the general political situation in the Near and Middle East. To allow of this being done it would be necessary that periodical information on the subject should be co-ordinated and the situation reviewed as a whole.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner.



Enclosure 1 in No. 28.

## Report.

(Secret.)

KARA BEKIR KIAZIM PASHA informs by telegram the Turkish War Office that Kurds have risen in arms against the British in Kerkuk and Suleimanie. Sheikh Mahmud has reoccupied Suleimanie and the surrounding villages; also Rowanduz and Erbil are cleared from British troops.

Sheikh Meshal Vel Seid Abbas, chief of Shammar tribe, and Nakib-el-Eshraf Seid Mehmed, chief of the Aneze tribe, have addressed a telegram to the Sultan expressing their attachment to the Ottoman Empire and assuring him that Mesopotamia, Nejd and Mean will by no means recognise any other suzerainty except that of Turkey.

(From No. 4 [undated].)

Enclosure 2 in No. 28.

## Report.

(Secret.)

MUSTAFA KEMAL has convoked a general meeting of different Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab chiefs in Erzerum, in which they will discuss the means to be employed in order to resist the establishment of an Armenian State.

The Azerbaijan representatives also have arrived in Erzerum, and the Congress has begun.

The following persons also take part in the Congress:—

Officer Commanding 13th Army Corps,	Djevet Bey.
" " 20th " "	Ali Fuad Pasha.
" " 3rd " "	Selahaheddin Pasha.
" " 15th " "	Kara Bekir Kiazim Pasha.

Kara Bekir Kiazim Pasha informs the Turkish War Office that five field howitzers have arrived in Erzerum from Azerbaijan.

Hadi Pasha, Amed Abouk Pasha, Abdurrahman Sheref Pasha, Salih Pasha gathered in the residence of Djemal Pasha, Minister of War, on Monday last, and prepared a project of a new military organisation. This project is examined by the Cabinet to-day.

Mustafa Kemal is busy with a new vast organisation. He has projected a force under the name of Quvva-I-Islamie, Islamic forces, composed of Kurdish and Arabic tribes. Every tribe will have its own part in this force. Kurdish regiments will be commanded by Kurdish chiefs, Arabic tribes of Mardin district by their sheikhs, Turkish regiments by Turkish officers, and Mustafa Kemal will have the supreme command.

In accordance with an agreement with the Government, the Nationalists will double their effective on the Aidin front. The recruits will be raised from Konia and Angora districts. The Government will supply the necessary equipment, funds, and means of transport.

(From No. 4 [undated].)

Enclosure 3 in No. 28.

## Report.

(Secret.)

A NEW secret committee has been founded in Constantinople. The aim of this Committee is to hold large meetings in Constantinople three days before the opening of the Houses and to demand the dissolution of the elections, as the new members are not elected by the people, but they are nominated by the Unionists, and that they are traitors. They will force the Sultan not to recognise their quality of membership.

This committee is organised by *Entente libérale*.

(From No. 4 [undated].)

[170654]

No. 29.

Mr. Vansittart to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Mr. VANSITTART presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to transmit copy of a paper communicated by M. Berthelot on the 11th January, respecting conditions of peace with Turkey.

Hôtel Campbell, Paris, January 12, 1920.

Enclosure in No. 29.

Note communicated to Earl Curzon by M. Berthelot, January 11, 1920.

## PEACE WITH TURKEY.

(Translation.)

IN breaking the peace and the treaties which assured its territorial integrity and its sovereignty, Turkey has freed the Allied Powers from every other obligation other than respect for the guiding rules of their own policy, which are besides in accordance with the general principles of justice. In closing the Straits, Turkey cut the communications of Russia with the Allies, caused Russia's political and military dissolution, and prolonged the war with all its disasters; such a catastrophe cannot be allowed to be renewed.

The following principles appear to be those which should govern the settlement of the Eastern question:—

1. The maintenance of an independent Turkish State, composed of the provinces inhabited by a majority of Turkish elements and placed under the sovereignty of the Sultan, remains decided.
2. No mandates and no spheres of political influence will be accorded to any specific Power in the Ottoman Empire as constituted by the provisions of the Peace Treaty.
3. Turkish militarism will be suppressed like Prussian militarism; neither the Turkish army nor the Turkish fleet will be maintained.
4. The absolute freedom of the Straits will be ensured; guardianship over them, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, will be entrusted to an international organisation safeguarding the effective neutrality of the passage.
5. The Armenians will be entirely free from the Turkish domination and constituted as an independent State.
6. The Arab and Syrian populations cannot be replaced under the Turkish yoke.
7. The rights of minorities represented by numerous peoples of different race and religion will be scrupulously guaranteed by a special treaty placed under the specific guardianship of the League of Nations, which will affirm their right to keep their civil and religious status, their educational and philanthropic establishments, and complete political equality.
8. The reform of Turkish administration (administration, justice, finance, gendarmerie) will be guaranteed by the control of the interested Powers.

Peace with Turkey offers four principal problems:—

- (A.) Constantinople and the Straits.
- (B.) Anatolia and Asia Minor.
- (C.) Armenia.
- (D.) Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.

(A.)—Constantinople and the Straits.

Two solutions are possible: the maintenance of the Sultan at Constantinople or the expulsion of the Turks from Europe.

From the point of view of ethics and history, the eviction from Europe of a State which has remained barren and incapable of progress, and is based on the right of conquest and the oppression of different races and superior civilisations, represents a



victory for right. Moreover, the loss of Constantinople would mark in Moslem eyes the definite eclipse of that mysterious power which the possession of Constantinople entrusted to the descendants of Osman over the Moslem peoples dependent on England and France. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks marked the end of the Middle Ages. Their exodus from Constantinople would signalise the birth of a new epoch. To these arguments of philosophy one may add the difficulty of guarding the Straits without a considerable military force and without a very large expenditure if Constantinople and its 800,000 inhabitants remain in the hands of the Sultan, and consequently within the reach of the intrigues of a Germany militarily reconstituted, and perhaps supported by Russia.

The doctrine of the maintenance of the Sultan at Constantinople has numerous supporters, especially in France, because the development of the latter's material and moral interests in Turkey is larger than that of any other Power (although England had in 1913 more than a quarter of the whole trade of Turkey, and more than double that of any other Power). France possesses in Turkey the bulk of railway capital and of undertakings of private and public interest, in which, before 1914, she had invested more than 3 milliards; she possesses a great part of the Ottoman Public Debt, and had exercised a preponderating influence in the administration of the so-called assigned revenues and in that of the tobacco régime. Her moral influence was safeguarded and propagated by hundreds of schools and philanthropic institutions, religious as well as secular, distributed throughout the towns of the Ottoman Empire. The continuance of the old Turkey is for the rest a system the simplicity of which pleases many practical-minded men, and which may appease the susceptibility of a reconstituted Russia. Even in England a large number of those interested in politics, impressed by consideration for Moslems of India, are opposed to the idea of removing the Caliph from his secular capital. Lastly, the military leaders of the Allied Powers and the Allied Commissioners at Constantinople are unanimous in drawing the attention of the Heads of their Governments to the growing power of nationalist feeling in Turkey, to the organisation of the army of Mustapha Kemal in Anatolia, to the weakness owing to demobilisation of the Allied forces on the spot and of other available troops, and to the extreme difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of making the Turks accept, without a large military expedition, the decision of the Allies, which is to expel from Europe the Ottoman Empire and Caliph.

In view of the considerable weight behind each of these two theories, there would appear to be room for contemplating successively both hypotheses.

#### 1. *The Establishment of a State of Constantinople and the Straits.*

In the event of the Powers deciding to drive back the Ottoman State into Asia in order to ensure the freedom of the Straits, it would be possible to create a State of Constantinople and the Straits, comprising in Europe the territory situated between the Sea of Marmora and the line Enos-Midia (or confined to the Chatalja lines), and in Asia only the Asiatic shore of the Straits of the Bosphorus (with a frontier running from Shile on the north to Ismid on the south) and of the Dardanelles (with a frontier running from Tenedos and following a line about 50 kilom. from the coast), the Asiatic shore and [sic] the Sea of Marmora remaining Turkish. All the islands between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean would be included in the State.

The new State would be placed in a general way under the high protection of the League of Nations. It would be neutralised. The fortifications would be destroyed (to an extent to be fixed by a Military and Naval Inter-Allied Commission), and a zone to a depth of 30 kilom. would be demilitarised on the Asiatic shores.

The administration of the State would at first be organised and directed by a Government Commission ("Commission de Gouvernement"), representing the most interested Powers. This Commission would be composed of two delegates of each of the great Mediterranean Powers (France, England, Italy), to which could be added subsequently the United States, if it desires to participate, and Russia, as soon as the latter Power should have been entirely reconstituted, and one delegate for Greece, one for Roumania, and ultimately one for Turkey.

In the event of a persistent difference of opinion between the members of the Commission the question at issue might be carried, by a vote of two-thirds of the delegates, before the Council of the League of Nations for decision.

The Chairman of the Commission would hold office for two consecutive years; he would be alternatively French and English, on account of the predominant material, intellectual and moral interests of France and England in the Ottoman Empire. The

chairmanship might, however, after a period of eight years, be entrusted to one of the other Great Powers to whom the chairmanship would fall by rotation by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Commission.

The Commission would establish the necessary administrations and regulations, would nominate Government officials, and would examine a draft constitution as well as a judicial system to be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.

The administration would be made as simple as possible, and the Departments reduced to the following:—

- (a.) Ministry of the Interior (including Public Works, Education, Health, Posts, and Telegraphs).
- (b.) Ministry of Finance (and Commerce).
- (c.) Ministry of Justice.
- (d.) Ministry of Defence (and Peace).

The Commission would exercise the command over the military and naval forces charged with policing the State of Constantinople and guarding the Straits. The strength of these forces would be fixed by the interested principal Allied Powers, and might be eventually modified subsequently by the Commission.

These forces would consist chiefly of a gendarmerie on land, and a naval defence force (both inter-Allied), their strength being such as to enable them to keep order and resist a sudden attack, coming whether from Europe or from Asia, sufficiently long to allow the English and French fleets to intervene.

The State would receive, within a period and in a form compatible with the general organisation of its administration, elective institutions placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. All residents in the State would enjoy complete civil and political equality whatever might be their race or religion.

Should the resources of the State be insufficient at first to defray the expenses of its administration (which expenses would have to be carefully reduced to a minimum), the upkeep of naval and military forces, its own share of the Ottoman Debt and the obligations undertaken by Turkey, the Powers represented on the Commission for Government would have to consider how best they could assist it, either by means of money advances or by the transfer of other guarantees to Turkey's creditors.

From the religious point of view, all mosques would be respected. St. Sophia alone would be set apart and respected as a monument of antiquity, no religious services being allowed therein (unless services of various religions were celebrated there turn about).

The Commission for Government of the State of Constantinople and the Straits would be entirely independent of the Ottoman State in Asiatic Turkey, and would take no part in the supervision exercised by the Powers with regard to the finance, justice, and gendarmerie of such State, which would be sovereign and independent.

All care would be taken when transferring the seat of government from Constantinople and detaching the same from the Turkish State, all facilities being given to retiring high officials, and the task of provisioning and supply being carried out with care. The principles laid down by the Allies with regard to reparation would be applied to the personal property of the Sultan, as well as to private property in Constantinople and throughout the whole of the new State.

#### 2. *Constantinople to remain as Capital of the Turkish State.*

Should this be the case, the general principles set forth above would apply to European Turkey, as well as to the remainder of the Ottoman Empire in Asia. It would only be necessary to provide for:—

- (a.) An inter-Allied force of about 30,000 men (one-third each being supplied by the French, the English, and the Italians). Its task would be to guarantee the absolute liberty of the Straits and to occupy the points decided on by military experts, but which should not include Constantinople, where no Turkish troops could be maintained other than the Sultan's small personal guard.
- (b.) The limitation of the Turkish State in Europe to a very restricted hinterland to the capital, which should not go beyond the Chatalja lines (to which Greek sovereignty would extend, to balance its limitations in Smyrna), in order to respect the principles of nominal Turkish sovereignty and to facilitate the withdrawal of the Italian troops of occupation.



- (c.) Application of administrative reform and of Allied control over the State of European Turkey.
- (d.) The proposed formation of an International Straits Company, to be formed by the fusion of the French and foreign companies interested in all matters concerning navigation in the Straits. The inevitable development of traffic throughout the East after the conclusion of peace makes it possible to consider a scheme which would permanently internationalise communications between the Aegean and the Black Sea. Such internationalisation cannot fail to facilitate the settlement of questions concerning the hinterland of these communications by sea.

The board of the company would be assisted by a commission composed of delegates of the interested Powers (or their representatives at Constantinople), which would form a supervisory commission. The funds required to defray the expenses of such a company would be furnished by supplementary taxes on navigation and trade, which would be settled by international agreement.

#### (B.) *Anatolia and Asia Minor.*

The Ottoman Empire, whether existing in Europe or not, will continue to exist in Asia Minor under the national Osmanli dynasty.

Its territory will be bounded as follows:—

1. To the north, by the Black Sea as far as the Lazistan frontier (to be assigned to Georgia) to the east of Trebizond.
2. To the west (by the enclaves assigned to the State of Constantinople on the borders of Asia, of the Bosphorus, and of the Dardanelles), or by the Asiatic side of the Straits and of the Sea of Marmora, then by the Mediterranean as far as the Cilician frontier (the Lama-su River).
3. To the south, by the course of the Lama-su, the Chamarlu Dag, the division of the rivers beyond Bulgar Dag, as far as Uch Kapular Dag, then a line corresponding to the boundaries of the vilayets and marked out by the Kisil Dag, the Hezanli, and the Belli Gedik Dag, as far as the Tokhma-su, then the course of the latter and that of the Euphrates downstream as far as the boundary of the vilayets of Mamuret-ul-Aziz and the Diarbekir, then the boundary of such vilayets as far as the Upper Euphrates (Murad-su), and thence downstream until its juncture with the Munzur-su.
4. To the east, along the Munzur-su as far as its source and along the Munzur Dag, then by a line starting from the eastern end of the Munzur Dag (Merjan Dag), rejoining the Black Sea to the east of Trebizond by the Kara Dera river, this town being left to Turkey, together with Erzinjan and the road which runs between the two, and also Kharput. Erzeroum would belong to the new Armenian State and Argana-Maden to the territory for which the French will receive a mandate.

The capital (in which the Sultan would reside) would either be Koniah, Angora, or Broussa (if Constantinople were not retained as capital).

The Ottoman Empire would retain its parliamentary institutions, which would be adapted to new circumstances by the following reforms:—

1. *Military and Naval Reforms.*—The Turkish army and navy to be done away with, as well as the Ottoman War and Naval Ministries. The Turkish gendarmerie would be reinforced, commanded and instructed by Allied instructors, and placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior.
2. *Legal Reforms.*—The Ottoman Court to be reconstituted an Inter-Allied Commission, the seat of which would be in Turkey, and which would make use of the work already done in this direction by the Paris Conference and the Allied delegations in Constantinople.

After the application of these reforms the Capitulations (which would remain in force during the interregnum) would be abrogated.

3. *Financial Reforms.*—It will be impossible for Turkey to carry out her obligations to the Allies without financial control, or even to exist; supervision of all sources of revenue and of the distribution of income are equally necessary. An Inter-Allied Commission (composed of French and English representatives, Italy

having no Turkish interests and not having declared war on Turkey, which means that no war expenditure has been incurred by her in that country. She will, therefore, have very little to claim before the Reparations Commission, as her nationals have suffered no damage) shall be entrusted with preparing these reforms and organising supervision by the Powers on the following bases:—

- (a.) The Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall concern itself both with finance and with currency. The Ottoman Budget and all financial laws shall be submitted to it for approval before being laid before the Ottoman Parliament.

The Commission shall be charged with all currency questions and shall supervise all State payments.

- (b.) The former Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, which has shown proof of integrity and usefulness and which presents the interests of foreign holders, shall have its powers extended and shall be entrusted with the collection of taxes. For this purpose it shall be attached to the Turkish Ministry for Finance and shall be given instructions by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. It will be difficult to alter the present rules and regulations for the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, seeing that they are the result of an agreement between its creditors and the Ottoman State made with the approval and sanction of the Powers; it would be unable to act without the revenues at present granted. It will in all probability have its principal offices at Constantinople.

4. *Administrative Powers.*—Administrative control will be ensured by the presence of three delegates (English, French, Italian), whose counter-signature will be necessary, in each Ministerial Department (except the purely political ones, such as the Grand Vizirate and Foreign Affairs). The controllers will meet in council twice a month under the presidency of the Grand Vizier to examine administrative and financial questions.

5. *Protection of Minorities.*—The particular rights of the numerous populations of different race and religion scattered in Asia Minor will be guaranteed by a special treaty framed in accordance with the principles adopted in the Treaties for the Protection of Minorities already signed in 1919 (by Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Serbia, Greece), but adapted to the special needs of Turkey.

This treaty will establish for these populations the right to preserve their civil and religious status, their scholastic and hospital establishments, and even, if this seems convenient, their jurisdiction so far as concerns litigation arising in each community in connection with civil and religious status, the persons concerned being entitled in case of need to choose between their special tribunals and the new tribunals whose organisation is proposed.

The exercise of these rights will be guaranteed by the international control of Turkish reform and by the intervention of the League of Nations, which must be carefully defined.

#### 6. *Situation of Europeans.*

(a.) *Greek Occupation of Smyrna.*—The Greek troops have occupied Smyrna in consequence of the decision of the Supreme Council, which was due to the disorder and abuses which reigned there, and must only leave the town gradually.

It will be necessary, while respecting the nominal Turkish sovereignty and assuring full liberty of commerce in this port of exit which is so important in Anatolia, to assure a special position for the Greeks in the administration of the town of Smyrna. This port will be constituted a free port under Inter-Allied control. Greece will receive a predominant part in the exercise of military and judicial control in the sanjak of Smyrna, with the exception of the financial control established for the whole of Turkey, which must not be sub-divided.

On the other hand, Greece should receive compensation in Europe by the attribution to her in full sovereignty of Adrianople and Thrace, up to the Enos-Midia line, the frontier of the State of Constantinople, perhaps even up to the line of Tchataldja, access to the sea being assured to the Bulgarians under the control of a European Commission.

The Greeks would in addition have a share in the governing Commission of Constantinople (in the case of a separate State being constituted there) and will receive doubtless the Dodecanese and Cyprus.



(b.) *Italian Occupation of Southern Anatolia (Scala-Nova, Adalia, Koniah).*—The Italian troops, who are provisionally in occupation of a part of Asia Minor, have not been summoned there by the Allies, and have, on the contrary, called forth written observations by the British, American, and French Governments, and a refusal by the Conference to recognise the legitimacy of this occupation.

The withdrawal of these troops will, in addition, be easily obtained, as well as that of the Greek troops, in consequence of the organisation of the Ottoman State of Turkey in Asia and the control exercised over it by the Great Powers.

The Italians, who have made an agreement with the Greeks for the return of the Dodecanese, and who will have a share in the governing Commission of the State of Constantinople, as well as in the financial, judicial, and military control of Turkey in Asia, will receive as compensation for the withdrawal of their soldiers economic advantages which might consist in a right of priority over all commercial enterprises in Southern Anatolia as well as in a Franco-Italian agreement for the coal mines of Heralia.

(c.) The French occupation in Syria-Cilicia, which is the result of an Anglo-French agreement and of decisions of the Conference, implies for strategic and economic reasons the possession of the passes of the Taurus, the historical defence of Syria. The French Government is disposed to organise the administration of Cilicia in such a way as to ensure to the Turkish majority of the population, as well as to the Armenian minority, their rights and the largest measure of protection.

#### (C).—Armenia.

Armenia will be constituted a completely independent republic under the high protection of the League of Nations.

It will be composed essentially by the reunion of the Russian Armenian Republic (which comprises about 1,500,000 Armenians) and of the former Turkish Armenia where it will be necessary to bring back the greatest possible number of the 500,000 Armenians dispersed in Asia Minor, at Constantinople, in the United States, in Persia, in Bulgaria, &c. In this way there will by degrees be reconstituted in reasonable limits what was formerly the Kingdom of Great Armenia; it may be remarked, that of all the States which are endeavouring to establish control on the Russian frontier, an independent Armenia is that which the Russians are most prepared to recognise.

The territory of the Republic of Armenia would comprise—

1. The existing territory of the Armenian Republic of Erivan, including the districts of Bocharie, of Upper Kanbak and Zangueour, which are at present contested by the States of Georgia and Azerbaijan.
2. The Turkish Empire: the eastern portion of the vilayet of Erzeroum, including the town and district of Erzeroum, the plain of Mouch, the district of Bitlis, and the region of Lake Van, up to the Persian frontier. The frontiers of Armenia with the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, with Turkey, with the French zone and Kurdistan, will be traced on the spot by an Inter-Allied Commission.

The Council of the League of Nations will be charged to take action in order to give to the Republic of Armenia the assistance in relation to supplies and money which one might attempt to obtain from the public, and in particular the American public, by interesting them in the fate of these unhappy peoples.

A force, which may be estimated at a minimum of 5,000 and a maximum of 20,000 men, to be organised in mixed detachments, seems necessary for the maintenance of order in Armenia. This force might be organised by officers supplied by the Allies, under the direction of the League of Nations, which would act by means of voluntary recruiting.

Since the territory of Armenia has no direct access to the sea, or at least does not include any port, the relations of the new State to the other countries will be assured by transit conventions between Armenia and the States which surround it, and by the establishment of Batoum as an independent free city, under the guardianship of the League of Nations. This constitution, similar to that of Danzig, would guarantee to Armenia and to the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan the use of the port of Batoum.

Armenia would be directly connected with this port, which is its natural outlet, by being linked up to the Tauris-Djoulfa-Chakhtakti-Bouddachine Railway by a

branch line between Tauris, over the mountain chains of Northern Persia, and the Black Sea. Armenia would also be connected with Constantinople, towards which the traffic of its valleys was directed in the nineteenth century by the linking up of the line from Erzeroum to Angora, and with the Mediterranean by a branch line towards Alexandretta, which would be connected with the line from Bagdad by Diarbekr and Mardin, the existing southern terminus.

The idea has been considered of attaching the Greek province of Pontos to Armenia and giving it Trebizond as an outlet, but this solution will not stand examination, for in the vilayet of Trebizond the Mahomedan element represents 80 per cent. of the population, and the country must remain Turkish as even the Greeks are of opinion. The construction of a railway from Erzeroum to Trebizond is practically impossible in consequence of the mountainous character of the country, and in addition such a line would never pay expenses.

The great difficulty in establishing Armenia is that the Armenians practically nowhere constitute a majority; the great objection to attributing to them countries such as Cilicia, where there is a strong national nucleus, situated more than 400 kilom. from Armenia, is that such an extension would certainly result in placing the Armenians in a definite minority in their State, and that when a genuine consultation of the inhabitants took place they would elect a majority of representatives hostile to the Armenians. One must never lose sight of the fact that it is further from the historical Armenia to the Mediterranean than from Switzerland to Cete, and that there are on the way only isolated groups of Armenians in a population with an enormous majority and implacably hostile. Reality and logic are equally opposed to the dream of a Great Armenia stretching from Trebizond to Alexandretta.

But in order to create the united Armenia which we have defined, of which half (Turkish Armenia) is still only a theoretical conception, it will be necessary first of all to protect the grouped elements of Russian Armenia against a Tartar and Kurdish population which is extremely hostile, then to bring back into Armenia from the four corners of Turkey and the world several hundred thousand of Armenians who are scattered, and little inclined to leave their businesses, to spend hundreds of millions to rebuild the destroyed villages, to remake the roads, to reconstruct the railways, to ensure the feeding of the population in a region which is absolutely ruined and deserted, and finally to defend the new inhabitants against an energetic Kurdo-Turkish population which has seized the land, a task which is particularly difficult, because the long slavery which Armenia has suffered has deprived her of confidence in herself. With the assistance of America and of the League of Nations this problem, which is very difficult, even in the most reduced form, can no doubt be resolved.

[170895]

No. 30.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, January 13, 1920.

MY despatch No. 13 of 3rd January.

Parliament was opened at very short notice on 12th January.

Sultan pleaded indisposition and did not attend.

About seventy-five deputies were present.

Speech from throne is comparatively colourless. Most emphatic passage is that which refers to increased difficulty and agitations produced by Greek aggression at Smyrna, which is inseparable portion of Empire. Remainder of speech dwells on troublesome nature of situation; wickedness of those who involved Turkey in general war, and innocence of military authorities; difficulty of return to normal conditions in view of unprecedented duration of armistice, and occupation of further territory by Allies during armistice; right of nation to continued political existence in spite of defeat in the war, need for united effort and for fundamental reforms, guarantees for rights of minorities and importance of utmost economy in finance.

Copy of speech will be sent by bag.

United States High Commissioner was one of spectators.

(Repeated to Athens.)



[170159/ME 58]

No. 31.

*Lord Hardinge to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis).*(Private and Secret.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, January 15, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 11th January.

Although whole question of assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan is still under consideration by Cabinet and Paris Supreme Council, I think it right to warn you that it is very doubtful whether any military assistance whatever will be given, or whether the sending of help to Daghestan can be "authorised" in the sense of the Powers accepting responsibility for the consequences. You should therefore avoid giving any encouragement to the republics to take aggressive action against either Denikin or the Bolsheviks.

Please repeat to Tehran, Constantinople and Mr. Mackinder.

[171711/ME 44 A]

No. 32.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 19, 1920.)*

(No. C 12.)

My Lord,

*Aden, December 31, 1919.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of my letter, dated the 31st December, 1919, to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 32.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to the High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal,

*Aden, December 31, 1919.*

THE following is a summary of news received since the despatch of my letter dated the 18th December, 1919:—

*Imam.*

Sheikh Hussain Hibatullah of Dthabara in Haras, in the imam's territory, arrived at Hodeida en route for Surat, India. Major Meek gathered from him the following:—

There are 1,000 imamic troops in Saafan and 600 in Menakha, above the Wadi Har. Two Shafai tribes of Shaafan, Madwal and At-Taraf, have refused passage to the imam's troops, who were moving down to oblige the Shaafan tribes to pay their taxes. The imam wishes to take Bajil, but has not the power. The imam's power came from Turkish money, and is dwindling. The people follow him only so long as he keeps a semblance of power, but would overthrow him if opportunity offered. There is much oppression from the imam's amils, who abuse their powers. The imam wants to have Hodeida and the Tehama. People generally dislike the imam but have no one else to put in his place. He cannot keep his place long, and the country will be split up into independent sections.

2. With reference to the above, there is no question of the imam's unpopularity, largely, I think, owing to his miserly habits. It remains to be seen, however, whether his power is on the decline. He is very aggressive at present in all fronts, and especially within the Aden Protectorate, and it is possible that it is his intention to assert himself before the proposed settlement of the boundaries of Arabian chiefs.

*Idrisi.*

3. Captain Fazluddin, liaison medical officer with the Idrisi, has returned from leave and proceeded to Jizan. He writes that the intrigues of the King of the Hedjaz with Hassan-bin-Aidh have failed signally. The latter, who received a bribe of 3,000L from the King, was deposed by his tribe, and the King's agent, Sharif Abdulla Hazim, had to fly at night for his life.

A large and representative deputation from Ebha, headed by the uncle of Hassan-bin-Aidh, has arrived at Jizan to ask pardon for the latter. They are awaiting the Idrisi's reply.

4. Major Meek, Political Officer, Hodeida, paid a visit to the Idrisi at Jizan to thank the Idrisi for his help in obtaining the release of the Jacob Mission. The meeting was most cordial, and Sayed Mustafa-al-Idrisi has offered to take Major Meek over the country in his car.

*Aden Protectorate.*

5. The activity of the Zaidi troops in the Aden Protectorate continues. The following is a résumé of the news received for the last ten days.

The Zaidis proceeded against the Shairis. The latter, headed by Sheikh Saleh of Al Malaha and others, resisted the Zaidis and killed twelve of them. On being reinforced the Zaidis drove the Shairis out of their dars and destroyed some of their houses. The latter left for Halmain, where they are now staying.

6. The Zaidis are still occupying the Muflahi villages of Snoko, Khalla, &c. They captured the nephew of the Muflahi sheikh and his party, numbering twenty men, who were posted as pickets, disarmed them and carried away everything they could find in the villages, including jowari, live-stock, &c.

7. The Zaidis entered Shaib (Upper Yafa), but at first met with strong resistance and were obliged to retire after sustaining a few casualties. They returned with a strong force and a gun, and the Shaibis were obliged to submit. The Shaibi villages were pillaged. The inhabitants of a village called Al Kuza fought with the Zaidis for three days. The people were led by the nakibs of Mausata and put up a fierce resistance, but at last had to retire for want of ammunition. They are said to be collecting more men to resume the fighting.

8. Some Zaidis are reported to have entered the Haushabi territory, and the Sultan has appealed for assistance.

9. I am in favour of helping those who are offering real opposition with ammunition, and am taking measures accordingly.

*Mokalla.*

10. The Survey and Agricultural Mission, consisting of Messrs. Little and Heald, and two assistants, left for Mokalla on the 19th December. I have deputed Captain Nasiruddin, who, if necessary, will accompany the mission on its journeys and will report on the political situation. If he can safely do so, he will also visit Sheban and Terim and report on the working of the Kaiti-Kathiri Treaty.

Captain Nasiruddin writes from Mokalla that the Sultan was very much pleased at the arrival of Messrs. Little and Heald, and that no serious objections are likely to be raised to his visit to Terim, on which he will start shortly.

Yours, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART.

[171712/ME 44 A]

No. 33.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 19.)*

My Lord,

*Aden, January 1, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter, dated the 1st January, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.



*The Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal,

*Aden, January 1, 1920.*

SINCE writing my news letter dated the 31st December, 1919, letters have been received from Upper Yafa giving details of the fighting there. I give below a résumé of the letters.

Sheikhs Bubaker Ali Askar and Mahomed Mosin Askar, nakibs of Mausatta, write that, seeing that the imam's lieutenant, Mahomed-bin-Yehia Abbas, had occupied the whole of the Amiri country and the Muflahi villages of Upper Yafa without resistance, they proceeded with a force to Shaib on the Yafai border and remained there for seventeen days. The Shaibis were, however, unable to entertain them longer, so they sent their force back, leaving only 100 men behind to picket the border. Subsequently, one of the sections of Shaib, the Sakladi, went to the Zeidis with sacrifices and hostages, in token of submission, without the knowledge of the nakibs, and owing to this treachery the nakibs were compelled to retire to the extreme corner of Shaib and encamp in the village of Al Kuza. They received a reinforcement of 600 men from Mausatta, and advanced and met the Zeidis in the village of Maklan, where severe fighting took place. The Zeidis lost here 30 killed and the Yafais 10 killed, with many wounded on both sides. After the Maklan fight the Yafais retired to Al Kuza. The Zeidis followed them, and a four days' fight ensued, the Yafais putting up a strong defence. The Zeidis were reinforced by 800 men and a gun, and succeeded in destroying the fortlets of Al Kuza after a bombardment lasting from morning till night. The Yafais then sallied forth and engaged the enemy in a hand-to-hand fight, and had at last to retire, having exhausted all the ammunition. The Zeidis occupied and looted Al Kuza. The Zeidis' casualties are put down as 180 killed, including those in Maklan, and Yafais 30, which included one of the nakibs of Mausatta, Saleh Mohsin Askar. The death of this nakib has so exasperated the Yafais, that they are said to be joining in large numbers to fight the Zeidis.

The nakibs draw my attention to our obligations under the treaty with them, and ask for immediate relief. They remark, "Sensible men say when will the relief come, and how long we will be promised. You might come out when you will find none of us alive."

The Muflahi sheikh also draws my attention to his treaty with us, and asks me to send troops at once to protect them.

The Zeidis have sent orders to the nephew of the Kotaibi sheikh to remove his post on the Hardaba pass, and he has complied with the orders. The Kotaibi sheikh has already warned his people to get a bullock ready and kill it before the Zeidis can do any damage in his country.

Arabs of places occupied by the Zeidis in our protectorate have been made to join the Zeidis in their attacks against other places in the protectorate. For instance, Dala people were used against the Ahl-ash-Shaib, and the latter against Halmin.

An informant states that Amir Abdul Hamid, brother of the Amir of Dala, left for Halmin and thence to the village of Dabab, where he had an interview with the Akils of Halmin and Al Ajud, in which he advised them to make their submission to the Zeidis before they came to them, reduced them to subjection, and pillaged their country. The akils replied that they would never submit. The Amir's brother is said to be acting under compulsion.

The informant says that during the last week the Akils of Halmin and Al Ajud, who carry on a blood feud, met in the village of Habil-al-Jabr and agreed to bury the hatchet and to co-operate with each other against the Zeidis.

It appears that general suspicion in our protectorate is that there is a secret understanding between themselves and the imam, hence the latter's activity in our protectorate and our indifference. The prevailing opinion is that if Government move up a few hundred troops, even as far as Nobat Dakim only, the Arabs, who are at present very nervous, will be emboldened to fight whole-heartedly, and that unless these troops move up before the Zeidis reach the Alawi territory, Government will find the greatest difficulty in facing the enemy, who will be helped by our protégés whom he has subdued.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[171840]

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 19.)*

(No. 45. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, January 17, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 25 of 19th January.

1. Removal of Jemal and Jevad has become not merely desirable, but imperative. Before receiving your telegram I was aware of existence of abundant evidence to show that whole national movement, primary object of which is to intimidate Peace Conference and prepare resistance to drastic peace terms, was again directed from Ministry of War.

On the receipt of your telegram I placed myself in communication with General Milne. He communicated to me a comprehensive statement of charges against Jemal, including his disrespect for decision of Supreme Council in regard to Smyrna delimitation, various flagrant breaches of express conditions of armistice, and other activities, all having for their object [group undecypherable] Allied authority and preparation for resistance as above. Jevad is known to be not only accomplice, but prime mover in these developments.

General Milne's statement convinced me that immediate action was called for and that only question was what form it should take. My French colleague, with whom I conferred, agreed as to desirability of action, but deprecated arrest of Jemal and Jevad by Allied military authorities mainly on the ground that it would expose Allied officers in interior to reprisals. We decided, after I had again consulted General Milne and my French colleague had consulted General d'Esperey, that the best course would be for Allied High Commissioners to demand removal of Jemal and Jevad within twenty-four hours, on the understanding that if demand were not complied with military authorities would be prepared to enforce it.

Advantages of this course are—

- (1.) It throws onus of action on Turks in first instance;
- (2.) It reduces to a minimum danger of reprisals; and
- (3.) If successful, it will discredit importance of Pashas and national movement infinitely more than other arrests by Allies, while it will constitute firm effective warning that Allies do not mean to be trifled with.

We fully realise proposed action may provoke general Cabinet crisis, and the two Pashas may fly to Anatolia. First of these contingencies does not greatly trouble us, as present Cabinet has no real control of situation, and is consequently of no particular value to us. Second will merely add two more to numerous fomenters of disorder in Anatolia.

I have set forth above at length in order to explain why I am taking action and not merely offering observations.

Italian High Commissioner has agreed in principle to course proposed [group undecypherable] perusal of charge-sheet against Jemal, which he has not yet seen.

Collective note to Porte is in preparation, and will be presented as soon as possible. Demand for removal will be based entirely on clear breaches of armistice.

2. I am opposed to making any "preliminary condition of peace" of kind calculated to aggravate nationalist feeling and delay negotiations. We have nearly as much interest as Turks in early conclusion of peace. It seems to me most important that all demands connected with peace settlement should be formulated simultaneously in draft treaty.

[171556]

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 18.)*

(No. 47. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, January 17, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 45 of the 17th January.

Text of collective note was agreed upon by three High Commissioners this afternoon.

[4370]

F



Note refers to previous collective note relating to Jemal's failure to comply with General Milne's instructions regarding Smyrna delimitation, and calls Porte's attention to further instances of improper conduct on the part of responsible heads of Ministry of War, as set out in enclosed schedule. It proceeds as follows:—

(D.) "Matter enumerated in this list involves definite breaches of article 5 and article 20 of convention of armistice between Allied Powers and Turkey, for which General Jemal Pasha and General Jevad Pasha are directly responsible.

"High Commissioners accordingly require Ottoman Government to remove the above-named two generals from their appointments within forty-seven hours of presentation of this joint note." (End of D.)

Offences enumerated in schedule are as follows:—

1. Despatch of specially selected officers from Constantinople for staff of National forces.
2. Despatch of men discharged, transferred from XIVth Army Corps to join National forces under orders from Ministry of War.
3. Secret despatch of arms to National forces proved by arrest of two officers caught red-handed.
4. Transfer of two battalions from Zumbuldak to Constantinople without permission of General Milne, and failure for over a month to obey orders for their return.
5. Transfer of 159th Regiment from Afium-Kara Hassar to Alashehr without permission. Jemal disclaimed knowledge of this, and eventually ordered return, but order was obeyed only by few details, and majority of regiment joined National forces.
6. Transfer of 174th Regiment from Brussa to Panderma without permission and failure even to notify movement until enquiry had been demanded.

We are now only waiting for military authorities to fix time for delivery of note which will fit in with their arrangements. This will probably be Monday morning, the 19th January.

Italian High Commissioner displayed almost insuperable reluctance to agree to note. He fought particularly hard against fixing of time limit, but eventually accepted note as drafted. French High Commissioner is preparing French text for signature. Note will be delivered by French political officer. French High Commissioner and I were in favour of presentation by the three High Commissioners in person, but our Italian colleague opposed this also so strenuously that we waived it.

[171843/ME 58]

No. 36.

*Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 19.)*

(No. 31. Private and Secret.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Tiflis, January 18, 1920.*

YOUR private and secret telegram unnumbered of 14th January.

Aggression of any kind on the part of Georgia and [? Azerbaijan] seems highly improbable. Both Governments have recently publicly declared their policy of absolute neutrality in Russian [? affairs]. All they desire is aid to preserve that attitude. They both realise that Bolshevism is now a cloak for Russian imperialism, but Daghestan is less conscious of danger from that quarter and some encouraging utterance by His Majesty's Government with regard to North Caucasus would be very valuable at this critical moment.

(Sent to Tehran, No. 17; Constantinople, No. 21; and Mr. Mackinder, No. 13.)

[172322/ME 58]

No. 37.

*The Earl of Derby to Lord Hardinge.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Paris, January 20, 1920.*

FOLLOWING from Lord Curzon:—

"At meeting on Monday, 19th January, Supreme Council accepted principle of sending help to Transcaucasian States, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in shape of arms, munitions of war and, if possible, food. British and French General Staffs

were instructed to consult as to means, and have telegraphed to General Milne to send an officer from Batoum to visit threatened States and report without delay as to their needs. Please instruct Wardrop and our other representatives in Caucasus to lend every possible aid to these enquiries."

[172133]

No. 38.

*Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 60. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, January 20, 1920.*

MY telegrams Nos. 45 and 47 of 17th January.

Slight hitch occurred at last moment, thus delaying presentation of note for twenty-four hours, but last night my colleagues and I met again and decided to proceed as originally intended. Joint note was handed over to Grand Vizier by French Political Officer at 11 A.M. to day, 20th January, in names of three High Commissioners. My colleagues and I thought it would be well to keep the Sultan apprised, and private message was therefore sent to His Majesty through sure intermediary immediately after delivery of note.

[172402]

No. 39.

*Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 21.)*

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, January 20, 1920.*

IT is reported from secret sources that a meeting of Ministers was called on 4th January to discuss report from Hurshid Pasha, one of two inspecting generals sent into Anatolia who had met Mustafa Kemal on 1st January. Report states following programme was decided by Cabinet on this occasion as result of understanding between Government and Mustafa Kemal:—

(a.) If Smyrna is given to Greece, Nationalists will declare their independence of Government and will attack Greek forces and Greek population. Government support was promised to Mustafa Kemal, and he was informed that Italian Government had promised not to interfere with Turks in their resistance to Greeks.

(b.) If Constantinople is detached from Turkey Government will publish address by Khalif to Ottoman world, and will proclaim general amnesty.

[172322/ME 58]

No. 40.

*Lord Hardinge to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis).*

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, January 21, 1920.*

SUPREME Council at Paris has accepted principle of sending help to Transcaucasian States, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in the shape of arms, munitions of war and, if possible, food. British and French General Staffs were instructed to consult as to means, and have telegraphed to General Milne to send an officer from Batoum to visit threatened States and report without delay as to their needs.

You should lend every possible aid to these enquiries and instruct all officers under you in the Caucasus to do likewise.

Please repeat to Constantinople, Tehran and Denmiss.

[172648/ME 58]

No. 41.

*Sir P. Cox to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 22.)*

(No. 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tehran, January 21, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 27 of 15th January.

I have discussed question confidentially with Cabinet.

In the circumstances they agree that transfer of the Volunteer Fleet to Enzeli is probably safest solution in general interests, but they point out it involves two dangers to Persia, for coping with which they count on our assistance.

[4370]

F 2



Firstly, mere fact of Denikin's fleet being harboured in Persian waters will increase hostility of Bolsheviks towards Persia and give them excuse of aggression on Persian coast of Caspian Sea.

Secondly, unless ships are treated as interned and disarmed, crews may at any time turn Bolshevik and use them against Persia, or may land forcibly and give trouble ashore.

If His Majesty's Government are in a position to assist Persia to guard against these contingencies, Persian Government agree to proposal, but express strong opinion that British detachment at Enzeli should be considerably strengthened.

[172442]

No. 42.

*Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 22.)*

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, January 21, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 60 of 20th January.

Late on afternoon of 21st January Minister for Foreign Affairs has addressed official letters to the Allied High Commissioners stating Minister of War and Chief of Staff have handed in their resignations, which have been accepted by the Sultan. Before decision was taken, Minister for Foreign Affairs called on each of the three High Commissioners to communicate explanation offered by Minister of War of charges enumerated in schedule referred to in my telegram No. 47 of 17th January.

For my part, I replied I was not prepared to enter into any discussion on the subject. I made it quite clear that action of High Commissioners had only been taken after their patience had been completely exhausted by repeated breaches of armistice and other signs of defiance.

My French colleague informs me he held similar language.

Both M. [sic] de France and I emphasised that the fact that attack was not directed against present Cabinet as such, and that we adhered to resolution of non-interference in internal politics.

As instancing attitude of Minister of War and his Chief of Staff towards Allies, I spoke very strongly of insolent behaviour of Turkish officers in the streets of Constantinople, behaviour which has made itself marked since Jemal and Djevad Pasha went to War Office and which, I said, was so universal that it could only be result of superior orders.

Impression I formed from armistice interview was that Minister for Foreign Affairs and Grand Vizier were extremely anxious to meet Allied wishes.

Capitulation of port indicates that they have succeeded, at any rate for the moment, in saving situation, but Cabinet has received severe shock and full results of incident will only be known when leaders of national movement here and in provinces have shown how they mean to take this rebuff.

[172978/ME 58]

No. 43.

*Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 44. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tiflis, January 22, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 3 to Foreign Office, paragraph 5.

Disquieting reports have reached me about Batoum town and province, and though matter is not one in which I have any right to interfere, I think it my duty to inform your Lordship that I believe—

1. The state of militia and frontier guard;
2. The large number of Armenians, Russians and other idle refugees;
3. The intrigues of the Jews and Bolsheviks in administration and elsewhere;
4. The activity of Bolshevik emissaries generally suspected to be working with Volunteer Army agents;
5. The suspicion that the loyalty of our troops is being tampered with;
6. The inadequate strength of the garrison;
7. Turkish intrigues amongst the Mussulmans of a certain faction;
8. Monetary and food troubles;

are matters which require immediate searching investigation, and I venture to suggest War Office might draw attention of Commander-in-chief.

I am repeating this to High Commissioner, Constantinople, for information of Commander-in-chief, No. 29, and to Batoum for information of Military Governor, No. 8. As regards 7, I understand an official declaration that Batoum province will not be restored to Turkey might do good, as rumours are current to that effect.

[174865/ME 58]

No. 44.

*Extract from Telegram from the Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.*

(No. 105.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, January 26, 1920.*

8. THE United States Ambassador stated that he had received instructions from his Government to inform the Conference that they concurred in the decision taken by the Supreme Council to grant recognition to the Republic of Armenia, on the condition that this recognition in no way prejudiced the question of the future frontiers.

The Armenian representative in Washington had been notified accordingly. On the other hand, while appreciating the point of view of the Allied and Associated Governments in wishing to render material assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, he could not but feel that the question of the recognition of these Governments as *de facto* Governments raised issues of great scope and importance. The possible effect on the minds of the Russians, hitherto friendly to the Allied and Associated Governments' demands, of such a recognition, which may be emphasised by the Moscow Government as the beginning of an attempt to dismember their Government, demands the very serious attention of the United States Government.

[173890]

No. 45.

*Summary of Events leading up to the Despatch of a Mission under Colonel Jacob to the Imam of Sanaa.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)*

ON the 20th March, 1918, the Resident at Aden invited the imam to come in definitely on our side and turn the Turks out of the Yemen. He promised that if the imam were to do this his independence would be ensured; he would be supplied with the necessary munitions; the disposal of Turkish prisoners of war would be left to him; he would be financed on a pre-war Turkish scale, tribal subsidies being paid through him and not direct, and a non-Idrisi port would be opened to trade for his benefit. The terms of our treaty with the Idrisi were explained to him at the same time. 83622/18.

On the 5th May, 1918, the imam sent a non-committal reply, in which he reiterated his previous claims to the overlordship of the Yemen, and made a few scathing remarks about the Idrisi. 126866/18.

He made twelve demands, as follows:—

1. Supply of munitions before commencement of operations.
2. Establishment of his rule and independence over all the Yemen, *i.e.*, over that part which was once under the sway of his predecessors, as also over that which his hand should acquire. His Majesty's Government to undertake to close access absolutely and continuously to all, whoever they might be, who propose to make aggression in the Yemen.
3. His Majesty's Government to pay the same subsidy which the Turks used to pay, all sums to pass through the imam's hands.
4. His Majesty's Government to have no direct dealings with any of the people of the Yemen, except the Sultan of Lahej.
5. Despatch of armoured troops.
6. Security for Yemen merchants in British dominions.
7. Prohibition of import of spirituous liquors, wanton pastimes, and all munitions except those intended for his use.
8. None but Moslem merchants to be allowed in the Yemen except with his permission.
9. Immediate opening of a port, *e.g.*, Hodeidah or Mokha.
10. No interference.
11. Prisoners of war to remain at his disposal.
12. Recovery of debts due to him by the Turkish Government.



159258/18.

On the 19th September Sir Reginald Wingate proposed to reply to these demands as follows:—

- 1, 3, 9, and 11: To repeat undertaking given in the letter of the 20th March.
- 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12: To give temporising replies.
- 2, 4, and 10: (a.) His Majesty's Government to reaffirm their willingness to ensure his independence in the Yemen without prejudice to their protectorate rights and their obligations to the British and stipendiary chiefs.  
(b.) His Majesty's Government to disclaim any wish to intervene in internal affairs of the country, provided that the interests of British subjects would be adequately safeguarded there.  
(c.) His Majesty's Government to propose that, in return for their assistance, the imam should undertake not to enter into treaty relations with, nor to alienate territory, nor grant concessions to a foreign Power without their consent.  
(d.) The imam to be asked to send an envoy with fuller powers to treat and an exact knowledge of his requirements in money and material.

On the 29th September this proposed reply was approved, subject to the following considerations:—

1. Arms not to be supplied until more satisfactory guarantees have been received that they would be used against the Turks.
2. Imam to be told frankly that His Majesty's Government could not agree to his second and fourth proposals.

159258, 18.

On the 14th October Sir Reginald Wingate reported that the proposed letter to the imam was being held up in view of the change in the Aden political situation. He also brought up the question of the amount of the proposed subsidy.

172213/18.

On the 31st October an armistice was concluded with the Turkish Government.

191797/18.

On the 20th November a report was received that the imam was obstructing the evacuation of Turkish troops from the Yemen on the ground that the Turkish Government owed him large sums for the upkeep of Turkish troops during the war.

2814/19.

On the 6th January a report was received that the imam was sending a deputation to Aden, and on the 15th January the General Officer Commanding, Aden, reported that his envoys had been sent back on the ground that they had presented letters to the French, American, and Italian representatives, and that this proceeding constituted a misuse of envoys.

29118/19.

On the 21st February a letter was received from the imam to His Majesty the King, in which he begged that his independence and rights of suzerainty in the Yemen might be recognised. He also complained of the British occupation of Hodeidah. This letter had been handed in at Aden by the imam's envoys.

26118, 19.

On the 6th March the Italian Delegation in Paris informed Mr. Balfour that the imam had asked for representation at the Peace Conference, and asked what answer should be returned. They were told that as the question of representation had been finally disposed of there could be no question of complying. Mr. Balfour impressed upon the Foreign Office the necessity for pressing on negotiations to bring the imam definitely into our orbit, and Sir M. Cheetham was instructed accordingly.

40937/19.

On the 11th March Sir M. Cheetham expressed the opinion that the imam's financial straits offered a hope that he might be induced to make a reasonable and durable agreement. He recommended the continued occupation by His Majesty's Government of Hodeidah, and perhaps Mocha, coupled with support of the Idrisi at Loheiya.

36308/19.

On the 14th March it was suggested to Sir Milne Cheetham that, in view of the disappearance of Turkish rule in South-West Arabia, the general policy of His Majesty's Government towards the imam and the Idrisi should be reconsidered, and the system of subsidising small sheikhs should be discontinued.

44168/19.

On the 21st March Sir M. Cheetham reported that he had received a letter from the imam deprecating the summary dismissal of his envoys, expressing a wish to maintain his old-standing friendship with us, and asking for a recognition of his territorial and financial claims against the Turks.

On the 26th March Sir M. Cheetham was instructed to authorise the Resident at Aden to inform the imam that the question of his representation at the Peace Conference had been finally disposed of and that territorial questions were under consideration.

On the 27th March the Foreign Office pointed out to Sir M. Cheetham that the suggestions put forward in his telegram of the 11th March amounted practically to a proposal to bring pressure to bear on the imam by blockade measures. The imam might object to the Idrisi occupying Loheiya, and it was thought unwise to take any step which appeared to prejudge the issue between the imam and the Idrisi. The suggestion was made that Colonel Jacob should be sent to ascertain the imam's views as a preliminary measure.

On the 10th April General Allenby telegraphed that he was in entire agreement with the general policy proposed in regard to the imam and Idrisi. He suggested that a treaty should be formulated with the imam especially excluding boundary questions. A treaty was being drafted and would be telegraphed shortly for approval. General Allenby's reply was based on the assumption that Great Britain was to be given a mandate for Arabia. This point was referred to Paris.

On the 14th April General Allenby reported that in his opinion His Majesty's Government should endeavour to avoid permanent occupation of any points outside the present Aden protectorate, with the possible exception of Salif.

He also gave his views as to the boundaries between the imam and the Idrisi.

On the 16th April General Allenby telegraphed the outline of a draft treaty, by which His Majesty's Government were—

1. To reaffirm willingness to ensure imam's independence throughout Yemen without prejudice to present British protégés;
2. To deal with him alone within the Yemen, provided his rule is just and palatable to his subjects;
3. To prevent import of liquor and harmful drugs;
4. To allow the Yemen free trade by sea as soon as military exigencies permit;
5. To have all harbour and railway concessions;
6. Not to be liable for continuance of old Turkish stipends nor for settlement of Turkish debts;

while the imam was—

1. To guarantee religious freedom of all his subjects;
2. To correspond with the British Government alone;
3. Not to cede, sell, or mortgage any part of the Yemen to other Powers or people;
4. To forbid all import of arms, applying in case of need to His Majesty's Government;
5. To have no foreigners in his service without the consent of His Majesty's Government;
6. To put the question of frontiers in the hands of a Commission, at which all concerned would be represented;
7. Both the imam and His Majesty's Government to have official agents—the imam at Aden, His Majesty's Government both at the imam's Court and at such of his ports as they deemed necessary;
8. To arrange, where circumstances permitted, that goods for the imam's personal use and for British Government official needs be allowed to pass customs free of duty.

Finally, His Majesty's Government were to pay the imam a subsidy to enable him to carry out his obligations.

On the 25th April General Allenby proposed that Colonel Jacob should be sent immediately to negotiate with the imam, and on the 28th April he requested that a reply might be expedited, as it was essential that matters should be carried through before the 1st June. He was informed on the 1st May that definite instructions could not be given until a reply was received from Paris.

On the 6th May General Allenby proposed that negotiations should be postponed until the position of His Majesty's Government as regards Arabia was clearly defined, and on the 7th May a reply was received from Mr. Balfour from which it was clear that His Majesty's Government were not to demand a mandate for Arabia, but that efforts were to be made with a view to their special position in the peninsula being recognised by the High Contracting Parties.

The Foreign Office accordingly referred General Allenby's proposal for the postponement of negotiations to Mr. Balfour on the 13th May and proposed to concur.

On the 17th May Mr. Balfour replied that there appeared to be some advantage to be gained by expediting the conclusion of a treaty with the imam, as, if and when



the question of Arabia came to be discussed by the Peace Conference, His Majesty's Government might be in a stronger position if they had by that time concluded a treaty with that ruler. He was content, however, to leave the date of Colonel Jacob's mission to Lord Curzon's and General Allenby's discretion.

75632/19.

The Foreign Office informed General Allenby of this decision on the 24th May, and expressed the opinion that it would be well to defer the final conclusion of the proposed treaty until after the peace settlement. They thought, however, that it would be well to open negotiations forthwith, both to strengthen the British case at the Peace Conference and to reassure the imam. They decided that Colonel Jacob should be despatched forthwith to open preliminary discussions.

79665/19.

On the 26th May Lord Allenby replied that Colonel Jacob was in any case unlikely to accomplish anything during the month of Ramazan (June), and that Colonel Jacob himself was convinced that it would not be possible to come to any understanding with the imam until the position of His Majesty's Government *vis-à-vis* Arabian rulers was clearly defined. He made alternative proposals that a committee of delegates from Arab rulers should be formed in Cairo, and that Colonel Jacob should first visit London and Paris. The Foreign Office pointed out in reply that there was no prospect of obtaining an early settlement of the Arabian question in Paris. The object of Colonel Jacob's mission was not that he should arrive at a definite understanding with the imam, but only that he should reassure him as to the policy of His Majesty's Government, and inform him that they felt bound to recognise the Idrisi. Inaction might result in a conflict between the imam and the Idrisi, which, taken in conjunction with the recent outbreak of hostilities between King Hussein and Ibn Saud, might have serious results.

The formation of the proposed committee was for the time rendered impracticable in view of the strained relations between King Hussein and Ibn Saud, and the despatch of experienced political officers to the imam and the Idrisi was considered the best policy, provided that it could be safely and expeditiously carried out. Colonel Jacob should accordingly be despatched to the imam if the latter expressed his readiness to receive him, and Captain Clayton should at the same time be sent to the Idrisi.

92266/19.

On the 13th June General Allenby reported that the two officers were ready to proceed. He pointed out that by their treaty of 1915 with the Idrisi His Majesty's Government were bound to use every diplomatic means in their power to adjudicate between the imam and the Idrisi at the conclusion of the war.

92367/19.

On the 22nd June General Allenby suggested that in order to ensure a good reception for Colonel Jacob His Majesty the King should write a letter to the imam, and that the latter should be informed that this was being done.

98000/19.

On the 7th July the Foreign Office concurred in a proposal made in a despatch of the 19th June from General Allenby that Colonel Jacob should proceed to England and report on the conclusion of his negotiations. They presumed that he clearly understood that no actual treaty was to be signed, and added that he should be particularly careful to make no promise that a subsidy would be paid to the imam.

99705/19.

On the 17th July a letter was despatched to the imam by His Majesty the King in which the object of Colonel Jacob's mission was explained.

111636/19.

On the 3rd August General Allenby reported that a letter had been received from the imam in which he stated that he would receive Colonel Jacob with special distinction. He would despatch officials and cavalry to Hodeidah as escort if he were given early notice of Colonel Jacob's arrival.

1171 2/19.

121592/19.

The mission left Aden for Hodeidah on the 14th August, and proceeded on the 25th August to Bajil, where the imam's escort was to meet them. They were escorted from Hodeidah to Bajil by two sheikhs of the Quhra tribe.

125585/19.

On the 31st August Colonel Jacob reported that he and his mission were practically prisoners at Bajil, having been detained by the Quhra sheikhs. The imam's agent and escort were said to be similarly detained.

After protracted negotiations, the mission were finally released on the 13th December and returned to Aden.

H. W. Y.

[173857]

No. 46.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 27.)*

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 25, 1920.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called on me on 24th January and said Porte had heard that, in consequence of rumours which were afloat about impending disturbances in Constantinople, it was intended to bring here division of Greek troops to maintain order. Turkish Government could not in any way vouch for accuracy of information, but thought it their duty to draw attention to [sic] my colleagues and myself to report, as any such importation of Greek troops could not fail to produce consequences even more deplorable than those of Smyrna occupation.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said Grand Vizier had also heard that Greek troops on railways in Thrace were making ready to leave and were saying openly that they were to be replaced by others, as they themselves were being sent to Constantinople.

I said I had heard nothing from any source, either official or otherwise, either of fear of impending troubles in Constantinople or of intention to bring Greek troops here. I promised to inform your Lordship and Officer Commanding-in-chief. I reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs that rumours about Smyrna, reproduced in my telegrams Nos. 3 and 23, had proved baseless. I took an opportunity of reading to him Lord Granville's telegram No. 9 of 9th January to the Foreign Office, with suitable modifications, as showing how much rumours were received in Athens.

Turkish Government are in highly nervous state. I presume there is not the smallest ground for supposing that Greek troops would be brought here in force for any reason before announcement of peace terms. If there were, I could only endorse most strongly Minister for Foreign Affairs' view that consequences would be disastrous.

As regards Greeks on railway, I understand my French colleague has explained to Minister for Foreign Affairs that only change is that Greek troops hitherto scattered in small detachments are being collected in two or three stations where they are more manageable.

(Sent to Athens.)

[174130]

No. 47.

*Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 28.)*

(No. 17. Confidential.)

British High Commission,

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 4, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a report submitted to me as Commander-in-chief by Commander H. C. Luke, R.N.V.R., Political Officer on the staff of the Naval Commander-in-chief, on the effects of Bolshevism on the British Empire.

2. I also enclose a memorandum by Mr. Ryan, of this High Commission, remarking on Commander Luke's report.

3. I bring these two papers to your Lordship's attention in view of the experience of the writers.

I have, &amp;c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

*Commander Luke to Rear-Admiral Webb.*

Commander-in-chief,  
Submitted:

"Iron Duke" at Constantinople,  
December 25, 1919.

THE recent Bolshevik successes are likely to give an impetus to what is, it is submitted, one of the most important of Bolshevik aims, namely, to turn the Moslem world against the British Empire.

[4370]

G



It may be doubted whether this aim, and the reality of the dangers to be apprehended therefrom, are as fully realised as they should be.

2. It is recognised that no Allied Power has incurred the hatred of the Bolsheviks so deeply as Great Britain, who is regarded by them as their most formidable enemy. In order to inflict injury on the British Empire, the Bolsheviks will use any instrument and any device, and will readily feign to disavow their own principles if thereby they can enlist Allies in their anti-British machinations. No principles, for example, are more fundamentally incompatible than those of Bolshevism and Islam; no two systems have less in common. Yet Bolshevism is making determined, and by no means wholly unsuccessful attempts, to delude Moslems into believing that the Moslem world would do well to ally itself with Bolshevism in war against the British Empire. These attempts are being made at the present moment in Turkey, Transcaucasia, Persia, Turkestan, Afghanistan, India, Syria, Arabia, and Egypt; and it is submitted that they merit the most serious attention.

3. Skilfully making use of every circumstance lending itself to misinterpretation or distortion the Bolsheviks have succeeded to make large numbers of Moslems in various parts of the Near and Middle East honestly believe that Great Britain is the enemy of Islam. The despatch of a Greek Army of Occupation to the Moslem province of Aidin, with its deplorable results, has been a useful and much used argument. The delay in concluding peace with Turkey, resulting in the rise of the national movement and the resurrection of the Committee of Union and Progress has provided valuable allies or, more correctly, tools. Another successful argument has been the injudicious policy of Great Britain's ally, Denikin, towards Moslem Daghestan and Azerbaijan. Moreover, the failure of the British Government (at all events, to the Oriental mind) to inflict drastic punishment on the Amir for his insolent aggression has tended to make the dupes of the Bolsheviks believe that the British Empire can be defied with impunity.

Very skilfully, too, the Bolsheviks are contriving to turn the somewhat vague and unformed aims of the pan-Islamic movement, such as it is, into anti-British channels. Great Britain, until recently regarded by Moslems as their principal protector, is now made to appear in the contrary light; and Mustafa Kemal is reported to be summoning a pan-Islamic conference, with deputies from Persia, India, Afghanistan, &c., to meet at Sivas. This conference, if it meets, will no doubt indulge in much anti-British propaganda; and although any deputies attending such a conference would necessarily be non-representative of real Moslem opinion in their respective countries, they will be capable of doing a considerable amount of harm.

4. An unfortunate factor in the situation is that these activities are creating an atmosphere of suspicion against Islam in Great Britain, where public opinion is not always sufficiently informed to distinguish between what is representative and what is not. To this atmosphere recent events in Egypt have very naturally contributed.

It would seem most desirable that steps should be taken to prevent a barrier of mutual distrust from growing up between Great Britain and the Moslem world. It is suggested that His Majesty's Government might, with this object in view, make some conspicuous public pronouncement, emphasising that Great Britain is now as ever the friend of Moslems; and that from the Moslem side similar pronouncements should be evoked from, say, King Hussein, the Emir Feisal, the Aga Khan, &c. It is also submitted, very tentatively, that a more cordial attitude might be adopted by the British authorities to the ex-Senussi, Sidi Ahmed, now living in the neighbourhood of Constantinople. Sidi Ahmed professes to be very pro-British, but his advances have always been ignored by our authorities from a sense of loyalty to the Italians. He still wields considerable influence in Pan-Islamic circles (incidentally he girded the present Sultan of Turkey with the sword of Osman), and he might conceivably prove most useful to us. I submit that we are under no such obligations to the Italians who are intriguing against us both here and in Egypt as to refrain, out of deference to them, from utilising Sidi Ahmed should it be found that he could be profitably used.

5. I further submit that the Bolsheviks' menace to the Far East is a very real one, irrespective of whether they now succeed in Russia or whether they fail. If they fail, and carry out their threat to retire via Turkestan into Western China, they may there find much fertile soil for their doctrines. Quite recently, for example, it has been reported that the Koreans, wearied with Japanese oppression, have taken to Bolshevism. The Emir of Bokhara is understood to be strongly opposed to Bolshevism, and, if properly supported, he should prove a valuable stumbling-block to the Bolsheviks' *Drang nach Osten*.

6. It is submitted that two ways whereby the Bolshevik plan to deceive Islam can be checked are:—

(1.) The adoption by the Conference, in drawing up the Turkish Peace Treaty, of the principle that no predominately Ottoman districts are to be placed under Greek rule.

(2.) Early recognition by the Peace Conference of the independence of Azerbaijan, which the Bolsheviks are working hard to win over.

H. C. LUKE, *Commander, R.N.V.R.,*  
*Political Officer.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.*

I AGREE almost entirely with Commander Luke's premises. Everything points to converging activities of the Bolsheviks and the political pan-Islamists. The object of the latter is to weld all Moslems into one whole to be used as an instrument against the west, especially against the Allies, and most especially against Great Britain. Constantinople is the natural pivot of this movement on the Islamic side.

2. Community of destructive aim enables both these forces to work in for the time being with extreme nationalist sentiment in eastern and probably in some western countries. In the case of Moslems the argument may be said to be expressed in one of two formulae employed according to the requirements of the particular situation:—"Be nationalist because it is the only way to save Islam," or "Be loyal to Islam because it is the only way to save your national inheritance."

3. How far all the converging activities so made up have a common instigation in Germany is for me a matter of doubt. There can be no doubt, however, that so far as Constantinople and Turkey generally are concerned they are in some measure the creatures and wholly the instruments of what in one aspect is the Committee of Union and Progress, in another the present "national movement."

4. While some of the forces in play must exhaust themselves or can be crushed, others contain in themselves the element of growing strength. Bolshevism is in the first category because, in its most ideal form, it is anarchical. Pan-Islamism is in the second. It is specially dangerous for Great Britain because the destruction of British rule over Moslems, even materially beneficent rule, can be represented as a religious ideal.

5. We cannot crush Pan-Islamism any more than we can crush the nationalisms of the West. Our aim must be to divide, to conciliate, and to rule. It is necessary to divide and to conciliate, because we do not want Moslems to rally as a whole round the fundamental but at present half-forgotten principle that Moslems should not be ruled by non-Moslems.

6. The above explains why I have more than once urged—

(a.) That the national movement is implacably anti-*Entente* and anti-British; that we must not lightly think it has lost its strength, which is protean; and that, however reluctant we have been to fight it or even to recognise it as hostile hitherto, we shall have to fight it in the end if we want to impose a hard peace on Turkey; and

(b.) That on the whole it is not politically desirable to challenge the enmity of the sections of Islam which recognise the Sultan-Caliph coming under the exclusive control of any Power other than Great Britain.

7. Commander Luke's memorandum strengthens my conviction regarding (a). As regards (b) its bearing is this:—I do not feel that any public pronouncement of friendship for Moslems, such as he suggests, would weigh much against the complete destruction of Turkey by depriving her not only of her outlying provinces but also of Constantinople and Smyrna. Considerable sections of Islam would regard the pronouncement as mere hypocrisy, and the withdrawal of Constantinople from Moslem rule as a deliberate blow at Islam. I am inclined to doubt whether even King Hussein and Feisal would now welcome the expulsion of the Sultan from Constantinople.

8. Commander Luke mentions two other specific measures of conciliation, viz., niceness to Ahmed Es-Senussi and early recognition of Azerbaijan. I cannot speak confidently of either. We are awaiting a memorandum from Cairo as to the recent history of the Senussi and can then judge better. In the meantime, I do not think



that here in Constantinople Seid Ahmed counts for much, nor do I think his pro-British sentiments amount to more than eagerness to get our help in going home, and a desire to play us off against the Italians. Our attitude to him must be determined by African considerations.

9. I mistrust Azerbaijan politicians profoundly and dislike the idea of giving Azerbaijan any preferential treatment in the matter of recognition. I feel that for a long time to come an independent Azerbaijan will tend to gravitate towards Turkey. I think that pending a general settlement our attitude towards Azerbaijan should be one of amiable reserve.

*British High Commission, Constantinople,  
December 29, 1919.*

[174487/ME 44 A]

No. 48.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 29.)*

My Lord,

*Aden, January 14, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter, dated the 14th January, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 48.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to the High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal,

*Aden, January 14, 1920.*

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my letter, dated the 1st January, 1920:—

*Imam.*

Major Meek writes that Abdul Kadir, son of Shurai Pasha, has come back from Taiz, where he held an official post. According to him, the sheikhs of the Taiz district would rid themselves of the imam if any means offered. The trouble is that the imam's Shafai tribes have no leader, and that every man is against his neighbour. In Sana, people praise the imam, but in their hearts they hate him. Men suspected of disloyalty are given short shrift.

Abdul Kadir heard nothing of the imam's intention to obtain the whole Aden protectorate, and says the imam has taken Dala because he has always claimed it as his.

Recently an agent of the Political Officer, Hodeida, visited Sana. While he was there one of the imam's lieutenants, Sharif Abdalla-ad-Domain, left Sana with two bulaks (companies) of the imam's soldiers and one gun in the direction of Mevakha.

The agent says that tithes for the imam at the rate of 10½ per cent. are levied on grains and animals, and that great activity is shown in their recovery. People feel oppressed by the imam's treatment, but they fear him. They are ready to revolt against him if they are given money and encouraged.

The agent states that his enquiries show that the imam is not really pleased at the release of the mission, though he pretends otherwise. He is suspected of having had a hand in their detention. The agent says that he cannot say what Mahmud Nadhim's intentions are, but he has heard that he has fallen out with the imam. His house at Sana is kept under surveillance.

The agent states that twelve cavalry and eight sowars on mules have left to escort him back to Sana from Bajil, and that it is publicly known in Sana that he had been the chief cause of the detention of the mission.

People in Sana are alarmed at the report that aeroplanes have gone to Malhan. This report is of course incorrect.

The agent reports the arrival of a deputation at Sana from King Hussein. It is believed that the aim of this deputation is to form an alliance between King Hussein and the imam against Ibn Saud.

In my opinion it is quite as likely that any alliance is aimed against the Idrisi as against Ibn Saud only. Sharif Nasir-bin-Shukr, who heads the deputation, arrived here from Jeddah with a letter from the assistant British agent there, and left for Sana in November last. He was accompanied by another sharif, Suleman-bin-Abdul Kadir, and three followers. While here Sharif Nasir stated that the object of his going to Sana was to bring about a better understanding between King Hussein and the imam.

The agent also reports the arrival of a Saiyid-as-Shahoodi from Constantinople. I am making enquiries about him and his mission in Sana.

From news received from another source, Raghib Bey appears to be the imam's chief political adviser. The latter visits the imam every night, when matters are discussed. Decisions arrived at are sent to Kanan Bey to be put into execution.

A correspondent at Beit-el-Fakih writes that Saiyid Hadi Razk (an ex-member of parliament) and Saiyid Abdoo Halabi are endeavouring to get people to espouse the cause of the Idrisi and to go to Marawa to join his troops when they arrive there. One of the Ulama of Zabeed, Sheikh Mahomed Yusuf Hidi, has secretly gone to the Idrisi. The people are delighted at the news of the expected arrival of Idrisi troops in that direction.

A report says that a portion of the Zabeed garrison (imam's) has moved to the fort at Al Badwaia, about one hour's distance from Al Husainia. The people of the latter place are panic-stricken, and in consequence the Zaraniks have garrisoned the borders. It is reported that endeavours are being made to effect a settlement between the imam's representative at Zabeed and the Idrisi's agent, Sharif Yehia-ar-Rifai. At the same time a conflict is reported to have taken place between them in which the latter captured twenty-five rifles and drove away the other's men. Majority of the people in the outskirts of Zabeed is in league with the Zaraniks.

News has been reported from Hodeida to the effect that on the 19th December the imam's men set fire to the bazaar of Wadi Har and then advanced against Al-Taraf and Madawela along the Quhra border. After a fight lasting three hours the places were occupied, the casualties on both sides being forty killed. The imam's men then advanced and occupied Bani Saad after a few hours' resistance. The casualties here were sixty on both sides. Imam's soldiers are reported to have committed various atrocities among the people of these places after their capture, killing women and children and burning alive blind persons.

It appears that Mahmud Nadhim, who left Bajil on the 19th December, accompanied by Syed Abdul Kadir and the Quhra sheikhs, Mahomed Zaid, Yehia Muzaria and Abdul Hadi, has been detained at Obal by the sheikhs on receiving the above news. They have also detained Sheikh Ali Salami, the imam's amil at Bajil, who was apparently leaving with Mahmud Nadhim. The sheikhs accused the ex-Vali and Syed Abdul Kadir of treachery in getting the mission released, as immediately after that the imam advanced against them. Sheikh Mahomed Zaid threatened to hand the ex-Vali over to the British, but he, as well as Syed Abdul Kadir, tried to convince them that they had not been faithless to them, and exonerated themselves by saying that they had done them a good turn in that they had saved them from a calamity which would have befallen them at the hands of the British Government had they persisted in detaining the mission. Mahmud Nadhim took upon himself to prevent the imam from advancing into the Quhra territory if the sheikhs promised not to allow the Idrisi's men to enter their territory. He warned them that the imam was powerful, and that he had 275 guns, by which he could destroy their country totally.

Sheikh Ismail Baghawi wrote to the Political Officer, Hodeida, on the 22nd December, reporting the occurrences at Al Taraf, Al Madawela and Bani Saad, and requesting him to take the necessary steps to stop the imam's advance on the Quhra in accordance with the terms of the agreement signed by the Quhra sheikhs with Colonel Jacob. The military administrator, Hodeida, wrote to the imam a polite letter asking him to refrain from further action against the Quhra. He has also informed Sheikh Ismail Baghawi and Abu Hadi of the action taken by him.

The latest news is that fighting has started between the Idrisi and the imam at Karyat-ash-Sharika and three other places in the territory of Beni Saad. The Idrisi has lost eleven killed, including three of Bani Saad. The imam's loss is not known. The strength of the Idrisi's force at these places is 700 all told with two guns. A reinforcement of 70 men left on the 2nd instant accompanied by the Quhra sheikh, Ahmed Khuzam, and another sheikh. Fighting continues.

Imam's soldiers are said to be collecting at Bara for the capture of Marawa. Sheikh Sahel Ali and other Aboos are suspected of being in secret communication with the imam.



Major Meek says that Sheikh Sahel Ali told him on several occasions that he wanted British protection, and, failing that, he was for the Idrisi. Sahel Ali is a bitter foe of Suleiman Bakheit, the other sheikh of the Aboos, who has been acting all along with the Quhra, and it is possible that his personal animosity may have driven him to the camp of the imam.

Supplies are being collected and kept ready for the imam's forces at Menakha. The imam is reported to have asked Al Mikdad, the chief of Anis, to summon his tribes to join his forces.

It is reported that a detachment of thirty men stationed at Bahih by the Idrisi plundered some of the imam's petty traders who were going with goods from Bajil. The commandant of the detachment has been warned by Syed Abdul Kadir not to interfere with the trade route, and asked to return the loot.

Syed Abdul Kadir sent Sharif Hamdan and Mahomed Bahkal to the Idrisi to ask him to send his troops to protect the Quhra country from invasion by the imam, and at the same time to confirm Sheikh Abu Hadi, who has been unanimously elected by all the sheikhs as amil of the district of Bajil.

#### Aden Protectorate.

News comes in that the Zeidis have asked the Ahl Halmin, a clan nominally under the Amir of Dala, to make submission. The sheikhs of the place have collected their men and have started fighting with the Zeidis. The news is not confirmed, but one of the sheikhs has written to me asking for assistance in arms and ammunition. I am sending him two cases of ammunition to enable him to co-operate with the Amir of Dala.

The Amir of Dala has gone to Halmin to try and organise resistance among his people against the Zeidis, and I have given him forty cases of ammunition for distribution among those who are ready to fight the Zeidis.

Amir Nasr-bin-Shaif reports his arrival at Al Rabwa and that he is engaged in collecting men. He asks for supplies of rice, jowari, dates, &c., for rationing the tribesmen who espouse his cause.

The nakibs of Mausatta are being sent 10,000 rounds of ammunition and monetary assistance amounting to 500 rupees to enable them to continue their resistance to the Zeidis. They are said to be collecting men in Yafa and are expected to come down shortly.

Two cases of ammunition and 300 rupees are being sent to the Muffahi sheikh as an assistance to enable him to resist the Zeidis who have occupied his villages.

The Hadrami sheikh is being sent a case of ammunition through one of his relations in order that he may co-operate with the Mau-atta, &c., in the defence of their respective countries.

Sheikh Salim Saleh, the Dubi, paid a visit to this residency and asked for assistance in ammunition, &c. He was given 500 rupees and 10,000 rounds of ammunition and told that he should go and show his resistance to the Zeidis by co-operating with the Mausatta, &c.

The Shairi sheikhs, headed by Sheikh Saleh Salim of Al Malaha, paid a visit to this residency and asked for assistance in ammunition, &c., to enable them to go and resist the Zeidis. They have been given five cases of ammunition and a present of 300 rupees for this purpose.

No news of fresh occurrences have been received of late, but everyone in the protectorate reports that he is collecting men and asks for assistance.

According to one Hamood Mohsin, a merchant of Dala, the imam's lieutenants who led the attack on Upper Yafa are:—

1. Sheikh Hamood-ad-Dul'i-al-Bakili (of Bakil tribe). He commands 400 men.
2. Sheikh Ali-al-Abdi of Hashid.
3. Ibn Misar Nihmi of the tribe of Nihm.

When they attacked Shaib, No. 1 had under him 200 men; No. 2, 300; and No. 3, 200. Their losses are stated to be 60, 70, and 40 men respectively.

Hamood Mohsin says that No. 1 is his friend and a man worthy of respect. He is said to be willing to give up fighting for the imam and come to Aden. There are others who would do the same, but are afraid of being imprisoned by us here.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[174582/ME 58]

No. 49.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, January 22, 1920.

PRIME Minister of Armenia, leaving to-day for Erivan, has just paid farewell visit. His Excellency says his four long conversations with Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs have been satisfactory, and he believes that Azerbaijan Government really wishes to keep out Turkish and Bolshevik intrigue. Any controversial territorial question can be decided, as in Europe, by commission of five neutrals plus one from each country interested.

Armenian Prime Minister told me conferences here with Georgian President and Azerbaijan Minister for Foreign Affairs on Bolshevik danger had resulted in agreement for collective resistance to Bolshevik aggression from outside, and severest repressive measures at home with all [groups omitted], and as spring approaches, when sowing begins and flocks move to mountain pastures, danger increases. He begged me to press on your Lordship urgency of settlement of Armenian question.

Armenian millionaires called on his Excellency and said they were anxious to put money into country, but could not do so till they had some political situation guaranteeing security. Armenia would be glad to accept British mandate or protectorate. I replied I had not received hint of any such intention from His Majesty's Government.

Kurd- and Armenians generally are working harmoniously, and Cherif Pasha must have been deceived [group undecipherable] or Paris would not have countenanced him; he, however, has no connection with Russian Kurds.

(Addressed to General Keyes, No. 19; Constantinople, No. 30; and Tehran, No. 22.)

[174578/ME 58]

No. 50.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, January 28, 1920.

I ARRIVED this evening from Baku and leave to-morrow for Erivan, return to Tiflis on 31st January.

In Baku I was received with much enthusiasm, and saw leaders of all parties except Bolsheviks. Even Ittehad leaders made friendly speeches in public, and party has apparently abandoned its anti-British attitude, which was, I am informed privately, adopted only for party reasons. Recognition has rallied all responsible nationalist politicians to our side, and has had effect among the mountaineers. Turks like Nuri Pasha show desire to merit clemency of His Majesty's Government. If Allies' terms with Turkey are not too harsh, we ought not to have no difficulties with Mussulmans. Only serious danger in Baku seems to be from Bolsheviks in case of food shortage, but Government assured me they have situation under control.

Continued reports of Armenian aggression in Zangezur created strong public feeling, and Government of Azerbaijan has been threatened if it does not take action immediately. I repeatedly made strong representations to Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom I daily spent three to four hours, begging them to avoid any reprisals which could alienate goodwill of your Lordship, and I believe they will try to avoid trouble. Last night Azerbaijan Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs both went to banquet given to me by Armenian representative, and made speeches friendly to Armenia.

Persian Commissioner in Baku gave me material assistance during my stay, and is very valuable helper, as he is highly respected.

Chief object of my visit to Erivan is to put strong pressure on Armenian Prime Minister to withdraw from Zangezur regular troops and artillery, and punish guilty. I have already telegraphed to his Excellency that, if Armenian Government does not cease aggression, I shall be forced to recommend His Majesty's Government not to help them.

(Sent to Tehran, No. 29, and Constantinople, No. 38.)



[175723]

No. 51.

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 3.)*

(No. 277.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 2, 1920.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 67 of the 8th January, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the boundary between the spheres of temporary British and French military occupation in Palestine and Syria.

I have, &c.  
DERBY.

Enclosure in No. 51.

*Note communicated by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

PAR une note du 10 de ce mois, l'Ambassade britannique a bien voulu rappeler au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères le point de vue du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté en ce qui concerne les limites septentrionales qu'il juge nécessaires à la Palestine.

Elle a fait ressortir que M. Clemenceau s'est abstenu de répondre au paragraphe de l'aide-mémoire de Mr. Lloyd George du 13 septembre demandant une extension des limites de la Palestine au delà de la ligne Sykes-Picot. Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères estime, en plein accord avec l'Ambassade britannique, que de ce fait on ne peut concéder ni que le Gouvernement a renoncé à son point de vue, ni que le Gouvernement français l'a accepté. Dans l'opinion de ce dernier, la question demeure régie par l'accord Sykes-Picot 1916 et la résolution du Conseil suprême du 15 septembre 1919.

En décidant la relève des troupes britanniques par les troupes françaises "en Syrie à l'ouest de la ligne Sykes-Picot," le Conseil suprême n'a certainement pas entendu supposer l'existence de territoires qui, bien que situés à l'ouest de cette ligne, ne seraient pas "en Syrie." Cette interprétation par l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté d'un texte qui jusqu'à ce jour avait paru exempt de toute ambiguïté ne pourrait se soutenir que si une délimitation précise de la Syrie et de la Palestine avait été préalablement établie—ce que manifestement n'est pas. Le Gouvernement français ne peut donc que s'en tenir, en ce qui concerne l'occupation militaire, à la décision du Conseil suprême et en réclamer l'application intégrale.

D'autre part, ainsi que l'indique, *in fine*, la note de l'Ambassade britannique, c'est de la Conférence de la Paix que la décision finale doit être attendue sur ce point comme sur toutes les questions orientales.

Le Gouvernement français tient cependant à préciser que, si sur certaines dispositions de l'accord Sykes-Picot il s'est montré disposé à admettre d'importantes modifications, il ne peut, par contre, consentir à un déplacement, dans la région visée, des limites établies par cet accord.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris,  
le 31 janvier, 1920.

[175689]

No. 52.

*Mr. Vansittart to Lord Hardinge.—(Received February 3.)*

(No. 9.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 2, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of a note by Mr. Fountain, of the Board of Trade, covering a series of draft articles and memoranda relative to the eventual economic clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. These documents are the result of unofficial discussions with the French, Italian, and Japanese representatives, which have been proceeding since the arrival of the British Delegation in Paris. These results cannot, of course, be regarded as final, but in any case an extent of ground has thus been covered which may eventually save much time. It has also become clear on what points the difference of view is likely to be most acute. The British Delegation cannot modify its view in regard to State

succession and concessions; a less uncompromising attitude might, if necessary, be adopted in regard to the liquidation of German property.

2. I venture also to suggest that the Egyptian Government might be asked whether they desire any special provisions inserted, dealing with (1) any liquidation of, or similar dealing with, Turkish property in Egypt (either in the past or in the future) which may require to be covered by the treaty; (2) any property of Egyptians in Turkey which may have been injuriously affected by action taken by the Turkish Government. It will be seen that the British economic representatives reserved the right to make propositions on this subject. The enquiry might be framed by Mr. Fountain or Mr. Hutchinson, who have both returned to London.

I have, &amp;c.

R. G. VANSITTART.

Enclosure in No. 52.

*Note by Mr. Fountain.*

THE opportunity of the presence of British economic representatives in Paris has been used for an attempt to arrive, in consultation with the corresponding representatives of France, Italy, and Japan, at an agreed text of the economic clauses which it will be necessary to insert in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. The results of this discussion are appended. The discussion took place in French, and the text which has emerged from the discussion is consequently presented here in a French form. An official English version has not yet been prepared, but such preparation will of course involve no difficulty.

Although the discussion was in this sense informal, that we none of us were prepared definitely to commit our Governments, and reserved a general right to make modifications later, it can be said at once that the text arrived at so far as it is embodied in the document marked "A," is satisfactory to us from the British point of view, and that, speaking generally, neither the French nor (still less) the Japanese are likely to wish to make substantial alterations in it. The Italian representatives were somewhat more reserved and more disposed to emphasise the informal nature of our discussions. They intimated that they might have some additional propositions to put forward at a later stage of the treaty negotiations, but even in their case it is probable that the clauses arrived at will not require to be modified substantially. We have of course no means of knowing what views may be put forward by the smaller Powers. Probably both Greece and Serbia will have particular interests which they will wish to embody in clauses of their own when an opportunity is afforded to them to consider the matter.

The general approval by the French of these clauses is, however, subject to two important qualifications:—

1. The French are very insistent that the treaty with Turkey should include provisions for the complete liquidation of all German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian assets in Turkey, and they say that their acceptance of the section relating to property, rights, and interests must be regarded as generally subject to their obtaining their wishes in this respect. The clause which they put forward for dealing with this matter will be found annexed and is marked "B." We took the strongest exception to this proposal, and put in a note on the subject, which is marked "C."

2. We are all agreed that some clause or clauses will be necessary in the treaty with regard to the maintenance, modification, or cancellation of Turkish concessions so far as they relate to territory which will be separated from Turkey by the Treaty of Peace. In order to make our attitude on this matter as clear as possible we have sent to the French a draft clause with an accompanying annex, copy of which is appended and marked "D." We are well aware that the French are not prepared to accept this proposal, but they have not at present found it possible to put forward a definite counter-proposition. We understand that they are inclined to take the position that all concessions should remain in force in such territories unless an agreement can be come to between the new Governments and the concessionaires. They would no doubt be prepared ultimately to give up this extreme position in favour of some arrangement for arbitration, but they consider that any arbitration must be based on the general legal doctrine that the new State succeeds in principle to all the obligations of the old.

[4370]

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I do not think our discussions can be regarded as altogether wasted, if only because they have brought into clear prominence these two outstanding points of difference in economic questions between our and the French points of view.

In the present uncertainty as to the territorial rearrangement of the Ottoman dominion it was clearly impossible to frame clauses as to the general economic régime which should prevail in territories separated from Turkey. We thought it well, however, to endeavour to lay down some propositions of a general character on this subject, and put in a document which was only discussed very briefly, and was not formally adopted. This document is marked "E." I understand that, so far as the French Ministry of Commerce are concerned, the principles embodied in this document are regarded as acceptable, but of course they raise political questions of some importance, and it is therefore probably not absolutely safe to assume that the French Government, as a whole, are prepared to accept them.

(Note.—Just as I was about to send forward this paper, I received from the French Foreign Office a paper in defence of their proposition ("B") that all German property in Turkey should be liquidated. I attach copy of this paper (marked "F"). It does not induce the British economic representatives to modify their views in this matter in any respect.)

## A.

### Economic Clauses proposed for Insertion in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

#### SECTION I.

##### *Relations commerciales.*

Article 1<sup>er</sup>. Le régime capitulaire résultant des traités, conventions et usages sera rétabli au bénéfice des Puissances qui en bénéficiaient directement ou indirectement avant le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914; le bénéfice en sera étendu aux Puissances alliées et associées signataires du présent traité qui n'en jouissaient pas au 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914.

(Note à l'article 1<sup>er</sup>.—La Commission économique estime qu'un article devrait être inséré prévoyant qu'en attendant l'institution d'un nouveau régime judiciaire dont le code pourrait être rédigé sous l'autorité du Conseil de la Ligue des Nations par une Commission des Représentants des Puissances alliées et associées, la juridiction consulaire devrait être provisoirement rétablie en Turquie. Toute Puissance qui n'avait point de tribunaux consulaires en Turquie à la date du 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914 serait admise à conclure des accords avec l'une quelconque des Puissances qui, à la même date, possédaient des tribunaux consulaires, afin que les procès intéressant des nationaux qui, sous le régime consulaire, ressortissent à la juridiction consulaire puissent être portés devant les tribunaux de l'autre Puissance contractante.)

Article 3. La Turquie renonce expressément à tous droits de suzeraineté, ou de juridiction de quelque nature qu'ils soient, sur les musulmans soumis à la souveraineté de tout autre État que l'État turc.

Article 4. La Convention du 25 avril 1907, relative aux droits d'importation en Turquie, sera remise en vigueur en faveur de toutes les Puissances alliées et associées signataires du présent traité, et de toutes les autres Puissances qui, à la date du 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914, bénéficiaient directement ou indirectement du régime capitulaire.

Néanmoins, la Commission financière\* établie en exécution du présent traité pourra, à tout moment, autoriser une modification à ces droits d'importation.

Toute Puissance alliée ou associée signataire du présent traité pourra, dans les trois mois qui suivront la notification qui lui aura été faite de la modification proposée par la Commission financière, introduire une opposition auprès du Conseil de la Ligue des Nations. Si le Conseil de la Ligue des Nations ne fait pas droit à cette opposition

\* On a supposé, dans cette clause et dans la clause suivante, qu'une organisation sera établie par les Alliés pour le contrôle des finances turques ou pour conseiller la Turquie au point de vue financier. L'expression "Commission financière" a été employée pour désigner cette organisation.

par une majorité des deux tiers de ses membres, la modification proposée par la Commission financière entrera en vigueur six mois après que l'opposition aura été introduite devant le Conseil.

Article 5. Dans les mêmes conditions, la Commission financière aura le droit d'autoriser l'application par la Turquie, à la personne ou aux biens des ressortissants des Puissances alliées ou associées, signataires du présent traité, de toutes taxes et droits qui seraient également imposés aux sujets ottomans dans l'intérêt de la stabilité économique et d'un bon gouvernement de la Turquie.

La Commission financière aura également le droit d'autoriser l'application de toutes prohibitions à l'importation ou à l'exportation qui apparaîtraient nécessaires dans le même but.\*

Toute Puissance alliée ou associée, signataire du présent traité, pourra, dans les trois mois qui suivront la notification qui lui aura été faite desdites taxes et prohibitions, introduire son opposition auprès du Conseil de la Ligue des Nations. Si le Conseil de la Ligue des Nations ne fait pas droit à cette opposition par une majorité des deux tiers de ses membres, la modification proposée par la Commission financière entrera en vigueur six mois après l'opposition qui aura été introduite devant le Conseil.

- Article 6. Voir article 273 du traité avec l'Allemagne.
- Article 7. Voir article 274 du traité avec l'Allemagne.
- Article 8. Voir article 275 du traité avec l'Allemagne.
- Article 9. Voir article 278 du traité avec l'Allemagne.
- Article 10. Voir article 281 du traité avec l'Allemagne.

#### SECTION II.

##### *Traités.*

Article 282 du traité avec l'Allemagne avec substitution aux conventions indiquées dans ce texte des conventions suivantes:

1. Conventions du 14 mars 1884, du 1<sup>er</sup> décembre 1886, du 23 mars 1887, le protocole final du 7 juillet 1887 sous la protection des câbles sous-marins.
2. Convention du 5 juillet 1890, relative à la publication des tarifs de douane et à l'organisation d'une Union internationale pour la publication des tarifs douaniers.
3. Arrangement du 9 décembre 1907, relatif à la création de l'Office international d'Hygiène à Paris.
4. Convention du 7 juin 1905, relative à la création d'un Institut international agricole à Rome.
5. Convention du 27 juin 1855, relative à l'emprunt turc.
6. Convention du 16 juillet 1863, relative au rachat des droits de péages sur l'Escaut.
7. Convention sanitaire (les conventions sanitaires auxquelles la Turquie est partie seront mentionnées ici, les autres lui seront imposées par un article suivant).
8. Convention du 29 octobre 1899, relative à l'établissement d'un arrangement définitif destiné à garantir le libre usage du canal de Suez.

Article 12. Voir article 283 du traité avec l'Allemagne.

Article 13. Voir article 284 du traité avec l'Allemagne.

Article 14. (Relatif à la propriété industrielle). Voir article 166 du traité avec la Bulgarie *mutatis mutandis* (1<sup>er</sup> août 1914).

Article 15. La Turquie s'engage à adhérer aux traités, conventions et arrangements ci-après et à les ratifier:

1. Convention du 11 octobre 1909 relative à la circulation internationale des automobiles.
2. Accord du 15 mai 1886 relatif au plombage des wagons et protocole du 19 mai 1907.
3. Convention du 31 décembre 1913 relative à l'unification des statistiques commerciales.

\* La Commission économique estime, toutefois, que la Commission financière devra s'abstenir autant que possible d'imposer des prohibitions et droits à l'exportation sur les matières premières produites en Turquie.



4. Convention du 3 septembre 1910 relative à l'unification de certaines règles en matière d'abordage, d'assistance et de sauvetage maritime.
5. Convention du 21 décembre 1914 relative à l'exemption pour les bâtiments hospitaliers des droits et taxes dans les ports.
6. Convention du 18 mai 1904 et du 4 mai 1910 relative à la répression de la Traite des Blanches.
7. Convention du 4 mai 1910 relative à la suppression des publications pornographiques.
8. Convention sanitaire du 3 décembre 1903 et de toutes autres figurant dans le traité avec l'Allemagne auxquelles la Turquie n'est pas partie.
9. Convention du 29 novembre 1906 relative à l'unification de la formule des médicaments héroïques.
10. Convention du 3 novembre 1881 et du 15 avril 1889 relative aux mesures à prendre contre le phylloxera.
11. Convention du 19 mars 1902 relative à la protection des oiseaux utiles à l'agriculture.

Articles 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22. Voir articles 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295 du traité avec l'Allemagne.

### SECTION III.

#### *Propriété industrielle.*

Articles 23-28. Voir articles 190 à 195 du traité avec la Bulgarie.

### SECTION IV.

#### *Biens, Droits et Intérêts.*

Article 29. Les biens, droits et intérêts qui se trouvaient placés sous la juridiction ottomane à la date du 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914, appartenant à des ressortissants des Puissances alliées et associées qui n'étaient pas, pendant la guerre, ressortissants ottomans, ou à des sociétés contrôlées par eux, ou à des ressortissants ottomans jouissant de la protection consulaire de l'une quelconque des Puissances alliées et associées, seront immédiatement restitués aux ayants droit, libres de toutes taxes levées par ou sous l'autorité du Gouvernement ou des autorités turques, sauf celles qui auraient pu être appliquées conformément aux capitulations. Le Gouvernement turc devra prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour remettre le propriétaire évincé en possession de son bien, libre de toutes charges ou servitudes dont il aurait été grevé sans l'autorisation dudit propriétaire; il devra indemniser les tiers lésés par la restitution.

Si la restitution prévue par le présent paragraphe ne peut être effectuée, ou si les biens, droits et intérêts dont il s'agit ont subi des dommages ou préjudices, le propriétaire aura droit à une indemnité. Les réclamations formulées à ce sujet par les ressortissants alliés et associés ou par les sociétés contrôlées par eux ou par les protégés de l'une quelconque des Puissances alliées ou associées seront examinées, et le montant des indemnités fixé par une commission arbitrale désignée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations. Cette indemnité sera à la charge du Gouvernement turc et pourra être imputée sur les biens des ressortissants ottomans sur le territoire ou sous le contrôle de l'État du réclamant.

Article 30. Les biens, droits et intérêts en Turquie des anciens ressortissants ottomans qui acquièrent de plein droit la nationalité d'une Puissance alliée ou associée ou d'un État nouvellement créé conformément aux dispositions du présent traité leur seront restitués tels qu'ils se comportent.

Article 31. Sous réserve de dispositions contraires qui pourraient résulter du présent traité, les Puissances alliées et associées se réservent le droit de retenir et de liquider tous biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants ottomans ou des sociétés contrôlées par eux, sur leurs territoires, colonies, possessions et protectorats.

La liquidation aura lieu conformément aux lois de la Puissance alliée ou associée intéressée, et le propriétaire ottoman ne pourra disposer de ces biens, droits et intérêts, ni les grever d'aucune charge, sans le consentement de cet État.

Article 32. Ne seront pas considérés au sens des articles 31, 33, 34, 35 et 38 et du 2<sup>e</sup> § de l'article 29 comme ressortissants ottomans, les ressortissants ottomans qui acquièrent de plein droit, par application du présent traité, la nationalité d'une Puissance alliée ou associée ou d'un des États nouvellement créés.

Article 33. Les biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants ottomans dans les territoires d'une Puissance alliée ou associée, ainsi que le produit net de leur vente, liquidation ou autres mesures de disposition, pourront être grevés par cette Puissance alliée ou associée du paiement des indemnités dues à l'occasion des réclamations des ressortissants de cette Puissance introduites en vertu de l'article 29, ou des créances qu'ils ont sur les ressortissants ottomans.

Les biens, droits et intérêts ou le produit de leur liquidation seront restitués aux ayants droit dans la mesure où ils ne seront pas utilisés conformément aux articles 31 et 33.

Article 34. Le Gouvernement turc s'engage à indemniser ses ressortissants en raison de la liquidation ou de la rétention de leurs biens, droits ou intérêts en pays alliés ou associés.

Article 35. Les Gouvernements administrant des territoires détachés de l'Empire ottoman par application du présent traité peuvent liquider les biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants ottomans ou des sociétés contrôlées par eux dans ces territoires. Dans le cas de ces liquidations, nonobstant les dispositions des articles 31 et 33, on devra se conformer aux règles suivantes :

1. Le produit de la liquidation sera payé directement à l'ayant droit.
2. Si, au cours des opérations, la Commission arbitrale visée à l'article 29 acquiert la certitude que les conditions de la vente ou les mesures prises par le Gouvernement en question en dehors de sa législation générale ont réduit injustement le prix obtenu, ils auront le pouvoir d'accorder au propriétaire une indemnité raisonnable, qui devra lui être payée par son Gouvernement.

Le présent article n'est pas applicable aux sociétés dans lesquelles les ressortissants des Puissances alliées et associées, y compris les ressortissants de la Puissance mandataire, ont la majorité des capitaux.

Article 36. Est confirmée la validité de toutes mesures attributives de propriété, de toutes ordonnances pour la liquidation d'entreprises ou de sociétés, ou de toutes autres ordonnances, règlements, décisions ou instructions rendus ou donnés par tout tribunal ou administration d'une des Puissances alliées ou associées, ou réputés avoir été rendus ou donnés par application de la législation de guerre concernant les biens, droits ou intérêts ennemis.

Les intérêts de toutes personnes devront être considérés comme ayant valablement fait l'objet de tous règlements, ordonnances, décisions ou instructions concernant les biens dans lesquels sont compris les intérêts dont il s'agit, que ces intérêts aient été ou non expressément visés dans lesdites ordonnances, règlements, décisions ou instructions.

Il ne sera soulevé aucune contestation relativement à la régularité d'un transfert de biens, droits ou d'intérêts effectué en vertu des règlements, ordonnances, décisions ou instructions susvisés.

Est également confirmée la validité de toute mesure prise à l'égard d'une propriété, d'une entreprise ou société, qu'il s'agisse d'enquête, de séquestre, d'administration forcée, d'utilisation, de réquisition, de surveillance ou liquidation, de la vente ou de l'administration des biens, droits et intérêts, du paiement ou du recouvrement des dettes, du paiement des frais, charges, dépenses, ou de toutes autres mesures quelconques effectuées en exécution d'ordonnances, de règlements, de décisions ou d'instructions rendus, donnés ou exécutés par tous tribunaux ou administrations d'une des Puissances alliées ou associées, ou réputés avoir été rendus, donnés ou exécutés par application de la législation exceptionnelle de guerre, concernant les biens, droits ou intérêts ennemis.

Article 37. Aucune réclamation ni action de la Turquie ou de toute personne ressortissante de l'Empire ottoman au 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914 ou l'étant devenue depuis cette date, en quelque lieu qu'elle ait sa résidence, n'est recevable contre une Puissance alliée ou associée ou contre une personne quelconque agissant au nom ou sous les ordres de toute juridiction ou administration de ladite Puissance alliée ou associée relativement à tout acte ou toute émission concernant les biens, droits ou intérêts des ressortissants ottomans et effectués pendant la guerre, ou en vue de la préparation de la guerre.

Est également irrecevable toute réclamation ou action contre toute personne à l'égard de tout acte ou émission résultant des mesures exceptionnelles de guerre, lois et règlements de toute Puissance alliée ou associée.

Article 38. Le Gouvernement turc, si on le lui demande, remettra, dans un délai de six mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité, à chaque Puissance alliée ou associée, tous les contrats, certificats, actes et autres titres de propriété se trouvant entre les mains de ses ressortissants et se rapportant à des biens, droits et intérêts situés



sur le territoire de ladite Puissance alliée ou associée, y compris les actions, obligations ou autres valeurs mobilières de toutes sociétés autorisées par la législation de cette Puissance.

Le Gouvernement turc fournira à tous moments, sur la demande de la Puissance alliée ou associée intéressée, tout renseignement concernant les biens, droits et intérêts des ressortissants ottomans dans ladite Puissance alliée ou associée, ainsi que sur les transactions qui ont pu être effectuées depuis le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1914 en ce qui concerne lesdits biens, droits ou intérêts.

Article 39. Les dettes entre le Gouvernement turc ou ses ressortissants et les ressortissants des Puissances alliées ou associées qui n'étaient pas ressortissants ottomans pendant la guerre, soit qu'elles aient été payables avant la guerre, soit que, provenant de transactions ou de contrats dont l'exécution totale ou partielle a été suspendue du fait de la guerre, elles soient devenues exigibles pendant la guerre, seront payées ou créditées dans la monnaie de celle des Puissances alliées ou associées (y compris les colonies et protectorats des Puissances alliées, les dominions britanniques et l'Inde) qui sera intéressée. Si les dettes doivent être réglées dans toute autre monnaie, elles seront payées ou créditées dans la monnaie de la Puissance alliée ou associée intéressée (colonie, protectorat, dominion britannique ou Indes). La conversion se fera au taux du change d'avant-guerre.

Pour l'application de cette disposition, on considère que le taux du change d'avant-guerre est égal à la moyenne des taux des transferts télégraphiques de la Puissance alliée ou associée intéressée pendant le mois précédant immédiatement l'ouverture des hostilités entre ladite Puissance intéressée et la Turquie.

Dans le cas où un contrat stipulerait expressément un taux fixe de change pour la conversion de la monnaie dans laquelle l'obligation est exprimée en la monnaie de la Puissance alliée et associée intéressée, la disposition ci-dessus relative au taux du change ne sera pas applicable.

Le produit de la liquidation des biens, droits et intérêts ennemis visés à la présente section sera également décompté en la monnaie et au taux du change prévus ci-dessus.

*Note.*—Les dispositions ci-dessus visant le taux du change sont présentées sous toute réserve d'un examen ultérieur de la Commission financière de la Conférence de la Paix.)

Les dispositions de cet article ne s'appliqueront pas au cas de territoires transférés de l'Empire ottoman en exécution du présent traité.

(*Note.*—On laisse à la Commission financière ou à tout autre organisme compétent le soin de proposer toutes stipulations qui pourraient être nécessaires relativement aux dettes entre particuliers résidant en Turquie et ceux qui résident en territoires transférés.)

Article 40. Les dispositions des articles 29 à 39 s'appliquent aux droits de propriété industrielle, littéraire et artistique qui sont ou seront compris dans la liquidation des biens, droits, intérêts de sociétés ou entreprises effectuée par application de la législation exceptionnelle de guerre, par les Puissances alliées ou associées ou par application des stipulations de l'article 32.

(*Note.*—La Délégation britannique réserve la question de l'insertion dans la partie appropriée du Traité d'une stipulation relative à l'application de ces clauses à l'Égypte; elle se réserve également, si cela était nécessaire, de proposer toute modification de rédaction propre à couvrir ce point.)

## SECTION V.

### *Contrats, Prescriptions et Jugements.*

Article 41. Sous réserve des exceptions et des règles spéciales au sujet des contrats particuliers ou des classes de contrats mentionnées dans l'annexe ci-jointe, tout contrat conclu entre ennemis sera maintenu ou annulé conformément à la législation de la Puissance alliée ou associée dont est ressortissante celle des parties contractantes qui n'était pas sujet ottoman avant la guerre.

Les conditions suivant lesquelles le contrat est maintenu ou annulé seront réglées par cette loi.\*

Article 42. (Voir article 300 du traité avec l'Allemagne, paragraphe 2.)

Article 43. (Voir article 301 du traité avec l'Allemagne.)

Article 44. Les jugements rendus pendant la guerre par une autorité judiciaire ou administrative turque quelconque contre ou au préjudice des intérêts d'une personne qui était alors ressortissante d'une Puissance alliée ou associée, ou contre ou au préjudice des intérêts d'une société dans laquelle un ressortissant allié ou associé était intéressé, seront sujets à révision, à la diligence de ce ressortissant, par la Commission arbitrale prévue à l'article 30. Lorsque cela sera possible et équitable, les parties seront replacées dans la situation qu'elles occupaient avant le jugement rendu par l'autorité turque. Lorsque cela ne sera pas possible, le ressortissant d'une Puissance alliée ou associée qui aura subi un préjudice du fait du jugement aura le droit de recouvrer telle compensation que la Commission arbitrale jugera équitable, cette compensation étant à la charge du Gouvernement turc.

Lorsqu'un contrat a été invalidé, soit en raison du fait qu'une des parties n'en a pas exécuté une clause, soit en raison de l'exercice d'un droit stipulé au contrat, la partie lésée pourra s'adresser à la Commission arbitrale.

Cette Commission pourra accorder une indemnité à la partie lésée ou pourra ordonner la restauration de tous droits en Turquie qui auront été lésés par l'annulation dans tous les cas où, en raison des circonstances de l'affaire, une pareille restauration sera équitable et possible.

La Turquie indemnifiera tout tiers lésé par les restitutions ou restaurations effectuées conformément aux dispositions du présent article.

Article 45. Toutes questions relatives à des contrats conclus avant la mise en vigueur du présent traité entre des ressortissants des Puissances alliées et associées ou des États nouvellement créés et des ressortissants turcs seront réglées par les tribunaux nationaux ou les tribunaux consulaires de la Puissance alliée ou associée ou de l'État nouvellement créé dont une des parties est ressortissante à l'exclusion des tribunaux ottomans.

Article 46.—Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux nationaux ou consulaires d'une Puissance alliée ou associée ou d'un État nouvellement créé et les sentences de la Commission arbitrale dans tous les cas où, d'après les stipulations du présent traité, ils seront compétents, seront reconnus en Turquie comme obligatoires, et seront exécutés sans qu'il soit nécessaire de les déclarer exécutoires.

## ANNEXE.

*Note.*—Les dispositions des paragraphes 6 à 21 de cette annexe s'appliqueront seulement aux contrats d'assurance et de réassurance entre des compagnies et des nationaux turcs d'une part, et des compagnies et des nationaux des Puissances alliées et associées ou des États nouvellement créés d'autre part, pour lesquels le commerce avec la Turquie a été rendu illégal par loi ou décret.

Les dispositions en question ne seront de même pas applicables aux contrats entre les ressortissants turcs d'une part, et des compagnies et particuliers établis sur des territoires transférés à la suite de la guerre aux Puissances alliées et associées ou États nouvellement créés.

Les contrats d'assurance et de réassurance visés au paragraphe précédent seront soumis aux dispositions de l'article 41 (1<sup>er</sup> article des contrats).

### I.—Dispositions générales.

1. Au sens des articles 41 à 43 de cette annexe, les personnes parties à un contrat sont considérées comme ennemies lorsque le commerce entre elles sera devenu impossible en fait ou aura été interdit ou sera devenu illégal en vertu des lois, décrets ou règlements auxquels une de ces parties était soumise, et ce, à dater du jour où ce commerce est devenu impossible en fait ou a été interdit ou est devenu illégal de quelque manière que ce soit.

2. Restent en vigueur, sous réserve d'application des lois, décrets et règlements

\* Une exception concernant les États-Unis, le Japon et le Brésil doit être insérée si ces États sont signataires du présent traité.



internes pris pendant la guerre par les États alliés ou associés, ainsi que des clauses des contrats :

- (a.) Les contrats ayant pour but le transfert de propriétés, de biens ou effets mobiliers ou immobiliers lorsque la propriété aura été transférée ou l'objet livré avant que les parties ne soient devenues ennemies.
- (b.) Les baux locations et promesses de location.
- (c.) Les contrats d'hypothèque, de gage et de nantissement.
- (d.) Les contrats passés entre des particuliers et l'État, les provinces, municipalités ou autres personnes juridiques ou administratives analogues et les concessions données par ledit État et lesdites provinces, municipalités ou autres personnes juridiques, administratives analogues.

(Note.—La question des concessions dans les territoires transférés fera l'objet d'une clause séparée qui devra être insérée à la suite des présentes dispositions générales et avant les dispositions particulières à certaines catégories de contrats.)

## II.—Dispositions particulières à certaines Catégories de Contrats.

3, 4 et 5. Positions dans les bourses de valeurs et de commerce (voir §§ 4, 5 et 7 de l'annexe correspondante du traité avec l'Allemagne, sauf la dernière phrase du § 5).

## III.—Contrats d'Assurance.

6. Voir paragraphe 8 de l'annexe correspondante du traité avec l'Allemagne.

### Assurances contre l'Incendie.

7 et 8. Voir §§ 9 et 10 du traité avec l'Allemagne.

### Assurances sur la Vie.

9. Voir le numéro 11 de l'annexe du traité allemand moins la dernière phrase.  
10, 11 et 12. Voir numéros 13, 14 et 15 de l'annexe du traité avec l'Allemagne.

### Assurances maritimes et autres Assurances.

13 à 21. Voir numéros 16 à 24 de l'annexe correspondante du traité avec l'Allemagne, sauf le deuxième paragraphe du No. 22.

## B.

### Article proposed by the French for insertion in the Turkish Treaty.

#### LIQUIDATION OF GERMAN, AUSTRIAN, HUNGARIAN, AND BULGARIAN PROPERTY IN TURKEY.

Le Gouvernement turc fera procéder, sous la direction des Puissances alliées et associées et dans les conditions indiquées par elles à la liquidation des biens, droits et intérêts appartenant sur le territoire turc, à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent traité, à des personnes ressortissantes, à cette même date, de l'Allemagne, de l'Autriche, de la Hongrie ou de la Bulgarie.

Jusqu'à la liquidation, le Gouvernement turc interdira toute transaction sur lesdits biens.

Le produit des liquidations ainsi effectuées sera versé à la Commission des Réparations et affecté par elle au paiement des dommages visés à l'article , qui n'auront pu être payés conformément à l'article

Le solde restant sera, le cas échéant, appliqué à la réparation des autres dommages de guerre.

## C.

### Note by the British Economic Representatives on the Proposed French Clause respecting Liquidation of German, &c., Property in Turkey.

It has been suggested that it is desirable, and that it is legitimate, to make use of the power conferred by article 155 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany in order to introduce into the Treaty of Peace with Turkey a provision for securing the liquidation of all German property in Turkey.

If it had been intended that all such property should be liquidated, there is no reason whatever why a provision to that effect should not have been inserted in the German Treaty itself. It appears, in fact, that some such proposal was actually made when the reparation clauses were under discussion, but that it was rejected by the Supreme Council,\* and that the only specific provision with regard to German interests in Turkey which remains is that contained in article 260 of that treaty. This article, as it will be recollected, merely puts in the hands of the Reparation Commission German interests in public utility undertakings and concessions in Turkey, and in the other countries mentioned specifically in the article.

On a point of form, it seems clear that if article 155 had been framed with the view to the possibility of all German property whatever being liquidated, the phraseology employed would have been assimilated to that used in other parts of the treaty in which German property is spoken of.

The usual phrase, "biens, droits et intérêts," would have been employed, and not the phrase peculiar to this article, "droits, intérêts et privilèges." In view of the British economic representatives, Germany was entitled to suppose that, speaking broadly, the question of what was to be done with the property of her nationals throughout the world was already regulated by the specific terms of the German Treaty, and that it is therefore unreasonable that article 155 should be used to justify the wholesale confiscation of all German property in Turkey.

According to our information this article was introduced into the German Treaty, not for the purpose of justifying any such general procedure, but solely because in regard to certain German interests of particular descriptions in Turkey it might be necessary when these interests came to be examined to take action, the exact nature of which it was not at the time possible to predict.

The British economic representatives do not wish to be regarded as opposing themselves to the consideration of all such cases separately on their merits. They recognise that in regard to some descriptions of German institutions it may be necessary for high political reasons to take action of a character which could be represented as confiscatory. Each such case, or each such class of cases, will no doubt have to be considered in due course, but this is not the time or the place for such consideration.

The British economic representatives think it necessary, however, to place formally on record their inability in any event to accept the proposal that all German property in Turkey shall be submitted to a process of forced liquidation.

They do not share the fear that the maintenance in Turkey of any German property is likely to constitute a grave obstacle to the future trade prospects of the Allies in a country which, after all, is going to be very materially reduced both in wealth and extent by the Treaty of Peace. They are satisfied that the provisions of article 260 of the German Treaty, supplemented, if necessary, by particular action such as is suggested above in certain limited cases or classes of cases, should amply suffice to guard the Allies against the danger of any effective renewal of German economic penetration in Turkey for a considerable time to come.

\* Since this was written we learn that the clause was referred by the Economic Commission to the Commission on Reparations, but was not included in the reparation clauses ultimately adopted by the Supreme Council.



## D.

## Turkish Treaty.

## DRAFT CLAUSE re CONCESSIONS PROPOSED BY BRITISH ECONOMIC REPRESENTATIVES.

(Note.—Copies of this have been communicated to the French, but the latter are not at present prepared to discuss it.)

The Government of any State to which territory is transferred by the treaty shall have full power to maintain, to cancel or to modify any concessions which may have been granted by the Ottoman Government, or by the Ottoman local authorities, affecting such transferred territory, subject to the payment to the concessionnaire, in the event of cancellation or modification, of equitable compensation.

For the purpose of determining the amount of such compensation in the absence of agreement between the parties, there shall be set up, under the authority of the League of Nations, arbitral tribunals, which shall consist of one member nominated by the State to which territory is transferred and one by the State of which the concessionnaire is the subject or citizen. In the event of the concession being held by a company, in which the subjects or citizens of more than one State have a substantial interest in the share capital or in the control of the company, two members of the tribunal shall be nominated by the two States principally interested, and two by the State to which the territory is transferred. There shall be a chairman of some other nationality, who, in default of agreement between the parties, shall be appointed by the Council of the League.

In determining the amount of equitable compensation to be paid, the tribunal shall be guided by the principles set out in the Annex hereto, so far as they are applicable to the case in question.

The signatory Powers undertake not to recognise the grant or transfer of any concession by the Ottoman Government or by Ottoman local authorities which may have been effected between the date of the armistice and the coming into force of the treaty. All such grants and transfers shall be null and void, and their cancellation shall give rise to no compensation whatever.

## ANNEX.

## PART I.—Mining Concessions.

1. Persons in the enjoyment at the time of the transfer of territory of the exclusive right to exploit mines, quarries, or oilfields in a given area are recognised as having the right in principle to continue such exploitation under the terms of their original concession, and in the event of a modification or cancellation of the concession being rendered necessary by the laws of the State to which territory is transferred, or being made by that State on grounds of public interest, the compensation to be paid shall be based on the full recognition of that right.

2. Where persons entitled to prospect for minerals (including oil) in the transferred territory have succeeded in proving the existence of minerals, but have not yet converted their prospecting rights into mining rights, account shall be taken in fixing compensation for the cancellation of their rights of their reasonable prospect of profit, having regard to the discovery of minerals actually effected.

3. Persons entitled to prospecting rights who have not yet proved the existence of minerals shall only be entitled to compensation in respect of their actual expenditure on land, or in the construction or purchase of buildings, plant, or other tangible property, of which the benefit passes to the Government to which the territory is transferred.

## PART II.—Concessions for works of public utility (railways, tramways, roads, harbours, docks, quays, telegraphs and telephones, and the supply of gas, water, electric light and power and other similar undertakings).

1. The compensation to be paid for the cancellation or modification of any concession for works of public utility which have been constructed and are in actual operation shall be based on a consideration of the expenditure of the concessionnaire on any such

works, and (to such extent as the tribunal may consider equitable in the circumstances of the case) of the amount of profit derived and derivable therefrom.

2. Compensation shall not be granted in respect of rights of which the concessionnaire had not made use or of rights to make extensions which the concessionnaire has not made.

3. If a concession for a work of public utility has not been carried into effect or actually operated in any given locality, compensation in respect of such works as may have been constructed in that locality shall be based solely on the actual expenditure by the concessionnaire on land and in the construction or purchase of buildings, plant, or other tangible property, of which the benefit passes to the Government to which the territory is transferred.

## PART III.—Concessions conferring Monopoly Rights throughout the Ottoman Empire.

Exclusive rights in the purchase, sale, import, or export of any commodity and financial rights such as the rights of issue of paper money throughout the Ottoman Empire as a whole, need not be continued by the Government of any State to which territory is transferred by this treaty, and no compensation can be claimed by the concessionnaire for loss of such rights in transferred territory.

## E.

## Traité de Paix avec la Turquie.

## PROJET DE RÉSOLUTION RELATIF AU RÉGIME ÉCONOMIQUE DES NOUVEAUX ÉTATS ISSUS DE L'ANCIEN EMPIRE OTTOMAN.

## Proposition de la Délégation britannique.

Le Comité spécial de la Commission économique s'est demandé s'il devait préparer des clauses relatives au régime économique applicable à tout nouvel État issu de l'ancien Empire ottoman, qu'il soit placé sous mandat ou non.

Le Comité a jugé un semblable travail difficile, sinon impossible en l'absence de tout renseignement quant au degré et à la forme de contrôle qui sera appliqué à ces territoires par les États alliés et associés, ou dans l'hypothèse d'un mandat, par la Ligue des Nations.

La forme à donner à ces clauses doit aussi dépendre nécessairement de la procédure employée pour le règlement de ces questions, soit qu'elles fassent l'objet d'une ou plusieurs sections du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, soit que, comme dans le cas à peu près semblable de la Pologne et de la Tchéco-Slovaquie, des Traités de Paix séparés y pourvoient pour chacun des nouveaux États.

Quelle que soit la procédure finalement adoptée, la Délégation britannique désire rappeler que, à son point de vue, des dispositions doivent être prises pour prévoir :

1. Que pour une période effective d'un certain nombre d'années, des facilités égales seront assurées au commerce et à la navigation de tous les États membres de la Ligue des Nations, aucune préférence n'étant accordée sur ce point à aucun État sans le consentement de la Ligue.

Mais il est désirable que le traité envisage des accords qui pourraient être conclus entre les États faisant partie de l'ancien Empire ottoman, pour faciliter l'échange réciproque de leurs produits ;

2. Que des dispositions devront être prises par analogie à celles des articles 15 et 17 du traité avec la Pologne du 25 juin 1919, pour assurer le traitement national aux navires des États alliés et associés, ainsi que la liberté du transit pour les personnes, marchandises, navires, voitures, wagons et malles postales transitant de ou pour un État allié et associé ;

3. Que tous ces nouveaux États seront invités à adhérer aux principales conventions internationales auxquelles la Pologne s'est engagée à adhérer en vertu de l'article 19 du traité susvisé avec la Pologne.



## Liquidation des Biens allemands en Turquie.

La question de la liquidation des biens ennemis en Turquie n'est pas seulement une question économique, c'est aussi une question politique de la plus haute importance.

Les raisons qui ne permettent pas à la Délégation française de l'envisager autrement que par la destruction des droits de propriété allemands sont les suivantes :

1° *Il est très important que la situation morale et matérielle de l'Allemagne et des Allemands en Turquie soit définitivement ruinée.*

On ne vise pas ici les intérêts que l'Allemagne peut s'acquérir dans l'avenir, mais tous ceux qu'elle ou ses nationaux s'étaient créés dans le passé.

L'Allemagne a fait de la Turquie sa base d'action dans tout le Levant et, d'autre part, l'alliance des deux pays a prolongé la guerre de quelques années, causé la destruction de la Russie et entraîné la perte de millions de vies humaines. Il n'est pas utile de développer ce thème trop connu, mais le rappel au souvenir de la guerre est nécessaire, car il suffit à justifier, au point de vue politique, toute action qui sera prise contre les Allemands en Turquie.

La liquidation des grandes concessions allemandes, quoique représentant l'acte le plus décisif dans cet ordre d'idées, ne suffit pas. Certains établissements allemands, comme la Deutsch-Orient Bank, certaines grandes sociétés, comme Hugo Stinnes, enfin d'innombrables compagnies et affaires privées allemandes, constituaient un élément capital de l'influence allemande, élément sans doute très réduit aujourd'hui, mais non détruit et qui, restant en possession de ses bases d'action, ne tardera pas à reprendre son essor, tandis que s'il est liquidé les Alliés auront le champ libre pendant longtemps.

2° *La liquidation des biens allemands en Turquie ne représente rien d'excessif et ne constitue pas une innovation.*

Les Alliés ont partout admis le principe général et rigoureux que non seulement les grands intérêts publics, mais aussi les biens privés allemands seront liquidés sur leur territoire; ce principe entièrement nouveau dans les annales des guerres modernes n'est plus contesté, et l'Angleterre a été la Puissance la plus déterminée à entrer dans cette voie. La proposition française ne comporte donc ni innovation de principe, ni rigueur nouvelle; elle tend seulement à étendre pour des raisons politiques et économiques le système à un pays de plus.

On ne peut découvrir la plus petite raison d'ordre moral qui justifiait la sauvegarde à Constantinople des biens des Allemands. Nous pouvons, en France et en Angleterre, liquider les biens des Allemands et nous réserverons certainement par le traité avec la Turquie le droit de liquider à notre gré les biens des Turcs. D'où viendrait donc qu'en Turquie les biens allemands seraient sacrés? Est-ce pour avoir pris possession de la Turquie pendant la guerre et avoir fait de ce pays une place d'armes la plus dangereuse contre nous une raison suffisante pour les Allemands à s'y réserver une terre d'asile? Est-ce par pitié et pour ménager quelques petites gens? Les Allemands de Turquie que nous visons étaient de puissants personnages et rentrent dans les catégories qui ont été les plus visées tant en Angleterre qu'en France. Rien ne s'oppose, d'ailleurs, à des mesures d'indulgence pour les humbles, car le droit de faire liquider ne se confond pas avec l'obligation de faire liquider.

3° *Y a-t-il des textes qui s'opposent formellement à la liquidation des biens allemands en Turquie?*

Il est exact que l'article 260 n'a pas prévu la liquidation des biens privés allemands en Turquie, mais seulement "l'acquisition par l'Allemagne pour être mis à la disposition de la Commission des Réparations des droits de ses ressortissants dans toute entreprise d'utilité publique ou concessions dans un certain nombre de pays, y compris la Turquie".

La forme très générale de cet article démontre qu'il ne vise que la question des entreprises publiques et concessions, et non celle des biens privés qui est, au contraire, visée par l'article 155.

La Délégation fait objecter que la proposition de liquider les biens allemands en

Turquie n'est pas entièrement nouvelle et que, formulée il y a de longs mois, elle a été rejetée par le Conseil suprême. En réalité, ce n'est pas la thèse de la liquidation des biens allemands en Turquie qui a été rejetée, mais une thèse générale présentée à un moment où les problèmes turcs n'avaient pas été abordés et qui était celle de la liquidation des biens allemands dans les autres pays.

Il a été admis sans discussion au cours de tous les débats qui se sont déroulés depuis un an que le problème turc était spécial et devait être traité d'une manière spéciale. On comprend donc ce que le Conseil suprême n'a pas admis; c'est une formule permettant de liquider à Vienne et à Budapest les biens des Allemands, mais il n'envisageait même pas la question des biens allemands à Constantinople: il s'est borné à écarter la question pour l'Europe, ce qui, à notre avis, ne l'écarta que momentanément pour la Turquie. Les situations ne sont nullement comparables et la liquidation des Allemands à Vienne n'était ni justifiée ni même concevable, tandis qu'à Constantinople, où ils sont peu nombreux, riches et influents, nous ne pouvons les ménager.

On ne peut pas davantage tirer argument du fait que la Turquie est mentionnée à propos des concessions d'intérêt public allemandes dans l'article 260, tandis qu'elle ne l'est pas pour la liquidation des biens privés allemands à l'étranger. L'article 260, nous le répétons, est très général: il traite des concessions allemandes dans le monde entier (Russie, Chine, Autriche, Hongrie, Bulgarie); il ne pouvait donc passer sous silence la Turquie, où sont les concessions les plus retentissantes (Bagdad, Anatolie).

Il y a d'autres cas où le Conseil suprême a traité certains problèmes d'Europe qui se posent aussi en Asie sans mentionner la Turquie, tout en réservant l'examen de ces problèmes. On peut réitérer, par exemple, les divers traités de protection des minorités et surtout le traité visant la protection des minorités en Grèce, dont les termes ne s'appliquent, de l'avis général, qu'à l'Europe, et non aux territoires turcs d'Asie, bien que les mêmes problèmes s'y posent et demandent des solutions spéciales.

L'absence de texte n'implique pas forclusion, et dans le cas spécial qui nous occupe nous invoquons l'article 155 de Versailles.

4° *L'Allemagne peut-elle prétendre que le sort des biens privés allemands en Turquie est déjà réglé par le Traité de Versailles et ne peut plus être modifié?*

La Délégation britannique estime que "parlant dans un sens large, l'Allemagne serait en droit de supposer que la question du sort des propriétés de ses nationaux à travers le monde était déjà réglée par les termes du traité allemand et qu'il est par suite déraisonnable que l'article 155 soit utilisé pour justifier une confiscation totale de toutes propriétés allemandes".

La Délégation française ne peut partager à aucun degré ce sentiment. L'argumentation qu'elle développe tend à établir que, même en l'absence de l'article 155, le Gouvernement français est en droit d'affirmer que le sort des biens privés allemands en Turquie n'est pas réglé et elle propose une solution rationnelle. Les spécialistes français chargés de la protection des intérêts des questions turques n'ont jamais admis ni même envisagé que les délibérations du Conseil suprême impliquent une forclusion. Ils ont toujours entendu réserver le débat pour le moment où s'ouvrirait la discussion des affaires turques. Ce moment est arrivé et dans cette circonstance la Délégation française appuie avec une entière confiance sa thèse sur les termes suivants de l'article 155.

"L'Allemagne s'engage à reconnaître et à agréer tous arrangements que les Puissances passeraient avec la Turquie et la Bulgarie relativement aux droits, intérêts et privilèges quelconques auxquels l'Allemagne ou les ressortissants allemands pourraient prétendre en Turquie et en Bulgarie et qui ne sont pas l'objet de dispositions du présent traité."

Il est impossible de tirer de ces termes si clairs, si nets et si étendus, la conclusion que l'Allemagne peut exiger de l'article 155 pour renvoyer les Alliés à l'article 260, qui ne vise que les concessions publiques allemandes à l'étranger. Ces termes impliquent que les Alliés se sont réservés toute latitude. Ils ont été arrêtés postérieurement aux délibérations du Conseil suprême invoquées par la Délégation britannique. Ils constituent la \* des parties, ils lient l'Allemagne, ils laissent toute latitude aux Alliés. Nul doute qu'après avoir reconsidéré la question et pesé en détail les mots employés par l'article 155, la Délégation britannique ne reconnaisse dans le simple domaine de l'argumentation économique le bien-tondé de la thèse française, qui est celui

\* Word omitted.



que toute latitude nous reste pour régler le problème et que la solution est celle de la liquidation. La Délégation britannique n'a pas même besoin pour cela de se placer sur le terrain politique, où la Délégation française ne manquera pas d'évoquer le débat, s'il le faut.

Le 29 janvier 1920.

[176619]

No. 53.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 6.)*

(No. 81.)

My Lord,

Cairo, January 25, 1920.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 526 of the 27th October, 1919, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a third report by the Arab Bureau on the subject of the detention at Bajil of Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob's mission to the Imam Yahya.

This document has been compiled from copies of official and demi-official letters received from the Political Officer, Hodeidah, through the Resident, Aden, and deals with the closing stages of the negotiations.

I have, &c.  
(For High Commissioner)

M. CHEETHAM.

Enclosure in No. 53.

*Note 3 on the Seizure of Colonel Jacob's Mission to the Imam Yahya.*

IN the last paper (Note 2) on the seizure of the Jacob mission, events were recorded up to the middle of October. Shortly afterwards a long letter from Colonel Jacob, dated the 5th October, arrived in Cairo by telegraph from Aden. Colonel Jacob repeated his recommendation that the Quhrah tribe should be appeased by the Yemen being allowed to remain within the Turkish sphere of influence and by the Turkish civil officials and a limited number of Turkish troops being permitted to return. This, asserted Colonel Jacob, would rid His Majesty's Government of direct responsibility in the Yemen.

As was expected, the Foreign Office refused to consider such a proposal, and the Quhrah sheikhs, who apparently had nourished the belief that the return of the Turks was a possibility, then put forward an alternative proposal. This consisted of a demand for arms and ammunition (with which to defend themselves against the Imam) and for the handing over by us of the town of Hodeidah to their nominee, Seyyid Abdul Kadir. Major Meek rejected these terms, and on the 14th November wrote to all the Quhrah sheikhs formally demanding the release of the mission, promising a free pardon to the captors, and stating that it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to remain at Hodeidah until arrangements should have been concluded for the safeguarding of the interests of the town and of the Shafai tribes in its vicinity.

At the end of October the Resident, Aden, had suggested that stringent orders should be sent to Colonel Jacob to discontinue negotiations for his release, and that Major Meek, who had been specially sent from Aden for the purpose, should take charge. This was approved by the Foreign Office, and Colonel Jacob was telegraphed accordingly on the 7th November.

On the 3rd November the Foreign Office made enquiries as to the probable amount to be expended in obtaining the release of the mission, the Political Resident, Aden, having ordered 50,000*l.* in gold from India on receiving instructions from the High Commissioner, Egypt, that attempts should be made to bribe the tribesmen. In reply, Aden telegraphed that no definite amount of ransom had been stated by Colonel Jacob, whilst Major Meek was opposed to making payments to the Quhrah, but was using funds to isolate that tribe from all possible supporters. At that date (6th November) the Quhrah had not, reported Major Meek, formulated their terms.

On the 23rd November Major Meek received a deputation of the Quhrah at Hodeidah, when, in his words, "he offered our protection against unprovoked aggression until a final settlement has been effected," together with a free pardon. This offer he repeated in a letter he wrote the same day to Sheikh Omar Saghir, of the Zaraniq tribe.

Colonel Jacob, having been informed by Major Meek of his offers to the tribesmen, replied on the 25th November, pointing out that he failed to see how the Government

could protect the tribe's interests if attacked. "What are our means?" he asked. "Certainly not two aeroplanes."

A demonstration flight took place over Bajil on the 26th November. Its immediate effects are best described in a letter sent by one of Colonel Jacob's fellow-prisoners (Major Reilly):—

"An aeroplane flew over Bajil this morning," he wrote, "causing intense excitement. There was a good deal of firing at the aeroplane, and after it had left a swarm of people came to attack us, numbering without exaggeration, about 300. They surrounded the house and fired at it for about twenty minutes."

Colonel Jacob reported that had it not been for Seyyid Abdul Kadir, Mahmud Nadim and the Quhrah sheikhs the members of the party would have been killed. Nevertheless, the Political Resident, Aden, proposed that a bomb-dropping demonstration should follow after an interval of ten days.

Colonel Jacob subsequently reported that the results of the flight had ultimately proved excellent, and Major Meek explained that the burst of excitement which greeted the aeroplane's appearance over Bajil was due to the machine developing engine trouble and so falling a few hundred feet. The High Commissioner, however, suggested that the bomb dropping should not be carried out, as it might provide pretexts for reprisals on the mission, and this suggestion was approved by the Foreign Office.

Writing to Colonel Jacob on the 27th November, Major Meek said that he had seen the Quhrah deputation and had explained to them that arms could not be given. He gave the deputation a letter, addressed to the Quhrah sheikhs, in which he confirmed an offer he had made verbally, the more important points of which were as follows:—

"There are certain terms with regard to arms in your letter which we regard as impossible of acceptance either by the British Government or by the Allied Powers, who are now engaged in measures for the security and freedom of nations; for any reference on this subject would not be confined to your case, but would have to include other tribes which would come forward with similar requests, and you will readily appreciate the danger to security in this part of the Yemen which would result from such action.

"We offer you full pardon for your conduct in respect of the mission.

"We give you permission, you and the other tribes of the Hodeidah district, to assemble at Hodeidah for the discussion of the question of the appointment of a ruler acceptable to you, and we declare that the British Government will remain at Hodeidah till this matter has been arranged in a manner conformable to the views of the people; and we undertake to refer your wishes to our Government so that they may be considered in connection with matters relating to the Yemen generally which form part of the major considerations now receiving the attention of Great Britain and the Allies.

"We undertake that the British Government will protect you from any aggression (which God forbid!) so long as you behave well and do not disturb the peace or act against the general welfare and Islam.

"Trade in Yemen by land and sea will be secure and nothing will be done to impede its freedom."

On the 29th November Major Meek wrote to Aden stating that, in a letter he had sent to Abdul Kadir, he had given the Seyyid to understand that if the mission were released, he would hand over to him a small amount of arms and ammunition, his idea being to give about 100 rifles.

Colonel Jacob continued to urge that arms and ammunition should be used as a medium of negotiation, and on the 29th November said that he considered guns to be the least dangerous form of weapon to give, as the Arabs did not know how to use them.

Major Meek's offer to the Quhrah deputation produced an effect in due course, for on the 5th December Colonel Jacob telegraphed to him as follows:—

"The sheikhs have accepted your proposals for release, but desire me to corroborate over my signature. This I have done with slight alterations which are logical amplifications of your text. The modifications are as follows:—

"1. Seyyid Abdul Kadir is chosen at once with approval of all the tribes concerned to be temporary ruler until the peace treaty with Turkey, when a permanent ruler is to be freely chosen by the tribes.



"2. The general amnesty is stipulated to include release of Arab prisoners taken in attacks on Hodeidah since our occupation.

"Seyyid Abdul Kadir now wants a message from you confirming the agreement thus amended and endorsing my action in signing it. If you so desire, I will send you the original draft by special messenger for your approval and signature."

Major Meek immediately replied to Colonel Jacob as follows:—

"I agree generally to modifications in keeping with general tenor of my terms to sheikhs. I agree also to release of Arab prisoners."

At the same time Major Meek sent an Arabic telegram to the sheikhs to the effect that he accepted the terms of the agreement arranged between them and Colonel Jacob, and he further reported to Aden as follows:—

"Owing to my anxiety to secure release of the mission, I have acted as indicated above. The Quhrah may elect Abdul Kadir as temporary ruler, and if other tribes associate themselves with the Quhrah in the matter—which is unlikely—there is no objection. The election will be a matter of home politics and will not affect Hodeidah or the Tehamah generally. The portion '... when a permanent ruler is to be freely chosen by the tribes' contains a trap. The mission released, the Aboos, Zaranig and other tribes will not, I am sure, agree with the Quhrah in seeking Seyyid Abdul Kadir as ruler. Further, it has been clearly shown that Hodeidah interests must be fully safeguarded, and the Aboos sheikhs have readily admitted this necessity. We can afford, then, to 'accept generally' as above indicated."

To Seyyid Abdul Kadir, Major Meek sent the following message:—

"We have received your telegram this evening. We desire to assure you that if the tribesmen elect you as their ruler pending the settlement of the future government of the country we shall approve of their election and congratulate you on your appointment. As to the question of future government as a permanent measure, that has been fully provided for in my letter to the sheikhs given to the deputation. The Arabs taken prisoners in operations at Hodeidah will be released as we have previously assured you. We hope you will take steps to secure the immediate release of the mission, as the prolonged delay may exhaust the patience of Government. We welcome you to Hodeidah."

Colonel Jacob's draft agreement with the Quhrah was duly despatched by him to Major Meek on the 5th December. "It is based," he wrote, "on the terms sent by you. I decided to adopt the amendments on my own responsibility. The sheikhs insisted on having my signature to the document and said they would accept it. I regard the amendments as merely dotting the i's and crossing the t's of your draft. I hope you will agree; but if you do not, I will take all responsibility on my shoulders with regard to the amendments."

In a note added later to the above message, Colonel Jacob stated it had afterwards appeared that Seyyid Abdul Kadir required Major Meek's endorsement. "Your telegraphic approval," he continued, "does not satisfy him, so I send the document for your consent and approval on behalf of the Government. I hope you can sign and return the document at once without reference to Aden or elsewhere."

The terms of the draft agreement as translated from the Arabic were as follows:—

"I, the undersigned, Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob, His Britannic Majesty's envoy, take oath in the name of God the Almighty, Jesus Christ, in whom all Moslems believe, and on whom be peace, and also in the name of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, the British nation and Government, and on my honour, and make promise to fulfil the following conditions:—

"1. That whereas I am fully aware that our detention in Bajil by the Quhrah was based on misunderstanding and distrust of our purpose of forcibly subjecting them to the governance of someone they did not want, I consider their conduct excusable.

"2. Therefore, owing to my knowledge of the truth of their excuse, I promise to them that they will not receive punishment or the slightest harm at the hands of the British Government, now or hereafter, on this account.

"3. That whereas Bajil Qaza generally, and the Absiyah and Zaranig tribes, have elected, with their free consent and will, the candidature of Seyyid Abdul Kadir to be their absolute ruler, I, therefore, engage to the said Seyyid Abdul Kadir and the afore-mentioned sheikhs and those associated with them that the great British Government will restrain, absolutely, both Iman Yahya and Seyyid Mohammed-el-Idrisi from interference with the Quhrah and the above-mentioned tribes by necessary means, either diplomatic or by force, so long as they, the aforesaid tribes, continue to behave well and do not disturb the peace nor act against the general welfare of Islam and the dictates of humanity.

"4. During the continuance of our occupation of Hodeidah, our Government engages to safeguard the trade of the Yemen, export and import; to grant all postal facilities by sea to all outside places, and to give safety to all the people of the Yemen who may want to enter Hodeidah, or leave it, and they will also not be subjected to any let or hindrance.

"5. Pardon will be extended to all tribesmen who, since our occupation of Hodeidah, have committed crimes in Hodeidah involving loss of life or property and our\* acts are also condoned. Also that no one will be taken to task at all by our Government, and I, therefore, engage the release of all prisoners, Quhrah, Absiyah or Zaranig, now confined in Hodeidah, Aden or other places in British territory.

"6. Since the sheikhs have engaged to conduct us with our men, animals and property to Hodeidah in safety and with due respect, and leave to me the question of their honourable treatment after arrival at Hodeidah, I accept the fact.

"7. The people of the Yemen will be free to travel by land or sea, wherever they wish to go, both now, before the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, or after.

"8. Whereas the people of the country do not want to be associated with any Government, and insist on remaining under the control of the Sublime Turkish Government, they will remain as stated in paragraph 3 above, and will manage their affairs through the medium of their ruler-elect, the afore-mentioned Seyyid Abdul Kadir, without our intervention or that of any other party, till the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with the Turkish Government, when they will be free either to continue in their present condition or to come under the protection of anyone they choose.

"9. Whereas the land in Hodeidah is the property of the Quhrah and Absiyah, who are under the authority of the Mansab of Marawa, Seyyid Abdul Kadir-el-Ahdal, and if, in these circumstances, the Qaza of Bajil, Absiyah and Zaranig require funds for the management and conduct of their Government, the said Seyyid Abdul Kadir-el-Ahdal is empowered to establish customs in Hodeidah if he so wishes, personally or through some agency, without objection from us or any other, provided no levies are laid on articles, necessities and all that appertains to the requirements of the army of occupation in Hodeidah; and provided also that the customs officer will be under the supervision and protection of the Military Commander of the army of occupation in Hodeidah."

With the draft agreement Colonel Jacob sent the following explanatory notes:—

"1. The main sin of the Quhrah sheikhs is their desire to be independent. For this reason they detained the mission, which they believed was bent on transferring their country to the Imam.

"2. The sheikhs are very pleased with Major Meek's declaration, but prefer that the same should be put forward by one whom they know. This is a common trait of the Arab, and no slight factor in the delay of operations after the arrival of Major Meek.

"3. This engagement is only temporary, and is dependent on the will of the country after the Peace Treaty passes its fiat on the Turks of the Yemen.

"4. Therefore it is immaterial whether Abdul Kadir be elected now or after our return to Hodeidah, provided we are sure of the general desire to-day of the tribesmen for his personality. The house of Al Ahdal is famous throughout the Tehamah, and its influence extends north to the territories claimed by Idrisi.

"5. After the declaration of the Peace Conference the tribesmen will finally elect their future ruler. They will have, they say, to choose between the present Seyyid or one of his house, the Imam, the Idrisi, one of their own sheikhs or ourselves.

\* His Majesty's Government's?



"6. For this reason they wish to retain our military garrison until affairs are more or less settled. They further want us to stay because our presence will regulate trade by sea, to which they attach great importance.

"7. The promise to return prisoners is, I know, beyond my province, but seems a natural sequence of the forgiveness which has already been extended to the marauding tribesmen by Major Meek.

"8. I have taken on myself the responsibility of modifying Major Meek's terms without. I believe, materially altering their provisos. This I have done because I know that Government expect that I be consulted as far as possible on important matters, and also because I am aware of the daily telegrams passing between the Imam and his officials in Bajil. I know the Imam's eagerness to effect our release, which will re-open negotiations between himself and us. The longer we stay here, the nearer the probability of Idrisi intervention, and the embroiling of the country in civil war, which would upset our calculations based on our endeavours to keep both the Idrisi and the Imam outside this area until matters have arrived at a satisfactory conclusion.

"9. I have therefore taken upon myself the full responsibility for the course I have adopted."

The following day (6th December) Major Meek wrote to Aden regarding the above-quoted agreement. He remarked that he did not like it, but did not wish to cause a sudden flare at Bajil by saying at once that he repudiated it. Clause 9 was very objectionable to him, but he informed the Political Resident, Aden, that if he found it essential to make an agreement with Abdul Kadir, he would recast this clause in a form by which Seyyid Abdul Kadir would receive a fixed sum monthly from the customs dues collected by the British Military Administrator. Clause 8, he also said, he would recast to show that the wishes of the people as to future rule would be ascertained in representative assembly in Hodeidah.

Major Meek wrote on the same day to Colonel Jacob saying that he could not sign the document, but would accept all but clause 9. The following extracts from his letter are of importance:—

"Your letter of the 5th December was a great blow to me. It would have been preferable had you continued to refrain from participation in negotiations. The sheikhs had my reply through their deputation to me, and it was accepted in manner made satisfactory by aeroplane demonstration. You have now cloaked it in a meaning it did not convey and fallen again a victim to Nathim's intrigue, giving it fresh life and setting back the hands of our clock and the date of your release indefinitely. The whole spirit of my position has been (1) that the mission must be released first and discussion take place afterwards, and (2) that Bajil intrigue shall not decide the fate of Hodeidah and the neighbouring tribal area. In amending my terms to the sheikhs you have not had regard to this fact; you have departed entirely from its intentions and have thrown yourself unreservedly into the arms of Mahmud, Nathim and Abdul Kadir.

"I cannot sign this document. I would accept all but clause 9, in spite of the falsehood in the implication that the agreement represents the free-will of the Qubrah, Aboos and Zaranig tribes, in spite of the word 'absolutely' in clause 3 and in spite of the references to Turkey in clause 8. Clause 9 is utterly impossible, so much so that it is of no purpose to discuss it. In my letter to you showing what I had said to the Qubrah deputation here I made a specific mention of the impossibility of handing over Hodeidah to the tribes, and it is to ensure a solution just to Hodeidah itself that we have declared our intention to remain in Hodeidah after your release, the protection of the Qubrah having been a second thought and a secondary consideration.

"If you can get out on this agreement at once, good and well. If not, I require that you take no part whatever in negotiations except in so far as I may specially request of you. On your advice I wired Abdul Kadir and the sheikhs that I would accept your agreement with them, but fortunately Abdul Kadir pressed me for a more explicit reply, which I gave him, and which is in keeping with my true position. How I shall now proceed is matter for further thought."

On receipt of Major Meek's letter mentioned above the Political Resident, Aden, telegraphed to the High Commissioner as follows on the 12th December, 1919:—

"Letters from Meek, dated the 6th December, show differences between him and Jacob, which are no doubt hampering release of mission. Jacob still regards

himself as in control, and has signed an agreement with Qubrah which I consider contains many most embarrassing conditions, i.e., that His Majesty's Government will restrain absolutely the Imam and the Idrisi from interfering with Qubrah by necessary means, either diplomatic or forcible. Also that after conclusion of peace with Turkey the tribes which insist on remaining under control of the Turkish Government will be free to choose any protecting Power they like. Tribesmen have asked Meek to ratify this, but up to now he has not done so. I have instructed Meek to inform Jacob that whilst a prisoner he has no official standing and the Government cannot be bound by any agreement he makes whilst in captivity. I have told Meek that he himself must consult Government through me before committing His Majesty's Government to any important measure."

These instructions to Major Meek were fully approved by the High Commissioner, but the release of the mission took place before there was time for the receipt of comments from the Foreign Office.

However, whilst Major Meek's letter of the 6th December was travelling to Aden, correspondence was going on between him and Colonel Jacob. The latter, in reply to Major Meek's letter, in which the latter disagreed with clause 9 of the draft agreement, stated (the 7th December) that he could not understand Major Meek's objection to the inclusion of the word "absolutely" in clause 3. "I took care," proceeded Colonel Jacob, "to insert the saving clause, 'either diplomatic or.' This was omitted in the original Arabic draft. In other words, I amplified your promise to the sheikhs and gave the Government a loophole to escape from the use of force only, and got the sheikhs to agree to the use by us of diplomacy, which they never contemplated nor desired.

"You say that the protection of the Qubrahs is only a 'secondary consideration.' I should be sorry to be a party to a promise that was only half a promise or not seriously meant, or not even properly considered in advance. Better give no promise at all.

"I take it from your letter received to-day that, in spite of the agreement being considered a poor one, you are ready to ratify it after the exclusion of clause 9. I have put the matter before the Seyyid and sheikhs, and I believe it is coming up for discussion to-night. If they agree, and I get this in writing, I trust you will close with the agreement as it then stands. It is the best possible one in the peculiar circumstances of the case as explained to you in my last letter."

No copies of correspondence between Colonel Jacob and Major Meek between the 8th and the 11th December have been received, but on the 12th Major Meek wrote to Aden as follows:—

"Jacob has concluded an agreement with the sheikhs identical with that I rejected, less clause 9. It has not been sent to me for ratification. Had Colonel Jacob been strong no agreement would have been necessary, for between our aircraft, popular opinion and the Idrisi the sheikhs had no option.

"The Imam seems to contemplate an attack on Bajil, and it is quite on the cards that we shall have Bajil the scene of an Idrisi-Imam battle. Such a conflict would bring in the Qubrah-Aboos-Zaranig confederation against the Imam and might settle the future of the Hodeidah district to Government's satisfaction as a portion of the Idrisi's dominions. My personal sympathies are certainly with the Idrisi, and I trust he is strong enough to give a good account of himself. I fancy the Qubrah would be so ready to invite Idrisi aid that our undertaking to afford protection against attack would lose in significance."

The mission was released on the 13th December and taken to Hodeidah by the Qubrah tribesmen, Colonel Jacob having signed the agreement with the exclusion of clause 9, other members of the mission signing as witnesses.

A copy of the actual document in its final form has not been received, but Colonel Jacob states that it is the same as the previously quoted draft without clause 9, with an additional terminating paragraph in which the sheikhs stated their refusal to treat with any other person than Colonel Jacob.

Writing on the 17th December, Major Meek stated that, at an interview he had with the Qubrah sheikhs who took the mission to Hodeidah, reference was made to the agreement, and he, Major Meek, was asked if he accepted it. He stated that he at first evaded direct reply, but afterwards told Abu Hadi, the leading Qubrah sheikh, that the "Government could not endorse an agreement made by an officer in captivity, and Abu Hadi regarded this as self-evident and said that he was sure the sheikhs would



decide in a few days to take the hint and leave the settlement of affairs entirely in the hands of the Government."

Major Meek spent about 6,500 rupees on the release of the mission, whilst Colonel Jacob spent 2,800 rupees. The total expenditure therefore amounted to 10,850L sterling, at the present rate of exchange. This does not, of course, include administrative expenses such as cost of aeroplane, transport, telegrams, &c., one telegram alone exceeding 1,000L.

The release of the mission appears to have been brought about by a combination of causes. Firstly, Major Meek's terms to the Quhrah, which were adopted and amended by Colonel Jacob, but which in their final form were agreed to by Major Meek, except clause 9, although he did not ratify them. Secondly, the moral pressure of the aeroplane flight. Thirdly, persuasion from the Idrisi who was in touch with the sheikhs. Fourthly, and almost certainly the least in effect, in spite of its extent, bribery.

The first fruits of Colonel Jacob's agreement with the sheikhs appeared on the 29th December. On that date, in spite of Major Meek's previous intimation to Sheikh Abu Hadi that the Government could not recognise a covenant entered into by a captive officer, the sheikh informed Major Meek by letter that the Imam was concentrating forces on the Quhrah border, and that his tribesmen looked to His Majesty's Government for protection according to their agreement with Colonel Jacob.

Major Meek replied, ignoring the request for protection, and advising Abu Hadi and his men to exercise restraint in order to avoid conflict with the Imam, but conceded that, if the Imam attacked them, the British Government would not consider it a wrongful act if they sought the aid of the Idrisi.

"As an indication of our good intentions," added Major Meek, "I will deliver to you 100 rifles and some ammunition, for defensive purposes only, if you will send a party of trusty men to receive them."

K. CORNWALLIS, Colonel,  
Director, Arab Bureau.

Arab Bureau, Cairo, January 15, 1920.

[175775]

No. 54.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 102.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 4, 1920.

FRENCH High Commissioner called and informed me that he had received telegram from General Gourand to the effect that latter viewed situation in the area north of Aleppo arising from events at Marash with grave concern. Situation was such that it could no longer be called armistice, and that there was in effect a state of hostilities between his forces and the Turks. General Gourand's information was that Turkish regular formations were moving from central Asia Minor and area north of that against his troops in Marash area. I informed High Commissioner that British in Constantinople had received no information to show that such movements were taking place. On the contrary, reports had been received to the effect that plans of Nationalist leaders were based on idea of concentrating all available forces on Smyrna front for general attack on Greeks should Smyrna be given to latter by the Allies.

French High Commissioner is making representations to Turkish Government on the subject of hostile movements of Turks against General Gourand. I consider Cabinet has no control over Nationalists, and its position even in Constantinople is insecure pending crystallization of attitude of Chamber towards it. On 31st January Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation with me put forward fresh complaints regarding French conduct similar to those reproduced in my telegram No. 75 of 25th January, and he gave me to understand Turkish Government took most serious view of whole situation in Cilicia. I have no means of getting unbiassed account of what happened in Marash area.

If, as seems possible, these events are beginning of general military activity on the part of Nationalists, the contingency may arise of French either asking us effectively to control movements of Turkish armed forces in General Milne's sphere of Asia Minor

or to give free hand to General Franchet d'Esperey to deal with them. Latter is believed to have twenty battalions at his disposal in European Turkey. I contemplate making representations to Turkish Government in support of my French colleague.  
(Repeated to Egyptforce and Political, Bagdad, for General, Bagdad.)

[176545/ME 44]

No. 55.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 6.)

(Secret.)  
Sir,

War Office, February 5, 1920.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, the enclosed copy of a telegram which has been sent to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief the Army of the Black Sea.

The Army Council consider it most important that General Milne's position with regard to General Franchet d'Esperey should be strengthened as much as possible, and they can see no grounds for the action which General Franchet d'Esperey has taken and threatens to take in withdrawing French troops from General Milne's command.

I am therefore to say that the Army Council hope Lord Curzon will find it possible to approach the French Government on the subject, with a view to preventing any further interference on the part of General Franchet d'Esperey.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure in No. 55.

War Office to General Milne (Black Sea).

(Secret.)

February 3, 1920.

YOUR telegram of 29th January.

The Cabinet decided this morning that the garrison at Batoum be withdrawn with all convenient speed and quartered under your orders in Constantinople, and that the command in Constantinople shall remain as heretofore in the hands of the British.

You will therefore inform General Franchet d'Esperey that, as he has thought fit to withdraw some of his troops from General Wilson's command, you are reinforcing General Wilson from Batoum. You will report to me the reason or pretext why General Franchet d'Esperey has withdrawn his troops, and the Foreign Office will be asked to call for an explanation as well.

If General Franchet d'Esperey, when he sees this move on our part, persists in withdrawing more French troops from the Constantinople command, you will inform me what further reinforcements, if any, you will require. Please report your proposals re withdrawing the Batoum garrison, and you will of course carry out this move in conjunction with the admiral.

A further telegram will be sent you as to the future régime in Batoum after your troops have been withdrawn, but two things remain clear: first, that your troops in Batoum will be withdrawn to Constantinople and remain under your orders; and secondly, that under no circumstances will the command of Constantinople pass from our hands.

[177085]

No. 56.

Dr. Weizmann to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 7.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 4, 1920.

I HOPE you will find the enclosed report on our work in Palestine of some interest and use. It is my present intention to return to Palestine the end of February with the hope of initiating the programme of actual work therein outlined. I am particularly anxious, as I have already had occasion to inform your Lordship, that Dr. Arthur Ruppin, who is perhaps the foremost authority on Palestine, should accompany me. I am sure that his services would be most invaluable, and as Lord Allenby has no objection I hope that his going will meet with your approval.

I am, &c.

CH. WEIZMANN.



Enclosure 1 in No. 56.

Dr. Weizmann to Earl Curzon.

My Lord,

Paris, February 2, 1920.

SUPPLEMENTING my conversation with your Lordship last week, I beg to submit for your consideration the following observations respecting Palestine:—

*The Arab Position in Palestine.*

It is not easy to give a clear account of the Arab position in Palestine. It is difficult to distinguish what is a particularly Palestinian manifestation and what is a repercussion of happenings in Egypt and Syria. There is certainly an intimate connection maintained between Jerusalem and Damascus, and Jerusalem and Cairo. Many Palestinians, especially from Nablus, have entered the service of the Shereef and have become officers in the Shereefian army. Shereefian and Turkish agents are coming through Palestine on their way to Egypt and bedouins from the desert are coming into Palestine, and so effervescence and agitation constantly goes on and is maintained. Rumours spread with great rapidity throughout the country—in most cases in an extremely exaggerated form.

In Palestine itself there are some clubs and circles, consisting chiefly of young men, in which nationalist ideas are preached and fostered. This nationalism is not free from a strong religious element, and the nationalist teaching assumes often the form of hostility against the infidel. It would be difficult to ascribe to this movement any great political value. There is no political organisation and no political leadership—the Arab families and tribes are much too divided among themselves and the jealousies between them much too pronounced. They are not welded together, and do not form, at least at present, anything like an homogeneous body.

The hostility against Zionism, which was so manifest six months ago, is due to various causes. Firstly, to ignorance of Zionist aims and methods. The Arabs were repeatedly told that the Jews were coming in masses into the country in order to despoil them of their land and property. Naturally they became enemies of the Jews. Some exaggerated statements in the Jewish press and speeches of extremists like Mr. Zangwill have also served to mislead the Arabs as to the real intentions of the Zionists, and have done the Jewish cause in Palestine incalculable harm.

The second cause is also perhaps more economic than political, and is chiefly applicable to the effendis, or large landowners. These people were in a privileged position during the Turkish régime. They controlled large numbers of fellaheen, or peasants, whom they bled white. They also formed in the time of the Turks the chief part of the administration, and still continue to do so now under the temporary military British rule. (It is not for me to criticise their administrative methods and habits. No doubt the Foreign Office is aware of these from the reports of its own advisers.) The establishment of the Jewish national home would lead no doubt in the course of time to a considerable change in the personnel and methods of administration, and the effendi feels his privileged position slipping away from him. He abhors all European methods, feeling that they would mean a reform of the political and economic abuses from which he profits. But the British being too strong for him to oppose openly, he seizes Zionism as a very convenient pretext in order to embarrass the British administration.

A third reason is the presence in Palestine of numerous agents of great European Powers who try to influence the population. It is interesting to note that foremost amongst the Powers which display a considerable, and a somewhat dangerous, propaganda are the Italians. In that connection one should remember that in Palestine the Vatican and the secular Italian Government seem to be identical. The cleavage which exists in Rome is not apparent in Jerusalem; almost every religious order, particularly the Franciscans, are at the same time political agents. The "Banco di Roma," which is a Vatican bank, is trying, even under the present military law, to create vested interests in Palestine by methods which cannot always be considered as the very best. The French propaganda has also been active and extensive, although recently, especially since the occupation of Syria by the French, it has abated, and is likely to diminish still more in the future if a settlement of the Anglo-French relations in the Near East is not unduly protracted. All these foreign influences operate on the population of Palestine and keep it in a state of unrest. They all appeal to its national and religious instincts, and they all make use of Zionism as a weapon against

England, and there is no doubt that anti-Zionist and anti-British propaganda amongst the Arabs run parallel.

One place in Palestine occupies a somewhat particular position, both in its attitude to Great Britain and to Zionist policy, that is Nablus. Nablus is very powerful economically. The prosperity of Nablus is based chiefly on the olive-tree and the industry connected with the production of oil and soap. The chief argument against Zionism of the people of Nablus is that Zionism may build modern factories and so compete successfully with their oil industry. One important agitator based his opposition against me particularly on the ground that I was a chemist and probably had the intention of making soap in Palestine.

Nablus is also a powerful centre not merely of Mahomedan but of Turkish influence. Extensive communications are established between Nablus and Mustapha Kemal. Large stores of arms and ammunition are accumulated there. Through the co-operation of the Zionist Intelligence Service several thousand bombs and rifles of German origin were recently discovered in Nablus.

The feeling in Nablus against the Jews, unlike in other parts of Palestine, is of long standing. No Jew has lived in Nablus or the neighbouring towns of Tulkerem and Kulkilia for centuries. The anti-Jewish feeling is due in no small measure, I believe, to the ancient Samaritan community which still dwells in Nablus and still retains its belief in the animosity between Samaritans and Jews which was supposed to exist in Biblical times. These ancient prejudices will, however, I am convinced, disappear in time when the Samaritans see what help the Jews can be to them. I have been in very close touch with their High Priest, unfortunately a man of not a very attractive personality, and not entirely reliable and trustworthy. As a result of our conferences, however, certain members of the Samaritan community presented to the Zionist Commission a number of requests for assistance, including a request for the establishment of a school with Hebrew teaching. The most interesting request, perhaps, was that the Zionist Commission should use its influence with the Jewish community of Jerusalem so as to induce Jewish girls to marry Samaritan young men. The Samaritan community has hitherto never concluded any marriages outside their own circle. If inter-marriage would take place it would contribute greatly towards the establishment of an *entente* between the Jewish community and the Samaritans, who would in their turn use their good offices in order to pacify the Arabs. It is, of course, difficult to break down prejudices which have been persisting for almost thirty centuries, but from a political point of view it is very desirable that the Jewish community should give increased attention to the welfare of the Samaritans. The Zionist Commission is at present engaged in setting up a school and sending down some teachers, and also a relief agent.

Various Arab notables of Nablus visited me and, amongst other things, asked me to set up a bank in Nablus which would give long term credit on mortgages. That is a distinct change for the better as compared with six months ago, when an attempt to establish a branch of the Anglo-Palestine Company in Nablus met with considerable hostility. I also visited Kulkilia and Tulkerem, and, outwardly at any rate, the reception was most cordial. It would be erroneous to suppose that these signs of oriental cordiality denote a deep change in the Arabs' attitude, but one is driven to the conclusion from the experience one gathers in the country that the Arab hostility should and can be met by a frank, honest and bold policy. The Arabs were told that we were returning in great numbers to Palestine to which we had an inalienable claim; that we did not intend to swamp the country as that would lead to a catastrophe; that we were working for a well-organised immigration; that there was ample room in the land for us and for them, and that the development of the country would inure to our common benefits. On the whole such a statement is taken by the Arabs in a friendly spirit. They are suspicious, perhaps critical, and therefore I think that mere propaganda on our part would not help matters. It is only through the beginning of actual work in Palestine, and the association of the Arabs with that work, that we can hope to remove completely their suspicion and distrust.

It should be remembered that Arab hostility towards Jews and Zionists is a product of comparatively recent development. The Arabs knew the general tendencies of Jewish colonising activity, and understood that it meant more to the Jews than the mere building up of a few villages. They always expected that there would be a time when Jews would be coming into the country in great numbers, still they never showed any hostility to our colonies; on the contrary, the relations between the colonists and their Arab neighbours were cordial. And even now a great many of our colonists have numerous connections with the Arab world, especially among the fellaheen, who



always come to them for advice and guidance. The case of our colony Metullah is interesting as an illustration of this. Metullah, which is at present in the French sphere (we trust only temporarily), is a Jewish village placed almost at the foot of the Hermon, rather away from the rest of the Galilean Jewish colonies. It is surrounded by a very mixed population of Arabs, both Christian and Mahomedan, Druses, Circassians and some Turks. There has never been any trouble between the colonists and their neighbours. The colonists are even now in this troublesome period the only Europeans who can go about unmolested in the remote Transjordanian districts of the Hauran and Jaulan. Our colonists receive daily numerous offers from landowners, big and small, and requests to come and buy property in various districts. Metullah has recently become a centre of disturbance, but that is due entirely to friction between French and Arabs. One notices the tendency of certain French agents to try and represent the trouble in Upper Galilee as Arab hostility against the Jew, but the facts belie this contention. The British political officer, Colonel Waters Taylor, had an opportunity to watch and study from Haifa the conditions in North Galilee, and he would bear out this statement fully. I went over the whole of the Litani district, visited Metullah, and had ample opportunity of investigating the position. One could not notice any trace of hostility against the Jews. It was only the arrival of a small French garrison into Metullah, and the attempt of the French to occupy Hasbeiya and Rasbeiya, two great Arab communities, which provoked the populations. Bedouins attacked Metullah, and their leaders informed us this attack was directed against the French and not against the Jews. From many facts and observations gathered in the country one is driven to the conclusion that the hostility to Jews and Jewish aims is artificial, brought about by agencies working in the dark, operating against Great Britain's position in the East. These agencies assume very different aspects. They assume the guise of Egyptian, Arab or Turkish nationalisms, they sometimes utter Bolshevik threats. These dark forces of destruction work on the imagination of the primitive Bedouin, incite him to brigandage, pillage and even murder. Those forces will develop as long as these political conditions in the Near East remain undefined. It is the duty of the Zionists in Palestine to take the Arab movement seriously, and to try and establish friendly relations with the Arab community on a basis of honest co-operation. This is possible, and a great service would be thus rendered to the cause of civilisation in the Near East.

#### *The Land Question.*

The land question is a crucial one. The Jewish national home must be rooted in the soil and grow up about a sturdy Jewish peasantry. The improvement of the present poor state of the Arab fellaheen also depends largely upon a proper handling of the land question.

Palestine is at present very uneconomically cultivated. The Arab method of agriculture is primitive and extensive. With irrigation, modern roads, sanitary conditions, and the use of machinery and other methods of modern farming, probably not more than one-sixth of the land which at present is used by an Arab farmer would be required to yield a livelihood for a family accustomed to European standards. The power of the large absentee landowners, the oppressive system of taxation and the ignorance of the fellaheen combined to prevent a more economic use of the land under the Turkish régime.

The incidence of taxation at present falls almost wholly on the gross yield of the land. The development of intensive farming, which entails comparatively heavy operating costs, is consequently discouraged, while no effective check is placed on the uneconomic use of the land and its retention solely for speculative gains. In the interest not only of Jewish colonisation, but the Arab peasant as well, the system of taxation must be thoroughly revised. Measures will have to be taken like in Egypt and the Soudan which will tend to throw the incidence of taxation on the unimproved value of land, so as to encourage the cultivator to improve his holding and increase its productivity. Such measures would automatically tend to the breaking-up of the large latifundia, in so far as they have no economic basis and would doubtless bring into the market considerable quantities of land required for colonisation. The entire question of taxation, particularly in so far as it relates to the land, is of great importance and should receive immediate attention by experts.

The present uncertainty of land titles is likewise a serious impediment to economic progress, both from the Arab and Jewish point of view. A cadastral survey is essential for the prevention of tax evasion and as a basis for taxation reform. So long

as the uncertainty of land titles exists, it will be difficult for the Zionists to take effective steps to acquire considerable areas of either public or private lands. One of the first measures required to facilitate the Zionist programme and to lay the necessary basis for the economic development of the country therefore is a cadastral survey.

Taxation reform and a cadastral survey would make for the improvement of the economic welfare of the country and incidentally tend to bring land into the market for Jewish colonisation. But it is doubtful whether these measures would be adequate in themselves to make sufficient land available for Jewish settlement at a reasonable price, i.e., a price bearing any relation to the productive value of the land or at all comparable to the price paid for similar land in other countries. The Zionists would have to rely on more direct measures to secure access to the land. From the point of view of national economy a great deal could be said in favour of the compulsory breaking-up, on a basis of reasonable compensation, of the large latifundia which are wastefully cultivated and in favour of settling Jews upon them, after first providing, of course, for the needs of the present tenants. It would, however, probably be politically unwise for the Zionists to press at the present time for such measures, which might provoke hostility upon the part of the landlords and lead to the intentions of the Zionists being misinterpreted to the people. There are, however, large quantities of State lands, waste and unoccupied lands in Palestine, and it seems to me only right and proper that these should be turned over to the Zionists upon reasonable terms and conditions for the purpose of colonisation and development. Of course, the Zionists would have to make satisfactory provision for the comparatively few tenants who are now dwelling on such lands.

#### *Public Works.*

I shall attempt only to touch upon a few of the main types of public works which should be carried out in Palestine in the nearest future. My remarks should be supplemented by reference to the attached report of Sir Charles Metcalfe and Sir Douglas Fox (Limited), which deals with a number of projects of public works and which was drawn up after a technical inspection and survey of the country extending over several months.

Foremost among the public works which will have to be undertaken are those connected with drainage and sanitation. The prevalence of malaria stands in the way of any organised immigration. The vitality of the immigrants would be sapped and their life imperilled by the malaria mosquito. The drainage of the marshes is of course the only thorough way to combat malaria, all other sanitary measures simply serve as a palliative and do not eradicate the causes of the disease. The number of marshes to be drained is relatively small, and this work should be begun immediately.

The most important district is the lake of Huleh to the north of Tiberias. The draining of the lake of Huleh would have a triple advantage: firstly, it would get rid of the greatest centre of infection; secondly, it would set free a large tract of very fertile land; and thirdly, it would make available for irrigation the waters of Merom which are at present a source of disease, thereby increasing the fertility of the neighbouring district perhaps tenfold. It is the opinion of competent engineers, both British and Jewish, including the head of the Department of Public Works of the British Administration, that the drainage of the Huleh could also yield a very considerable quantity of power which could be utilised for pumping the waters needed for irrigation upon the surrounding plateaux.

Another important project is the drainage of the Jordan valley. Here again a vast district, which, if freed from malaria, could produce splendid crops and feed a population of perhaps 500,000 souls, is lying waste. Parallel with the draining of the Jordan valley would proceed the irrigation of, and the establishment of settlements on, the adjacent hills.

While it would probably be unwise to undertake large irrigation schemes at present, local irrigation from underground waters, springs and streams can now be developed to advantage, for this, however, power will be required. Assuming Palestine obtains her proper boundaries on the north, sufficient power can be developed from the Litani, the Jordan and the Yarmuk for irrigation, milling and other industrial enterprises closely associated with the agriculture of the country, although power is never likely to be abundant in Palestine and the economic life of the country must always be primarily agricultural. The development of power from the falls of the Jordan between the lake of Merom and the lake of Galilee could, in the opinion of the Department of Public Works of the British Administration, be undertaken at once.



The establishment of a harbour in Haifa, which is destined to become the leading port of Palestine and the neighbouring countries, should also receive early attention. Contrary to the usual projects, however, I should not contemplate the immediate erection of extensive facilities, but should establish at first only modest accommodations for two or three ships, as the trade of Haifa and the surrounding district is not yet sufficiently developed to justify at present the building of a costly modern harbour with all the necessary appliances. More extensive facilities can be provided as the commerce of the country grows and develops. The views of the present Administrator of Ports in Palestine on this subject coincide with mine.

I am pleased to find that comparatively little seems to be required in the way of the further development of the present network of roads and railways, except for a system of narrow gauge railways to link together the main trunk lines. The military authorities have built a splendid series of roads and railways, which should be sufficient to meet the economic needs of the country for some time to come. Unfortunately, however, the present service of maintenance and repair stands in urgent need of reorganisation.

A few remarks should be made on the future of the railway from Kantara to Ludd. This railway at present is run at a loss of approximately 600,000l. a year. In the opinion of experts, like Sir Charles Metcalfe, the losses could be greatly reduced under a different system of management, but even under the best conditions there is very little prospect of the railway yielding a return unless a through service could be maintained between Cairo and Jerusalem, which would avoid the change from Kantara West to Kantara East. For that purpose the swinging-bridge over the Suez Canal would have to be opened up definitely for railway traffic. A considerable part of the tourist and pilgrim traffic would then travel on this route, and the railway possibly could become self-sustaining. Otherwise it would always remain a burden to the British Government, which would probably want to maintain the railway for strategic reasons. It would seem, in any event, a pity to tear up about 200 kilom. of well-laid track.

Finally, a very important branch of public works urgently requiring consideration is the afforestation of Palestine. The hills and the sandy dunes do not lend themselves to agricultural purposes in the ordinary sense of the word, but it is sufficient to observe what has been done in hilly and rocky districts between Nablus and Jerusalem and on the road between Jerusalem and Jaffa to be convinced that there are vast possibilities, even on these hills which for centuries have been devastated and which, under the influence of winds and heavy rains, have become more and more disintegrated—the rocks break up and cover the plains of Palestine with rolling stones and so impart to the whole landscape an aspect of extreme desolation. The dunes are in fact eating up the fertile part of the maritime plain. One can measure the progress of the dunes and the devastation of the plains every year. There is therefore pressing need that measures should be taken to stop this progress of desolation and convert this waste land into a source of wealth for the country.

In the opinion of competent experts, and this opinion is supported by actual experiment which ranges over a number of years and in different parts of the country, the hills could be covered with at least three sorts of trees: the olive the pine-tree and the carob-tree. There is no need to dwell on the possibility of growing olive and pine-trees. The wealth of Nablus and vicinity comes from the hills, whose flanks are covered with magnificent olive groves. There is no reason why similar olive groves should not be planted on the barren hillsides all over the country. The same is true of the pine-tree, particularly of the maritime pine. The carob also grows wild in Palestine, and one sees luxurious and shapely trees breaking out of rocks spontaneously all over Palestine and Syria. If the growth of these trees is developed systematically, they not only will protect the hills from further disintegration and will give Palestine abundant shade, of which it now stands sorely in need, but they will produce large quantities of cattle food. The carob particularly is perhaps the best cattle food known. Groves of carob would form the basis of an extensive cattle culture and all that is connected with it, and make the country again flowing with milk, if not honey. Here, as elsewhere, many a circumstance which tends towards making Palestine uninhabitable at present could be converted into a source of wealth and strength to the country. It only needs the hand of man, capital, intelligence and energy.

#### Education.

I may be permitted to touch upon the subject of education, which is most important from the Zionist point of view. The Zionists have given considerable attention to the

development of a system of Hebrew education in Palestine, and under very difficult circumstances have achieved progress. Before the advent of the Zionist organisation into Palestine there was no unified system of Jewish education. Every European Jewish community established its system of schools. These schools taught in the languages of their respective mother-countries, and naturally became political advance guards of the various European Powers. France, for instance, established an influence in Palestine through supporting the Alliance israélite universelle, and French influence spread in Palestine through the medium of the Jewish schools. When Germany entered into competition with France for the hegemony in the Near East, she encouraged the activities of the Hilfsverein Deutscher Juden in Palestine, which created a system of schools with German as their language of instruction. The Anglo-Jewish Association established the Evelyn de Rothschild's school, with English as the medium of instruction, and so Palestine, and particularly Jerusalem, became a veritable tower of Babel. The Jewish community was the dumping-ground of political intrigues, jealousies and rivalries. Needless to say that this variety of systems did not render the children fit for remaining in the country, but, on the contrary, turned the eyes of the more ambitious among them to the countries they were taught to look upon as their motherlands. The national idea naturally militated against this disintegrating tendency and it found its practical expression in the one fundamental demand for a national system of schools with one language of instruction, which naturally was Hebrew. Out of 16,000 Jewish children who go to school in Palestine, 14,000 are at present in the Zionist schools, but even the remaining 2,000 who are still in other schools are forcing them to adopt Hebrew as the language of instruction. This does not mean that there is an antagonism towards the European languages; on the contrary, the Palestinian young generation speaks European languages with great ease. Particularly since the occupation of Palestine by the British, the children have been most eager to learn English, but the Palestinian child receives its fundamental training and education in Hebrew just as the English child receives its training and education in English.

The educational budget per capita is the highest in the world. Owing to this rapid development of education it has been found necessary to proceed with the setting-up of higher schools like a technical college and an university.

#### Possibilities of Palestine.

It is true that Palestine has no great mineral wealth or great natural resources, but it is equally true that Palestine is rich in sun and in water (the yearly rainfall in Jerusalem is equal to that of Manchester), both of which can be utilised to produce out of the soil of Palestine, if not wealth, moderate prosperity. It is from the Zionist point of view happily a country which does not lend itself to the making of big fortunes, but will yield a respectable return only for hard and honest work. With the preparation and cultivation of the land and the construction and maintenance of public works, employment for a large number of people should be provided. It is the opinion of experts that, even without great technical development, there is room in Palestine at present for at least 3,000,000 people without in any way encroaching upon the rights of the present population. A little reflection will show that this is not at all paradoxical. The southern Jewish colonies were established under Turkish rule about thirty or twenty-five years ago by people who had no agricultural training, no agricultural traditions, and who were typical town dwellers. The colonies were established under a Government which put every obstacle in their way. They experienced practically every difficulty imaginable. The acquisition of land was not allowed. The Jewish pioneers had to buy their land somehow and somewhere. They naturally were not in a position to select the most suitable tracts. Yet, in the course of thirty years, they have transformed their sandy patches into flourishing gardens, and one sees the Jewish colonies standing out as oases in the midst of sandy desert. Rishon, for instance, possesses about 2½ square kilom. of land, and on this comparatively small stretch live 3,000 people. It is obvious that the density of population possible in Palestine is far above what it is usually estimated. There is no reason why all of the maritime plain of Saron should not be covered with colonies like Rishon.

The density of population in the hilly Lebanon, only one-eighth of the area of which is cultivated, is approximately 160 inhabitants per kilom. In Palestine it is approximately 25. If one assumes that Palestine may become no more densely populated than the Lebanon, there is room for another 135 inhabitants per kilometre. Assuming the proper boundaries for Palestine, it would contain approximately 30,000 square kilom., and could support a population of 4,000,000 people. If one takes



into consideration that the Transjordanian plains are almost empty, that at present it is practically no man's land, and that it is very fertile and crossed by numerous streams, these estimates appear to be rather conservative.

Mention should be made also of the possibilities of trade and industry. With the harbours of Haifa, Gaza and Jaffa, Palestine should enjoy much of the trade of the hinterland of Syria and Arabia. It should become the point of transit between Mesopotamia and Egypt, when the Haifa-Damascus railway is extended to Bagdad. Trade communications should be maintained with the ports of the Black Sea, as the Jews coming from Russia, Roumania and other Balkan States would naturally retain their connections with those countries. There should also be room for certain industries in the country itself, like silk-weaving, carpet-making, glass, oil, soap and all industries connected with agriculture, like the preservation of fruit, jam-making, wine, &c. Finally, the chemical deposits in and about the Dead Sea should afford the basis of a considerable chemical industry.

#### *Colonisation and Defence of Transjordan.*

I should like to add a few words on the subject of the maintenance of law and order in Palestine, particularly in Eastern Palestine, during the period following immediately after the publication of the mandate. I had many opportunities of discussing the question with the competent authorities in Palestine. It is generally thought that during the next two or three years, especially if the fermentation in Egypt and Syria continues, a small army of occupation will be needed in Palestine, which may gradually be replaced by a militia or gendarmerie recruited locally and under British guidance and tutelage. But the weak point in such a scheme centres about the defence of Transjordan. The eastern frontier of Palestine is always open to the inroads of bedouin tribes, and it can only be rationally defended through the planting of a settled population in Transjordan. Already the Turkish Government tried to meet the bedouin danger by founding Circassian villages, especially in the north-eastern part of Palestine. As the vast unpopulated plains of Transjordan are particularly suitable for agricultural settlements, and have in the past served as the granary of the whole of Syria, it would seem from every point of view desirable to bring into these districts Jews from Transcaucasia who are capable soldiers, good agriculturists and who have maintained for centuries a pure Hebrew tradition. Their number is about 60,000 to 70,000, and from numerous letters and petitions which reach us at present they are all ready to emigrate. During my stay in Palestine two representatives of these Jews arrived there, having made their way on foot from Daghestan. Such people would form a most valuable nucleus for the colonisation and defence of Transjordan.

#### *Immediate Programme.*

What is now required above all else in Palestine is the beginning of actual work. In many respects there has been too much talk from all quarters. The starting of concrete work is bound to relieve the political situation from both Arab and Jewish point of view. For all practical purposes it may be accepted as a *fait accompli* that Palestine is to be placed under a British mandate and to be re-established as the Jewish national home. With the co-operation and under the supervision of His Majesty's Government the Zionist Organisation can now quietly and unassumingly begin its constructive work.

A modest programme has been prepared by the Zionists with the help of experts, and this has met with encouragement from Lord Allenby and the Administration in Palestine, as is evidenced from letters annexed to this report. We are prepared to initiate this programme at once. It calls for the improvement and extension of a number of the existing colonies and the preparation of the soil, looking towards the establishment of new settlements, particularly upon tracts of the State domains. It includes an extensive housing programme, as at present the dire lack of accommodation stands in the way of even a most restricted immigration. The erection of 1,000 houses in various parts of the country would be insufficient to meet the demands of the coming year. Our housing programme will require the setting-up of a number of factories to manufacture and prepare bricks, tiles, slabs and other building materials.

The Zionists are also prepared to undertake experiments in the afforestation of the hillsides and the planting of the dunes as soon as the necessary stretches of hills and dunes are placed at their disposal.

As the malaria swamps must be drained at once, if the Government is not prepared to carry out this most urgent public work, the Zionists would also undertake to do it under arrangements which would enable them to acquire the land reclaimed.

The magnitude of the Zionist work in Palestine is not to be underestimated. Already the Zionist budget, which is now used mainly for education, agricultural experimental work and sanitation, almost equals that of the British Administration, and it will be greatly increased as soon as the possibility of constructive work becomes a reality.

But the Zionists cannot carry through their programme without the full-hearted co-operation of the Government. In order to restore more normal conditions in the country and to make it possible for the Zionists to undertake the contemplated reconstruction, the following measures, in my humble judgment, should be taken at once by His Majesty's Government:—

1. The enactment of the Land Ordinance which was submitted to His Majesty's Government some time ago by the Chief Administrator with the approval of the Chief Political Officer.

This ordinance would modify the present prohibition of land transfers and permit small stretches of land to be transferred under proper conditions. The embargo was necessary during the war to prevent illicit transactions and harmful speculations in land, but its usefulness has now ceased. It is crippling the economic life of the country and causing great hardship. Unrestricted dealings in land would almost be preferable to the present all-embracing embargo, which prohibits even the most legitimate and necessary transactions.

The Land Ordinance proposed by the Administration does not permit all transactions in land, but endows the authorities with Powers adequate to prevent speculation and abuse. It permits, in a limited degree, transfers necessary to the resumption of the normal economic life of the country. It would enable the peasants and small proprietors to obtain credit upon their land. It would enable the Zionists to obtain small tracts of land and to start their building programme. It would allay the unrest and suspicion which springs from the present static and abnormal economic state.

2. The appointment of a Land Commission for the following purposes:—

- (a.) To make a cadastral survey.
- (b.) To revise the present system of taxation so as to encourage the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land and discourage its uneconomic use or non-use.
- (c.) To arrange terms and conditions under which State, waste and other lands over which the State may possess the power of disposal should be turned over to the Zionist Organisation for colonisation and development, the rights of the present cultivators of such lands being equitably safeguarded.

The making of a cadastral survey has been greatly simplified by modern improvements in the art of aero-photography. One of the leading experts and inventors in this field is now in Palestine, and the Zionists would be pleased to place him at the service of the Government. He has with him the most modern photographic appliances and equipment and would be prepared to undertake this work at once.

3. The modification of the present restrictions upon immigration.

The Zionists fully appreciate the danger of Jews coming into Palestine more rapidly than they can be absorbed into its economic life. The presence of a large idle and unemployed body of Jewish immigrants in Palestine would not advance the Zionist cause. But the gates cannot be kept closed for ever, and the sooner regulated immigration is allowed the easier it will be for the Zionist Organisation to allay the growing impatience of the masses and to control the flow of immigration in the future. There is no reason why expert and technical men desiring to familiarise themselves with the conditions and possibilities of the country, business men contemplating establishing productive enterprises in the land, and other people who in the judgment of the Zionist Commission would be likely to find productive employment and not become a charge upon the community, should not be permitted to enter Palestine. It is believed that the present military administration might be quite prepared to accept the recommendations of



the Zionist Commission in this matter. With the consent of His Majesty's Government, there should be no difficulty therefore in working out a policy of immigration along the lines suggested.

4. The drainage of malaria-breeding swamps.

As already indicated the only effective way of combating malaria, which is the curse of the country, is through the drainage of the swamps. The American Medical Unit is doing great constructive work in fighting malaria, but the more active co-operation of the Government in the drainage of the swamps is required. If the Government is not prepared to do this work directly, the Zionists, as stated above, would undertake to do it under arrangements which would enable them to acquire the land reclaimed.

5. The placing of stretches of dunes and hills at the disposition of the Zionists for experiments in afforestation.

In order to enable the Zionists to carry out contemplated experiments in afforestation on a larger scale than has heretofore been possible, suitable arrangements should be made to place at their disposition stretches of dunes and hills.

6. Reforms in the Administration.

The Administration in Palestine is at present, with the exception of a few head officials, almost solely Syrian. The recruitment of more British and Palestinian Jews in the personnel of the post-office, railways and other administrative offices would, in my judgment, make for increased efficiency and a better *esprit de corps*.

I am conscious that this report is not entirely unbiassed. The Zionist idea is so much a part of my being that it naturally must influence my judgment. But I have tried, however, as far as possible to have my conclusions confirmed by trained experts and corroborated by the British authorities on the spot. It is now more than ever my firm conviction not only that Palestine will prove the best means of solving as a part of the world's peace the difficult and far-ramifying Jewish problem, but that it will as the Jewish national home prove a source of strength and satisfaction to its mandatory, Great Britain, and to all that Great Britain stands for in the East.

I have, &c.

CH. WEIZMANN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 56.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr. Lloyd George.*

Dear Prime Minister,

Cairo, December 24, 1919.

DR. WEIZMANN, the bearer of this letter, is leaving Egypt to-morrow after a prolonged visit to Palestine. He will no doubt explain to you the State of Zionism in Palestine.

I should like to add that Dr. Weizmann has been of great assistance to my administration, his moderate views having gone a long way to ameliorate the political conditions in Palestine and restore the confidence of the Arab in the Jew.

Dr. Weizmann has prepared a comprehensive programme for the preliminary work necessary to inaugurate the Jewish national home, and I trust he will return to Palestine at no distant date to give me the benefit of his further advice.

Yours sincerely,

ALLENBY.

Enclosure 3 in No. 56.

*General Bols to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.*

*Headquarters, Occupied Enemy Territory Administration  
(South), Jerusalem, December 21, 1919.*

Dear General,

I AM sending this to you by Dr. Weizmann. He has been out here a couple of months, and has done such good work in dealing with all matters in a quiet and

impartial way. I think there is little doubt that antagonism to Zionism has been reduced by his action, and my view, after a month as Chief Administrator, is that there will be no serious difficulty in introducing a large number of Jews into the country provided it is done without ostentation. There are a few paid agitators, and of course their cry for an individual Syria will continue.

The country is in need of development quickly in order to make the people content. At present we are suffering from being forced to make the budget balance. The moment the mandate is given we should be ready to produce a big loan, part of which should be subscribed by the inhabitants. I want Sir Herbert Samuel here for advice on this matter, and I want a much bigger financial adviser than you have been able to send me as yet.

With such a loan—say, 10 or 20 million—I feel certain I can develop the country quickly and make it pay, and gradually the population should increase from the present 900,000 to 2½ million. There is plenty of room for this. The Jordan valley alone should hold a million instead of its present thousand.

But we must have water. The northern and eastern frontiers must be arranged to ensure control of the Litani River and the Jordan. These matters are of no use to our northern and eastern neighbours, and they are essential to me.

I hope, then, that—

1. You will send Weizmann back soon.
2. You will send Sir H. Samuel for a visit.
3. You will send us a big financial fellow.
4. Consider the plans for a loan.

If this is done I can promise you a country of milk and honey in ten years, and I can promise you will not be bothered by anti-Zion difficulties.

I have written this to you, as I do not know Lord Curzon sufficiently well to write direct.

Early information of the probable date of the mandate will help me.

Sincerely yours,

L. J. BOLS.

[176906/ME 44]

No. 57.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 7.)*

Sir,

*War Office, February 6, 1920.*

WITH reference to Army Council letter dated the 21st November and your letter dated the 3rd December, and previous correspondence on this subject, I am commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, copies of telegrams, dated the 3rd February, from the War Office to General Bridges and to General Milne on the same date.

I am to say that the Army Council understand that Lord Curzon is making the necessary representations to the French Government, which are alluded to in the telegrams under reference, and which it is understood were decided on by the Cabinet.

The Council would be obliged if they could be furnished, in due course, with a copy of the communication made to the French Government. They will forward to Lord Curzon a copy of General Milne's reply to their telegram as soon as it has been received.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 57.

*War Office to General Milne (Black Sea).*

(Telegraphic.)

*War Office, February 3, 1920.*

YOUR telegram of the 29th January. It was decided by the Cabinet this morning that the garrison at Batoum be withdrawn with all convenient speed and quartered under your orders in Constantinople, and that the command in Constantinople shall remain as heretofore in the hands of the British. You will therefore inform General Franchet d'Esperey that as he has considered it fit to withdraw a portion of his troops from General Wilson's command, you are reinforcing General Wilson from Batoum. You will report to me the reason why or pretext upon which General Franchet



d'Esperey has withdrawn his troops, and the Foreign Office will also be requested to ask for an explanation.

If, when he sees this move on our part, General Franchet d'Esperey persists in withdrawing more French troops from the Constantinople command, you will inform me what further reinforcements, if any, you will require. Please report your proposals re withdrawing the Batoum garrison, and you will of course carry out this move in conjunction with the Admiral.

A further telegram will be sent you as to the future régime in Batoum after your troops have been withdrawn, but two things remain clear:—

1. That your troops in Batoum will be withdrawn to Constantinople and remain under your orders.
2. That under no circumstances will the command of Constantinople pass from our hands.

Enclosure 2 in No. 57.

War Office to General Bridges (Constantinople).

(Telegraphic.)

War Office, February 3, 1920.

FOLLOWING has been sent to General Milne:—

"This morning the Cabinet decided that the garrison at Batoum be withdrawn with all convenient speed and quartered under your orders in Constantinople, also that the command in Constantinople shall remain in the hands of the British as heretofore. You will therefore inform General Franchet d'Esperey that you are reinforcing General Wilson from Batoum, as he has thought fit to withdraw some of his troops from General Wilson's command. You will report to me the reason why or pretext on which General Franchet d'Esperey has withdrawn his troops: we will request Foreign Office to call for an explanation as well.

"If, when he sees this move on our part, General Franchet d'Esperey persists in withdrawing more French troops from the Constantinople command, you will inform me what further reinforcements you will require, if any. Please report your proposals re withdrawing the Batoum garrison; you will of course carry out this move in conjunction with the Admiral.

"A further telegram will be sent you as to the future régime in Batoum after your troops have been withdrawn, but two things remain clear: First, that your troops in Batoum will be withdrawn to Constantinople and remain under your orders; secondly, that under no circumstances will the command of Constantinople pass from our hands."

2. General Franchet d'Esperey's procedure cannot but afford grave dissatisfaction to His Majesty's Government. By unwarranted interference with General Milne's dispositions for the control of Constantinople, he has tended more and more to the creation of an impossible situation. The Government are quite determined that in no circumstances will they allow the British commander to be ousted by any machinations on Franchet d'Esperey's part, which you should make perfectly clear to him forthwith. Also at your discretion you may hint that we may be compelled to ask the Government to press for his removal on personal grounds if he persists in this line of action.

[177156/ME 58]

No. 58.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 64. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tiflis, February 2, 1920.

FOLLOWING for Georgian Delegation, Paris:—

"Message re recognition of *de facto* Georgian Government received on 12th January.

"News received by all Georgia with greatest enthusiasm.

"Entire Georgian people ready to defend independence. On partial mobilisation, can place 60,000 under arms. On general mobilisation, 200,000. Munitions of war, provisions, urgently needed. Trying to hasten help. Point out that we can wholly defend ourselves, provided Black Sea littoral guaranteed.

"Bolshevik proposal of military agreement refused, at the same time accepting political negotiations based on principle of independence and non-intervention in internal affairs, with a view to establishment of good neighbourly relations. No reply up to the present.

"Country quite orderly.

"State organisation proceeding on solid foundations. No dissension. Food crisis alone hindering labour. Finance disorganised, chiefly owing to artificial rise of foreign currency.

"Take such steps as you properly can to hasten final solution of Batoum problem. This question agitates whole population. We await daily solution favourable to Batoum province as well as to Georgia. Georgian Government consents that Batoum remains British base, but administration of province and town should be Georgian.

"Strong Bolshevik and Turkish propaganda now in Batoum. These frontiers of republic quite unprotected. Mortal *[sic]* danger threatens Great Britain as well as us unless urgent measures are taken. Georgians relying on popular sympathy of Batoum province; can establish necessary order and definitely guarantee frontiers from possible Turco-Bolshevik invasion.—GUEGUETCHKORI *[sic]*, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

[176894/ME 58]

No. 59.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, February 6, 1920.

I HAVE received a cypher message, purporting to come from General Milne, stating that, under orders from home, British are evacuating Batoum forthwith.

I have had no indication whatever that such a step was contemplated, and I am not even now aware to whom it is proposed to hand over Batoum.

The one stabilising influence which has kept Transcaucasia quiet has been our occupation of Batoum.

I cannot imagine His Majesty's Government can possibly realise momentous consequences which must inevitably follow such a step. It will undoubtedly be regarded by recently recognised Governments as clear indication that Great Britain takes no further interest in Transcaucasia, and abandons it to its fate.

I most earnestly request that any orders given for evacuation should be immediately revoked, and that a decision in the matter be deferred until I have been able to submit detailed reasons why such a step should not be carried out.

(Sent to Constantinople, No. 56, and Tehran, No. 37.)

[177317]

No. 60.

Acting High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Earl Curzon. (Received February 9)

(No. 102.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 18, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to invite your Lordship's attention to a report entitled "The Nationalist Movement in Turkey," compiled by the General Staff, Army of the Black Sea, under date of the 10th January, 1920, a copy of which has, I assume, been sent to your Lordship.

2. This report is a summary of reports received from the various military control officers in the interior, in reply to a questionnaire issued by the General Staff on the 28th October. There are two points with regard to it on which I submit the following comments:—

- (a.) Little or no mention is made of the present unsatisfactory condition of the Christian population in the interior and their precarious future should the Nationalist leaders consider it advantageous to adopt violent methods of oppression as a means to bring pressure to bear on European opinion.
- (b.) There is a general tendency unduly to belittle the potential strength of the National movement. Considered from the standpoint of an officer living in a provincial centre, the local national organisations may well appear to have lost ground during the past few months, to have a restricted number of adherents, and to possess no hold over the sympathies of the greater part

[4370]

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of the population. Moreover, the very number of the separate local organisations may give the impression that there is no common purpose uniting them, and no general organisation connecting them and directing the movement as a whole.

3. I do not consider that this view is correct. It is true that the supporters of the movement are everywhere in a minority; they are, however, an energetic and unscrupulous minority such as, I understand, has always dominated the situation in this country, whilst the rest of the population is passive and accepts the situation. The announcement of drastic peace terms by the Allies will automatically throw many waverers into the arms of the Nationalists, and again set the organisation working at full activity. At the same time the Allies will not be able to count upon any support in imposing such terms from the moderate and pro-Entente elements of the population and their political and local leaders, who would otherwise have been at one with them in wishing to destroy the Committee of Union and Progress and to re-establish normal conditions in the provinces.

4. I venture to submit, as I have frequently done before, that if it is intended to enforce drastic peace terms in Anatolia it will not be possible to carry this into effect unless the Allies are prepared to support their decisions by the employment of sufficient physical force to break the National movement.

I have, &c.  
RICHARD WEBB.

[177607/ME 44]

No. 61.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 89.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 17, 1920.

WITH reference to my despatch dated the 15th September, 1919, relative to the status of Hellenic subjects as regards Capitulations, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter which has been received from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject, and a copy of a joint note addressed to his Excellency in reply.

2. I would invite your Lordship's attention to the second paragraph of the letter from the Sublime Porte, in which there is (1) recognition of the fact that a state of war exists between Turkey and Greece, and (2) an assumption that a fundamental principle of future peace is the unrestricted sovereignty of Governments within their territorial limits.

3. Copies of the letter received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of the joint notes dated the 10th September and 9th January, have been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.  
RICHARD WEBB,  
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 61.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to British High Commissioner, Constantinople.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Sublime-Porte, le 20 décembre 1919.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la communication que votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire, en date du 10 septembre dernier, conjointement avec leurs Excellences MM. les Hauts-Commissaires de France et d'Italie, au sujet du rétablissement en faveur des sujets hellènes résidant en Turquie du régime privilégié qui leur était appliqué avant la guerre.

Sans vouloir faire ressortir que la guerre a mis fin à tous les traités, conventions et accords internationaux turco-helléniques, l'état de paix n'étant pas encore rétabli, les Hellènes ne peuvent jouir que du régime reconnu aux étrangers relevant d'États n'ayant aucun traité avec le Gouvernement impérial; que le principe fondamental admis pour la paix future est celui de la pleine souveraineté du Gouvernement territorial dans ses possessions, j'ai l'honneur de faire observer que le régime antérieur des Hellènes ne saurait en pratique être mis en vigueur en raison de l'état de choses actuel.

Aussi, vu les inconvénients qui résulteraient de la mise en suspens dans la période actuelle de toutes les actions intéressant les Hellènes déjà bien nombreux en Turquie, il semble que la mesure la plus opportune serait de remettre à la conclusion de la paix la discussion de la question de principe et de soumettre les Hellènes au traitement dont jouit dans l'Empire tout étranger dont le Gouvernement ne se trouve lié par aucun accord avec la Sublime-Porte.

La question offre d'autant plus d'importance que les Hellènes ne se soumettent pas aux injonctions des agents de la force publique ottomane; les injurient; se refusent de fournir leur témoignage; ne respectent pas les lois du pays; se soustraient aux pénalités prononcées contre ceux qui commettent des infractions même graves, laissent en souffrance les voies coercitives civiles, telles que les saisies, ainsi que les décisions des agents de la Dette publique ottomane concernant le régime et la fermeture des débits de boissons.

Cet état de choses, qui menace gravement la sécurité publique et l'ordre, exige un remède prompt et efficace en raison de la tendance des Hellènes à abuser de la situation, se sentant ainsi au-dessus des lois et de toute sanction.

En soumettant ces considérations à la bienveillante appréciation de votre Excellence, je la prie de vouloir bien munir d'instructions en conséquence la gendarmerie interalliée.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

(Pour le Ministre le Sous-Secrétaire d'État),  
ISMAIL DJENANY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 61.

British High Commissioner to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Constantinople, le 9 janvier 1920.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur d'accuser réception au Ministère impérial des Affaires étrangères de sa lettre en date du 20 du mois dernier.

Laissant de côté les considérations contenues dans cette lettre concernant la paix future, ils ne sauraient cacher à son Excellence Moustafa Réchid Pacha leur surprise de voir le Ministère des Affaires étrangères invoquer l'état de guerre vis-à-vis des Hellènes pour leur refuser le bénéfice des Capitulations, alors que le Gouvernement impérial conteste la qualité du Commissaire hellénique en niant précisément que la Turquie ait été en guerre avec la Grèce.

Les Hauts-Commissaires alliés ne reconnaissent d'ailleurs pas que les Capitulations aient pu être abolies ou suspendues par la guerre. Ils ne peuvent dans ces conditions que maintenir entièrement les termes de leur note collective du 10 septembre dernier.

A. DEFRANCE  
RICHARD WEBB,  
MAISSA.

[E 47/47/44]

No. 62.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 12.)

Sir,

Aden, January 28, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of letter dated the 27th January, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

[4370]

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Enclosure in No. 62.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Lord Allenby,

Aden, January 28, 1920.

THE following is a summary of news reported since the despatch of the last letter dated the 14th January, 1920:—

*Imam.*

A Turkish officer, named Sabri Effendi, came into Hodeida on the 7th instant for repatriation. According to him the imam is universally disliked on account of his harsh treatment and heavy exactions. All the Turks now in the Yemen would gladly surrender if they received the necessary assistance from the imam, which is not forthcoming. Should at any time the imam consent to their surrender, they will come via Aden and not Hodeida, as he is afraid of their joining the Idrisi. The Turks themselves are unable to come to Aden, as they have no money. They are in a most destitute condition, especially the widows, orphans and Turkish pensioners. They receive from the imam only  $\frac{1}{2}$  a kadah ( $1\frac{1}{2}$  maund) of barley monthly. Mahmud Nadhim has strongly represented their case to the imam, and has asked him either to provide them with sufficient maintenance or to arrange for their repatriation. Sabri Effendi expects some good result to come out of the representation.

Mahmud Nadhim has also written to the American consul asking him to arrange to forward to the Turkish Government a letter asking for 20,000l. to enable him to arrange for the repatriation of the Turks in Yemen. This letter came into my hands by mistake, and in delivering it to the American consul, I informed him that if the Turkish Government itself furnished money for its officers and their families I had no objection to offer.

Referring to the deputation from the King of Hedjaz, Sabri Effendi said that the deputation discussed matters in strict secrecy. He, however, heard from a reliable source that the imam had declined the King of Hedjaz's proposal to form an alliance against Ibn Saud and Ibn Ar-Rashid. The King of Hedjaz expected the imam to provide fighting men, only their feeding, &c., being left to himself. In return the King expressed his willingness to agree to any terms the imam wished to impose.

Sabri Effendi says that in the fighting between the imam and the Idrisi forces on the 4th instant the imam lost seven killed. He heard a report that the Idrisi's men had attacked and captured two guns from the imam's men on the 7th January. The imam's force in Beni Saad is about 2,000 men. The inhabitants of Reima and Safan are preparing to revolt against the imam.

The Sheikhs of Reima have addressed a letter to the Political Officer, Hodeida, in which they state that the imam has occupied their country, but that they do not like his government, as the people are badly treated. They are capable of turning him out, but need ammunition. They ask the British Government to espouse their cause and protect them.

Akil Umar Saghir, of the Jamadia section of the Quhra, in a letter dated the 4th January, 1920, refers to the agreement signed by Colonel Jacob, and asks for protection. He says that the imam's army has surrounded the Quhra country in all directions, and a force is collected in the Al-Taraf and Beni Saad country. He has had information from some of his friends in Menakha, which is confirmed by a telegram received by Syed Abdul Kadir from the imam himself, that the latter intends to declare Jihad and attack Bajil and Hodeida and the surrounding country. The akil asks for assistance in arms and ammunition.

On the 2nd instant Sheikh Abu Hadi sent in for the perusal of the Political Officer, Hodeida, two telegrams in original received by Syed Abdul Kadir from the imam. In one the imam empowers Syed Abdul Kadir to settle the question of Al-Taraf and Medawela as to hostages, tithes, &c., and to ensure peace to those who are submissive to himself. The imam hopes to get their active co-operation in a holy war which he intends to wage unceasingly against the friends of the British. He refers to the capture of Sha'ib in our protectorate as a great victory.

The other telegram acknowledges a telegram sent by the ex-Vali Mahmud Nadhim promising on behalf of the imam not to interfere with the Qubras. The promise is confirmed on condition that the latter remain faithful and obedient to the imam. It is hoped that they will fight with him in the cause of religion. They are assured that no ill will exists in connection with their recent conduct in detaining the mission.

In a subsequent telegram the imam is reported to have accused Syed Abdul Kadir of intriguing with the Idrisi, and ordered him to leave Bajil with his friends, as he has thereby proved himself unworthy to be his amil in the Tehama.

An informant from Bajil reports that Sheikh Mahomed Ahmed of Hajjaila, with Ahl-el-Kitah and Beni Kuraish sections of the Quhra tribe, has made submission to the imam.

The informant states that in a joint telegram the imam and the ex-Vali Mahmud Nadhim have warned the Quhra sheikhs that unless the Idrisi retires from their frontier they will send a big expedition against them with a train of artillery extending from the gate of Shahara to Hodeida, and will kill their women and children. The informant confirms the order to Syed Abdul Kadir to leave Bajil.

Fighting between the Idrisi and imam in the Beni Saad country continues. News received shows that the imam's men have been worsted and forced to retire, and a telegram from Major Meek shows that the Idrisian troops have entered Bajil amidst a rejoicing populace.

Jamil Bey, a nephew of Mahmud Nadhim, has come into Hodeida from Bajil. He made the following statement:—

His uncle does not wish to remain in the Yemen, but is anxious to get his family out first. On his departure from Bajil, he asked Jamil Bey to stay at Bajil and await the arrival of his family there, should he succeed in his attempt to persuade the imam to permit them to go to Constantinople for a change. Once they are out, it will not be difficult for his uncle to leave the Yemen. Owing to the fighting between the imam's men and the tribes lying on the Bajil and the Hujjaila route, the telegraph line is interrupted, and, in consequence, he has had no communication from his uncle as to what he had done. He has therefore come to Hodeida to speak to the Political Officer on the subject. He intends to stay in Hodeida or go back to Bajil to await the result. He cannot leave for his country until he knows that his uncle's arrangement has failed.

Re the propaganda carried on by his uncle, Jamil Bey said that his uncle had nothing to gain by it, but he was forced to do it in order to please the imam. It serves the interest of the imam to make the people believe that the Turkish suzerainty in Yemen still holds good, and to detain the Vali and other Turks in the Yemen. He does not think that the imam would allow the Turks to leave Yemen willingly.

In drawing a comparison between the imam and the Idrisi, Jamil Bey stated that the imam was miserly, ambitious, and covetous. The Idrisi was a better ruler for the Tehama, where the inhabitants were Shafais, and his administration was fairer than that of the other.

With regard to the fighting on the Quhra border, Jamil Bey blamed the Quhra for it, because of their dual intrigues with the imam and the Idrisi. If they had not applied to the Idrisi and brought him to their territory, the imam would have left them alone. They are a set of mischief-makers, even with the British Government. They ask Government for arms and ammunition, but they will not fight the imam with such arms. They will eventually sell them.

Jamil Bey gave the strength of the imam's force in the Beni Saad country as between 1,500 and 2,000 men. Large forces were collected at Menakha, Bora and Reima. He estimated their number at 6,000 to 7,000 men. The imam's object in collecting troops at Bora and Reima was to engage the Abus and the Zaranik, and prevent them from joining the other tribes of the north, such as the Quhra, Beni Saad, &c. Jamil Bey thinks that the imam will never spare the Quhra, because they have irritated him, firstly by stopping the mission from going to him, and secondly, because they have sought the Idrisi's protection.

Jamil Bey says that the strength of the Idrisi force on the Quhra frontier is about 700 men. He thinks that with this small number it is impossible for the Idrisi to cope with the larger strength of the imamic forces. If the Idrisi throws in more men, he might get the upper hand, as he will have the co-operation of the local tribes, who are in his favour.

Jamil Bey expressed his opinion that Government should at once intervene and stop the fighting between the parties, and that they should not abandon Hodeida in favour of either party. The imam should remain within his own limits, and the Idrisi should not go beyond Zeidiya. Until this is made clear to them they will not cease fighting.

An akil of Beit-el-Fakih who lately visited Hodeida stated that all the Zaraniks were in favour of the Idrisi, except Sheikh Munassar Saghir and his small party. Sheikh Munassar has been trying hard to get the imam's men in. He lately went and saw Sheikh Suleiman Bukheit, of the Aboos, at Ar Rad.



According to latest news telegraphed by Major Meek, an Idrisi force entered Bajil on the 14th January amid popular rejoicings, and men have been posted on the imam's borders in Quhra and Aboos territory. Idrisi orders were promulgated in Marawa on the 20th idem. The Zaraniks threaten to expel the imam from Zubaid.

#### Aden Protectorate.

In his latest letter, received here on the 25th instant, the imam informs me that he has issued instructions to his representatives at Dala that, unless they are attacked, they should not advance further into our protectorate. He, however, does not wish to withdraw from Dala pending the arrival of our mission, and continues to regard his operations there as a matter of internal administration.

The Upper Yafais are organising resistance under the leadership of Sultan Saleh-bin-Omar against the Zeidis. I have sent Sultan Saleh 10,000 rounds of ammunition and a present of 1,000 roubles.

The Amir of Dala, with a force consisting of his tribesmen of Ibdali, Hujeli, Dhairi, Halmin, Malalai and Bakri, led an attack against Dala on the 19th January, 1920, and temporarily succeeded in recapturing some of his dars, but was forced to retire on the third day. Any further attempt on his part is hopeless without an active support, as the tribesmen cannot be maintained in the field for any length of time in the absence of a properly-organised supply and transport service. The Kataibi sheikh co-operated with the Amir in the attack.

The Alawi sheikh writes that the Zaidis have come into Tafwa close to his border, and makes a pressing request for British troops to be moved up to As Soda and Al Quashaa, but I am unable to comply, as, with the present force under my command, it is quite impossible for me to advance beyond my advanced camp at Nobat Dakim.

Pending a reply from His Majesty's Government to a telegram I have sent requesting instructions as to what answer I should send to the imam's letter asking for the despatch of another mission to settle outstanding questions, I am discouraging further Arab attacks on the Zaidis, provided the latter are not aggressive. I was unable to restrain Amir, as he had already started on his unsuccessful attempt to recapture and hold Dala before receipt of the imam's letter. I am of opinion that we should insist on the imam's evacuation of our protectorate before holding any further conversations with him either in Aden or elsewhere. I am also strongly of opinion that we should support our protected chiefs with our troops, but the size of the forces at present under my command renders me powerless to enforce any demands I may make, and the Arabs themselves are of no account for offensive operations.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 291/289/44]

No. 63.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 18.)*

(No. 107.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, February 6, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 27 of 10th January.

High Commissioners have decided to proceed with formation of Inter-Allied Tribunal. I have drawn attention of my colleagues to your points regarding need for subsequent indemnity.

Do you also now agree to reopening of Consular Court? Italians have already opened theirs, and French will do so when suitable accommodation can be secured. Both point out that access to Consular Court is conditional on reciprocity, and that if our Court does not function, British subjects will be disabled from instituting proceedings against French or Italians.

Once we have laid down principle that capitulations are in force notwithstanding state of war it is difficult to see what international ground there would be for contesting validity of jurisdiction of Consular Court.

A definite ruling is required to enable me to reply to my colleagues, but there is no need for Judge Grain to hurry back here till he has had his full leave. I should be glad to learn when he may be expected.

[E 58/3/44]

No. 64.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 118.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 10, 1920.

MY telegram No. 109 of 6th February, paragraph 4.

Government has made terms with Nationalists by consenting to jettison certain Ministers.

Reconstruction took place on 7th and 8th February, and reconstructed Cabinet obtained practically unanimous vote of confidence in Chamber on 9th February.

Ministers sacrificed to Nationalists are Foreign Affairs, Interior and Justice. Successors are Nationalist nominees, though not men in forefront of movement. Minister of Agriculture has also resigned.

New Minister for Foreign Affairs is Sefi Bey, who acted in same capacity during Ferid Pasha's absence in Paris last summer. He is diplomatist of second-rate importance with definite Nationalist sympathies.

Government's statement of policy presents no new features. It contains usual references to need for internal reforms with assistance of foreign specialists; protestations of desire loyally to observe armistice; Smyrna; [group undecypherable] principle; gravity of financial situation. Net result is that Nationalist leaders have established complete hold on Government, though they have either thought it unnecessary or lacked courage to put in a Government composed of their own stalwarts.

[E 32/3/44]

No. 65.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 12.)*

(No. 119.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 10, 1920.

MR. HAROLD BUXTON, who left Adana 4th February, gives following account of situation:—

At that date Marash was still isolated, said to be burning and great part destroyed. Zeitoun and Antab sanjak were in revolt against French occupation, and Nationalist bands, possibly with Arabs co-operating, were active throughout districts of Marash, Bageche and Biejik.

After fighting at Marash had begun, inhabitants of some seven Armenian villages in the vicinity were massacred. Chief Administrator of Cilicia puts down number of survivors at 1,500.

French at Adana say Nationalist plan is to advance south in three columns through Marash, Sis and a point further west, with the object of cutting railway at Bageche and Bozanti. Colonel Brémont considers that he has situation in hand.

Two American relief workers, Messrs. Perry and Johnstone, have been murdered between Killis and Aintab.

Buxton says that French Governor of Marash district, Captain Andre, had made a mess of things and mishandled situation until trouble, which had been brewing for a few months past, came to a head.

On 31st January Armenians in Adana, who were much dissatisfied with French management of things, held mass meeting, as result of which leaders of community put following demands to Chief Administrator:—

1. Formation of an exclusively Armenian militia.
2. Gendarmerie to be cleared of all Moslem suspects, and majority of force to be Christian.
3. Distribution of arms for self-protection to Christian inhabitants.
4. Dismissal of Governor of Marash, Andre, who is accused of following pro-Turkish policy.

These demands were telegraphed to General Gouraud, whose reply is believed to have been satisfactory to Armenians.

(Repeated to Egyptforce, Cairo, No. 9, for General, Bagdad.)



[E 103/3/44]

No. 66.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 13.)*

(No. 127.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, February 12, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 109 of 6th February.

Nationalist outbreak of antagonism to Allies would have most disastrous repercussion on Eastern situation generally, which it would, in my opinion, be most desirable to avert.

If, therefore, it has not been definitely decided to deprive Turks of Constantinople and Smyrna, I suggest that, even if it is not possible to make any immediate publication of announcement, I may at least be authorised to make some tranquillizing communication in that sense which might tend to allay present excitement and obviate to some extent danger of excesses now threatened.

My French colleague and my Italian colleague are telegraphing in similar sense.

[E 102/3/44]

No. 67.

*Mr. Aneurin Williams, M.P., to Mr. Phipps.—(Received February 14.)*

Dear Mr. Phipps,

*House of Commons, February 13, 1920.*

CILICIAN MASSACRES. When I left you a copy of my cable from Constantinople to-day I promised copies of two others: here they are. I have not shown either of these to the French Embassy, but I gave them a copy of the one from Constantinople. I also sent a copy of it to Mr. Balfour, as the secretary at the French Embassy thought the matter might be brought before the League of Nations Council by M. Bourgeois (I was surprised at that).

I have also put down a question to be answered in this House on Monday.

Yours sincerely,

ANEURIN WILLIAMS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 67.

*From Chief Agent of Lord Mayor of London's Fund for Relief of Armenian Refugees.**Constantinople, February 11, 1920.*

REGRET must confirm news of massacre of 1,500 Armenians at end of January near Marash by Nationalist bands. On 1st February two Americans, James Perry, General Secretary International Y.M.C.A., Turkey, and Johnson, his colleague, were murdered, believed by same bands, near Aintab. Much indignation is aroused among Europeans here who call for strong hand against these continued outrages.

Enclosure 2 in No. 67.

*Cablegram from Constantinople.*

FAISANT suite à ma dépêche No. 180, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que es Arméniens de Cilicie viennent d'adresser au Haut-Commissaire de France à Beyrouth, Général Gouraud, la longue et très énergique dépêche suivante dans laquelle, en exposant la situation désespérée des Arméniens dans la région qui se trouve en véritable période massacre, ils plaignent amèrement de l'attitude des autorités d'occupation qui, malgré leurs nombreuses et fréquentes démarches, n'ont rien fait pour défendre les Arméniens de Cilicie ou du moins pour leur permettre de se défendre eux-mêmes. Dans cette dépêche est signalé que par cette situation le prestige français et l'influence des autorités civiles et ecclésiastiques arméniennes sont sérieusement ébranlés aux yeux des populations arméniennes dont l'exaspération a atteint paroxysme, et mesures suivantes sont indiquées comme indispensables pour calmer et rassurer Arméniens. Formation

milices exclusivement arméniennes; épuration gendarmerie turque des éléments suspects musulmans, recrutement gendarmes chrétiens pour assurer majorité absolue chrétienne; armement général populations arméniennes pour relèvement de son poste du Gouverneur du Djebel-Bereket, Capitaine André, personnifiant aux yeux arméniens politique musulmane. Si réclamations sont pas satisfaites sans plus délai toutes les autorités arméniennes se verront forcées démissionner en bloc déclinant responsabilité ultérieure. Conseil mixte, Patriarcat arménien, a adressé aujourd'hui aux Hauts-Commissaires alliés, Constantinople, une note formulée dans le même sens. Dans cette note est déclaré qu la responsabilité morale des Alliées se trouve désormais engagée la grave question des Arméniens éparpillés et disloqués malgré eux à travers la Turquie vaincue et occupée.

Enclosure 3 in No. 67.

*Télégramme du Patriarche arménien à Boghos Nubar Pacha Président de la  
Délégation nationale arménienne, Paris.*

*Constantinople, le 6 février 1920.*

UNION Arménie, Adana, informe que réguliers turcs et bandes nationalistes ont massacré région Marash-Zeitoun plus 2,000 Arméniens. Cilicie et autres agglomérations arméniennes sont en danger. Population Cilicie exige armes pour se défendre. Situation alarmante. Avertissez organisations amies.—ZAVEN.

[E 122/3/44]

No. 68.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 14.)*

(No. 129.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, February 13, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 109 of 6th February.

On 10th February General Milne informed me that he had received very disquieting news from his control officer at Konia, who informed him that religious dignitaries had been set on to excite the population and that massacres were apprehended within a few days. While discounting danger of immediate massacre, I feel that situation in interior, especially since Marash incident, justifies grave anxiety. As result of conference with my French colleague, it was decided that political officer of the three High Commissioners should visit Grand Vizier on Monday and make serious representations to him, pointing out that, after recent reconstruction of Government and vote of confidence in Chamber, Central Government could not divest itself of responsibility for acts of Nationalists. His attention was called to various duties entailed by this establishment of complete identity between Government and Nationalists, and amongst others that of guarding against massacres.

[E 103/3/44]

No. 69.

*Earl Curzon to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 123.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Foreign Office, February 16, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 127 of 12th February: Constantinople.

You may make public the fact that it has been decided by the Conference not to deprive the Turks of Constantinople. You should, however, add that, unless the massacres of Armenians and the attacks on Allied troops in Asia Minor cease immediately, the peace terms will probably be modified to the detriment of Turkey.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 243, and Rome, No. 67.)



[E 246/166/44]

No. 70.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).*

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, February 16, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward three copies of my report on the tour of my mission to the Yemen. Copies have been handed in to the Foreign Office here.

I have, &amp;c.

H. F. JACOB.

Enclosure in No. 70.

*Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob on his Mission to the Yemen.*

*Paragraph 1.*—I left Cairo on the 15th July, 1919, for the Yemen as envoy of His Majesty's Government to the Imam of Sana, to whom I carried a letter from His Majesty the King (Appendix (A)). It was thought in Egypt that the occasion was premature (*vide* telegrams that passed between the High Commissioner of Egypt and the Foreign Office):—

- (1.) From High Commissioner to Foreign Office, No. 652, of April 26, 1919.
- (2.) From High Commissioner to Foreign Office, No. 709, of May 4, 1919.
- (3.) From Foreign Office to High Commissioner, No. 642, of May 24, 1919.
- (4.) From High Commissioner to Foreign Office, No. 855, of May 26, 1919.
- (5.) From Foreign Office to High Commissioner, No. 661, of May 30, 1919.

The High Commissioner's contention was that the views of the Imam were well known, but it was essential for Colonel Jacob to be able to affirm the validity of our mandate; otherwise the Imam would continue to look to the intervention of the Allies to strengthen his position and would procrastinate. We knew that the Imam had early in 1919 addressed the consuls in Aden of the United States of America, France and Italy. The Foreign Office thought that the position of His Majesty's Government might be stronger if able to explain that a treaty already existed. After the reply of the High Commissioner that it would not be possible to come to any understanding with the Imam, the Foreign Office decided that the visit was intended rather to show that His Majesty's Government were prepared to recognise the Imam and to reassure him of our general policy, and they added: "If we remain inactive trouble may develop between the Imam and the Idrisi which might have disastrous results."

*Paragraph 2.*—I should here like to emphasise the fact that the *keynote* of my policy during the four months of my detention in Bajil was so to act, or to forbear from acting, that all friction between these two rival rulers might be minimised, if not eliminated. I was not concerned so much with freeing the mission from detention as safeguarding the future welfare of the country. Hence, in part, our protracted stay in Bajil. Having this statement in view, it will, I hope, be clear why I put forward the various propositions in my telegrams to Egypt and the Foreign Office. I refer to this point in my paragraph 18 to prove that had my proposals been accepted, we might have been released two months before our actual exit from Bajil on the 12th December. As a matter of fact, my proposition *re* "Shafai bloc" was accepted later through the mouthpiece of Major Meek.

*Paragraph 3.*—I was very anxious to proceed to Sana via Hodeida. The other route up through our Aden protectorate, though longer in actual mileage, was easier, and my experience in these regions should have carried me through without a hitch. We, however, knew this part of the Imam, also the views of our Shafai protégés there—which views are more plastic than is generally supposed. The crux of the whole situation in which I was placed was the Tihama of the Yemen and its port of Hodeida, which the Imam covets and claims as the heritage of his ancestors. We were aware that early in 1919 the Imam was in correspondence with the Kuhra tribe (whose habitat lies between Hodeida and Al Hujjaila), and that matters culminated in May of 1919, when the Kuhras put up their "fourteen points," and, if accepted by the Imam, the Kuhras were prepared to accept the Zeidi nominal suzerainty. The Kuhras

had nominated their head sheikh, Abu Hadi, as the administrator of their territory on behalf of the Imam. There was a hitch in the proceedings mainly because the Imam wished to nominate his own "amil" (or governor) at Bajil; he desired free access for his troops through the Tihama, and a quota towards their salaries, in that event, to be paid by the Kuhra tribesmen. If the Imam could have sent his escort to Hodeida as asked, his power and influence there were established. If not, his failure to do so I was intending to instance as a useful object-lesson to him that, without conciliatory methods, he could not hope to extend his rule in the lowland country. Everything thus pointed to Hodeida as my best route to Sana. My detention in Bajil had a decided advantage. It taught us much, and it taught the Imam more.

*Paragraph 4.*—There is a religious side to Yemen politics. The Foreign Office would have preferred not to accentuate this point. It could not, however, be discounted. It is just because the Imam has in his prospective domain other and contumacious "persuasions" that we were going to advise him to conciliate these by diplomatic means rather than by force. In Viscount Allenby's letter to Imam Yahya, which I was carrying, it is stated: "It appears to His Majesty's Government that your Excellency's wisest policy is to conciliate the hearts of those who, during the Turkish occupation of the country, have become estranged from the rule of your enlightened ancestors. It is this rule which His Majesty's Government is anxious to resuscitate, provided it can be effected by diplomacy and goodwill. His Majesty's Government believes that the qualities of a just and broad-minded ruler will be found inherent in your Excellency." (Appendix (B).)

In my letter to the High Commissioner dated the 10th July, 1919, just prior to my leaving Cairo on this tour, I wrote that the Shafai and the Ismailia sects would not sit down quietly under the Zeidi unless—

- (1.) These recognise that His Majesty's Government will deal solely with the Imam; and
- (2.) They see the Imam consolidate his rule in a conciliatory manner.

The Kuhra's "fourteen points" showed us the antagonism. It is true that I have ever deprecated *undue* accentuation of the religious question, but it is only right to remember its existence, though it is not insurmountable.

Still earlier—on the 24th December, 1918—when in Aden, I telegraphed to the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, that, in view of the arrival in Aden of the Imam's mission, I was of opinion that there was no one man able to rule the Yemen with full assent of all the people, but that the Imam was the strongest man and would in time gain supremacy; that as we were not going to live in the country, soon to be evacuated by the Turks, it was impolitic for us to allocate the various bounds of Zaidi and Shafai; that all we could do was to stipulate with the Imam that he guarantee Shafai Courts in Shafai areas, as the Turks had done before.

It is not alone a religious difference that separates the Zaidi from the Shafai, but also the fact that the former is the mountaineer and the latter the lowlander. We have had ample proofs in our Aden protectorate of the possibility, on occasion, of a Zaidi and Shafai combination, of intercourse and marriage between the two sects, and not infrequently of a Zaidi becoming a Shafai, and *vice-versa*. The Tihama Shafai is more religious than his co-religionist of our Aden protectorate, yet even in the Tihama a man will change his creed as readily as he doffs his dress, and will espouse the tenets of the religious party which offers the greatest inducements to worldly advancements. Sheikh Muhammad Ahmed-al-Mashhur is an instance. Though a Shafai, he is Imam's amil at Al Hujjaila. He told me he adapted his mind to the times. An Arab once told me that the Prophet at prayer would both cross his arms over his breast or extend them at full length at both sides,\* and so he conformed to the practice of the country.

The Arab of the Yemen is very akin to Bunyan's Mr. By-Ends, who had always the luck to jump in his judgment with the present way of the time, whatever it was, and his chance was to get thereby. Others were for rushing on their journey all weathers, but he was for waiting for wind and tide. Others for hazarding all for God at a clap, and he for taking all advantages to secure his life and estates. With another, and a less parsimonious ruler than Imam Yahya, the Tihama Shafais would have more in common, nor would they refuse to submit to Zaidi predominance and suzerainty, if left alone to live their lives according to the dictates of the Shafai conscience. Yemen history in all its changes of dynasties will prove my assertion. Even in Bajil, where the Kuhra

\* The Sunni and Shia modes respectively of beginning prayer.



tribesmen had affected the religious sense, and showed greater fanaticism than I have seen elsewhere in the Yemen, Shafai and Zaidi votaries worshipped together at Friday prayer. At one time the Idrisi was backing the rival Imam to Yahya, and with the Idrisi's help and countenance that other would have had but little difficulty in extending a peaceful sway over his Shafai subjects.

The Imam Yahya will win over the Tihama neither by force nor by prescriptive authority, nor by any incontrovertible reasoning, but slowly by the process of assimilation. It is very true that the Shafais are weak through dissensions and a belief that their co-religionists will not assist them. It is a common saying in the Yemen, "The Shafais have agreed never to agree." It is true that Abu Hadi, the head sheikh of the Kuhra, who was acting as the Imam's Governor in Bajil, derided the Imam when the latter condescended to call the Kuhra his children. He instanced the simile of the Imam as the loving, but hill-dwelling husband of his lowland bride, the Kuhra. It was idle, he said, for the husband to woo his distant bride who wished none of him. In that case, the sensible husband would relax his attentions! I was, however, much struck all through my stay in Bajil by the Kuhra references to the Imam as their "liege lord," and time and again they would remind me that my advent in Bajil was the cause of the Imam's resentment against themselves; for had I not appeared, the tribesmen and the Imam were on the eve of coming to an amicable understanding. This may be true, but any understanding would be based on the Imam's nominal suzerainty only. The Imam had promised to escort my mission to Hodeida and to Sana. In this he was balked by the Kuhra sheikhs going back on their pledged word, neither allowing us to proceed up to Sana nor go back to Hodeida. The Imam fumed over this slight on his honour, the more so as his impotence to fulfil his engagement was now fully patent to His Majesty's Government, who would naturally doubt his ability to "make good" from Sana to the sea.

The idea of a United States of Arabia may seem chimerical to many, and yet, so far from variety destroying unity, it is the only ground of unity, and peace can subsist between those only who agree to differ. The varieties of doctrine found in the Yemen can blend together. If there is not in this country a community of interests, there can be a transfusion of prejudices. In any case, propinquity is the mother of economic and political assimilation, and the stronger power must eventually control the weaker. If the two forces hurtled, I cannot predict who would win the day. Civil war can, however, be avoided if we put our backs into it.

Paragraph 5.—As I have above said, the "crux" of the situation lies in the position of Hodeida after the Turkish rule has been eliminated from the Yemen by the edict of the Peace Conference. I had proposed that this town be evacuated as soon as His Majesty's Government was convinced of the Imam's ability to impose there his peaceful rule. The Foreign Office, replying to High Commissioner in their No. 862 of the 21st December, 1919, telegraphed as follows:—

"I am content to leave the matter to Colonel Jacob's discretion whether he should reply as proposed or, alternatively, somewhat on the following lines: 'Pending the conclusion of peace with Turkey and of a treaty between the Imam and His Majesty's Government, the question of military movements is decided by the military authorities, and Colonel Jacob could only undertake the representation to them of any wishes which the Imam may express on the subject.'"

There are three inferences I should like to draw from the above alternatives, and I shall refer to them later in this report:—

- (1.) Until the Peace Treaty with Turkey is concluded, the Yemen is admittedly Turkish.
- (2.) Hodeida might fall to the Imam if our treaty with him were ratified, and this was possible only after the official close of the Turkish rule in the Yemen.
- (3.) The occupation of Hodeida was primarily and principally a military measure to facilitate the surrender of Turkish troops under the terms of the armistice with Turkey.

When this object was attained, the troops of occupation had no further *locus standi*. They, however, remained to keep order in the locality, and incidentally to await the return of my mission from Sana. Telegraphing to the High Commissioner on the 12th May, 1919, the War Office said that, "Until negotiations with the Imam are completed, it has been decided to keep a battalion in Hodeida."

Paragraph 6.—I arrived in Aden from Cairo on the 19th July, where I completed my arrangements, and awaited the letter from His Majesty the King to the Imam of Sana. This arrived on the 13th August, and I started for Hodeida that afternoon. The Political Officer in Hodeida, Mr. Richardson, had telegraphed to the Political Resident at Aden, previous to our departure from Aden, that the routes were unsafe through the Kuhra country, but it was agreed that I should leave Aden after receipt of the King's letter and await the turn of affairs in Hodeida. The Acting Political Resident and the General Officer Commanding, Aden, Brigadier-General L. Beatty, thought an escort of twenty-five Aden troop sowars under an Indian officer absolutely essential for guarding the treasure and presents and for ceremonial purposes. He did not consider it sufficiently strong for the safety of the mission, and thought that it might possibly act as a bait. On the other hand, he thought a big escort would entail endless transport and might be resented by the Imam. I agreed with these views, and chose this lesser of the two evils. I have travelled extensively in our protectorate, and amidst wild tribes where no Englishman has been before me. I found it wise always to rely on the escort of the tribes through whose territory I was marching, and I never took with me more than ten of the twenty-one Aden troopers who formed my personal escort. These guarded my tents and baggage. This plan was always successful. The tribesmen were flattered by the confidence placed in them, and my party were as safe as if at headquarters.

In my telegram from Aden on this subject dated the 28th July, 1919, I gave the above arguments of General Beatty, and added, "If possible, I am very anxious to be escorted from Hodeida by the Imam (who had promised to meet me with his escort), or, failing the Imam, by the Shafai tribesmen of the Kuhra, from Hodeida to Al Hujjaila, at which place I expected to be met by the Imam's escort. Full responsibility for the safety of the mission is taken by me."

Paragraph 7.—The mission landed at Hodeida on the 16th August. The party consisted of myself as envoy; Major B. R. Reilly, O.B.E., Assistant Resident, Aden; Captain E. A. P. Brock, R.A.M.C.; Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed, Political Assistant in Aden, who was my private secretary and treasurer; Captain D. T. Richardson, M.C., R.A.M.C., and Sheikh Abdallah-al-Mughira.

Paragraph 8.—On arrival in Hodeida I found no Imamic escort had arrived. Telegrams were received by Mr. Richardson, the Political Officer, both from Abu Hadi, the head sheikh of the Kuhra, and from Sheikh Ismil-al-Baghawi, whose territory stretches from Hodeida to Bajil and eastward, that the mission should not leave Hodeida till they arrived. I notice that Mr. Richardson, writing his report to Aden dated the 23rd August, 1919, stated that his Political Assistant told him [*sic*] that Sheikh Ali-al-Salami, the Imam's representative at Bajil, had telegraphed that Abu Hadi and Al Baghawi were leaving Bajil to escort Colonel Jacob. At all events, while we were at Hodeida these two sheikhs arrived, and assured us that they had come to terms with the Imam, who had guaranteed them concessions. Ali-al-Salami was quartered at Bajil with the consent of the Kuhra, and had 100 Zeidi soldiers and eight Zeidi horsemen as my escort. Again, Abu Hadi, the Kuhra head sheikh, was the Imam's approved Governor at Bajil. Everything therefore pointed to a successful journey. I did not insist on the tribesmen giving hostages; I have never resorted to this practice in the Yemen. I prefer to trust the Arab. Up to this time I have never been deceived.

To revert to Mr. Richardson's report: he goes on to say that the two sheikhs in question had assured him that, although the roads through the Kuhra country had recently been rendered unsafe owing to the Imam's ill-advised and untimely action, *they would be clear for the passage of the mission*. After my arrival and detention in Bajil I saw the original of a document passed over their seals by the three important sheikhs of the Kuhra in which they guaranteed our safe-conduct through the Kuhra territory. This goes to prove that these two above-mentioned sheikhs had grounds for the assurances given to Mr. Richardson. Abu Hadi had not affixed his seal, because as the Imam's Governor at Bajil his name was not essential to the bond. Ahmed Khuzam's name is absent—why? because he was pro-Idrisi. Other sheikhs were won over later by Ahmed Khuzam's love for Idrisi, though Ahmed Khuzam must have laid stress on threatened Imamic invasion. Mr. Richardson wrote to Mahmud Nadim, the Vali, on the 18th September, 1919, remarking that *the Kuhra sheikhs had engaged to take us up, but had broken their word*. Mr. Richardson, then, was perfectly assured that our journey carried no risks. I, also, was similarly assured.

I would state that Major-General Sir James Stewart, the Political Resident, Aden, in his notes at the foot of my telegram of the 25th November, 1919 (Appendices (C) and



D), to Viscount Allenby, which telegram he forwarded from Aden by post on the 3rd December, 1919, has remarked as follows: "I understand [*sic*] that Colonel Jacob was advised, both in Aden and Hodeida, that it was not safe for him to proceed. Confident in his own influence with the Arabs, he decided to start." In the light of my above remarks and Mr. Richardson's statement, it will be seen that this note is a travesty of the facts. The Resident proceeds to state that "the Imam and the Vali are working entirely in their own interests, and are using the mission as a pawn in their game." No one who had been in Bajil and had seen the work of these men there would have made the above remark. I shall return to this when dealing with the parts played by the Imam and the Vali (whom I shall hereafter style "X") in releasing the mission. Both were strenuously working on our behalf, but both were up against conflicting interests that hampered them at every turn.

Paragraph 9.—Bajil is 35 miles north-east by road from Hodeida. The mission left Bajil for Tannam, the half-way stage, on the afternoon of the 20th December. The advance party with the tents and heavy baggage had preceded us the day before, with orders to go to Uhal and await our arrival. We stayed the night at Tannam, and left for Bajil on the 21st at 2:30 P.M., arriving there at 8:30 P.M.

A short distance from Bajil, Sheikh Al Baghawi, in reply to Nasiruddin's query as to our house in Bajil, said, "It will be the prison house." We took suspicion at this remark, and I halted the caravan, but was reassured by both Abu Hadi and Al Baghawi that they had pledged their faith and would not fail us. I recollected that the Government House, where our residence had been arranged, had been the place in which Mr. Richardson was closely imprisoned for one month at the opening of the war; hence the allusion to the "prison house." In any case a return in the dark and at that stage was impossible, and would have led to confusion. I afterwards learnt that the pass we had then entered was lined with armed tribesmen, and Al Baghawi, whose avarice has made him very unpopular with his tribesmen, was anxious that night for his personal safety. This sheikh afterwards admitted to me that he had heard rumours at Tannam of the unwillingness of his fellow-sheikhs to let us go up, but he did not communicate his suspicions to any of us, and declared that he had hoped to push us through in spite of every obstacle.

Paragraph 10.—Every attention was given us on arrival at Bajil. Saiyid Abdul Kadir, the revered head of the priestly house of Murawaa, was there. He wrote at once to assemble the various Kuhra sheikhs, for these would decide whether we were to go up to Sana. We were given to understand by Abu Hadi that the delay was only temporary. He himself was no party to our detention, and he would frequently stigmatise the other sheikhs as "dogs." Eventually on the 28th September, 1918, the four sheikhs who are known as "the bad four" presented their ultimatum: declared we were prisoners, and demanded our mules, rifles, money and baggage. The rifles and mules were taken, and were nominally made over to Abu Hadi and to the friendly Saiyid Abdul Kadir. The mules remained in our lines and in charge of our men; the rifles were deposited in a room of the house in which we lived, and Abu Hadi handed us the key. Our money was taken away and kept in the custody of Abu Hadi. We could go neither upwards to the east, nor back to the west. Eventually the sheikhs told us we were not prisoners, but political *détenus*; that we were free to move about as we liked and be at our ease, for they would shortly formulate their demands for our release.

Paragraph 11.—I would here note that the Kuhra sheikhs were not "out for" money or loot. They did not ill-treat us. We were allowed to wander about the village and in the out-kirts of Bajil, accompanied, however, by guards. These guards were arranged by the friendly head sheikh, Abu Hadi, who was very jealous of his prerogative as our custodian, and resented the intrusion of the soldiers of any other co-sheikh. Our men played football daily, at which the whole village would turn out. On the Id day, we held sports. The Kuhra believed that I was going to Sana to enter into a treaty with the Imam; that I had 140,000*l.* in gold to give him (hence their search of our kits), and that the Government was planning to place their country forcibly under the Imam's sway. In a word, these sheikhs detained us in order to secure protection against the Imam and the Idrisi. For this reason they checked my upward journey, while their consciences, after their breach of faith in engaging to take us through, smote them heavily; the more so as week succeeded to week, and fear of retribution from us determined them to hold us till adequate assurances were forthcoming of pardon granted.

Paragraph 12.—Thus it was that later on they asked for guns, arms, and ammunition to defend themselves against the Imam and the Idrisi. These sheikhs are no fools, but a canny diplomatic lot of men, and they were well aware that the bare

receipt of these few arms, so far from protecting them from Imamic aggression, would but serve as an incentive to draw that ruler on. Rather, the gift of arms by us would, they thought, have been *ocular proof of our forgiveness*, and this no mere promises could adequately convey. The Arabs of this region have never before had dealings with His Majesty's Government, nor could they know that our word is our bond. Forgiveness assured by the above means, they realised that their political motives for detaining the mission had been clearly understood and condoned, and that if the Imam should thereafter attack them, the earnest of arms already given would precede a guaranteed assistance on our part, if occasion demanded. Had these guns been given them, nothing further would have been necessary. We should have washed our hands of them once and for all. I revert to this again below.

Paragraph 13.—On this same day, viz., the 30th August, the Abus tribe, under the guidance of Saiyid Ali Bari of Murawaa, attacked Hodeida. The Kuhra were asked to participate, but refused at the instance of Saiyid Abdul Kadir. Whether the attack was inspired by Kuhra I cannot say. It may have been arranged to accentuate our isolation. Rumours had it that the evil results of the blockade and the unpopularity of the then political officer in Hodeida were prime causes of attacks. The Arab is proud and is a gentleman. He expects gentlemanly treatment. The attacks were repulsed twice, when the raiders learnt that our position was too strong. The *fons et origo* of every intrigue against us in Bajil was this Saiyid Ali Bari, who would boast to me that the Almighty had decreed him from his birth to practise intrigue, and he was but a tool in His hands. "X" told me that always in his tour as Governor-General of the Yemen he would attach this Saiyid to his retinue to guard against the frustration of his plans. Others, and high officials, have been cited as our enemies—black hands—but their names have been given through bias and ignorance of facts.

Paragraph 14.—The first letter of the Kuhra sheikhs to me was naturally couched in unfriendly terms. They were suspicious of the arrival of a British mission, and decided that we were stealing a march on our Allies and were bent on a surreptitious treaty with the Imam against themselves. I fully understood this attitude was due to Turkish intrigue and the result of past propaganda issued by the Imam and "X." After all, the Kuhra are Turkish subjects, and if they imbibed Turkish propaganda it is no strange thing. I am aware that neither the Kuhra nor Zeranik, nor 'Abu-, who all make common cause against us, love the Turks for any intrinsic Turkish virtue. Abu Hadi told me, "The Turks were our masters, and Moslems like ourselves. We had to submit to them, and while they were here we found our country secure and we got to respect them. If God decrees their departure, the devil take the hindmost."

At the same time, the Tihama people are sincere in preferring Turkish and Moslem rule. They want no substitute, and certainly not the entrance of a Christian Power in place of the ruler and Caliph of Islam. "Rather a bad Moslem Power than a just Christian Power," is their sentiment often expressed to me. This is Islam the world over, and Islam is strong and waxing stronger in the Yemen Tihama. Many a time have the sheikhs told me that Mecca was of the Yemen, and that our release must be sought from Mecca. There was a growing Pan-Islamic "tang" noticeable in the Yemen during the Great War. Whether fostered by Turks or Turkish Nationalists is quite beside the mark. Enough to know it was ever present, strong, and in the ascendant, and the soil in which it was planted was good soil and has brought forth fruit, some a hundred-fold, some sixty-fold and some thirty-fold.

"If you would evince your friendship to us," said they, "safeguard Islam. We want no interference. \*We would be independent of you, and on these terms we would be your friends. We are liberally gifted by Allah with crops. We have our arms and our houses; and our 'Kat'† comes to us regularly from the hills. We want nothing but to be left alone. Why do you talk of religious differences between our various sects? They certainly do exist, but can be solved. God preserve Islam!"

This was a common topic between us. Am I to be blamed for choosing this route? Had I got through, we had learnt much. Having failed, I have learnt more. Had I taken the easier route through our Aden protectorate we should have remained in the dark as to this particular part of the Yemen.

After a time the sheikhs became more reasonable. "We cordially disliked you at first and distrusted you. Now, with the passage of time, we know you are sincere. We make you our envoy. We will brook no other mediator. May Allah blacken their faces!"

Major Meek reported to the Political Resident, Aden, in October that the Hodeida

\* This sentiment must be borne in mind when reading the agreement.

† Leaves from the plant called "Catha Edulis," of which the people eat immoderately.



people were anxious for the return of the Turks. This is a fact that cannot be controverted. For certain reasons, everybody wanted the return of the Turks.

Paragraph 15.—In Arabia, as in the East generally, it is the personal element that counts. Everyone should know this. I know it well after thirty-two years' service in the East and fifteen years spent in the Yemen. If Eastern peoples once take a fancy to you they are careless of all others outside their ken. It goes against the grain to say so, but looking to the remarks made by Aden and the political officer, Hodeida—Major Meek—who deprecated all intervention, I must in defence say that my name goes a long way in the Yemen—not for any intrinsic, inherent virtues (which I do not claim), but by reason of long residence and an understanding acquired of Arab idiosyncrasies. As their saying goes—"An Arab's intellect lies in his eyes." Arabs will do for me what they will not begin to look at with others. The Kuhra knew I was a "good catch," and they meant to derive some advantage from my arrival in their midst. At the same time I did not court their adherence to me. I told them times without number that another had come to represent my Government, and that I was, in their parlance, "mufaddam," or "muzzled as the camel"; but they declined with oaths to treat with Major Meek, and refused to go in and see him at Hodeida. I recognised Major Meek's rôle, but I saw very clearly that *without co-operation nothing was possible*. Technically I was a political *détenu*—not, however, a prisoner of war, and most certainly not closely guarded. My liberty was restricted only. Sheikhs came to me from the whole countryside by day and by night. I was in telegraphic communication with the Imam, 120 miles to the east, and we exchanged letters. I saw all the telegrams that passed between "X" and the Imam (and they were legion). "X" was sent down by the Imam to effect our release, and the Kuhra elected him as their mouthpiece to represent their case to me, although, Arab-wise, they did not give him full powers and could not on occasion resist putting in their oar.

For good reasons I did not visit Abdul Kadir but once, though he wrote frequently to me. He was afraid of being accused by the sheikhs of too great an intimacy with the opposite side. My assistant, however, Captain Nasiruddin, visited him on my behalf almost daily, and I was in close touch, through many agencies, with his views and work. I had, too, spies in his house. I gave him presents from time to time, and granted facilities to his *entourage* for conveyance of goods to Aden. For this reason I cannot admit the dictum of the Acting Political Resident, Aden, made on the 2nd October, 1919, to the High Commissioner, Egypt, that he considered Major Meek in a better position to take a clear view of the situation *than a man surrounded by hostile guards*. (This was, of course, not the case.)

The Political Resident, however, went on to propose that while Major Meek should take charge of negotiations, "he should consult Colonel Jacob, if possible, before taking any important step." I have never seen any letter or order cancelling this scheme of *consultation*, and therefore I was at a loss to follow General Sir James Stewart's remarks in his letter to Viscount Allenby, dated the 3rd December, 1919 (Appendix (C)), where he says: "I am of opinion that Jacob's proximity with the sheikhs and the conditions warp his views. In any case he has been told that negotiations are out of his hands. Yet I fear he still regards himself as our envoy, and this point of view is likely to be shared by the sheikhs. I am anxious to disabuse the sheikhs and Mahmud Nadiu of any idea that their prisoner [*sic*] now exercises control." Facts disprove General Stewart's surmises. His views of my impotence were not shared by the sheikhs. They and I were in the very midst of things. My detention was carried out by them, and with them alone was all parleying to be conducted. *To isolate them was suicidal*.

I have never initiated any negotiations, but, as aforesaid, I have co-operated with the political officer, not as an envoy (though this office was merely suspended), but as the political expert in Yemen politics and as adviser of the High Commissioner, Egypt, in South-West Arabia.

Paragraph 16.—Major Meek talks idly of the "Jacob-Kuhra" agreement. This is a clumsy misnomer. I had certainly, in my telegram dated the 8th September, 1919, to the address of the Acting High Commissioner, Egypt, advocated, for stated reasons, a "Shafai bloc" as the best available policy to hand. I had no reply from Government to my suggestion, nor directly, indeed, to any of the eight telegrams I despatched to Egypt and the Foreign Office (I refer to these telegrams in my paragraph 18 below). *It was Major Meek who finally put forward this promise of "protection."* The Kuhra, however, would not treat with him, and brought me the agreement in Arabic, taking Major Meek's promise as the basis. I still further modified the same in the interests of His Majesty's Government, translating the abstract into the concrete, and to this

agreement the sheikhs and Saiyid put their seals. I had cogent reasons for my action, which I will touch on below.

The incontrovertible proofs that I was *not* tongue-tied nor inefficient are instanced in the final scene of the last act, where, in co-operation with the political officer, Hodeida, the mission was extricated at a time when things had come to an *impasse*. The Political Resident had stated that aeroplanes could not be long detained in Hodeida, and troops, I knew, were not easily available, and if available an expedition was anathema. The tension between the Imam and the Idrisi had reached a climax. By immediate action, however, I prevented these two rivals from coming into conflict. The mission rode out of Bajil on Friday, the 12th December, at 4:30 p.m., and on the following day, accompanied by all sheikhs, akils and hundreds of jubilant tribesmen we entered Hodeida. The mission, our escort, followers, mules, tents and baggage, money and treasure-chests with rifles were all intact! The cause of our release was the work of days, and is attributable to many and various causes, but none will deny that the causes at work were operating more strongly in Bajil than in Hodeida, and the prime factor determining our exit was the *belief of the sheikhs in the word and promise on behalf of his Government* made by the writer of the memorandum, who had based the agreement on Major Meek's own formula of *protection*.

I entered Bajil as an enemy of the Shafais. I left Bajil their friend. They told me I could return at any time, and would receive a welcome; that I could stalk through the country at will, and no one would molest me. This is the result of patient dealing with wild tribesmen—the policy of attrition.

Paragraph 17.—Too much was said of the "loss of dignity" of His Majesty's Government. It was essential to understand with whom one was dealing. We were not known in these parts save as a Power who, on the Aden front, had failed to break through the Turkish defence. "You have money, we know," they said, "but you fight only with mercenaries. You are not a militant people." According to their lights and reasoning the Kuhra were wise in detaining us. The only way was to recognise the *impasse* and patiently see it through. I did not believe that His Majesty's Government favoured an expedition (the only alternative), and I telegraphed to High Commissioner on the 25th November, 1919 (Appendix (D)), that we should humour the tribal sheikhs by gifts of arms, and so preclude any military operations which would give the Allies occasion to blaspheme; for an armed entrance into the Yemen would be interpreted by them as betokening ulterior designs on the country, and I was aware that we did not expect to obtain anything so tangible as a *mandate* even.

Paragraph 18.—I will now treat of my telegrams to High Commissioner, Egypt, and the Foreign Office, all of them sent through the Political Resident, Aden. Their dates and gist of contents are as follows. I give much detail, because I learnt afterwards in Cairo that these messages had not come through in their entirety:—

(1.) Dated the 27th August, 1919, to High Commissioner.

I refer to distress in the Tihama owing to the blockade; that this has not only adversely affected my position and influence, but will prejudice our cause and our claim to be the most interested Power in the country's future. I urged immediate opening of all Arabian ports.

This was forthwith done by an order from Aden. The blockade was instituted to cripple the Turks. As I had predicted at a naval conference in Aden early in 1916, the blockade hit the Arabs very hard, and completely ruined Arabian enterprise in the Red Sea. It had very little effect on the Turks. It was rendered practically null and void by the smuggling of goods from the port of Jizan (Idrisi) both by native craft and by land caravans, which conveyed goods along the length of the entire Arabian littoral. The Arabs had to pay through the nose for these goods, and this tended to make us extremely unpopular everywhere, to say nothing of the numerous dhows we destroyed and grains, &c., we forfeited.

I tell of my being held up by the Kuhra sheikhs, and that people here regard the presence of a British envoy, to the exclusion of the Allied Powers, as an isolated attempt on our part to advance the cause of the Imam to their own detriment. (The Imam's letter to His Majesty the King and to the Ministers of the Allied Powers will prove the reality of Arab suspicion.)

(2.) Dated the 8th September, 1919, to High Commissioner, Egypt.

The Kuhra object to our going up to Sana, and had made us prisoners. That "X" and Imam were treating for our release (this was not based on bazaar rumours, but on documentary evidence); that our return to the coast was impossible; that the Kuhra



were treating with the neighbouring tribe of Abus to form a "Shafai bloc" *versus* the Imam; the attitude of our captors was prompted by earlier manifestos of the Imam and "X" with special reference to the necessity of deputations arriving from all Allied Powers; that Imam was very keen to release us, and that "X" has warned Saiyid Abdul Kadir and sheikhs that their attitude is inimical to the interests of Turkey and of Islam (I read this telegram in original); that the Kuhra urge that the Yemen is still technically a Turkish province; that they press for the future evacuation of Hodeida; that if "X" accepts the Kuhra's invitation to come to Bajil, I might recognise civil control in the country, and hand over Hodeida to him after the evacuation of our troops *provided he can hold it and ensure order*; that the Imam's occupation of Hodeida is for the present out of the question, and our subsequent treaty with him is problematical; that the Idrisi craves Hodeida, *though without any legitimate claim, and to give it to him would still further estrange the two rivals*; that if "X" cannot come down we have but two courses open to us: (1) to remain in military occupation of Hodeida, or (2) to hand over the town to Abu Hadi, who, though a Shafai, is the Imam's appointed Governor of Bajil, and so his temporary hold of Hodeida would offend the Imam less than the tenancy of any other personality; that in any future treaty with the Imam we should make the peaceful penetration of Tihama one of our stipulations; that the Kuhras are asking for stipends (they afterwards changed their minds) and a *guarantee against the Imam as the price of our release*; that if Shafai sheikhs assume a more hostile attitude the *last resort would be our relief by a force from Hodeida*.

Following this was a telegram (undated) from Political Resident, Aden, to Office Commanding, Hodeida, giving instructions from the Foreign Office. The gist was that I should be told to withdraw to Hodeida if possible and make financial terms with the Arabs (this the Officer Commanding put forward, but as the Kuhra did not want financial aid, they scorned the offer); that a message should be sent to the Imam emphasising his responsibility for the safety of the mission, and that *the Government would only treat with him in Hodeida*, and adding that he must on no account undertake military operations against the Kuhra till Jacob's mission has arrived at Hodeida. The political officer, Hodeida, Mr. Richardson, took action on this order, but he overstepped his instructions. He wrote on the 10th September, 1919, to the Imam as follows: "No doubt after the safe arrival of the mission here *you will not fail to punish all the offenders who have created these troubles*." This advice I now sedulously strove to prevent the Imam from adopting, as it was fatal to the policy I had come to the country to promote, viz., its peaceful settlement. I was constantly hereafter subjected to the tactics (from outsiders) calculated to destroy the object for which I had been deputed. The question whether I was, or was not, an "envoy" at this stage is pointless. The policy was fixed, and could not be changed with impunity.

On the 20th September, 1919, the Officer Commanding, Hodeida, wrote me that the High Commissioner, Egypt, had wired to ask what was being done for our release, and that the political officer should now ask the Kuhra their terms for release of the mission. He added that, "as basis for discussion, he could negotiate on the lines of Jacob's suggestions," and one term read as follows: "His Majesty's Government will not assist the Imam in subjugating the Shafai." This may refer to my telegram No. 2 of the 8th September, 1919, in which I had opined that the Shafais would ask for "guarantee against Zeidi encroachment." This was not strictly on the "basis of my suggestions," for I had suggested a "Shafai bloc" owing to the Imam's inability to come down to Hodeida except by force. I had talked of handing over Hodeida to "X," &c., but no instructions were issued on this very important point.

(3.) Dated the 21st September, 1919, to High Commissioner, Egypt.

I say that, although the Kuhra may not refuse ransom money, *the solution of the matter lies elsewhere* (this has proved only too true, and the diagnosis was made by me in Bajil. It was not grasped by anyone outside Bajil). I reiterate the matter of the "Shafai bloc" and say that both Officer Commanding, Hodeida, and the political officer have done their best, but that a *settlement is best effected in Bajil*. I once more put forward the Shafai's proposals, one of which will be refusal of His Majesty's Government to assist the Imam in subjugating the Shafai. I advise the arrival at Bajil of "X" as both Governor-General and the Imam's representative, and I say I will conduct negotiations through him if willing; that "X" is anxious to get us back to Hodeida. I deprecate any reference being made to the Imam's responsibility in the matter, even if a quota of blame can be laid at his door. I refer to his sympathetic

\* Why then was Idrisi's aid sought?—H. F. J.

letter to me where he asks my advice. I will refer to this letter in my paragraph 31. I propose again to offer Hodeida to "X" after the removal of our troops, but if "X" refuses, owing to Shafai suspicion of his office, I would offer it to Abu Hadi; that I will give written assurance of His Majesty's Government's refusal to assist the Imam against the Shafai, but I add that it is possible that the latter will insist on His Majesty's Government's assurance to *protect Hodeida by sea from any attacks from without*, and that this appears reasonable; that the Shafais believe that they can, in combination, withstand the *Imam's land attacks* provided they know His Majesty's Government will not assist the Imam; that the Shafais now speak of coming under British protection, but I have discouraged the idea as savouring of interference in Arab internal affairs. I narrowed down our rôle to one of *oversight only*, since His Majesty's Government is the one Power interested in seeing a peaceful Arabia, each sect living within its own borders. I add that no mention has been made (by the Imam) of Turkish debts; that I shall refrain from mentioning ransom money *as this is outside the main issue, viz., the security of Shafai territory from Imamic subjugation*.

This was Government's best programme. Arab policy is kaleidoscopic: you must deal quickly with Arabs. I have not dealt with them these fifteen years to no purpose. I know their peculiarities.

[It will be seen that I had advocated the protection of Shafai interest against Imam's possible invasion, but that this should be confined to protection from the sea only, as was the case with the Idrisi Saiyid during the war. This was really the innermost wish of the Kuhra, and must be borne in mind when examining the text of the agreement eventually drawn up on the 12th December (see paragraph 29).] I report a lengthy interview with "X," who at their instance is the Kuhra's mouthpiece. "X" fears Imam's bellicose intention to sway the Yemen with his Zaidi forces. "X" will not take over Hodeida, as he is shorn of power, and says that Shafai tribesmen cannot hold Hodeida, for they fear the Imam. He deprecates the Idrisi occupation of Hodeida. I state receipt of a letter from a leading Zarnuki sheikh (which I believed was manufactured in Bajil, but here I was wrong, as I ultimately discovered), who asks for the evacuation of Hodeida and the *replacement of our garrison by Turkish troops, which is the Kuhra's programme*, definitely stated by them to me (see their mind in paragraph 14 above), and is due to their fear of the Imam; that the Shafais know of our wish eventually to leave Hodeida and our aversion to mixing ourselves up in Yemen politics; that Abu Hadi, the friendly Shafai of the Kuhra, assures me that our return to Hodeida will be at once effected by agreeing to this programme. (N.B.—Abu Hadi was no friend of the Turks, who had largely demolished the old family fortress in Bajil and had destroyed the prestige of his house, once predominant in this part of the Yemen.) I report that "X's" definite proposal is the temporary occupation of Hodeida by Turkish troops (as gendarmes) till the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, for this will satisfy both the Kuhra and the Imam, who is anxious to see the Turks return to Yemen to coerce his recalcitrant tribesmen (this penchant for the Turks on the part of Imam Yahya I have constantly mentioned since 1905). That "X" goes on to say that the Imam does not want a treaty with His Majesty's Government; but I remark on this that he speaks as a Turk, for if Imam knew that the Turks would not return he would certainly desire a treaty with us, since he requires financial support (to withstand internal foes). "X" further thinks that if the Turks were finally excluded from the Yemen we should elect a Moslem Governor to stand for the Shafai interest. I objected on the behalf of my Government, but "X" replied, "You have ousted the Turks and are therefore responsible for their replacement by a stable Government, otherwise chaos will follow." I add that the question of a Turkish garrison returning to Hodeida may sound chimerical, but one point deserves consideration, viz., the vague nature of the armistice terms given in the case of Yemen, where, with the removal of the Turkish forces, the country was left without one sole ruler who could enforce his sway throughout, in striking contrast to the Asir province, where the Idrisi was paramount and unhampered by diverse and varying sects; that in the Yemen proper there was still a Governor-General and civil functionaries in nominal charge. I therefore suggest supporting "X's" scheme; that the alternative is to reinforce Hodeida with a mobile column in conjunction with aeroplanes. Otherwise our stay in Bajil will be prolonged indefinitely and will encourage Idrisi aspirations to the Tihama. Not only so, but our failure to exercise a policy here will set in motion a large Shafai combination probably hostile to us, and certainly not amenable to our advice and direction. Finally, with regard to "X's" suggestion for the future of the Tihama, we are now confronted with the effacement of a united Yemen under the Imam. (This was an important telegram, but



no pronouncement was made till the 26th October, *i.e.*, over a month later, when Major Meek wrote in reply to my reminder that nothing on these lines was to be considered. Were the messages detained at Aden? It is all very mysterious.)

(5.) Dated the 4th October, 1919, to High Commissioner, Egypt.

I refer to previous telegram where I made two proposals—both temporary expedients and *neither of them involving any permanent policy*: that the temporary return of the Turkish troops to Hodeida will give us plenty of time to consider the future of the country before the terms of the Peace Treaty are divulged; that a Shafai defensive combination (this is the other suggestion advanced) seems the best policy to adopt to preserve the equilibrium of power maintained by the Turks aforetime. I promise fuller details.

(6.) Dated the 5th October, 1919, to High Commissioner, Egypt.

I report Imam's intention to crush the Kuhra in spite of His Majesty's Government's wishes to the contrary; that "X" and myself have telegraphed to Imam to desist from this course, which would both imperil the mission and thwart a peaceful settlement; that Imam, however, replied that he was resolved on the campaign, and he recalled "X" to Sana. Whereupon, at a large representative gathering of sheikhs at Sana, "X," while protesting his devotion to Imam, *declared he stood for the Shafai cause if Imam attacked*. He told the sheikhs he was their representative parleying with me, and we awaited the decision of the British Government as to the temporary return of Turkish troops. (This waiting for definite orders from the Government necessitated our "marking-time" before launching out on the sheikhs' proposals.) The Kuhra warned all the neighbouring Shafais to prepare for Zeidi invasion; that the Idrisi (so said "X") had offered to extricate us, but I deprecated his intervention on lines of *declared policy, which is to keep Idrisi and the Imam out of the arena*. ("X," too, was against his offer.) I then referred to my telegram of the 8th September, 1919, where I proposed to hand over the Hodeida conditionally to "X," and said that the Government agreed to act "on basis of my suggestions" (the reference was, unfortunately, vague). I reiterate the fact of the presence of the Governor-General and the Turkish Civil Government (present, even if inoperative); that "X" declines Imam's invitation to return to Sana on grounds of his Turkish status; that he has taken over Kuhra affairs and is responsible for the safety of the British mission to the British Government and to humanity; that "X" tells the Imam that the main issue is the return of the Turkish troops to Hodeida; reminds the Imam that the latter had engaged to attack the mission up-country, and it is unseemly for him to discount his personal responsibility. (All this surely diminishes the statement made of "X's" hostility to us.) I remark that "X" has served us well and deserves recognition, although I am aware he speaks from the Turkish standpoint. I agree with him that we are responsible to replace a staple Government in the Yemen, and that unless we check this threat of constant chaos in the country we shall imperil the mission, and, further, *shall lower our prestige as the Government interested in the country's welfare*. (This is important, looking to our future demands from the High Contracting Parties at the Peace Conference.) I believe a change of policy is unavoidable, and I show the superiority of supporting the Shafai's *passive independence* over our adhesion to an imperious ruler who is too far away to be controlled, and who will not treat with us unless we guarantee him financial support, while for the present he awaits the edict of the Peace Conference as to the Turks' future. By my proposal we shall extend our pacific influence along the entire Red Sea Arabian littoral, starting from Hedjaz in the north and passing along the Asir littoral and down to the south. I remark that just before the war a retirement to the littoral ports was discussed by Turkish politicians as that country's best policy; that if the Imam is sensible he will take up the threads of his peaceful policy with the Kuhra where he dropped them in May 1919; but in the long run he will descend to the coast, because he lusts after possession of the port of Hodeida and covets his ancestors' old-time dominions since occupied by the Turks. I say that the Imam had again wired to "X" to enquire if it were the policy of His Majesty's Government to treat with him. I replied that former policy had not ceased, but would be pursued after I had returned to Hodeida. (This was eventually cancelled, for the time at least, by reason of Major Meek's programme as conveyed in his letter to the Kuhra sheikhs.) I conclude if the crime is projected it is not with punitive forces, as this would entail shedding of Moslem blood.

Continuing my telegram to the High Commissioner, I say I await the Government's order re the temporary return of Turkish troops. If the Government reply is

in the negative, and if the Imam grow restive, I ask for a promise to assure the Shafais that the Government will protect them against unprovoked Zeidi invasion, for without such a promise our return to the coast will entail a show of force. (This prophecy was fulfilled, and the Kuhra released us only on receiving the above assurance.)

I deprecate, and for reasons, the permission given to the Imam to attack the Kuhra on our release. I support "X's" candidature, and advocate this *radical change of policy* (*viz.*, a Shafai defensive bloc) in order to secure the requisite equilibrium of power in the country—I go still further, and, as an alternative, I advocate the policy approved in the Yemen generally, namely, to let the country remain within Turkish influence, so as to rid ourselves of direct responsibility, &c. (*Vide* again my paragraph 14, giving the grounds of Arab partiality for the Turks.)

Paragraph 19.—In commenting on the Turkish Governor's work in Bajil and espousing the use of the Turkish troops as a police force for a specified period, it has been held in certain quarters that I am pro-Turk. So far as the general Turkish question and the Caliphate are concerned, my experience in India, and the imperialistic views I hold about our Empire, and understanding the Indian Moslems' regard for Turkey; further, the position of His Majesty the King as the Sovereign governing more Moslems than any other ruler in the world, yes, I am pro-Turk, and glory in the same. I refer, however, to other and careless slanders made which suggest my being prompted, by my close interviews with "X," by an anti-British strain of thought, for this, surely, is what the first of the two following quotations would suggest:—

- (1.) Major Meek, reporting to Aden, says: "Did I not know Jacob as I do" (a sop to Cerebus), "I would be tempted to declare that evidence showed him an agent of Turkey."
- (2.) General Stewart's remark to the High Commissioner, Egypt: "Jacob seems to have come absolutely under the influence of the ex-Vali."

The inference they would draw is fairly clear. I accept the fact that these remarks may be privileged, though in bad taste. They apparently have been made with the intention of rendering the facts secondary to their own opinions and wills. I will merely remark, "Plus souat quam valet."

Paragraph 20.—The seventh and eighth telegrams I sent to the Foreign Office through the usual channels. They are dated the 20th and 22nd October respectively.

In the first one I complain of want of replies to my several telegrams; that I have learned indirectly that Egypt considers the introduction of Turkish troops impossible, and that Major Meek has been asked to report on the *possibility of releasing the mission through Idrisi agency*. (It is this latter item that surprised me. I had started with a definite programme from the Foreign Office and from Egypt, and although my office of envoy was temporarily interrupted, the message had still to be given. Why, then, this new and startling opening without apprising me of the same, more especially as I had given solid grounds for rejecting Idrisi assistance, and had striven throughout my stay in Bajil to combat this extraneous and evil influence? Doubtless it is open to His Majesty's Government to cancel any past policy, but the principle of employing several agents is bound to prove disastrous unless each one knows what the other is doing; and there was no apparent ground for this *volte-face*, especially as we were in friendly correspondence the while with Imam Yahya.)

In the second telegram I ask for early and authoritative announcements that the Turks shall not return, so that we may be able to propose final negotiations before resorting to force; that the sheikhs would exclude the Idrisi from Hodeida. They admit that the best policy is reconciliation between themselves and the Imam on the lines of *self-determination*, and some such scheme is already in train. I remark here that after our release the above seems the correctest solution, and it is not impossible to satisfy the Imam on the basis of his suzerain rights in the Tihama, and the time-honoured custom of his ancestors to administer these tracts, by utilising local sheikhs as their representatives. I deprecate the punishment of the Kuhra as likely to upset the country and to encourage the descent of the Imam. I ask the Government to discount the effect of humiliation and loss of dignity, and explain the motives which prompted the Kuhra to arrest our journey up to Sana. Finally, if the offer of a ransom is withdrawn by the Government, or if the Kuhra demand the alternative of protection from an aggressive Imam, I think that Major Meek at an interview will be able to convince them that after our release the Government will assuredly protect them against unprovoked Zadia attack; to do less will not be human. In the meantime, it is not



impossible to persuade the Imam to leave these folk alone until a reasonable settlement, conducive to his honour and the best interests of the country, is arrived at. I trust that the Government will carefully consider this proposition based on long experience of Arabs.

Paragraph 21.—Let me now describe "X's" rule and work from the time he arrived in Bajil on the 19th September. I worked with "X" because the Kuhra sheikhs came and asked me to do so. Before he came down they were all very suspicious of the part he might play. They knew his sympathies with the Imam. "X" has throughout worked strenuously on my side. I know his acts and his propaganda during the war. They were, of course, pro-Turk, and to this we cannot object. His post-Armistice propaganda up to the arrival of the mission in the country was in thorough bad taste. I told him so, and he admitted his indiscretions. He was, however, very bitter on the subject of a message received from Mr. Richardson and written in an unfriendly strain, which, says "X," was couched in phraseology for which apparently he had no sanction from higher authority. He refused to accept the authenticity of a message from his Government as it was in a code already compromised, and he received no reply to his latest letter in defence of his remaining in the Yemen. He was told, he alleges, to retire from the Yemen and to place his civilian officials under the orders of the General Officer Commanding at Aden [sic]! Again, the Imam had prevented "X" coming down to Hodeida, or leaving the country, and had further vetoed the departure of a number of Turkish officials and civilians, men, women and children, till he knew of the certainty of the removal of the Turkish Government, with whom he had concluded a pact in 1911 and 1912. This action of the Imam is thoroughly sound and is good diplomacy. The Political Resident, Aden, in his telegram to Government, No. 96 A.P. of the 21st June, 1919, intimated that instructions from the Grand Vizier had been sent to "X" and implied that the Imam is the stumbling block to his departure. See also a letter from the Imam Yahya to the Political Resident, Aden, dated the 6th June, 1919, regarding orders of the Grand Vizier where he says: "We have received a letter from Colonel Field, the officer commanding the British forces, Hodeida, enclosing a telegram signed by the Grand Vizier to Madmul Nadim Bey. Be it known to your Excellency that compliance with the orders therein contained is dependent on our receipt of an intimation from that quarter and also on the receipt by us of a reply to our appeal to His Majesty the King of Great Britain." (In other words, before obtaining Turkish support, the Imam Yahya would receive definite assurance of British assistance. The Imam is no fool.)

The Imam has detained "X's" family in Sana and has treated the Turkish men, women and children there and in other places with parsimony. All reports, written and verbal, and the evidence of my own eyes, go to show that these Turkish residents are in a woeful plight, and for this reason I advocated generous treatment and the passing on of "X's" letter to Constantinople, in which he asked for 10,000*l.* to provide them with the means of sustenance. It was a great opportunity to show our friendship with Turkey, who was looking to Great Britain for future benefits. It was an act likely to commend itself to Indian Moslems, and was of Imperial importance. Yemen's politics cannot be considered apart from general Moslem politics in our Empire.

I was able, through the paid offices of the Turkish telegraph operator in Bajil and through other agencies, to see the various telegrams that passed between "X" and Abdul Kadir, between "X" and the Kuhra sheikhs, and between "X" and the Imam, and I cannot but admit that "X" was sincerely genuine in working for our release either Sanawards or to the coast. If whilst in Bajil I was regarded as a closely-confined prisoner, doubtless my success in arriving at the truth would have been very limited, but being, on the contrary, in close touch with all the personalities there and with the sheikhs of the surrounding tribes, who would visit me bi-weekly on market days, I became conversant with the people's demands, and was fully able to gauge their aspirations. For this reason, I so often wrote that it was from Bajil that our release must be effected, for it was in Bajil that all the *dramatis personae* resided, and they would deal with me only. "X" was beset by grave difficulties. He was the Imam's representative to gain our release, and had taken up the Kuhra cause at their request; he had to combat also the pro-Idrisi proclivities of Saiyid Abdul Kadir, for he knew only too well that the entrance of this factor would not alone upset the Imam's programme, but would cause bloodshed and incessant unrest in the Tihama. "X" further was aware of his own unpopularity with ourselves, and he was not sure of the wishes of his own Government. He had to submit daily to insults from the Kuhra sheikhs, who saw him despoiled of his former power as a Governor backed by force. In the circumstances, "X" did extremely good work and his motives were sincere. Aden has looked mainly

to his later propaganda. There is no one in Aden now—for residents come and go with amazing rapidity—who knows "X's" pre-war career. I have been for fifteen years in Aden and its hinterland, and can assure the Government that during our earlier troubles with the Imam and his flirtations with our protégés, it was enough to write to "X," who always put things straight. One man in his time plays many parts, and "X's" part, before and after his arrival in Bajil, was unquestionably on my side, and based on measures whose goal was our release. It is unfair to condemn "X" wholesale by taking an isolated epoch in his twenty-six years' career in the Yemen. Aden started with a bias against the man, and this has warped its judgment. Nothing good can seemingly come out of "X." "X's" relations with the Imam became very difficult as time went on, and matters moved turbidly. The Imam suspected that the Governor was acting covertly to further Kuhra and Tihama interests, whereas he was awaiting the result of the proposal to bring back a Turkish garrison in Hodeida, and he was let and hindered by Kuhra suspicions and by Abdul Kadir's intrigues with the Idrisi Saiyid.

There is no doubt that the Imam would not have been anxious to treat with us until he knew of the exit of the Turks from the Yemen. I am also very sure, and I have written this many a time in the past, that the Imam would not dislike the return of the Turks to the country. He requires money and assistance to render his position secure. He has many internal foes, and there are many aspirants for the Imamate. He is proverbially stingy, and he cannot control his lieutenants and the hordes of turbaned Saiyids, &c., who, while he himself has liberal views towards non-Moslems, themselves are the acme of fanaticism. The Turks paid his lawless tribesmen on the Hashid and Bakil, and assisted the Imam Yahya by force, if the former showed the cloven hoof of rebellion. With the Turks gone, and no foreign Government living in the country, the Imam foresaw trouble ahead; hence his desire for the stay of the Turks. "X" knew this fact, and so long as the matter of the temporary return of the Turkish soldiers to Hodeida was undecided, he induced the Imam to keep quiet. When that idea was scouted, the Imam again became restless, for he scented possible Idrisi intervention. "X" found it politic to keep in with influential Abdul Kadir, but eventually broke away from him when the latter vacillated over the Idrisi intervention (contrary to the wishes of the Kuhra sheikhs), and things looked a bit dark. Before the candidature of Abdul Kadir as Shafai head was put up by the Kuhra and company, "X" took the precaution to sound the Imam, who quickly approved of the temporary nomination, for although Abdul Kadir is pro-Idrisi, the tribes wanted independence, and the Imam felt sure that his hated rival would be kept out of the Tihama and Hodeida till the Turkish Treaty was published. "X" assured me that on our return to the coast he would at once return to Sana, and there use his influence with the Imam to bring about reconciliation between him and the Tihama folk, in order to avoid bloodshed and eliminate the entrance of the Idrisi.

In the past "X" had been very hospitable and kind to Mr. Richardson, the consul of Hodeida, when the latter had been taken prisoner by the Turks to Sana. He had also befriended Sir John Jackson's employés, who were sent by the Turks as prisoners of war to the Yemen capital. Messrs. Cowdrey and Bakewell will testify to "X's" kindly treatment.

Paragraph 22.—As regards Saiyid Abdul Kadir, his rôle was pro-Idrisi, but he could not bring it off. He was throughout our stay friendly to us, and quieted the sheikhs when at first their feelings towards us were tinged with bias and hatred. He refused to allow the looting of our mules and baggage, and, on the occasion of the tribal upheaval caused by the appearance of an aeroplane, this Saiyid was foremost in appeasing the crowds, and I attribute our safety then and throughout our stay very largely to his benign influence. Abdul Kadir, however, is easily swayed by various parties and cannot come to a decision. I would call him a peace-loving Saiyid, but a vacillator and a time-server. His love for the Idrisi is explicable, for he believed the Imam, who has no love for the holy men outside his own persuasion, would try to conquer the Tihama, and he saw salvation for his special creed possible from Asir alone. No Arab believes that His Majesty's Government will stay in Hodeida indefinitely. It is only natural then that the Arabs should fend for themselves and seek combinations amongst themselves. They resent our parcelling out the country and then standing at a distance issuing platitudes of good counsel. Abdul Kadir has been abused, but looking to his lights he did us well. He might have extricated us earlier by his influence with the tribesmen, but he was looking not only to our personal safety, but far ahead to the future of his country and his house. Major Meek's tampering with the Murawaa Saiyids to isolate Abdul Kadir annoyed this man and made him obstinate.



This holy house of Murawaa harks back to 400 years and has still a wonderful influence throughout this part of the Tihama.

You cannot belittle such a representative simply because he does not see eye to eye with you, and cannot accept your programme at its face value. Arabs work slowly, and when in their meshes it is necessary to work your way out along lines of least resistance. "Haste," they say, "is the devil's rôle."

Paragraph 23.—Believing that I was unable from my position to work our release, the Government sent Major Meek as political officer to Hodeida. In their telegram to the High Commissioner, Cairo, dated the 20th October, 1919, the Foreign Office said: "Meek may ignore past negotiations at Bajil and exclude 'X' as their intermediary;" and, again, "Meek will no doubt bear in mind that the object of negotiations is to secure the release of the mission."

I submit that it is really not feasible to ignore the past until you know exactly what that past has been, and even then in the East you must build upon foundations already laid. I have less to say against the exclusion of "X" as an intermediary, but it is quite a different thing to start operations by abusing him (as Major Meek did), and, further, by anticipating the fiat of the Peace Conference by announcing the coming exit of the Turks from the Yemen. I protested at such statements not only as unfair to "X," but, from Major Meek's own standpoint, as lacking in common sense. You may think "X" a villain, and you may not wish to work through him; the remedy is to ignore him. If, however, he has influence and is the Kuhra's elected agent, it is not likely to further your cause if you start to pulverise him by abuse. With Easterns, more than with any other, it is good to remember that "a drop of honey catches more flies than a gallon of gall." After a flow of uncomplimentary phrases intended to annoy "X," Major Meek evolved the following sentence which needs no comment from me: "And now, Janab-al-Pasha, I wish to write a few words about the mission. You have been Colonel Jacob's friend; be now also mine, and give me the benefit of your assistance!" On my remonstrance, Major Meek wrote to me on the 21st October, 1919: "I will certainly ask your opinion before taking any important step, and regret I did not do so in the case of my letter to 'X,' which you find unfortunate [*sic*]." Nevertheless, afterwards, he again accused me of being in the hands of "X," and, writing to the Kuhra sheikhs, made another determined attack on the Governor's love of intrigue and his selfish policy. All this did infinite harm. It is to "X's" credit and a proof of his sincerity to us that he never swerved from his original purpose.

Major Meek's policy was to re-establish good relations in Hodeida, which he certainly did, and his work there was highly commendable. He, however, gave offence by appointing a municipality to conduct local affairs. Personally, I saw nothing but good likely to result from the work of the municipality, and I argued the point with the Kuhra sheikhs. These, however, were greatly offended, and fancied they saw in his interference an attack on the independence of the country. I quote this merely to show Kuhra feeling. Colonel Wilson of Jeddah's opinion is pertinent. Wilson refrained from oiling the pools where mosquitoes swarmed, as this was likely to argue interference with municipal affairs, and give a handle to Turkish propaganda, which would bruit the British intention to annex the Hedjaz.

Egypt had said it was of the greatest importance that the political officer at Hodeida should establish touch with the Kuhra (italics are mine) and other tribes. He was able, by grants of money and kindness shown in Hodeida, to win over the neighbouring tribes, and thus to isolate the Kuhra. The latter were not impressed, but, on the contrary, resented the largesse given to the Abus and others, and refused point blank to listen to the Abus overtures when their sheikhs visited us at Bajil. "We have captured the mission in the Tihama, and we will not allow others to take credit for the release." Thereupon the Abus representatives remounted their mules and returned to Murawaa—disappointed men.

Egypt was right. The Kuhra were the principle tribe to tackle. The isolation was a mistake. However, this all-important tribe refused to treat with any other than myself.

Eventually I induced Major Meek to give largesse to the Kuhra akils, who were growing dissatisfied with our long detention, and feared reprisals which would affect them far more than the sheikhs. I sent in several of these akils to Hodeida, but at first they were not received cordially.

The use of the aeroplane on the 26th November, 1919, was a trifle premature, since the Kuhra sheikhs' delegates (whom "X" had persuaded to go into Hodeida) were there parleying with Major Meek, and the appearance of the aeroplane was taken

as an act of treachery. Being market day, Bajil was thronged with armed tribesmen, who fired wildly at the plane, and after it had passed, swarmed round our house and began firing at us through windows. Had it not been for the strenuous efforts of the sayyids, "X," and the Kuhra sheikhs, the house would have been rushed and all of us killed. At the same time, there is no doubt that the appearance of the aeroplane, whose arrival in Kamaran was doubted, played no small part in inducing the sheikhs to let us go.

I will detail the various causes that contributed to inducing the sheikhs to let us go. Their change of mind was not brought about by any sudden factor, but matured gradually. The policy of isolating Kuhra by gifts of money to other tribal heads was not a success. Nor did the offers made by Major Meek of douceurs of 1,000 dollars apiece to two of the Kuhra sheikhs at all avail. The sheikhs knew I could give money galore—

- (a.) But it was not money they wanted. Directly Meek, on my advice, began to wean away by bribes the akils of the Kuhra clans, the sheikhs were forced to consider the situation more attentively. Full credit for this move is due, however, to Abu Hadi, who had for some time been hatching the intrigue, and supported by Risaldar-Major Malikdad Khan, who commanded my escort. The akils of all four clans were bought over by degrees with moneys paid by Abu Hadi and myself, and guarantees were given for liberal payments in future. What actually induced the sheikhs Al Baghawi and Mohamed Zaid to release us was not the promise of a paltry bribe, but the fear of being deposed of their sheikhships, and this had actually been arranged by Abu Hadi. I was in close contact with all the tribal akils, who realised that further delay would expose them to our vengeance, and that it was they rather than the four sheikhs who would suffer thereby. As I have said, these akils were being seduced from their allegiance to their sheikhs, and a coup was planned for our forcible release and conduct to Hodeida. Here again, however, Abdul Kadir's influence temporarily put a spoke in the wheel. This sayyid dreaded bloodshed and civil war. When Meek's programme of protection was grasped and accepted, I had to dissuade the akils from immediate action, and their intervention was diverted by Abu Hadi's directions.
- (b.) The arrival of the aeroplane, as above stated, hastened the endeavours of the akils, and so became a contributory cause.
- (c.) "X's" extreme patience amid daily insults and humiliation and his constant insistence on British good faith gradually impressed the Kuhra minds.
- (d.) The increasing fear that the Imam's patience would be exhausted and that he would descend to take vengeance on the Kuhra, his force and ours from Hodeida hemming them in. The sheikhs often asked me to telegraph to the Imam to stand aloof, and I both wrote and telegraphed, pointing out to him the benefits of patience.
- (e.) The Imam's telegram to the sheikhs and to Abdul Kadir, dated the 4th December, 1919 (Appendix (E)), reassured the sheikhs. This message was the outcome of letters "X" and myself had written to the Imam pointing out the evils of his hasty action and the benefits of exercising a peaceful policy.
- (f.) The Idrisi's interference by his agent, Sheikh Ahmed Khuzam (one of the Kuhra sheikhs), and various other agents and his letter to Abdul Kadir was also a factor in the case.
- (g.) Lastly, the gradual process of attrition. By unfailing patience and daily reasonings we of the mission at Bajil won the hearts of our captors, who, believing our promises of friendship and Government protection, at last yielded and took us back to Hodeida.

Paragraph 23 B.—I would like to expatiate on item No. 5 above, viz., the Idrisi's handiwork.

In the early days of our detention I was very suspicious of the Idrisi's part in this play. I am not at all sure that he did not encourage our detention to further his own ends, *vis-à-vis* the Imam. There was general suspicion that he had considerable interest in our not going up to Sana. Sayyid Abdul Kadir is his friend, and a feeling of mutual admiration exists between them. Sheikh Ahmed Khuzam, one of the Kuhras, was Idrisi's agent in Bajil. This sheikh constantly disappeared from Bajil and made lengthy stays in the Idrisi territory. He openly advocated to me Idrisi intervention.



Frequent letters passed between the Idrisi and Abdul Kadir. Ultimately pressure, presumably from Aden, was brought to bear on the Idrisi to intervene (see paragraph 20 above).

I heard on the 24th October of a letter written by the Idrisi to Saiyid Abdul Kadir in which he claimed Bajil. Abdul Kadir asked him to postpone his visit, but the Idrisi pressed his claims to the place. The Bani Kais of Jabul Milhan, where Idrisi troops were then quartered, are at variance with the Kuhra and would help Idrisi. The Jorabiha, who live to the north-west of Bajil, are one with the Kuhra, and had a short time before come to Bajil to discuss with them the future of the country. I append (Appendix (F)) letter of Idrisi to Abdul Kadir. This letter is not friendly to us, but it is possible this was a ruse on Idrisi's part to impress the tribesmen with the evils of further delay. In any case, it proves Idrisi's ambitions. Saiyid Abdulla of Munira also came to see me. He was sent by Idrisi to counsel the sheikhs to let us go. He naturally did not favour the grant of any concessions to the Kuhra, and was candid enough to state that the Kuhra, by compliance with his master's wishes, would have the benefit of his master's protection. The Kuhra sheikhs, except the agent above named, who is a nonentity in the tribe, would have none of the Idrisi. On the night before the sheikhs signed the engagement they came to me and, referring to the presence in close proximity of Idrisi troops, asked if I were actually plotting for the Idrisi entrance into Bajil. It took "X" and myself over an hour to reassure them that nothing of this nature was contemplated. Thereupon Sheikh Yahya Ali and Al Baghawi said, "Oh, envoy, we rely on your promise implicitly to keep the Idrisi from our country." Had it not been for this assurance the sheikhs would not have let us go on the following day. I meant what I said to them, and wrote a strong letter to the Idrisi's uncle, Saiyid Mustafa, warning him to keep clear of this locality. The Kadi of Zeidiya (a place now in Idrisi's hands) was another, with several other counsellors, who from time to time came from that direction to press the Idrisi claims on Bajil and vicinity.

The Kuhra deputation, whom "X" eventually persuaded to go in to see Major Meek, consisted of a local mufti and Saiyid Hamud, who was Idrisi's "spot" man. This gentleman, who has married a Turkish lady, was formerly a protégé of the Imam's, but, suffering some slight at his hands, changed his camp and was welcomed by the Idrisi. It was this Hamud who on our first arrival in Bajil had been chief adviser to the Kuhra to prevent our going up to Sana. He rightly knew this would enrage the Imam. He knew his new master, the Idrisi, would be correspondingly pleased, and for this reason partly I have said that the Idrisi was interested in blocking our advance to the hills. There are some who cannot bear any disparagement of their Idrisi idol. It was I who brought the Idrisi into the arena against the Turks, and I have studied him, his antecedents, his policy and his machinations more than any other. I know his value, and have always recognised his special work. I have objected to his aims of aggrandisement in territory to which he has no claim and where his arrival would be the harbinger of perpetual strife. The Idrisi has come to Lohaiya and to Zeidiya and vicinity, also to Jabul Milhan and neighbouring hills. His true *métier* is to work out the future of Asir, to contest the possession of Kunfida, the port of Abha and to consolidate his northern borders where these march with the Hejaz. When the Idrisi steps into the Yemen Tihama he poaches. The Kuhra and Company do not want Idrisi suzerainty, though, if hard pressed by the Imam and his lusty lieutenants, it is very likely they may be compelled to throw themselves into the Idrisi's arms. This we should try to avert.

Major Meek's true object was, as ordered by His Majesty's Government, to extricate the mission. When he began to devise plans for the future of the country he was acting beyond his rôle and ken, and I was constrained to put in my word. However, the question of our release was inextricably woven with the future politics of the Yemen. How, then, was it possible for me to remain silent?

Paragraph 24.—As regards the agreement with the Kuhra and Company. I will preface my remarks by saying that these people forced me to take part, by flatly refusing to deal with the political officer in Hodeida. Another reason for not holding myself aloof was the growing tension in the country between the Idrisi and the Imam, and also the state of mind of the Kuhra, which was always so variable. When at last I found them united in counsel and their minds malleable, I struck while the iron was hot. This agreement is not a perfect one, but if we had stayed to discuss it, or wait for a better, no advance would have been possible. The original terms given by Meek were vague and inexplicable to the sheikhs. With Arabs it is all important to leave no suspicion of *arrière-pensée*. They themselves are simple and direct, and do not understand finesse. The agreement is attached (Appendices (L) and (L) (1)).

Meek's first letter to the sheikhs is dated the 14th November, 1919. It will be found (Appendix (G)). The scarcely covert reference in paragraph 4 to the intriguer concerns our friend "X," the herring Major Meek was ever trailing across the track! I reproduce paragraph 5, which outlines a policy, if not of actual protection, of practically nothing else:—

"It is the intention of the British Government to remain in Hodeida until arrangements have been made which will safeguard the interests of Hodeida and of the Shafai tribes in its vicinity. The Government will not leave Hodeida and the Kuhra and Abus in the lurch; and will endeavour to effect a just settlement which will be suitable to all interests."

In short, and as it was understood by plain folk like the sheikhs, Major Meek declared:—

- (1.) Our stay in Hodeida is temporary only.
- (2.) We recognise a community of interests between Hodeida and the Shafai tribes in its vicinity.
- (3.) We will safeguard their mutual interests before we leave Hodeida and them satisfied and happy.

On the 21st November, 1919, I asked Meek what he meant by "not being left in the lurch," and if arms were to be given to them. In this my letter written five days before the plane appeared, I wrote to deprecate air operations unaccompanied by a mobile force, as "there is no doubt our position will become dangerous." I had hoped that he and the Kuhra delegation then in Hodeida would come to some settlement, and I suggested that the gift of a few old surrendered Turkish guns would meet their wants.

On the 25th November, 1919, I telegraphed to Viscount Allenby, who had but recently returned to Cairo. (This will be found as Appendix (D).) I pressed for a gift of guns to the tribe. This was doubtless the easiest way for us out of the difficulty, though I admit it might have annoyed the Imam. Al Salami, Imam's agent at Bajil, had promised Abu Hadi that he would ask the Imam for a few old guns to satisfy the Kuhra. Salami was in daily telegraphic touch with his master, and this showed that the Imam was inclined to diplomatic measures with the tribe.

Paragraph 25.—On the same day, 25th November, I wrote to Meek advising his buying over of the Kuhra akils. I said that Saiyid Abdul Kadir is frightened and ill at ease; that the causes are: (1) the arrival of aircraft over his village of Murawaa; (2) defection of the akils; that the Saiyid has been warned strictly by Abu Hadi as to the evil consequences should the Government's patience be exhausted; that the Saiyid realises all this, but is clay in the hands of the potter, and feels obliged to be complacent to all. He, however, told Abu Hadi that he would await the result of the Kuhra delegation now in Hodeida, and would then look to the akils' complaints, as they were pressing for the removal of their sheikhs.

Paragraph 26.—On the 26th November Meek wrote to me again re his interview with the Kuhra delegates. He states, "I promised pardon and protection to the sheikhs in the event of immediate compliance with my demands." (See Appendix (H).) The delegates had asked for a meeting with Hodeida notables, and this was granted. Thereafter all came to Major Meek and presented him with a set of resolutions agreed to unanimously. Major Meek wrote, "The resolution contained points I laid down in my reply to the sheikhs, a copy of which I attach." (Appendix (J).) Meek writes that the plane demonstrations have made a great impression everywhere. "The disturbances between the various factions in Bajil," said he, "will no doubt cause you unpleasantness and anxiety, but I feel very sure your safety will not be endangered." (The man on the spot was not considered able to judge—presumably because a prisoner!) On that very day a plane flew over Bajil with results already stated, and my prophecy was fulfilled.

Paragraph 27.—Major Meek's points of assurance are very precise and are four in number. No. 2 associates Kuhra and Company (i.e., Abus and presumably Zeranik) with the Hodeida district, and declares that the British Government will stay at Hodeida till the matter of election of a ruler has been arranged in conformity with popular views. It is true that Meek added he would refer their wishes to the Government. No. 3 says: "We undertake that the British Government will protect you from any aggression so long as you behave well, &c." (This is the crux of the whole matter.)



As above stated, I concluded an agreement with the sheikhs on the lines of the above letter. It was dated the 5th December, but was not signed or sealed till the 12th December. It, with accompaniments, will be found (Appendices (K), (L), (M)). Clause 9 was eventually ruled out at Meek's instance by the aid of "X." I will explain the spirit of the treaty in my paragraph 29.

*Paragraph 28.*—I give copies of correspondence that passed between Major Meek and myself, dated the 6th and 7th December, regarding this agreement. It will be found (Appendices (N) and (O)). The gist of the matter is just this: protection was promised by Meek, who was the Government's agent. This is the main point of issue; the only one that counts. One cannot escape from it, nor can the promise be whittled down. As I have said, a gift of arms might have precluded protection, but once protection was promised, and the fact was at last accepted by the sheikhs and the Saiyid ruler, it was surely monstrous and un-British for Major Meek to say that the protection he contemplated was only of "secondary importance." This was the first experience by fanatical and exclusive Arabs of His Majesty's Government, whose representative they had first suspected of treachery and then learned to respect. These sheikhs were out for protection only; money was of slight import. What would have been the effect on the Arab mind of such a *rolle-face*? Again, I say, it is fortunate for the credit of my Government that I insisted on co-operation, for otherwise our short acquaintance with this tract would have left a stain on our escutcheon. All this comes of amateurism run amok.

*Paragraph 29.*—Before dealing with the agreement itself, which was signed by all the five sheikhs, the Saiyid and myself, I will ask your Excellency to read Appendices (P), (Q), (R), (S). These will show Meek's assent to my signing the document. His statement to the Kuhra in Hodeida, after I had left for Aden, that Government would not recognise the validity of a document signed by a prisoner was therefore unnecessary. It is true that after all my protestations as to Meek's prerogative to sign the document, Saiyid Abdul Kadir at first telegraphed to him to ask if the agreement would be accepted; but after Meek's letter to me (dated the 6th December, 1919), (Appendix (N)), Abdul Kadir fell in with the sheikhs' views, and unreservedly accepted my rôle. See also final paragraph of the agreement dated the 12th December, 1919 (Appendix (L) (1)), which states that they *will deal with none other than me*. This is the original document. Its translation will be found (Appendix (L)). Clauses 1 and 2 of the agreement are clear. Regarding clause 3, I hold letters from the Abus and the Zeranik which prove that these tribes were hand and glove with the Kuhra. The Abus were bought over by Meek, but I have read the original of a letter from the Abus head sheikh to Saiyid Abdul Kadir in which, just prior to our release, he urged our further detention in Bajil owing to the appearance of a 'plane over the holy city of Murawaa. The largesse expended here by Major Meek did not prevent the sheikhs writing in this strain, although Suleiman Bakhit was treated very honourably by Major Meek, and sucked thereby no small monetary advantage.

I hold a true copy of another letter written by the head sheikh of the Zeranik, who, addressing all the Kuhra sheikhs by name, urges them to detain the mission until the terms are satisfactory to the Shafais generally, for he believed that the British Government and the Imam might thereafter unite to crush the tribes!

It is to the credit of the Kuhra and to "X's" exertions that the Kuhra placed confidence in my word and paid no heed to these warnings. Had I dallied at this juncture the Kuhra might have doubled on their tracks. It was necessary for the satisfaction of the Kuhra to particularise the Imam and the Idrisi as the ones they feared, and though I disliked to mention the Imam, who had backed the candidature of Abdul Kadir, I was glad to instance the Idrisi, for I knew Abdul Kadir's attitude towards him. The tribe-men, however, were not of Abdul Kadir's opinion. They told me: "We do not wish to be under one who is himself under you."

If the Saiyid or the Kuhra now bid for Idrisi's assistance against Imam, or if the Kuhra and other tribes mentioned reject Abdul Kadir's leadership, our promised protection *ipso facto* ceases.

I have insisted on the inclusion of the diplomatic means of protection, although the sheikhs were bent on our using *force only*, and distrusted palavers.

As to the words "will absolutely restrain," to which Meek objected, the better translation should be "effectively." Unless effective, protection is a misnomer, and the use of the word mischievous. There is, however, more to be read into this clause than meets the eye. The Kuhra and Saiyid Abdul Kadir are fully aware we shall not stay long in Hodeida, and clause 4 opens with this assumption. The protection they seek

is from the sea rather than by land, and this is what the sheikhs persistently told me (see paragraph 18 (3) above). These Arabs form a very strong combination of Shafai tribesmen, and would resent our prolonged occupation of Hodeida or the Tihama, by which alone our protection would be effective from the point of *forceful* measures against an Arab invasion by the Imam of Sana.

Clause 8 brings out still more clearly their love of independence and desire to be left unshackled and free from the constraint of any non-Moslem Power till such time as the Peace Treaty shall determine the exit of Turkey, when they will be free to determine a fixed form of Government conformable with the Arab genius. If they then elect a ruler from amongst themselves—such as Abu Hadi—or choose the Idrisi, or can come to some amicable settlement with the Imam, our hands are freed so far as this agreement goes. Again, our protection is contingent on their good behaviour, as per Major Meek's phraseology. We should be able to dissuade the Idrisi, our ally, from attacking them, and the Imam also. The Imam has passed his bond to Abdul Kadir and all the Kuhra sheikhs that if they release the mission he will grant them security (see Appendix (E)). If the Imam keeps faith and the Idrisi can be made to desist from poaching in the Tihama, there is no other enemy against whom our protection will be called in. Here, however, we are brought up against a serious difficulty, if Aden did urge the Idrisi intervention—contrary to the policy already settled on by His Majesty's Government.

In his telegram to Meek (No. 253 A.P., sent to me on the 22nd November, 1919) the Political Resident, Aden, did not approve of arming the Kuhra, as "the giving of arms is against the present settled policy of the Allies." He goes on to say: "You can assure them that we will protect their interests if attacked. The means must be left to us. We cannot always have aircraft available." By what means, then, was protection contemplated? By enlisting Idrisi's aid? No Arab would have accepted this bare assurance couched in abstract terms. I translated the abstract into the concrete. The only way to secure our release, had I not stepped in to modify Meek's programme, was to equip an expedition—a costly affair and inexpedient (see War Office wire of the 1st November, 1919, to the effect that they had put two aeroplanes in Kamaran for purposes of demonstration in Bajil, "as these may help towards release of the Jacob mission and save necessity of an expedition"). It is co-operation alone that has obviated a call to arms, and saved a great expenditure and an exposure of policy that the Allies would have mistrusted.

If the Imam is bent on violation of the Dala plateau and vicinity, things may become complicated, and we can then retaliate by taking up the cudgels for the Tihama folk and so prevent his access to the coast. This is the Imam's darling wish.

As regards paragraph 9 of the draft of the 5th December, this has been eliminated from the actual text of the signed agreement of the 12th December (Appendix (L) (1)). This modification was due entirely to "X's" exertions. Hodeida belongs by reversion to the Kuhra and Abus tribes and to none other. Our declared policy has been to abstain from aggrandisement in Arabia, and our manifestoes from the beginning of the war have consistently reiterated this policy. If "self-determination" means anything, Hodeida should be given to the two tribes above, and clause 9, to which Meek objected, was but a corollary to what preceded it.

It is surely no concern of ours, in that event, if Hodeida wanes as a commercial port, just as Mokha, Al Jah and Ghuleifika have already waned, owing to bad government.

The agreement carries with it no pecuniary liability devolving on His Majesty's government. The Kuhra sheikhs scorned the offer of a ransom, and their aims were purely political.

*Paragraph 30.*—There remains the question of the Imam. I have already, in paragraph 4, discussed the situation in the Tihama. There remains our protectorate and the Anglo-Turkish border of 1904, which, with the departure of the Turk, has ceased to exist. I cannot understand the attitude of the Imam in invading our protectorate at Dala unless he thought that the Tihama and Hodeida were lost to him. Having been humiliated here and realising that the detention of the mission was the cause, he may have launched out into this new sphere where for years he has sought aggrandisement. Dala was once an appendage of his ancestors, and Amir Nasr, our stipendiary, is chiefly to blame for having encouraged Turkish and Imamic friendship during the war. In 1915 Amir Nasr wrote to the Hijaili akils (within our protectorate) as follows: "The Islamic Government is our Government and our Caliphate. Whoever submits to this Government submits to God and His prophet; whoever rebels is an outcast." It will be recollected, however, that we were not in a position



to assist the Amir, who had solicited our aid, and for this reason pardon has now been extended to him, and he was in Aden when I left there just before Christmas.

*Paragraph 31.*—The Imam did all he could by diplomatic means to release my mission, and his attitude was consistently friendly, because doubtless he hoped for benefits to come after the Turks had evacuated the country. I append (Appendix (T)) a letter he wrote me offering his aid. I replied I had received orders from my Government to withdraw to Hodeida, and his best course was to refrain *now and hereafter* from aggression in the Tibama, as this would inevitably draw in the Idrisi. His friendly message to Saiyid Abdul Kadir and the Kuhra, above referred to (Appendix (E)) was inspired largely by my letter to him dated the 3rd November, 1919. On the 8th November, 1919, "X" had made up his mind to back the Kuhra akils unless Abdul Kadir gave way. A later letter of the Imam to me is Appendix (V). It indicates he is open to negotiations and calls on us to restrain the Idrisi. The Imam is surrounded by fanatical Saiyids, and it is just possible these have forced his hand on our protectorate border. This taking of the law into their own hands has often been exhibited by his wayward lieutenants on our north-east border.

On the 2nd December, 1919, the Imam wrote to his agent at Bajil: "I hope for the realisation of my aims after the entry of the mission in Hodeida." I was, however, hurried away from Hodeida on the 13th, and left negotiations in the hands of Major Meek.

*Paragraph 32.*—The Imam has recently written to the Political Resident, Aden, commenting on the return of his budget of letters sent to the Allied foreign Ministers, but he argued that our action would seem to imply that we had "squared" our Allies, and would do the best we could to satisfy his aspirations.

This interruption of our relations with the Imam calls for very delicate handling. He wants our friendship after the Turks go. His message to the Kuhra has been taken to prove his enmity to us. It is a mere ruse to effect our release, and the Kuhra saw in it a trick to swamp their country and paid no heed to it. The Imam said: "Let the mission go. After its arrival at Hodeida we will watch events. If Hodeida is not early evacuated, I will come down with a force and in conjunction with you will force the British out of the country."

I am strongly opposed to an expedition being sent against the Imam before exhausting every diplomatic means. He has certainly no business to have come within our protectorate, for he knows our policy to keep our protégés outside his future domains over Turkish-released tracts. The Imam has for years coveted the extension of his sway here and along our northern border, and, as I have said, the Governor-General of the Yemen was ever our friend in the past and checked his ambitions. I have been styled an "Imamophil." My advocacy, however, has nothing to do with personnel but with a principle. I have always foreseen Imam Yahya's potentialities. There was in 1905 a strong Turkish Arab party who plotted to give the Imam ascendancy over the entire Yemen, and even to support his claim to the Caliphate. When, before the war, the Turks were considering a retreat to the coast, they planned the surrender of the whole interior to the Imam. Imam Yahya has long nursed imperial ideas, and our policy should be to befriend him as far as circumstances permit. I am not pro-Imam to the exclusion of any other Arab potentate. Each ruler has his own legitimate sphere, and in the Yemen it has been the Government's policy to avoid contracts with a plethora of Arab rulers. Of two things I am sure:—

- (1.) That by exercising a consideratory policy towards the Shafais, Imam Yahya can in course of time acquire ascendancy over them, and they, in their turn, will acknowledge him as liege lord, as the Kuhras did in their earlier letters to me.
- (2.) These Shatai tribesmen will not stomach a Zeidi ruler, who would ride roughshod over their prejudices.

*Paragraph 33.*—I am a staunch believer in the Imam's future ascendancy, if he plays his cards well. His agent in Bajil told me that his master would treat with us, but he added significantly that "a scabbard cannot hold two swords," in other words the Imam would disapprove of any Power living in the Yemen. If we cross him, we may give a cue to the Shafais to resist him by joining our ranks. It would be a great pity to stir up religious feelings in this way. Again, our opposition to the Imam may stir up the Moslems of both sects against us. There exists such a thing as Turkish nationalist propaganda in the Yemen, and the Arabs may ascribe ulterior motives to our action, and make a combination against us throughout the country. This would be

disastrous both for the future and for our prestige as "the best friend of the Arabs." The Turks, despite their shortcomings, are Moslems, and the Yemen is very strongly pro-Islam.

*Paragraph 34.*—The Imam has never quite forgotten the dismissal without a hearing of his envoys from Aden in early 1919, and this because they brought letters to the representatives of France, Italy and the United States in Aden. As Chief Political Officer of the Aden Field Force I opposed this action of the General Officer Commanding and Political Resident, but was overruled. The Imam's idea was to get the best possible terms in the Yemen, and he thought this could be done by enlisting the sympathies of all our Allies. He wanted no treaties with any of these Powers. He recognised our predominating interests in the Yemen. Before my start from Cairo on this mission the Imam again wrote to High Commissioner, Egypt, enclosing a second batch of letters, in open covers, addressed to all the foreign Ministers. Quite recently the Imam has asked to see me, and I think he should be approached on our protectorate border. He will brook no interferences from outside, and will not admit Sherif Husein's claim to Arab suzerainty. He will not style Husein as King, and no Arab ruler will admit this title. Hence his wish, formulated through Italy, to be represented at the Peace Conference, distinct from the Hedjaz. He does not however love the Italians, as his many letters evidence. The Italians, on the other hand, have for years had their eye on this part. The Imam told King Husein quite recently that there were too many rulers arrogating to themselves the style of "Amir al Muminin." The Imam himself adopts this style!

Our own protectorate has always vacillated on the question of the Imam. I can prove by chapter and verse, after a close study of this region for many years, that our protégés are somewhat insincere in their remonstrances against Zeidi rule. Every Arab naturally likes to be independent, and he is, of course, keen to have direct relations with His Majesty's Government, because he can fill his pockets thereby and need pay no taxes. It is a mistake to imagine that religious prejudices are the *only* factor here. Ever since 1904, when I was Political Agent on the Dala plateau, I discounted this supposition. The Arabs of our protectorate are not famed for religion. You must call it "religiosity."

*Paragraph 35.*—There was a great scarcity in the country owing to our past blockade of the coast. I distributed some grain locally, but could not touch the distress in the whole countryside. The four Kuhra sheikhs objected to my charity on religious grounds! Supplies, however, should be pushed up now by Arab agency from Hodeida.

*Paragraph 36.*—I brought back with me to Cairo His Majesty the King's letter to the Imam, as it was impossible to deliver it in person. The Imam was expecting it and is still calling for it. I would recommend the letter be sent through our Aden protectorate by a trusty messenger. This will clear the air and reassure him of our friendly feelings.

*Paragraph 37.*—Statement of accounts will be found (Appendix (X)). I think it will be admitted that my political expenditure for four months, viz., rupees 26,887 : 4 : 9 is extraordinarily moderate and will compare favourably with moneys spent in Hodeida. It is usually supposed that the Arab is a money-grabber and cares for nothing else. This is not always true, and here in Bajil money was of secondary importance. Monetary grants to the sheikhs were in consequence very small.

*Paragraph 38.*—My chief helpers in Bajil, each in his own way, were "X," the Saiyid Abdul Kadir, Abu Hadi and the friendly Kuhra akils; also the Mansab of Kutai, Jamil Bey (kaimakam), Yusuf Hasau (mute-sarif), Mudabish (the merchant), Salami (the Imam's agent), "X's" aide-de-camp, Yahya Effendi (Abdul Hadi's clerk), Al Ara-hi (the Imam's envoy from Sana) and, latterly, Saiyid Mohamed Ahmed-al-Baghdadi.

Abu Hadi was particularly helpful to me throughout. I cannot speak too highly of this man, who is also a *persona grata* with the Imam. If he were hereafter elected as the ruler of this tribal conclave, Government would have a sincere and faithful friend, one ever ready to study British interests. His work deserves special recognition. He is a splendid type of an Arab gentleman, and is far ahead of any other Tibama sheikh in deportment and culture. "I am prepared to do anything," he said to me, "to help you out of this difficulty," and his work proved his sincerity.

*Paragraph 39.*—I owe very much to the personnel of my mission. Major Reilly, O.B.E., is a first-rate political officer of large experience in Aden affairs, and one who has served seven years in the residency. He is deservedly popular with all classes of Arabs. His work deserves higher recognition.

Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed, one of the political officers in Aden, was invaluable to me not only as the Moslem member of the party, but as my assistant and secretary.



He is a very able officer, hardworking and reliable. He was responsible for the political accounts of the mission. I trust he will be given a permanent appointment either in Mesopotamia, where he was before, or in another Arab country. He had to suffer numerous insults from the sheikhs because he had allied himself to a "Kafir" mission, but his temper was always unruffled.

Captain E. A. P. Brock, R.A.M.C., was the life and soul of the party, a very great political asset to me, and perhaps the most useful member of the mission. Assiduous in his duties by day and night, he became very popular with the sheikhs and tribesmen. His presence and cheerful humour did more than any other factor to popularise the mission and our Government.

Captain D. T. Richardson, M.C., R.A.M.C., was my transport officer. He has seen four years' service in the Aden Field Force, where he was considered a most efficient officer. He helped Brock in the medical work and was also my reconnaissance officer; also the organiser of the games which did so much to convert the populace of Bajil from foes to friends.

I attach a copy of a letter I wrote in Aden eulogising the services of the Aden Troop and the Supply and Transport Agent Abdul Ghafur (Appendix (X)).

Sheikh Abdallah-al-Mughira, a Nejd Arab, one of the pan-Arab party employed by General Sir John Maxwell of Cairo at the beginning of the war, has been often used by me, and was of great assistance during this trip as an informant on Turkish matters. He was a friend of "X," whom he had known in earlier days. He had been in this part of the country on a former occasion.

Paragraph 40.—One Mujaikar is at present languishing in the Imam's dungeon in Memkha. It was proposed by Egypt, or by Aden, to the Imam that he should liberate this man when it was supposed the Kuhra would release the mission. This gentleman is of no account. He was the head sheikh of the clan of which Mohamed Zaid is now successor. He is a bandit of the vilest reputation and was interned by the Turks at the instance of the Kuhra tribe, who do not want his release for he would upset the whole country. I do not understand why his name was mooted. It was a joke and much talked of in Bajil.

At the risk of prolixity I will rehearse as shortly as possible the chief points in my report:—

1. This was the first time since 1873 that any European had travelled by the Hodeida-Sana route unescorted by Turks. There was no reason to suspect treachery after the precautions taken. I have never before known Arabs to violate a written bond. Usually no bonds are given in the Yemen. An Arab's word has always been sufficient.

2. I went to Hodeida for the simple reason that the crux of the situation lay here. We knew the ground in our own hinterland and we knew the Arab mind there.

3. The Imam engaged to take me up, and his agent in Bajil had received a bond from the three Kuhra sheikhs for my safe-conduct. It was extremely diplomatic on the Imam's part in the circumstances to have kept his escort at Bajil. He was working along the line of least resistance. He is not, therefore, responsible for the *impasse*.

4. My entrance into a Turkish province to come to an understanding with a prospective Arab ruler was premature. The Turkish element might have proved nasty. On the contrary, "X" and his fellow-Turks did all in their power to extricate the mission. Full credit is due to "X."

5. I consider myself fortunate to have been detained in Bajil, where we learned more of the Shafai mind than was possible from a rapid tour through to Sana. Coming to the Tihama at the psychological moment of the Turks' expected exit, we have had a unique revelation of the Shafai mind that could not have been diagnosed while the Turks were in military occupation.

6. The Tihama Shafais are very strong for Islam and the Turkish Caliphate. Turkish propaganda has made great strides during the war in this Turkish Tihama. Here King Husein is regarded as a heretic and his son, Faisal, as a "Kafir." I befriended and used the Turks in Bajil, and they in return worked for my release. I adopted the idea of the temporary recall of Turkish troops to Hodeida as the best policy available to keep the Imam, Kuhra and Company pleased and to keep out the Idrisi. I was working with the fixed policy of His Majesty's Government, and not for my mere release. For this action I have been accused of dalliance with the Turk and of being under "X's" thumb. This slander is born of ignorance and bias. *Les chiens hurlent; la caravane passe.*

7. The delay in effecting our release was caused partly by my "marking time" to know the result of the Turkish proposition at Hodeida and partly by reason of an undercurrent of intrigue from the Idrisi. If the Idrisi was not an active thwarter of the mission's progress, an *agent provocateur*, he was certainly a *tertius gaudens*. I think he was both. I therefore deplore the telegram from Aden thanking him for his share in our release. Again, had my telegrams been answered our release would have been possible some two months earlier.

8. By co-operation alone was it possible to extricate the mission from Bajil. Whether I was an "envoy" or not was a factor outside the question. My co-operation was essential owing to the sheikhs' refusal to deal with Major Meek.

9. I was no close prisoner, but in direct touch with all the elements that really counted. The Kuhra sheikhs believed in my promise, which was based on Meek's formula of protection, and they personally conducted the mission, intact in every detail, to Hodeida.

10. The Kuhra, our captors, are the strongest and most influential Tihama tribe. Owing to their position between Hodeida and the hills they were largely utilised by the Turks. All work outside this tribe was doomed to failure.

11. I had early in the proceedings asked for aeroplanes on reconnaissance work. Later and many times over in my telegrams I discounted their use, unless in combination with a mobile column, for our release. Five days before the aeroplane came over Bajil I had warned the political officer to keep them away from us.

12. It is ill-advised to "ignore" influential parties who have already committed themselves to negotiations. You may perhaps ignore them, but you must not convert them to foes by tactless statements.

13. If Idrisi has since come to Bajil, in spite of Aden's earlier warnings to him to keep off, we shall be confronted by very grave difficulties. The Imam will accuse us of breach of faith, and the Idrisi will require a *quid pro quo*, if indeed he does not forcibly seize a tract which is not his to enter on. His domain lies to the north, where he has conundrums to solve with King Husein.

14. If the tribesmen in fear of the Imam have, as a *pis aller*, called in the Idrisi, we should have called the latter off. In this event, since the Idrisi was one of the certified persons against whom protection was sought, the agreement becomes null and void.

15. The agreement of the 12th December, 1919, is but temporary and does not commit His Majesty's Government at all seriously. It looks as if it were even now a dead letter. The Arabs did not believe in our prolonged stay in the country, and the protection they asked was mainly from without by sea. Hence their final acceptance of the alternative words "protection by diplomacy," when at first they had insisted on our forceful assistance only.

16. I submit we should even now eliminate the Idrisi from this region and give Hodeida to the tribesmen. They will elect their own ruler, and he will probably be our friend Abu Hadi. This would please the Imam, who would be free to deal with the Shafais by conciliatory measures. To use a vulgar phrase, he knows on which side his bread is buttered. Abu Hadi is a man of extraordinary tact and good breeding, and is very popular with the akils and the tribesmen of the Kuhra. His family is of ancient stock, and in old times, before the advent of the Turks, his house was most influential in the Tihama.

17. If the Yemen is made a fighting-ground for the Imam and the Idrisi, how shall we stand before the High Contracting Parties at the Peace Conference? What becomes of our prestige as the Power best cognisant of the country's needs? Knowing all this, I protested against the Idrisi's intrusion, which was, further, against the original policy of His Majesty's Government.

18. The Idrisi has many outlets in the Red Sea. The Imam has no outlet at all, and Hodeida is the natural port of Sana. Our intention was to bring down the Imam here by counsels of conciliation, and he would administer its affairs either in person or at first by proxy. It is better to agree with this powerful ruler while we are in the way with him, and to convert a potential foe into a fast friend. The late Sultan of Lahej, Sir Ahmed Fadl, a shrewd statesman, was ever asking the Aden Residency to come to terms with the Yemen's strong man, and Sir Ahmed had himself concluded a secret treaty with Imam Yahya.

19. It is impossible to deal with a host of Arab tribal chiefs. Our experience in our Aden protectorate has taught us this lesson. Here we have concluded numerous treaties with sultans and sheikhs amongst whom is no cohesion, nor to us any real benefits. All we have done is to keep others out. Had the Imam swallowed up the



majority of these tracts, our loss would have been negligible, and our monetary gain immense.

20. The Imam has been emasculated by the sojourn of the Turks in the Yemen since 1873, and he has still to find his feet. It is well to meet him half way, and this is the opinion of every thoughtful Arab in the country. The Shafai bloc is a reality, but I believe, *if left alone*, the Tihama and other "non-Zeidi" parties will eventually come to terms with the Imam of Sana.

21. The Imam is still calling for me, and I shall be very glad to meet him if His Majesty's Government approve. I am well known in the Yemen and my personality will tell. I feel sure that our several spheres can be decided amicably after an interview, and by a policy of give-and-take.

22. The moneys spent in Hodeida were of no avail in effecting our release, for the simple reason that the Kuhra wanted not money, but protection. The sums spent on other tribesmen to isolate the Kuhra served only to infuriate them.

23. I regret that this report contains so much of the personal element, but this is unavoidable. I was battling in a friendly way with my Arab captors and trying to carry out the fixed policy of His Majesty's Government. I was surprised, therefore, to find my action adversely criticised by those who were not in a position to judge, and insinuations made that were without foundation. This extra burden, more than any unpleasantnesses met with from Arab hands, aggravated the situation and accentuated my difficulties.

H. F. JACOB.

*Foreign Office, February 16, 1920.*

#### APPENDIX (A).

##### *Message from His Majesty the King to Imam Yahya.*

WE have not failed to interest ourselves in the question of your Excellency's rights of suzerainty in the Yemen, and it is with the object of full discussion of this important matter that we are sending Colonel Jacob to you as the envoy of His Majesty's Government.

It is not hidden from you that we have no intention of interfering in your internal affairs, but we are anxious to uphold and respect the rights and liberties of independent rulers of Arabia and to see them living in future in peace and happiness.

GEORGE, R.I.

#### APPENDIX (B).

##### *His Majesty's Special High Commissioner for Egypt to His Excellency the Imam Yahya bin-Muhammad.*

(After compliments.)

Be it known to your Excellency that Colonel Jacob, who has been many years in the Yemen, is being deputed to your Excellency as a special envoy of His Majesty's Government. He has been authorised to discuss with your Excellency matters of importance to yourself and your country. I therefore commend him to your care.

Rest assured that His Majesty's Government are desirous of seeing your Excellency established as the autonomous ruler of the Yemen and living in friendly relations with the other autonomous rulers—your friends and ours.

The question of boundaries also may be freely discussed. His Majesty's Government is anxious to know your claims, and will do its utmost to support the same; but your Excellency will readily realise that any authoritative settlement is not possible at this juncture.

It appears to His Majesty's Government that your Excellency's wisest policy is to conciliate the hearts of those who, during the Turkish occupation of the country, have become estranged from the rule of your enlightened ancestors. It is this rule which His Majesty's Government is anxious to resuscitate, provided it can be effected by diplomacy and goodwill. His Majesty's Government believes that the qualities of a just and broad-minded ruler will be found inherent in your Excellency.

Accept, then, my sincere and hearty compliments, together with my assurance that the prosperity of your country and its peoples is bound up in your Excellency's administration.

His Majesty's Government think it necessary, after free discussion with Colonel Jacob, that a convention be called of rulers, or their accredited representatives, where the question of respective boundaries may be definitely settled with the concurrence of all the parties.

I think this course will commend itself to your Excellency as the only one that promises finality.

(Compliments.)

#### APPENDIX (C).

##### *Note by Major-General Stewart, Political Resident, Aden, on Colonel Jacob's Telegram.*

I have decided to send this in original by post for the following reasons:—

1. The Eastern Telegraph Company have asked to send no more telegrams than absolutely necessary.
2. Owing to the block on telegraph lines it will not mean more than a few days' delay.
3. I wish to make a few remarks on the telegram itself.

I do not know to what telegrams Colonel Jacob is expecting a reply—possibly those regarding payments of considerable sums of money to Mahmud Nadhim. Colonel Jacob may be in close touch with the sheikhs, but I am of opinion that this proximity and the conditions cramp his vision. In any case, he has been told that negotiations are out of his hands. Yet I fear he still regards himself as our "envoy," and this point of view is likely to be shared by the sheikhs. I think it is a mistake for him to send telegrams, like the one under consideration, direct to the High Commissioner. I myself work entirely through our political officer in Hodeida (Major Meek), and have refrained from communicating direct with any of the mission. I welcome all views of Colonel Jacob and those with him, and am always very glad to receive his opinions and the opinions of Major Reilly, &c.; but I am anxious to disabuse the sheikhs, Mahmud Nadhim, &c., of any idea that their prisoner now exercises control.

Colonel Jacob says Government sent him prematurely to this country. I am not aware who originated the mission. Personally I was always in favour of opening communications with the Imam, but I held that the meeting should be in Hodeida. Colonel Jacob once told me there was no reason, political or religious, why the Imam should not come to Hodeida. However the mission originated, I understand that Colonel Jacob was advised, both in Aden and Hodeida, that it was not safe for him to proceed. Confident in his own influence with the Arabs, he decided to start.

He considers that nothing can extricate the mission except compliance in principle with the demands of their captors. There I differ. I fear that demands complied with will but breed fresh demands. We have no security that Arabs who have broken faith will not do so again.

He suggests, as an alternative, the employment of a strong composite and mobile force accompanied by aeroplanes. Looking to all the difficulties connected with the employment of such a force, I consider it must certainly be only a last resource. I am of opinion, too, that before such a force the mission will either be hurriedly retired or even meet with a worse fate. As regards the use of aeroplanes alone, their use so far has not been quite what we expected. It has, perhaps, created greater commotion and seemingly greater fear amongst the undisciplined tribesmen than was anticipated. I do not fear their immediate use again, and certainly never again where the mission actually are and where they may be subjected to the emotions of the moment. But I do think they may in time be advantageously re-employed.

What, in my opinion, should be our line is to convince the captors that they have nothing to gain and much to lose by retaining the mission, and that any harm done to any of the mission will react on them and their tribesmen for a prolonged period and blacken the name of Tihama Arabs for ever. I agree that this may take time, and I regret the prospect of delay. Like all others concerned, I am all anxiety to secure their early and safe release. As regards the Imam and Mahmud Nadhim, I think both are working entirely for their own interests, as they conceive them, and are using the mission as a pawn in their game.

[4370]

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We know that Mahmud Nadhim wants the return of the Turk and his own restitution to power. Out of the Yemen, Mahmud Nadhim has no position to hope for. The Imam is a more doubtful quantity. I think, personally, his policy throughout has been influenced by Mahmud Nadhim, and I feel confident that he is really antagonistic to us, but realises that he cannot stand alone either politically or financially. Yet we have always safeguarded his interests and accepted his far from benevolent neutrality.

If the sheikhs can elect a champion and if the Imam will accept him, I feel sure Government would gladly recognise the scheme, but I cannot agree that Mahmud Nadhim should have any hand in it. He has refused to obey the orders of his own Government and should receive no recognition whatever from us.

I am sending a copy of this note through Major Meek to Colonel Jacob.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Aden, December 3, 1919.

#### APPENDIX (C) (1).

*Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.*

*Bajil, Yemen, December 11, 1919.*

I expect we shall leave for Hodeida to-morrow. It has been a tedious job, and the delay is largely due to a lack of co-operation between the political officer, Hodeida, and myself.

It is idle for Aden to say I should not interfere. The Arab will trust no one but the man whom he sees. They became attached to me and my ways and have positively refused to treat except through me. Aden has failed to recognise this.

I have seen a copy of Aden Resident's notes (No. C-974 of the 3rd instant) on my telegram to your Excellency. It is necessary for me to remark here as follows:—

1. Your Excellency is aware of my reference to my being sent *prematurely* to this country.
2. I absolutely deny that I "was advised both in Aden and Hodeida that it was not safe for me to proceed."
3. I decided to start for the simple reason that I was under orders, and the road was declared safe.
4. I am a pawn in the hands of neither Imam nor Mahmud Nadim. They have self-interests to watch, but have both of them been working for our release.

I reserve further remarks for my full report later. It is a case of *les absents ont toujours tort*.

I am, &c.

H. F. JACOB.

#### APPENDIX (D).

*Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.*

(Through Political Resident, Aden.)

(No. A.)  
(Telegraphic.)

November 25.

I have received no replies to my telegrams. Am in closest touch with sheikhs and understand their attitude better than any other. Government have sent me *prematurely* to this country, and nothing can extricate us except either a compliance in principle with demands of our captors or, failing this, the employment of a strong composite and mobile force accompanied by aeroplanes. Mere intimidation by aircraft is not only useless but puts us in a predicament. Reference has been made to present settled policy of Allies, but there are no other means of protecting tribal interests as promised except by the grant to them of arms in measure. It is essential to abandon all reference to loss of dignity and unconditional surrender unless effective force as above mentioned is the alternative. Both Imam and "X" are working for our return to Hodeida but sheikhs oppose, as they seek our protection and require ocular proofs

before letting us go back. It is possible to give Hodeida to Idrisi as a condition of his aiding our release, but this will be a breach of faith with the Imam, alienating him from us and will lead to endless wars in the country. The sheikhs want candidature of one of the Holy House of Marawaa as their champion, and this scheme is acceptable for the time being to the Imam. I earnestly ask most careful consideration of my proposal, which will preclude involving us in military operations which will give occasion to Allies to blaspheme. I am very hopeful of being able, in conjunction with "X" (who in spite of his past indiscretions has wonderful influence in the country and over the mind of the Imam), and after our return to Hodeida, to bring about an understanding between the Imam and the sheikhs' champion, and of thus securing the quiet of the country and establishing the paramountcy of British influence in the Yemen. All missioners well.—JACOB.

#### APPENDIX (E).

*Telegram from the Imam to Saiyid Abdul Kadir (Agent at Bajil) and all the Chiefs and Sheikhs.*

Have received the Vali's telegram telling of the discussion in the affair of the mission, whose detention has caused anxiety. His Excellency has done well in explaining to you and to the British agent the decision for the return of the mission with honour to Hodeida. We did not wish them to return before their journey up to us, because we hoped that on reaching us we should have discussed what would have resulted for the good of Islam and Moslems; but events would have it thus! The Vali has arranged matters well; please then be expeditious so that he may return to me. Whatever suspicions anyone of us may have against the other, I have written this as a pledge of complete security to all the chiefs and sheikhs and all the people of the Kuhra upon oath, provided that the mission departs without molestation or delay and that there be a unity of the word in a manner pleasing to God and in conformity with His sharia. We pray God for His blessings on us and on all Moslems, both in this world and in the world to come.

*Dated 7 Rabi-ul-Awwal 1338 (the 1st December, 1919).*

#### APPENDIX (F).

*Translation of a Letter from the Idrisi to Saiyid Abdul Kadir-al-Ahdal.*

(After compliments.)

I have received your letter through our friend the B. Salad, who was accompanied by Saiyid Ahmed Khuzam, the son of our brotherly friend (N.B.—This is one of the Kuhra sheikhs who, as I have said, was the Idrisi's agent in Bajil). We have executed their affairs and they are now returning to you. We shall also instruct the military commander in the country of the Jorabiha to look after their interests. You have referred to the mission that you are in agreement with them, but the tribes have claims which the British, through whose fraud you are not secure, have not accepted. I had written you before explaining the situation, and then my cousin, Saiyid Mustafa, went to Lohaiya for the same purpose. In short, you are like others who have come to understand my policy towards the country which God has put in my charge, and how it has progressed and flourished. If you trust in God, His prophet, and in me, please release the mission with their arms and do not meddle with them in any way, especially in writing, because by your lack of experience of the world you may harm both yourself and the country. Listen therefore to my advice, which is for the good and maintenance of the Moslem country, and release the mission immediately, and be not afraid of anything because my armies, which are being concentrated in the Jorabiha country, will, after occupying J. Milhan and other places, proceed to Bait-al-Fakih, while a part of them will remain in Bajil; and if anything happens by way of sea or land, whatever befalls you will befall my troops also. (N.B.—The allusion to the sea is a hit at His Majesty's Government.) So leave it to me, for when I have put my hand to this affair you need not worry, and I will do



the necessary to safeguard your interests. Do not listen to intriguers and do not believe those who may say that I have worldly interests behind all this. Nothing remains after my advice but "red fire" and regrets when it is all too late. Give good advice to the tribes, and if they do not listen to it you had better come to us to arrange something to protect the village of Marawaa from harm, which we would avoid in that ancestral village. This should be considered sincere advice, the truth of which was understood by that father of us all, Saiyid Mohamed-bin-Yahya-al-Ahdal, Mansab of Munira, who has seen much of the world and is ripe with experience. He has already advised you what is good for you. Now the time is over, and the delay of the mission is very harmful, because in reality *Jacob and his staff are of no importance to England. In fact their Government would like their captivity to be prolonged, to make it an excuse for breaking their engagements with the Arab on the ground that the latter have broken their promises\* by capturing the mission and they will advance on your place, and thence to Sana, and take possession of it as they have done of Constantinople, Bagdad, Irak, Damascus, Jerusalem, &c. They will then rule over you as they like. The tribes at your place are ignorant men, and they who pretend in Bajil to be politicians and manage the correspondence according to their own ideas are very ignorant of the politics of these days. There is nothing more to explain, and may God guide everyone into the right path.*

*Dated 12 Rabi-ul-Awwal 1338 (the 5th December, 1919).*

#### APPENDIX (G).

##### *Letter to all the Kuhra Sheikhs.*

I write to inform you, oh friends, that a force of aeroplanes is now in Kamaran, and that I now require you to definitely declare your friendship to me and the great British Government.

2. Know, oh sheikhs, that you are responsible for the safety and the welfare of your people. If you make a false decision now you will be responsible for the destruction of all the villages of your land and for loss of life and suffering among your people. You will be responsible before God, as also your mansabs and the honourable sayyids.

3. You are already aware that I am prepared to discuss matters affecting your interests in Hodeida. I have invited you to come to Hodeida, and have offered you safe-conduct which still holds good. Do not forget that I am the representative of Government, and that it is your duty to come to me and not mine to go to you.

4. Let it not be hidden from you, oh sheikhs, that we are fully aware of all the circumstances of your arrest of this mission. We know that you were the agents of intrigue. This intrigue was not for your good, but against your interests. The person† who instigated you made you believe to be true things that were false. He made you believe that you would benefit yourselves and your people, when he had no care for you whatever, but sought only to gain advantage for himself. Even now he would lead you on to disaster, caring not what becomes of you in the execution of his foolish designs. Do not let yourselves be any longer led astray, but act for yourselves and do what you yourselves know to be correct, and you know now, oh sheikhs, that you can trust me and trust Government, whose only wish is your welfare. You have been advised by all the sayyids and by the merchants of Hodeida and by sheikhs that the action you have taken has been mistaken, and you have been advised that you can place your reliance on me. Take this advice now, oh my friends, quickly, before it is too late. I again offer you the hand of friendship if you release the mission immediately, and promise you full pardon, as we know that what you have done you have not done of your own accord, but at the wicked instigation of a self-seeker who seeks to ruin you. Come into Hodeida immediately and deliver up the mission, and you will be honourably received. If you do not comply you will be responsible for the punishment which will fall upon yourselves and your people.

5. It is the intention of the British Government to remain in Hodeida until arrangements have been made which will safeguard the interests of Hodeida and of the

\* This proves the treachery of the Kuhra in capturing us, and that their engagement to take us through was universally known.

† Refers to "X."

Shafai tribes in its vicinity. Government will not leave Hodeida and the Kuhra and Abus in the lurch, and will endeavour to effect a just settlement which will be equitable to all interests.

6. My last word to you is accept the friendship I offer you. Allow no more idle talk, and accept immediately my invitation to Hodeida, where we will discuss matters and make arrangements for your welfare and prosperity.

A. S. MEEK.

November 14, 1919.

#### APPENDIX (H).

##### *Major Meek to Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob.*

No. 9.)

Dear Colonel,

November 26, 1919.

The Kuhra deputation spent two hours with me yesterday, as on Saturday they had nothing to say for themselves or their friends. I began with Turkey, touched on past history, the war, present position; I spoke of our Arab policy generally and of the position here and our intention with respect to it. I referred to blockade, world and local. Then I went through the sheikhs' truculent letter sentence by sentence, showing its falsity and impropriety. I explained that arms could not be given. I contrasted the atmosphere of Bajil with that of Hodeida—the attitude of the importunate savage with knife in hand with that of quiet common sense and reason. They agreed with me on all points; said they had not understood the position of Turkey; admitted that the Kuhra were not fit to use or control a considerable supply of arms; that it was absurd to compare the Kuhra with important Arab rulers who had been furnished by Government with arms for particular reasons; that talk of "infidels" was nonsense; that they could rely on Government; that it was impossible to make over Hodeida to the tribes, and so on. They excused the sheikhs on the ground of their being mere savages and begged for patience. I dwelt at length on the position enlightened men, sayyids and others, occupy among the Arabs of these parts, of their responsibility as counsellors of the sheikhs and leaders of popular opinion, of my holding them to that responsibility. I stated that without making mention of names, I knew every actor in this play and the part he had played. I promised pardon and protection to the sheikhs in the event of immediate compliance with my demand for the return of the mission and undertook to give full opportunity for discussion in Hodeida. I gave warning that I would brook no more delay; that no Government but ours would have stayed their hand so long under such provocation; that we have done so because of the ignorance of these petty sheikhs and our desire to save the people from the evil which will fall on them in the event of punishment of the sheikhs. The *élite* of their miserable people, these individuals of the deputation, are poor specimens of men, and I learned that they left me "dumbfounded" and altogether at a loss as to what is to be their action now with the sheikhs. During their stay here—this is the fourth day—they have been well treated, but I arranged that they should be regularly bombarded by our Hodeida friends. On leaving me yesterday they asked for a meeting to-day with the chief men of Hodeida. The meeting was held and it discussed the position. Then all came to me, the deputation included and acting as partners with our friends, and presented me with a set of resolutions agreed to unanimously by them. The resolutions contain the points I lay down in my reply to the sheikhs, a copy of which I attach or will send hereafter.

I hope both Baghawi and Yehia Ali will soon lose their billets as sheikhs. The 'plane demonstrations have made great impression everywhere. The disturbances between the various factions in Bajil will no doubt cause you unpleasantness and anxiety, but I feel sanguine that your safety will not be endangered.

I have written the merchants and people of Bajil and Obal warning them that the action of the sheikhs may react to their detriment, and I have congratulated Omar Saghir on his good work.

Yours, &c.

A. S. MEEK.

Since writing the above your telegram re the flight above Bajil has arrived.\* I deemed it opportune to send a 'plane over Bajil and Obal yesterday. I had contemplated

\* Contrary to my advice given on the 21st November, 1919.



a straight flight, but it looks as if the 'plane were some time overhead. This effect has come to me as a great surprise and I am sorry you were placed in a position of danger. I am repeating your wire to Aden and await receipt of your telegram to Allenby.

Very kind wishes from us to all of you in Bajil.

A. S. MEEK.

November 27, 1919.

#### APPENDIX (J).

*Translation of an Arabic Letter sent to the Kuhra Sheikhs by hand of their Deputation to Hodeida.*

(The terms of the letter were agreed to by the deputation and representatives of Hodeida and accepted by the Political Officer. They were written down by Tahir Rajab on the lines of a draft by the Political Officer, which the meeting begged to have modified in the form shown.)

We have received your two emissaries in Hodeida and treated them with hospitality, honour and respect. We have had meetings with them on several occasions for the discussion of questions at-issue.

There are certain terms with regard to arms in your letter which we regard as impossible of acceptance either by the British Government or by the Allied Powers, who are now engaged in measures for the security and freedom of nations. For any reference on this subject would not be confined to your case, but would have to include other tribes which would come forward with similar requests. And you will readily appreciate the danger to security in this part of the Yemen which would result from such action. The best course you can take is to send in the mission to Hodeida and come with it yourselves, for you will find here everything that will please and pacify you. And we give you the following assurances:—

1. We offer you full pardon for your conduct in respect of the mission.
2. We give you permission, you and other tribes of the Hodeida district, to assemble at Hodeida for the discussion of the question of the appointment of a ruler acceptable to you. And we declare that the British Government will remain at Hodeida till this matter has been arranged in manner comfortable with the view of the people. And we undertake to refer your wishes to our Government that they may be considered in connection with those matters relating to the Yemen generally, which form part of the major considerations now receiving the attention of Great Britain and the Allies.
3. We undertake that the British Government will protect you from any aggression (which God forbid!) so long as you behave well and do not disturb the peace and act against the general welfare and Islam.
4. Trade in Yemen by sea and land will be secure and nothing will be done to impede its freedom.

We offer you the hand of friendship from which you will profit. Do not reject this offer from those whom you will find good friends and bad enemies.

A. S. MEEK.

November 27, 1919.

#### APPENDIX (K).

*Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob to Major Meek.*

(No. 27.)

Dear Meek,

Bajil, December 5, 1919.

I enclose the agreement which Abdul Kadir and the sheikhs wish me to sign and to which I have agreed. It is based on the terms sent by you, and in some parts embodies your actual words. The additions are, as I telegraphed to you this morning, logical expansions of what you proposed, and in no way alter the principles of the

agreement drawn up by you. I therefore agreed to them. My reasons for doing so at once were—

1. I considered it essential to strike while the iron was hot. There are undoubtedly forces here which are working counter to us, and which seize every opportunity for sowing suspicion and working for delay. I therefore did not wish to give any time for reconsideration, and decided to accept the amendments on my own responsibility.

2. The sheikhs insisted on having my signature to the document and said they would accept it.

3. I regarded the amendments as merely dotting your i's and crossing the t's of your draft.

I hope you agree to 3, but if you do not, I will take all responsibility on my shoulders with regard to the amendments.

The whole matter was going well until yesterday morning and I hoped to be out of Bajil to day, but yesterday it appeared that a hitch had occurred. Everyone was very reticent as to what the trouble was, but we heard reports from various sources that there was jealousy between the sheikhs and akils, the former accusing the latter of having received money from you to induce them to get us out by force and upset the sheikhs. Other explanations were also given, such as that an anonymous letter had come from Midi (possibly inspired by Enoch) telling the Cocks not to let us go. What the truth was I do not yet know, but to-day it appears that the saiyid wants your endorsement of the agreement as amended. Your telegraphic approval, for which I thank you, does not satisfy him, so I send the document itself to you for your assent and approval on behalf of Government. The saiyid is said to be much pleased with the agreement, but some evilly-disposed person (I suspect Ali Bari, who has just returned, and Ali Burra the merchant) is putting doubts into his mind as to our *bona fides*. "X" has worked hard for the agreement, and is much put out at the hitch that has occurred. "X" has acknowledged to me that he has been in the wrong in issuing propaganda since the armistice, and I believe he is now honestly working for our release.

I hope you can sign and return the document at once without reference to Aden or elsewhere. My principal fear about delay is that Abdul Kadir may try to improve the terms from his point of view by knocking out the temporary character of his rulership and trying to get us to recognise him at once as permanent ruler, an alteration which might lead to a deadlock, for Abu Hadi has aspirations for the permanent, but not the temporary headship.

Yours, &c.

H. F. JACOB.

#### APPENDIX (L).

*Text of an Agreement arrived at Bajil on the 3rd day of December, 1919, with the Kuhra Sheikhs.*

I, the undersigned, Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob, His Britannic Majesty's envoy, take oath in the name of God the Almighty, Jesus Christ, in whom all the Moslems believe, and on whom be peace, and also in the name of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, the British nation and Government, and on my honour, and make promise to fulfil the following conditions:—

1. That whereas I am fully aware that our detention in Bajil was based on misunderstanding and distrust of our purpose of forcibly subjecting them to the governance of someone they did not want, I consider their conduct excusable.

2. Therefore, owing to my knowledge of the truth of their excuse, I promise to them that they will not receive punishment or slightest harm at the hands of the British Government, now or hereafter on this account.

3. That whereas Bajil Kaza generally and the Absiyah and Zaranik tribes have elected, with their free consent and will, the candidature of Saiyid Abdul Kadir to be their absolute ruler, I therefore engage to the said Saiyid and the aforementioned sheikhs and those associated with them, that the Great British Government will restrain absolutely both Imam Yahya and Saiyid Muhammad-el-Idrisi from interference with the Kuhras and the above-mentioned tribes by necessary means, either diplomatic or by force, so

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long as they, the aforesaid tribes, continue to behave well, and do not disturb the peace nor act against the general welfare of Islam and dictates of humanity.

4. During the continuation of our occupation of Hodeida, our Government engages to safeguard the trade of the Yemen, export and import, to grant all postal facilities by sea to all outside places and safety to all the people of the Yemen who may want to enter Hodeida or go out of it, and they will also not be subjected to any let or hindrance.

5. That pardon will be extended to all tribesmen who, since our occupation of Hodeida, have committed crimes in Hodeida involving loss of life or property, and our acts are also condoned. Also that no one will be taken to task at all by our Government, and I therefore engage the release of all prisoners, Kuhra, Absiyah or Zaranik, now confined in Hodeida, Aden or other places in British territory.

6. Since the sheikhs have engaged to conduct us with our men, animals and property to Hodeida in safety and with due respect, and leave to me the question of their honourable treatment after arrival at Hodeida, I accept the fact.

7. The people of the Yemen will be free to travel by land or sea, wherever they wish to go, both now before the conclusion of Peace Treaty or after.

8. Whereas the people of the country do not want to be associated with any Government, and insist on remaining under the control of the Sublime Turkish Government, they will remain as stated in paragraph 3 above, and will manage their affairs through the medium of their Ruler-Elect, the aforementioned Saiyid Abdul Kadir, without our intervention or that of any other party till the conclusion of Peace Treaty with the Turkish Government, when they will be free either to continue in their present condition or come under the protection of anyone they choose.

9. Whereas the land in Hodeida is the property of the Kuhra and Absiyah, who are under the authority of the Mansab of Marawaa, Saiyid Abdul Kadir-al-Ahdal, and if in this circumstance the Kaza of Bajil, Absiyah and Zaranik require funds for the management and conduct of their Government, the said Saiyid Abdul Kadir-al-Ahdal is empowered to establish customs in Hodeida, if he so wishes, personally or through some agency, without objection from us or any other, provided no levies are laid on articles, necessities and all that appertains to the want of the Army of Occupation in Hodeida, and also that the Customs Officer will be under the supervision and protection of the Military Commander of the Army of Occupation in Hodeida.

H. F. JACOB, Lieutenant-Colonel,  
His Britannic Majesty's Envoy.

Dated Bajil, the 3rd December, 1919.

Witnesses:

REILLY, Major.

NASIRUDDIN AHMED, Captain.

#### APPENDIX (L).

*Translation of Rider to Arabic Agreement, dated November 12, 1919.*

We, the sheikhs, on our part and on behalf of our associates, the Absiyi and the Zaranik, have already chosen the Honourable Saiyid Ak-al-Ahdal, the Mansab of Murawaa as the present and absolute ruler over us, with our free-will and consent, and have accepted this agreement as between us and the Envoy of His Majesty the King of England, namely, his Honour Colonel Jacob, on whose integrity we have placed our entire reliance; and we do rely on his promise, and on that of none other.

#### APPENDIX (M).

*Explanatory Note on the Enclosed Agreement.*

1. The main sin of the Kuhra sheikhs is the desire to be independent. For this reason they detained the mission which they believed was bent on transferring their country to the Imam.

2. The sheikhs are very pleased with Major Meek's declaration, but prefer that the

same should be put forward by one whom they know. This is a common trait of the Arab, and is no slight factor in the delay of operations after the arrival of Major Meek.

3. This engagement is only temporary and is dependent on the will of the country after the Peace Treaty passes its fiat on the Turks of the Yemen.

4. Therefore it is immaterial whether Abdul Kadir be elected now or after our return to Hodeida, provided we are sure of the general desire to-day of the tribesmen for his personality. The house of Al-Ahdal is famous throughout the Tihama and its influence extends north to territories claimed by the Idrisi.

5. After the declaration of the Peace Conference, the tribesmen will finally elect their future ruler. They will have, they admit, to choose between the present Saiyid or one of his house, the Imam, the Idrisi, one of their own sheikhs or ourselves.

6. For this reason they wish to retain our military garrison until affairs are more or less settled. They further want us to stay because our presence will be able to regulate trade by sea, to which they attach great importance.

7. The promise to return prisoners is, I know, beyond my province, but seems a natural sequence of the forgiveness which has already been extended to the marauding tribesmen by Major Meek.

8. I have taken on myself the responsibility of modifying Major Meek's terms, without, I believe, materially altering their proviso. This I have done because I know that Government expect that I be consulted as far as possible on important matters and also because I am aware of the daily telegrams passing between the Imam and his officials in Bajil. I know the Imam's eagerness to effect our release, which will reopen negotiations between himself and us. The longer we stay here, the nearer the probability of Idrisi intervention and the embroiling of the country in civil war, which would upset our calculations based on our endeavours to keep both the Idrisi and the Imam outside this arena until matters have arrived at a satisfactory conclusion.

9. I have, therefore, taken upon myself the full responsibility for the course I have adopted.

#### APPENDIX (N).

*Major Meek to Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob.*

(No. 21.)

Dear Colonel,

*Hodeida, December 6, 1919.*

YOUR letter No. 27 of the 5th December was a great blow to me. It would have been preferable had you continued to refrain from participation in negotiations. The sheikhs had my reply through their deputation to me, and it was accepted in manner made satisfactory by aeroplane demonstration. You have now cloaked it in meaning it did not convey and fallen again a victim to Nathim's intrigue, giving it fresh life and setting back the hands of our clock and the date of your release indefinitely. The whole spirit of my position has been (1) that the mission must be released first and discussion take place afterwards, and (2) that Bajil intrigue shall not decide the fate of Hodeida and the neighbouring tribal area. In amending my terms to the sheikhs you have not had regard to this fact, you have departed entirely from its intentions, and have thrown yourself unreservedly into the arms of Nathim and Abdul Kadir. You say Nathim has worked hard for the agreement. It is his own work entirely, and any difficulties he overcame were not overcome as an agent of British policy. Let me mention here that the anonymous letter from Midi is probably the signed letter from Mustafa conveying a serious warning to Abdul Kadir and suppressed by him.

I cannot sign this document. I would accept all but clause 9, in spite of the falsehood in the implication that the agreement represents the free-will of the Kuhra, Abus and Zaranik tribes, in spite of the word "absolutely" in clause 3, and in spite of the reference to Turkey in clause 8. Clause 9 is utterly impossible, so much so that it is of no purpose to discuss it. In my letter No. 19 to you, showing what I had said to the Kuhra deputation here, I made specific mention of the impossibility of handing over Hodeida to the tribes, and it is to ensure a solution just to Hodeida itself that we have declared our intention to remain in Hodeida after your release, the protection of the Kuhra having been a second thought and a secondary consideration.

It seems the act of a bully that I should use harsh language to you in your present position, but I warned you fully long ago and repeatedly of your having been duped, and I tell you again that you have allowed Nathim to mould you to his evil will, upset all my plans and deferred your own release. If you can get out on this agreement



at once, good and well. If not, I require that you take no part whatever in negotiations, except in so far as I may specifically request of you. On your advice I wired Abdul Kadir and the sheikhs that I would accept your agreement with them, but fortunately Abdul Kadir pressed me for more explicit reply, which I gave him, and which is in keeping with my true position. How I shall now proceed is matter for further thought.

Yours sincerely,  
A. S. MEEK.

#### APPENDIX (O).

*Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob to Major Meek.*

(No. 28.)

Dear Meek,

*Bajil, December 7, 1919.*

Your No. 21 of the 6th instant and two accompaniments received. I should display a lack of dignity were I to reply to you in the terms of your letter. I will make my own defence hereafter to my chief. Let me say, however, your remarks re "X" and Abdul Kadir are too puerile for words. Crediting yourself with common-sense, you deny this quality to me.

I have already given you my reasons for "butting" in, quite unwillingly, in this matter. A little co-operation between you and me, and we should have got out ere this.

It is inevitable that in the terms for our release you should have touched on questions of the future of the country, and on this point I am probably as competent as you to pass an opinion, and you cannot expect me necessarily to accept your opinions at their face value.

As to your remarks about Hodeida, I care little what you and the Kuhra sheikhs' agent may have agreed upon as to the sheikhs' inability to rule there. I see no Government decision on this score. If one exists, your business it was to tell me. Before the return of General Stewart, his predecessor treated me shabbily by corresponding on the future policy in the Yemen without informing me, who was, and still am, the Government's accredited officer, of the proposed change; and this in spite of the fact that the dictates of courtesy required me to keep the Resident informed of my views and of what was passing.

As to "our declared intention to remain in Hodeida after your release" (I quote yours under reference), your letter to sheikhs by hands of their envoys confirms my former belief that our stay in Hodeida was only temporary, and my acceptance of clause 9 of the agreement is a logical corollary of the Government of the Saiyid, which is admittedly only temporary till the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. You say to the sheikhs: "We give you permission, you and the other tribes of the Hodeida district," &c. Precisely; and it is because these tribes have interest in the town that the solution of its occupation so closely affects their interests. You beg the question when you apparently suggest that Hodeida be treated as a separate *enclave* outside the tribes' ken. In other words, I am asked to accept your *ipse dixit* as gospel! If in your letter to sheikhs you meant to exclude Hodeida from their possession now or hereafter, you have certainly misled them; for the wording of your letter gives them to suppose that the views of the people would be asked in this matter also. Other than the tribes mentioned, I know of no Arab candidates for Hodeida unless Idrisi is one, but he, from what I have seen of your messages to me and elsewhere, has been definitely excluded. There remains the Imam. If you will read my wires to Egypt and Foreign Office, you will see my reasons for excluding the Imam both now and in the near future from any ability to enforce his claims there. The proposed agreement, however, was purposely made temporary, and the use by him of wise diplomacy, even if it failed in bringing under his nominal suzerainty the Shafai element, would, in any case, have excluded his rival's entrance. Again, the candidature of the Saiyid has been actually approved by the Imam, and for the above reason.

I do not think you have grasped the reason for which I was sent to the Yemen, nor that my efforts to secure the Imam's formal recognition of this temporary shift will be renewed after my release; for this reason I think that when you recently sent two letters to the Imam it would have been well for you to disclose to me their contents. They may have contained nothing important. I contend for a principle.

As to clause 8, I knew you would scent the hand of "X." Do you think that I failed to see his hand myself? The fact remains that the Yemen technically still

belongs to Turkey, so that the inclusion of these words is explicable, even if it proves irritating to you personally.

I cannot understand your objection to word "absolutely" in clause 3. I took care to insert the saving clause "either diplomatic or." This was omitted in the original Arabic draft. In other words, I amplified your promise to sheikhs and gave Government a loophole to escape from the use of force only, and got the sheikhs to agree to the use by us of diplomacy, which they never contemplated nor desired.

You say that the protection of the Kuhras is only a "secondary consideration." I should be sorry to be a party to a promise that was only half a promise, or not seriously meant, or not even properly considered in advance. Better give no promise at all.

When I mentioned the receipt of an anonymous letter from Midi I meant what I said, and I know its contents. Many other and genuine letters have been received from that direction.

I take it from your letter received to-day that, in spite of the agreement being considered a poor one, you are ready to ratify it after the exclusion of clause 9. I have put the matter before the Saiyid and sheikhs, and I believe it is coming up for discussion to-night. If they agree, and I get this in writing, I trust you will close with the agreement as it then stands. It is the best possible one in the peculiar circumstances of the case, as explained to you in my last letter.

Yours sincerely,  
H. F. JACOB.

#### APPENDIX (P).

*Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob to Major Meek.*

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

*December 5, 1919.*

Sheikhs have accepted your proposal for our release, but have desired me to corroborate the same over my signature. This I have done with slight alterations inserted by them, and these are logical amplifications of your text. The principal modifications are as follows: Firstly, Saiyid Abdul Kadir is chosen at once with approval of all tribes concerned to be their temporary ruler until the signing of Peace Treaty with "Turkey," when a permanent ruler is to be freely chosen by the tribes; secondly, the general amnesty is stipulated to include release of Arab prisoners taken in attacks on Hodeida since our occupation of town. These stipulations are in conformity with the principles of settlement laid down by you, and I have therefore taken on myself the full responsibility of agreeing to them. The Saiyid and sheikhs now want a message from you confirming the agreement thus amended, and endorsing my action in signing it. I hope you will do this at once, as any delay affording opportunity for further discussion or reconsideration is undesirable, and the receipt of this message from you is all that is now required to effect our release. If you so desire, I will send you original draft by special messenger for your approval and signature.—JACOB.

#### APPENDIX (Q).

(No. 14.)

Colonel Jacob,

*Hodeida, December 30, 1919.*

Your telegram of the 26th. I agree generally to modifications in keeping with general tenor of my terms to sheikhs. I agree also to release of Arab prisoners.

MEEK.

#### APPENDIX (R).

*Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob to Major Meek.*

(Telegraphic.)

*December 11, 1919.*

Thanks for your telegram re Kasara. Expect to arrive Hodeida with mission on Saturday morning. Agreement concluded minus clause 9.\*—JACOB.

\* Meek had said that if I could get out on the agreement barring clause 9 he would accept it in the circumstances, though he did not like the agreement on the whole.



## APPENDIX (S).

Major Meek to Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob.

(No. 16.)

Colonel Jacob,

Hodeida, December 11, 1919.

We await your arrival and shall give you a very cordial welcome. I am not informing Aden till you arrive. All good luck to you all and *bon voyage!*

MEEK.

[N.B.—Meek knew, therefore, that I had signed the agreement.]

## APPENDIX (T).

Translation of a Letter dated 12th Zil Hajja, 1337 (September 7, 1919) from the Imam Yahya to Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob.

(After Compliments.)

I have heard of your being detained in Bajil. Had such an eventuality occurred to me as possible, I would have made a befitting arrangement and increased my endeavours to ensure your safety when I got news from the Resident of Aden of your coming up. I had resolved to send his Highness the Governor to meet you, as you are already aware. When I heard of your detention at Bajil, I determined to act in a purely diplomatic manner and did all I could to check this piece of trickery. I have already ordered certain expedients by which I think I can expedite your progress if God wills. At the same time I address your honour to elicit from you what you deem advisable should your progress become impossible. Would you like me to send a force to Bajil to conduct you, or what other expedient can you devise? I am sending this letter by a messenger on whom I have impressed the necessity of speedy return.

Please detail to me clearly what your views are.

Greetings and compliments from me to all your companions.

I ask God to give success to you and to myself.

## APPENDIX (V).

Translation of a Letter from Imam Yahya to Colonel Jacob

(After compliments.)

I received your letter of the 9th Safar, 1338 (2nd November, 1919) which, though it came late, has given me the good news of your health and safety. I have been much annoyed with your delay, and I treated the matter with patience and leniency to avoid bloodshed and to comply with your wishes and the advice of the Vali of Aden and others. I hope everything will turn out for the best, and that those who caused your detention will be led to the right path. We have to wait, however, till you go back to Hodeida, and we will postpone taking any measures against those evil-doers while awaiting the good results, and because we love leniency and justice. I am thinking of the Idrisi's movements, which are contrary to the counsels of the British Government and against your recommendations of peace and tranquillity. I cannot understand if he has broken the relations existing between himself and the British Government, or if he has gone astray and neglects their good counsels. I hope you will send me the answer to this from Hodeida on your arrival there, as the Vali Mahmud Nadim Bey informs me that facilities are being made for your return to Hodeida as per your Government's instructions. I think that you are now in full knowledge of the situation and of all the movements and the movers thereof,\* which are contrary to the intentions of all. May God be with us all!

Dated 4 Rabi-ul-Awwal, 1338 (27th November, 1919).

## APPENDIX (W).

Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob to the First Assistant Resident, Aden.

I enclose a statement of accounts aggregating rupees 42,255 : 13 : 9 only, of which rupees 28,077 : 4 : 9 are debit to political funds, and the rest are advances

\* Alludes to the Idrisi.

recoverable from various officers and Departments. The officers have been asked to adjust their accounts as early as possible, and I would request you to ask the Supply and Transport Department to do the same. Item 9 refers to your office, and item 10 represents a sum of 100 dollars left by me in deposit with Political Officer, Hodeida, in August last for payment to camelmen. This he did not do, and I had to pay it to them in Bajil. Political Officer, Hodeida, may therefore be called upon to refund this sum into the Treasury. I regret to say that the time at my disposal being very short, it was not possible for me to have all advances recovered and adjusted in time.

2. Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed has been directed to hand you over certain articles of Toshakhana, purchased in Aden for presents to sheikhs. Their value, 1,190 rupees, may kindly be taken off the total expenditure incurred by me and debited to the Residency grant. This will reduce my political expenditure to rupees 26,887 : 4 : 9.

H. F. JACOB.

Aden, December 18, 1919.

AMOUNTS drawn from the Civil Treasury at Aden for the Jacob Mission, for which an Account has to be rendered.

				Rs.	a.	p.
July	25, 1919.	6,000 dollars purchased at 219 rupees per 100 dollars	..	13,140	0	0
"	28, "	Advance for mission expenses	..	1,000	0	0
"	29, "	"	..	15,000	0	0
"	31, "	"	..	445	0	0
August	1, "	"	..	630	0	0
"	5, "	"	..	19,000	0	0
September	18, "	"	..	6,645	0	0
October	10, "	"	..	190	0	0
November	4, "	"	..	115	0	0
"	11, "	"	..	2,250	0	0
"	6, "	"	..	268	11	0
"	7, "	"	..	431	8	0
"	11, "	"	..	29	0	0
"	17, "	"	..	4,420	0	0
"	21, "	"	..	434	13	0
December	13, "	Received from the Political Officer, Hodeida, 1,420 dollars at 225 rupees per 100 dollars	..	3,195	0	0
Total ..				67,194	0	0
Deduct amount refunded to the Treasury ..				2,000	10	0
Balance to be accounted for ..				65,193	6	0

## Debits.

				Rs.	a.	p.
Political expenditure as per statement enclosed	..	..	..	28,077	4	9
Advanced to the Supply and Transport Department	..	..	..	8,883	1	0
" " Colonel Jacob	..	..	..	81	8	0
" " Captain D. T. Richardson, R.A.M.C.	..	..	..	73	4	0
" " Captain E. A. Brock, R.A.M.C.	..	..	..	55	0	0
" " Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed	..	..	..	168	3	6
" " M. Muhammad Abdul Ghafar, Supply and Transport agent	..	..	..	88	6	6
" " Aden troop	..	..	..	1,656	0	0
" " Residency, Aden, on account of camp furniture	..	..	..	42	0	0
" " Political Officer, Hodeida, on account of camel hire	..	..	..	225	0	0
" " mission mess	..	..	..	2,906	2	0
Total	..	..	..	42,255	13	9
Closing balance	..	..	..	22,937	8	3
Grand Total	..	..	..	65,193	6	0

			Rs.	a.	p.
Gold (1,500L.)	..	..	22,500	0	0
Cheque	..	..	124	4	0
Dollars (74)	..	..	166	8	0
Cash	..	..	146	12	3

Total .. 22,937 8 3

H. F. JACOB, Lieutenant Colonel.



## STATEMENT of Expenditure incurred for Political Purposes and Secret Service by the Jacob Mission, from August 19, 1919.

			£	Dollars.	Rs.	a.	p.
August 20, 1919.	Coolies and hammals at Hodeida	..	—	—	50	0	0
	Keeper of the coffee-house, Tanam	..	—	15	—	—	—
" 22, "	Secret service at Bajil	..	—	7	—	—	—
	Coolies at Bajil	..	—	12	—	—	—
	Wages of guides	..	—	5	—	—	—
	Wages of Zeidi guards	..	—	12	—	—	—
" 24, "	Secret service	..	—	25	—	—	—
	Zeidi guard	..	—	8	—	—	—
	Messenger	..	—	1	—	—	—
" 25, "	Zeidi guard	..	—	12	—	—	—
	Water-carriers and coolies	..	—	7	—	—	—
	Grain for the poor	..	—	60	—	—	—
	Secret service	..	—	2	—	—	—
" 26, "	Zeidi guard and guard for kit from Obal back to Bajil	..	—	32	—	—	—
" 27, "	Zeidi guard	..	—	12	—	—	—
	Coolies and bishtis	..	—	4½	—	—	—
	Sheikh Ismail Baghwi for guards and guides from Hodeida to Bajil	..	—	50	—	—	—
	Secret service	..	—	5	—	—	—
	Sheikh Abdul Kadir through Abu Hadi	..	—	100	—	—	—
	Muhammad Shah, for expenses at Obal	..	—	20	—	—	—
	Secret service	..	—	3	—	—	—
" 31, "	"	..	—	25	—	—	—
	Zeidi guards	..	—	52	—	—	—
	Water-carriers	..	—	3	—	—	—
	Rent of huts for Aden troopers	..	—	8	—	—	—
September 5, "	Paid to the Kazi and Imam of Bajil	..	—	49	—	—	—
	Paid to guards and others on Eid day	..	—	142	—	—	—
	Secret service	..	—	54	—	—	—
" 12, "	"	..	—	61	—	—	—
	Wages of water-carriers for officers, men and animals	..	—	20	—	—	—
	Zeidi and other guards	..	—	175	—	—	—
	Rent of huts for men	..	—	10	—	—	—
" 20, "	" muleteers	..	—	8	—	—	—
	Water-carriers	..	—	11	—	—	—
	Guards, Zeidi and others	..	—	69	—	—	—
	Secret service	..	—	17	—	—	—
" 30, "	"	..	—	23	—	—	—
	Guards, Zeidi and others	..	—	67	—	—	—
	Water-carriers	..	—	13	—	—	—
	Rent of huts and a house	..	—	12	—	—	—
October 1, "	Khura sheikhs for political purposes	..	—	2,690	—	—	—
" 16, "	Sheikh Abu Hadi, for his bill on account of messengers and guards	..	—	361	—	—	—
	Secret service	..	—	45½	—	—	—
	Personal guards	..	—	15	—	—	—
	Water-carriers	..	—	14	—	—	—
	House rent	..	—	23	—	—	—
" 31, "	"	..	—	19	—	—	—
	Water-carriers	..	—	25	—	—	—
	Personal guards	..	—	15	—	—	—
	Secret service	..	—	117½	—	—	—
November 26, "	Reward to personal guard for services rendered on the day of aeroplane flight	..	—	60	—	—	—
" 30, "	Paid to the poor as charity	..	—	8	—	—	—
	Water-carriers	..	—	41	—	—	—
	Secret service	..	—	277½	—	—	—
	House rent	..	—	36	—	—	—
	Personal guards	..	—	30	—	—	—
December 12, "	Secret service	..	—	1,028	95	0	0
	Sheikh El Mashaikh Abu Hadi	..	500	—	—	—	—
	Water-carriers	..	—	41	—	—	—
	House rent and guards	..	—	24	—	—	—
" 13, "	Paid Sheikh Abu Hadi on account of his bill for guards, messengers and entertainment of akils.	..	—	720	—	—	—
	Coffee-house keeper at Tanam and two sayids	..	—	26	—	—	—
	Hire of camels from Hodeida to Obal back to Bajil; also detention of camels at Hodeida in August, and Bajil in August and September	..	—	921½	—	—	—
	Hire of camels for the return journey, Bajil to Hodeida.	..	—	206	—	—	—
	Cost of kimkhab, pieces of cloth and other presents purchased in Aden on 19th August for the Imam and sheikhs in the Yemen	..	—	—	2,044	13	0
	Carried forward	..	500	7,946½	2,189	13	0

	£	Dollars.	Rs.	a.	p.
Brought forward ..	500	7,946½	2,189	13	0
December 13, 1919. (cont.)					
Other expenses incurred in connection with the mission	—	—	435	15	0
Pay of Sheikh Abdulla Mugheira from 15th July to 15th December, 1919, at 100 rupees per mensem	—	—	500	0	0
Total ..	500	7,946½	3,125	12	0
Equivalent in rupees ..	7,500	17,451 8 9	3,125	12	0
Total in rupees (only) ..	..	28,077 4 9			

H. F. JACOB, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Aden, December 18, 1919.

## APPENDIX (X).

Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob to Major C. C. J. Barrett, C.I.E., First Assistant Resident, Aden.

Sir, Aden, December 17, 1919.

I have the honour to make the following remarks, which I would ask you to forward to the Political Resident and General Officer Commanding, Aden.

2. There were attached to me as an escort to the treasure and Government stores that accompanied my mission two dafedars and twenty-two troopers of the Aden troop, under the command of Risaldar-Major Malikdad Khan, Khan Bahadur and Sirdar Bahadur.

I cannot too highly eulogise the conduct of the troop during our enforced detention in Bajil. Although at first the people were fanatical and hostile, the troop disarmed and put to very great humiliation, the men never once complained but were cheery throughout, and finally became very popular in the village. It were invidious to single out individuals, but I must make special mention of (1) the Risaldar-Major who, in addition to his tact and presence of mind, did very good intelligence work; (2) dafedar Muhammad Shah, whose tact and ready resource prevented a disaster and bloodshed both at Ubal itself and on the return journey from that place to Bajil. The Arabs of Ubal opened fire and tried to loot this advance convoy, but Muhammad Shah was able, by playing off one Arab leader against another, to conduct the party in safety to Bajil with a minimum of goods missing. \*Both the dafedars were cheery optimists and set an excellent example to the troopers during a very trying time.

3. There is another name I would like to mention, that of Mr. Muhammad Abdul Ghafur, the supply and transport agent attached to the mission. Amongst a horde of grasping sheikhs who occasionally threatened him with death because he refused to comply with their demands for excess charges for supplies and camel-convoys, Abdul Ghafur maintained a wonderful nonchalance and performed his very arduous duties to my entire satisfaction. He is worthy of advancement, and I consider him very capable and hard-working.

I have, &c  
H. F. JACOB.

Head of the Political Mission.

[E 384/289/44]

No. 71.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 148.)

(Telegraphic. R.

Constantinople, February 19, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 27 of 10th January.

Note has been drafted for presentation to Porte, and a decree for publication in press providing for creation of an Inter-Allied Court of Civil and Commercial jurisdiction, with participation of Turkish judges if Turkish Government consents to appoint them, and without if it refuses. Question arises in whose name this Court is to give

\* Dafedar Nawab Ali.

[4370]



judgment. If Turks participate judgments would naturally be given in name of Sultan. If Turks hold aloof it seems necessary that judgments should be in names of heads of three Allied Governments. Can decisions of this point be taken in agreement with French and Italian Governments and communicated to me as soon as possible? My colleagues are telegraphing to their Governments in same sense.

[E 376/1/58]

No. 72.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis).*

(No. 89. Confidential.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, February 20, 1920.*

CABINET have decided that evacuation of Batoum shall proceed no further pending the decision on a proposal that a joint Allied force should hold the port until its future destination has been decided by the Peace Conference.

Please repeat to Tehran and Constantinople.

[E 382/166/44]

No. 73

*Memoranda on proposed Treaty with the Imam Yahya.—(Received February 21.)*

[See Summary of Events leading up to the despatch of a Mission under Colonel Jacob to the Imam of Sanaa: No. 45, *supra*.]

*Foreign Office Note.*

BEFORE discussing the proposed treaty clause by clause, it is necessary to consider our future policy in this part of the world as a whole. From Mr. Balfour's despatch No. 675 of the 6th May it appears that the position for which our delegation is working is that, while His Majesty's Government will not actually have a mandate for Arabia, they will be recognised as having special political interests in the Arabian peninsula and in certain islands. Other Powers will seek neither political influence nor territorial aggrandisement for themselves, and will respect treaties of a tracial nature which have been, or may be, entered into by His Majesty's Government with the chiefs whose territories lie within certain areas.

It is not quite clear what the term "treaties of a tracial nature" is intended to cover. The original tracial treaties in the Persian Gulf culminated in 1853 in the Treaty of Perpetual Peace, under which it was provided—

- (a.) That there should be a complete cessation of hostilities at sea between the subjects of the signatory chiefs and "a perfect maritime peace for evermore."
- (b.) That in the event of aggressions on anyone by sea the injured parties should not retaliate, but should refer the matter to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf.
- (c.) That the British Government should watch over the peace of the Gulf, and ensure at all times the observance of the treaty.

Out of the relations thus created, as Lord Curzon pointed out in his speech to the Tracial Chiefs of the Arab coast at Shargah in 1903, political ties grew up between them and the Government of India whereby the British Government became their overlords and protectors, and they bound themselves not to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any other Power; not to admit the agent of any other Government; and not to part with any portion of their territories. At the same time the British Government bound themselves not to allow anyone else to tamper with their rights or liberties. Provided that the chiefs governed their territories with justice, and respected the rights of the foreign traders residing therein, the British Government had no intention of interfering in their internal affairs. The British Resident would always use his influence to prevent internal dissensions from coming to a head, for the British Government could not approve of one independent chief attacking another chief by land simply because he was not permitted to do so by sea, and thus evading the spirit of his treaty obligations.

The policy indicated in the above summary is clearly that His Majesty's Government should bring pressure to bear on the Arab chiefs through their command of the sea. The treaties have sprung out of the maritime truce, and it is only at the ports that His Majesty's Government are represented. The question now arises whether relations of this kind will meet all requirements on the other side of Arabia, and whether it will be enough for us to base our relations with King Hussein, the Idrisi, and the Imam, in the first place, on maritime interests, or whether we are to ask the High Contracting Powers to recognise treaties of a more detailed character which are not based solely, or even in the first place, on maritime considerations. The position on the Red Sea coast of Arabia at the present time is very different from that on the Gulf coast at the time of the Treaty of Perpetual Peace. Not only are maritime operations between rival Arab chiefs almost unknown, but other European Powers have already endeavoured to establish interests which conflict with our own. The Hijaz is linked to the outside world by railway, and our maritime hold on King Hussein will consequently be weakened, unless some part of the railway is to be under a British mandate. Another important factor is the position of King Hussein as the guardian of the Holy Places of Islam, a position to the support of which we are now more or less committed by our having championed the Arab revolt during the war.

It appears from these considerations that such treaties of a tracial nature as we may in the future enter upon with the rulers of Western Arabia cannot be based solely upon maritime relations. Though we can still use our maritime supremacy to enforce the fulfilment of treaty obligations, and there is no need for us to depart from our traditional policy of avoiding inland commitments for ourselves, the tracial relations between the Arab rulers must be more comprehensive than those between the petty rulers of the Tracial Coast. Any treaty with an independent chieftain of Western Arabia should include an undertaking on his part to refrain from hostilities by land as well as by sea until the question under dispute has been referred to the British authorities.

The next point for consideration is with what rulers should these treaties be made. It was suggested in Foreign Office telegram of the 14th March that we should adopt the policy of dealing only with the overlords, and General Allenby has expressed his entire agreement in this proposal. The only two rulers who can really claim to be overlords are King Hussein and the Imam Yahya, but two other local rulers must also be reckoned with. The Idrisi of Asir is an upstart, whose independence was first encouraged by the Italians in the Turco-Italian war, and who has no real claim to independence at all; but we have encouraged and made use of him during the war, and can hardly drop him now. It is, however, open to question whether, when the present Idrisi dies, his successor will be able to retain his position.

Our position at Aden also necessitates a separate agreement with the Sultan of Lahej.

Beyond these four rulers there does not appear to be any necessity for our entering into tracial relations with any other ruler, unless we propose to extend our occupation of Aden further inland than the territory ruled over by the Sultan of Lahej. The War Office have lately revived the question of the occupation of a hill station in the Aden hinterland, and have expressed the opinion that with the exception of the inclusion of the Sheikh Said peninsula, the existing frontier of the Aden protectorate requires no readjustment from a military point of view. What then are to be our relations with tribal chiefs other than the Sultan of Lahej, whose territories fall within the existing artificial frontier? Are we to make tracial treaties with all of them, or are we to recognise the Imam or the Sultan of Lahej as their overlord?

Colonel Jacob, who originally drafted the proposed treaty with the Imam, has submitted a note on the future of the Yemen in which he suggests that the tribal treaties of our so-called protectorate might be slightly revised. He deprecates any further penetration into the Yemen, but says that we require a buffer between ourselves and the ambitious aims of the Imam. He outlines a scheme of railway construction, education, and raising of levies which has for its object the attaching to ourselves of the allegiance of the multitude in place of the privileged heads of the tribes inside the existing protectorate. His remarks, like the draft treaty, are based on the assumption that His Majesty's Government are to have a mandate for Arabia, and his proposals amount to a consolidation of the existing protectorate into a British administration. If this result is to be contemplated by the Peace Conference it may become necessary to insert a clause in the treaty with Turkey to make this clear. On the other hand, it is possible that our position in the Aden protectorate is not to come



before the Conference at all. In that part of the Yemen which adjoins Aden we are faced with three alternatives:—

1. To consolidate the existing protectorate and to extend the area of our effective occupation to its present boundary.
2. To recognise the Imam as the overlord of all territory within the existing boundary which is not required for the defence of Aden.
3. To recognise the Imam as overlord up to the existing boundary, and to attempt to keep up a buffer of small States between him and ourselves as we attempted to do between ourselves and the Turks.

The third alternative did not prove successful during the war, and is not likely to be any more successful against the Imam than it was against the Turks. If General Allenby adheres to his proposal to make a preliminary treaty with the Imam in which the question of boundaries is to be specially excluded, this point does not at present arise. But now that the negotiations are to be delayed it may be considered advisable to discuss the future boundary between the Imam and ourselves with a view to the inclusion in the treaty of a clause which at least gives some idea of what our policy is going to be.

To take the draft treaty clause by clause.

*Clause 1.*—It is doubtful whether the Imam will accept such a vague phrase as "throughout the Yemen." There is great danger that he will make use of it when his boundaries with the Idrisi are discussed later. The reference to British protégés is also open to misconstruction. If there are to be British protégés they will not be under the Imam, if the policy suggested by the Foreign Office is to be carried out. It might be suggested to General Allenby that the clause should be redrafted to read:—

1. To reaffirm willingness to ensure the Imam's independence and overlordship in all territory bounded by the territories of the British Government on the one hand, and by those of King Hussein and the Idrisi on the other hand, this territory to be referred to in future as the Yemen.

*Clause 2.*—Subject to the proposed modification to clause 1; no remarks.

*Clause 3.*—No remarks.

*Clause 4.*—The reference to military exigencies will be unnecessary if negotiations are postponed until after the conclusion of peace.

*Clause 5.*—This cannot be described as a crucial clause. In any case, the wording would be likely to offend the Imam. It would appear preferable for His Majesty's Government to express their readiness to assist in any port or railway projects which the Imam may contemplate in the future.

*Clause 6.*—As we are not to be a mandatory Power this appears unnecessary.

*Clause 7.*—This might be taken as undue interference.

*Clause 8.*—The Italians have had an agent in Sanaa for thirty years. We shall have to go very carefully about this clause, but it is justifiable on the analogy of our existing crucial treaties.

*Clause 9.*—This might be toned down by the addition of the words "without the consent of His Majesty's Government."

*Clause 10.*—No remarks.

*Clause 11.*—This is certainly desirable, but might possibly be resented by the Imam.

*Clause 12.*—This clause should be expanded to include crucial guarantees and should come earlier in the treaty. The Imam should undertake to refer all questions at issue between himself and other crucial chiefs to His Majesty's Government before taking hostile action.

*Clause 13.*—No remarks.

*Clause 14.*—This clause is out of place in the treaty. The Imam will make his own arrangements to ensure that goods for his personal use should pass free of customs duty, and an undertaking that British agents should have a similar privilege would more suitably be arranged separately.

*Final Clause.*—This is a very vague commitment and would never pass the Treasury. General Allenby has submitted further remarks for this clause in his telegram No. 634 of the 24th April. It is not clear from this telegram whether the subsidy is only intended to meet claims arising out of the war or whether it is to be paid in perpetuity. It would appear desirable to set a term of years in any case.

Some reference to the special position of King Hussein might well be suggested

to the Imam. Sir Reginald Wingate discussed this point in his note of the 25th December, 1917, and gave it as his opinion that in all negotiations with Arab chiefs we should be careful to define our attitude towards King Hussein and our intention to support the principle of Arabian autonomy. He thought that we should also affirm our desire to see the principles of cohesion and co-operation supersede separation and discord in Arabia. A stereotyped preamble on some such lines might well be introduced in future in any agreements with independent Arab rulers. It would also be of assistance if each ruler was informed at the time of opening the negotiations which of his neighbours was looked upon by His Majesty's Government as an independent ruler. In the case of the Imam, the neighbours concerned would be King Hussein, the Idrisi, Ibn Saud, the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla, and possibly the Sultan of Lahej. The latter would not, however, be considered as an independent ruler if our Aden Protectorate is to be consolidated up to the existing boundary or even to the boundaries of Lahej.

H. W. Y.

May 14, 1919.

*Memorandum by Colonel Jacob.*

1. There is some misunderstanding. No treaty has been drafted. Headlines only of a possible treaty were enunciated, and these not strictly in their logical sequence. My suggestion was that I should go as an accredited envoy with explicit data for a treaty. There must necessarily be a discussion and give and take. After discussion a treaty would have been prepared for His Majesty's Government's approval.

2. It appears very desirable to omit further reference to the word "crucial," which is inapplicable here.

3. It is very necessary to suggest to Imam Yahya the special position of King Hussein. One cannot press the point, however. The principle of Arabian autonomy is what we have all along advocated. The difficulty is to fix the boundaries of each autonomous ruler.

4. Idrisi Saiyid Muhammad-bin-Ali may be an upstart, but it is true we are seriously committed to his recognition by treaty.

5. I do not understand the necessity for any separate agreement with the Sultan of Lahej other than the treaty we already have.

6. With regard to "the three alternatives with which we are faced," I would remark that we have a large protected area inhabited by treaty chiefs. We do not intend to lose this area. It is incorrect to say that we had buffer States between ourselves and the Turks; we had a clearly defined boundary. This has, however, disappeared with the exit of the Turks, the tribes under our protection, however, remaining intact. These are our protégés referred to in clause 1 of the headlines for a proposed treaty, and also our protégé, the Idrisi Saiyid, with whom we concluded a treaty in April 1915.

A fourth alternative is as follows:—

"Our protected area, as recognised by the Turks, will continue to be recognised in its entirety by Imam Yahya, who will also recognise the boundaries to be decided hereafter 'twixt himself and Idrisi and between Idrisi and King Hussein. Further, Imam Yahya will accord full religious freedom and the exercise of their civil liberties to all those of his subjects within his to-be-defined autonomous area, to wit, those of the Shafa'i and Isma'iliya persuasions, and we will not interfere with his rule, nor deal directly with any individuals or bodies of men situate within his autonomous area, provided his rule is sane and just."

The Yemen of the Imam cannot be fixed till the chiefs or their representatives meet in conclave.

7. If the High Contracting Parties at the Peace Conference admit our predominant interests in Arabia as defined by the Foreign Office, there seems no need for us to annex Sheikh Sa'id, nor in any way to enlarge our present sphere of interest. In fact, to do so would provoke Arab remonstrance, as, indeed, it is admitted would be the case if we seized the Red Sea islands ourselves.

8. It is a mistake to say that my scheme for adoption in the Yemen, as outlined in my memorandum "The Future of the Yemen" (13th March, 1919), amounts to a consolidation of the existing protectorate into a British administration. My cry has



ever been "Hands off direct administration." I have merely urged intensive predominance within our sphere, and suggested that the place for initiating reforms is Aden itself, whence our influence would permeate up-country. It is a policy of production without possession, and development without domination. The railway would develop trade and be to the interest of all our protégés.

9. With regard to criticisms of headlines of treaty:—

No. 5.—In case we ever want to build a railway and get concessions, e.g., in Hod-idah (which, if it became a flourishing port, would kill Aden), the Imam would help us in this direction. The Arabs will do nothing in this line if left alone. We would keep out foreign syndicates.

No. 6.—Imam would certainly ask us to make good Turkish debts. We should refuse. This need not form an item of the treaty.

No. 7.—This is the *raison d'être* of the treaty. Were there no other religious parties in the State, many of whom are afraid of a powerful chief of an alien creed, there would be little need of concluding a treaty. We cannot deal with all these petty chieftains, and so we put our money on one man, merely stipulating that he will conserve the other's rights. We have promised, e.g., Sheikh Muhammad Nasir Mukbil that we will safeguard his interests. He is a leading man of Shafa'i persuasion and was, under the Turks, the chief Sheikh of Al Kamai'ra adjoining our border. Many another Shafa'i expects the same from us.

No. 8.—It seems essential to en-ure the Imam will not deal with others than His Majesty's Government. We should discount the Italian Caprotti, who lives at Sana.

No. 9.—The words "without the consent of His Majesty's Government" are inferred, but should be added.

No. 11.—Most essential to our interests that he engage no foreigners. This can be delicately placed before Imam, but perhaps can be omitted from the treaty if I find the Imam suspicious.

No. 14.—My remarks had special reference to goods passing through Aden for the Imam's personal use. I would propose that they should pass duty free. However, this can come up separately.

10. The final number was purposely left blank. The Imam will expect a subsidy to carry on the Government of the country and as a seal to the fact of his connection with His Majesty's Government. This can be settled at the discussion. I would advocate that he be given much the same as he got from the Turks, and I would give this in perpetuity provided his rule was just and equitable. To fix this sum for a term of years will render Imam Yahya suspicious.

11. I think much could be done, and much light thrown on the present situation in the Yemen, if I were to go home and represent the facts to His Majesty's Government. The Yemen is so little known and its affairs have so recently come within the purview of the Foreign Office that the truest economy is a personal interview—provided the mission to the Imam is delayed. After a full discussion with the Imam, I would suggest I go home with the heads of the proposed treaty and such counter-proposals as that ruler may have made.

H. F. JACOB, Lieutenant-Colonel.

Cairo, June 14, 1919.

*Foreign Office Note on Colonel Jacob's Memorandum of June 19.*

1. The misunderstanding was a natural one. General Allenby stated in his telegram No. 634 that the detailed treaty resulting from Colonel Jacob's negotiations with the Imam would be submitted to us for ratification. It was clearly the intention that a treaty should actually be signed, and I think that we should make it clear at once that this is not to be done. See also Cairo telegram No. 518.

2. No remarks.

3. No remarks.

4. No remarks.

5. The treaty we already have is presumably the one recently concluded at Aden and awaiting ratification. My original remark that a separate treaty with this ruler was necessitated by our position at Aden was only intended to show that for treaty purposes he must be considered as an independent or separate ruler, not that the

existing treaty with him would not be sufficient. We are awaiting the views of the India Office on the proposed new treaty which has just been concluded.

6. Colonel Jacob does not agree that the fixing of a boundary which we made no attempt to protect, and the subsidising of the sheikhs within that boundary, amounted to an attempt to keep up a buffer of small States between ourselves and the Turks. I submit that the three alternatives are correctly stated in my memorandum, and that Colonel Jacob himself admitted this by implication when he said in his "Note on the Future of the Yemen" "that we required a buffer between ourselves and the ambitious aims of the Imam." His fourth alternative is indistinguishable from my third.

7. I quite agree with Colonel Jacob about Sheikh Sa'id. I am also of opinion that the proposed administration of the quarantine station at Camaran could be equally effectively and more logically carried out by us in the name of some Arab chief rather than by our claiming the administration of the island as proposed by the Peace Delegation. . . .

8. I fear that there would not in practice be any distinction between intensive predominance, backed up by a railway and tribal levies, and the consolidation of the existing protectorate into a British administration.

9. My criticisms of the draft treaty were based on the assumption that it was to be described to the other Powers as being of a "trucial nature." This point has now been cleared up, and Mr. Balfour has given us a much more ambitious programme in his despatch No. 833 of the 29th May.

Clause 5.—This should now be worded as in Mr. Balfour's despatch No. 833—i.e., no concessions to be granted to foreigners without the consent of His Majesty's Government.

Clause 6.—Colonel Jacob agrees to cut this out of the treaty.

Clause 7.—It has been suggested by Colonel A. T. Wilson, of Bagdad, that a clause should be inserted prohibiting Akhwan propaganda in any future treaties with Arabian rulers. This would not agree with Colonel Jacob's proposal at all. I am inclined to think that questions of religion, as such, should be kept out of any treaty. Either extreme would be undesirable. Some more general phrase, such as "To guarantee the preservation of the rights and liberties of all his subjects," would be as much as we could suitably demand, and even that would be more than we could possibly enforce. Colonel Jacob himself, in his "Note on the Future of the Yemen," says: "Too much capital is made of the conflicting religious differences in the Yemen. What have we to do with Shafai and Zeidi? Why seek to accentuate and so perpetuate these differences? Certain self-seekers will make much ado if the Zeidi ruler come down into the place left by the Turk—into a sphere where once before his Zeidi forbears ruled. Since the Turks left the Yemen in 1640, Imams of Sanaa, Ashraf of Abu Arish and Abha, Egyptians, &c., have succeeded in turn as rulers of various portions of the country till the return of the Turks in 1873. In the same way as King Hussein of the Hejaz, once in alliance with the Turks, now claims to be the residuary legatee of tracts of which the Turks have been lately shorn, and belittles the claims of Idrisi, but recently domiciled, so Imam Yahya expects to be put into the Turks' room in the Yemen, and the Idrisi looks forward to the mastery over Asir and its netherlands. Looking at things broadly I can see no better claimant for the Yemen than Imam Yahya. Money, if wisely placed by him, will make all Shafai objections vanish into thin air and, after all, one religious creed or "Shehada" binds all parties. Many now Shafai were once Zeidi and would as easily revert to their origin. Even now these two persuasions readily intermarry. So long as the Imam is sympathetic, just and tolerant—and he cannot otherwise consolidate his rule—all religious objections would be waived, more especially if we stand aside and disclaim and desire ourselves to administer any Yemen tracts."

Clause 8.—My objection no longer holds, in view of Mr. Balfour's despatch No. 833.

Clause 9.—Colonel Jacob agrees.

Clause 11.—Colonel Jacob agrees that there may be some difficulty about this.

Clause 14.—Colonel Jacob agrees.

10. We might enquire from General Allenby how much the Imam used to get from the Turks.

11. I agree that Colonel Jacob might well come home to discuss the whole question after he has visited the Imam. He knows more about the Yemen than anyone else, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid misunderstandings when a treaty is discussed clause by clause by cable or despatch.

H. W. Y.



[E 432/3/44]

No. 74.

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 21.)*(No. 200.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Paris, February 21, 1920.*

MARSHAL FOCH has on instructions from French Government summoned a meeting this morning of Allied Military Committee at Versailles to enquire into military activities of Turkish Nationalists in Asia Minor, especially in Smyrna zone, in Cilicia and in regions north-west of Mosul, and to consider measures for bringing pressure to bear, especially at Constantinople, to put a stop to military preparations of Nationalist leaders and to prevent participation of regular army in any action by irregular contingents organised by Nationalists.

General Sackville-West has informed Marshal Foch that he is willing to attend the meeting, but that he will not be in a position to express any views until he has received instructions from His Majesty's Government. The Marshal replied that he did not expect much from meeting, but that it was really more with the intention of [group undecipherable] discussing general question that French Government had referred matter to Military Committee.

I should be glad to know whether it is the wish of His Majesty's Government that this question shall be dealt with by Military Committee sitting at Versailles, or whether it is not their view that the matter, like the rest of Turkish question, should be treated in London. If it is to be dealt with at Versailles it is necessary that General Sackville-West should be furnished with precise and definite instructions.

General Sackville-West has forwarded copy of General Weygand's letter summarising meeting to Chief of Imperial General Staff.

[E 289/289/44]

No. 75.

*Earl Curzon to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*(No. 149.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, February 21, 1920.*

FOLLOWING for Ryan from Vansittart:—

"French Delegation have communicated to Peace Conference note, dated 17th February, containing scheme for judicial reform. My immediately following telegram contains text of provisions which note proposes to insert in treaty for this purpose. Note states that scheme has been drawn up by experts, including Mandelstam, and based on Egyptian system. In order to emphasise analogy with Egyptian system frequent references to Egyptian laws are quoted.

"Please telegraph at once preliminary opinion of Waugh and yourself as to scheme with particular reference to following points:—

"1. Should treaty submit question to an Anglo-French-Italian expert commission in Constantinople and provide for Turkish acceptance of any scheme agreed on by commission? This was our original idea. The French are, however, pressing for the immediate adoption of the present text in approximately its present form.

"2. Is French scheme acceptable enough to be basis of commission's discussions?

"Please note that, with regard to Section (B), French note explains that Mixed Courts would have jurisdiction in matters of personal status.

"We should also be glad to have as soon as possible by telegraph your considered and detailed criticism of the whole text. In view of the course of discussions here the matter is one of great urgency."

[E 289/289/44]

No. 76.

*Earl Curzon to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*(No. 150.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Foreign Office, February 21, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 149 of 21st February.

## CHAPTER I.—REVIVAL OF THE CAPITULATIONS.

## ARTICLE 1.

The so-called régime of the Capitulations, which was abrogated by the unilateral decision of the Sublime Porte, is revived until the date of the introduction of a scheme of judicial reform.

## CHAPTER II.—JUDICIAL REFORM.

## Section (A).—Organisation of Mixed Courts in Turkey.

## ARTICLE 1.

A Court of Cassation, sitting in the capital, courts of appeal and tribunals of first instance shall be established. The number of courts of appeal and tribunals shall be determined by agreement between the Powers and the Ottoman Government.

## ARTICLE 2.

In the courts and tribunals of all degrees the preponderance of the foreign over the Turkish element shall be assured.

## ARTICLE 3.

Both the Turkish and foreign judges shall be appointed by the Porte, the latter being nominated by their respective Governments. The number of foreign judges and the distribution of seats among them shall be determined by international agreements.

## ARTICLE 4.

The appointment of all judges, foreign or Turkish, shall be irrevocable.

## ARTICLE 5.

The higher and lower courts shall have honorary Turkish presidents. The actual president shall always be a foreign magistrate.

## ARTICLE 6.

A procurator-general and a deputy procurator-general shall be appointed to the Court of Cassation, as also to the courts of appeal and the tribunals of first instance.

The procurator-general appointed to the Court of Cassation shall at the same time act as head of the *parquets* set up for the courts and tribunals.

The procurator-general and his deputy must necessarily be foreigners. They shall be appointed by the Government upon nomination by the Powers.

The procurators and their deputies shall be appointed by the Government upon nomination by the procurator-general, and with the approval of the general assembly of the Court of Cassation.

Procurators appointed to the courts of appeal must necessarily be foreigners. Procurators appointed to the tribunals and deputies appointed to the courts and tribunals may be Turkish.

The proportion of foreign procurators and deputies and of Turkish procurators and deputies shall be settled by agreement between the Porte and the Powers.

A service of judicial police and a penitentiary service shall be attached to each *parquet*. The head of each service shall be a foreigner, responsible to the procurator-general. The latter shall appoint and dismiss all the personnel, with the approval of the courts of tribunals.



Section (B).—*Jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts in Civil and Commercial Matters.*

ARTICLE .

*Jurisdiction.*

1. *Jurisdiction ratione persona.*

(a.) In civil and commercial cases the mixed courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction in cases between Turks and foreigners, between foreigners of different nationalities, and between foreigners of the same nationality.

(b.) The jurisdiction of the mixed courts shall include all matters, even those between Turkish subjects only, whenever the suit appears to involve any foreign interest.

(c.) The mixed courts shall also have jurisdiction in cases between Turks in the event of the two parties submitting by mutual consent to their jurisdiction.

A plea of no jurisdiction shall only be raised in *limine litis*.

When once a suit has been brought before the mixed courts, the mixed courts shall become definitely and exclusively competent to judge the suit. Decisions so pronounced shall be binding upon all other Turkish courts.

(d.) Suits between the Turkish Government and all branches of the Turkish public service and foreign nationals shall be tried by the mixed courts.

*Exceptions.*

The exceptions restricting the jurisdiction *ratione persona* of the mixed courts in civil and commercial matters shall be as follows:—

(a.) Foreign diplomatic or consular officials in Turkey shall be entitled to bring actions against third parties before the Turkish mixed courts, but shall themselves not be amenable to those courts as defendants, except in the case of counter-claims not exceeding the amount of the original claim.

If they carry on any trade or industry, or if they hold or exploit immovable property in Turkey, they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the mixed courts as regards all commercial or industrial matters and any suit affecting immovable estate in which they are not involved in their official capacity.

(b.) Religious or educational establishments placed under the protection of a foreign Power shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the mixed courts under the same conditions as diplomatic and consular officials.

2. *Competence ratione materia.*

(a.) The jurisdiction of the mixed courts shall include all matters relating to movable or immovable property.

*Exceptions.*

(b.) Claims brought by foreigners against a pious foundation with regard to the real estate held by that foundation shall, nevertheless, not be tried by the mixed courts.

The mixed courts shall, on the contrary, have jurisdiction in cases in which claims with regard to property are brought by the pious foundation as plaintiff.

(c.) The mixed courts shall also be competent to try cases relating to legal possession, whoever may be the plaintiff or defendant.

(d.) Turkey shall promulgate without delay a law prepared by the Powers with regard to the organisation of real estate and land registration.

Until this law comes into force all transfers of landed property in which foreigners are concerned must bear the visa of the mixed judicial authority and be registered by it. A chamber of the mixed tribunal shall be specially charged with such registration.

(Section C).—*Execution of Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters.*

ARTICLE 8.

The execution of judgments pronounced by the mixed courts in civil and commercial matters, whether against foreigners or against Turkish subjects, shall take place independently of any administrative, consular or other action, and on the order

of the court. It shall be effected by the court bailiffs, if necessary with the assistance of the local authorities, but in any case without interference by the administrative services.

Section (D).—*Jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals in Criminal Cases.*

ARTICLE 9.

(a.) The mixed court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in offences against Turkish police laws committed by foreigners.

(b.) With regard to crimes and misdemeanours the mixed court alone is competent to examine and try all offences committed by foreigners against other foreigners or against Turks, or by Turks against foreigners.

Section (E).—*Prosecution and Preliminary Enquiry before the Mixed Courts in regard to Crimes and Misdemeanours and Execution of their Sentences in Criminal Cases.*

ARTICLE 10.

The prosecution and preliminary enquiry in cases of crime and misdemeanour before the mixed courts, as well as the execution of the sentences of the tribunals in criminal cases, shall be carried out without any interference on the part of the administrative or consular authorities, unless such tribunals wish to appeal for the help of the local authorities for the purposes of execution.

Sentences of imprisonment or hard labour will be served in establishments under the direct supervision of the mixed courts.

Section (E).—*Law to be applied.*

ARTICLE 11.

(a.) A commission composed of lawyers of the Allied Powers and of Turkey shall be constituted with a view to drawing up the codes to be applied by the mixed courts. This commission shall base its labours upon French law and the Egyptian codes, taking into account where necessary the local laws.

The civil code drafted by the aforesaid commission must contain general rules for the solution of conflicts of law. Should it, however, prove impossible to arrive at an agreement, the commission shall merely insert a general provision of more or less the following tenor:—

“The mixed courts shall apply the rules contained in international conventions, and, in default thereof, the general rules of private international law. In cases where the national law, which is applicable under such rules, refers the matter to some other law, the courts shall act in accordance with such reference.”

(b.) The mixed courts shall not begin to sit until the codes have been drawn up.

(c.) The codes adopted by the commission and sanctioned by the Powers shall be promulgated by the Turkish Government.

(d.) Additions to and modifications of the codes in force shall be discussed and voted by the general assembly of the Mixed Court of Cassation.

The right to propose such new laws shall rest with the Court of Cassation, with each of the Powers adhering to the scheme of reform, and with Turkey. They shall be voted by a majority of two-thirds. The Powers shall be entitled, within a period of three months, to demand, either individually or jointly, a second discussion of the laws voted by the Court of Cassation. Within a further period of three months the Powers may—but only in case of unanimity—object to the promulgation of the laws voted after two discussions by the Court of Cassation. If no objection is raised within the fixed time limits, the court shall submit the laws so voted to the Turkish Government, which shall promulgate them forthwith.

(e.) Police regulations issued by the Government or the Turkish authorities shall only become applicable to foreigners in the event of their being approved by the general assembly of the Court of Cassation in the conditions set forth in the preceding paragraph (for the promulgation of additions and modifications to the codes).



## Section (G).—Administrative Jurisdiction.

## ARTICLE 12.

The mixed courts shall have jurisdiction to deal with acts of sovereignty or measures taken by the State in execution of laws for which it is alone responsible, and to deal with cases of prejudice inflicted by such acts or measures upon acquired right of a foreigner, such right being recognised either by treaties, laws or conventions.

They shall, if necessary, be entitled to stay execution of such acts as far as concerns the persons or property of foreigners.

## ARTICLE 13.

On the other hand, the mixed courts shall not have jurisdiction to deal with acts of sovereignty and measures taken by the State in execution of laws and regulations issued with the assent of the Powers, except to decide as to the conformity of the said acts and measures with the aforesaid laws and regulations, and to deal with cases of prejudice inflicted upon the rights of foreigners by a violation of such laws and regulations.

## CHAPTER III.—TEMPORARY PROVISIONS.

## ARTICLE 14.

Pending the putting into application of the judicial organisation, the disputes which arose, prior to the war, between the Powers and the Turkish Government regarding the interpretation and application of the capitulations shall henceforth be settled according to the following provisions:—

(a.) The judgments of all civil or commercial courts trying mixed cases, the subject of which exceeds 1,000 piastres in value, shall be delivered with the assistance of foreign assessors. Judgments delivered without such assistance shall be automatically cancelled, and the case shall be reheard with the obligatory assistance of foreign assessors.

(b.) The judgments of civil or commercial courts of all grades with regard to mixed cases shall be considered null and void whenever the consular representative shall have refused his signature thereto.

(c.) Civil or commercial courts trying mixed cases shall interpret the Turkish commercial code and code of commercial procedure in accordance with the usage of international trade, or, failing that, in accordance with French law.

(d.) In matters relating to immovable property the Turkish courts shall alone have jurisdiction to try actions regarding real estate, and the only competent Turkish courts shall be the civil courts. Actions regarding personal property shall be tried by the consular courts when all the parties are foreigners, and by the mixed commercial tribunals in the case of actions between foreigners and Turkish subjects.

The consular courts shall, moreover, alone have jurisdiction to try all cases relating to movable or immovable property in connection with the settlement of the testamentary inheritance of foreigners.

(e.) In places at a distance of more than nine hours' journey from the residence of the consular agent, mixed cases, the subject of which does not exceed 1,000 piastres in value, may alone be tried in the absence of the consul.

(f.) The execution of judgments delivered by Turkish civil or commercial courts in favour of Turkish subjects against foreign subjects shall be effected by the foreign consulates, who shall proceed in conformity with the regulations of their national law.

(g.) The residence of a foreigner may not be visited by the local authorities except in the presence of a consul, subject to the exceptions contained in the Protocol of 1868.

The presence of a consul shall always be necessary in cases where the local authorities have to prosecute searches or perquisitions in printing works or bookshops belonging to foreigners, or in hotels or apartment houses kept by foreigners.

Foreign ships may not be visited nor searches carried out on board except by the consular authorities.

(h.) Foreign subjects accused of crimes or misdemeanours committed against foreigners or against Turkish subjects shall be detained before trial in the consular prisons, except in the event of a request to the contrary being made by their consul.

(i.) The competence of Turkish courts in mixed criminal cases shall be restricted solely to crimes and misdemeanours committed by foreigners against Turkish subjects or by Turks against foreign subjects.

(j.) The presence of the consul shall be obligatory in mixed criminal proceedings both in the lower and higher courts.

(k.) Consular assistance shall be assured to all foreign witnesses before all Turkish courts.

(l.) Sentences pronounced by the Turkish courts in mixed criminal actions shall be deemed null and void in all cases where the consular representative shall refuse his signature.

(m.) Foreign subjects condemned by Turkish courts shall serve their sentence in consular prisons, unless their consul makes a request to the contrary.

## CHAPTER IV.—STATUS OF MAHOMMEDANS WHO ARE NATIONALS OF ALLIED POWERS.

## ARTICLE 1.

Mahomedan nationals, subjects and protected persons of Allied Powers shall enjoy the same régime in Turkey as other nationals, subjects and protected persons of the same Powers.

[E 414/1/58]

No. 77.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 28.)

My Lord,

Tiflis, January 22, 1920.

ENCLOSED I have the honour to transmit copy of a despatch No. 9 of the 15th January, addressed to me by Colonel Stokes, with reference to the Azerbaijan reply to the Bolshevik proposal for an attack on the Volunteer Army.

I have, &amp;c.

O. WARDROP.

Enclosure 1 in No. 77.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stokes to Mr. Wardrop.

Sir,

Baku, January 15, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the originals and translations of two drafts of the reply sent by the Azerbaijan Government to the wireless message from the Bolsheviks asking them to attack the Volunteer Army.

Through the courtesy of the Georgian representative at Baku I was made acquainted with the first draft, and as, in my opinion, it was undesirable that the Azerbaijan Government should reply expressing its willingness to enter into negotiations with the Government of the Soviet Russian Republic, I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and urged him to have the last sentence of the draft deleted. Dr. Alshebaia (the Georgian representative) supported my representations. Fath Ali Khan Khoisky (Minister for Foreign Affairs) undertook to put my views before the Cabinet, and meanwhile to delay the despatch of the telegram.

He also endeavoured to prevent the publication of the draft in the local press, but in this he was only partially successful. The Cabinet, having heard the Minister of Foreign Affairs, changed the words "the Government of Soviet Russian Republic" to "the Russian people," and the reply was sent as in draft (B).

It would, I think, have been preferable had the last sentence been entirely deleted, but I consider that the change made in the original draft, and the intentional vagueness of the language employed, render the message fairly innocuous.

I have, &amp;c.

C. B. STOKES, British Political Officer, Baku.



Enclosure 2 in No. 77.

Draft (A).

(Radio-telegram.)

Moscow.

(Translation.)

To the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

IN accordance with your telegram dated the 2nd January, which was received by me on the 6th January, I am informing you of the following:—

The Azerbaijan people in great historical events, by means of great efforts and losses, at last received its freedom and independence.

Our Government is based upon the principles of establishing a democratic republic. The Azerbaijan Republic stands on the point of view that every nation has a definite right to arrange its own fate and life in accordance with its views, and that is why the Azerbaijan Government never allowed any interference in the inner affairs of its people, and, on its part, never interfered in the affairs of other people.

In accordance with these principles, the Azerbaijan Government considers it to be impossible to interfere in the affairs of the Russian people in their struggle in arranging their inner life. The Azerbaijan Republic always remained neutral, but it is always ready to defend its fate and independence from the forces outside. That is the reason why the Azerbaijan Government had a severe struggle with the Tsar's General (Denikin) who always threatened the independence of the Azerbaijan people, and in order that this struggle may be a successful one, we made a defensive alliance with the neighbouring Georgian Republic. The above policy of the Azerbaijan Government dictates the letter of establishing friendly terms with the neighbouring people, and that is the reason why the Azerbaijan Government is ready to converse with the Government of Soviet Russian Republic, in order to establish good friendly feelings in connection with the independency of both Powers.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic.

Draft (B).

Answer of the Azerbaijan Republic.

(Translation.)

Moscow.

IN accordance with your telegram of the 2nd January received by me on the 6th January, I am informing you the following:—

The Azerbaijan people in great historical events, by means of great efforts and sufferings, received its freedom and independence. Our Government is based upon the principles of establishing a democratic republic. The Azerbaijan Republic stands on the point of view that every nation has a definite right to arrange its own fate and life in accordance with its principles, and that is why the Azerbaijan Government never allowed any interference in the inner affairs of its people, and on its part never interfered in the affairs of other people. In accordance with these principles, the Azerbaijan Government considered it to be impossible to interfere in the affairs of the Russian people in their struggle for arranging their inner life. The Azerbaijan Government always remained neutral, but it is always ready to defend its independence and freedom from any forces. That is the reason why the Azerbaijan Government had a severe struggle with the Tsar's General (Denikin), who always threatened the independence of the Azerbaijan people, and in order that the struggle may be a successful one, defensive alliance was made with the neighbouring Georgian Government.

The above policy of the Azerbaijan Government dictates the letter of establishing friendly terms with the other people, and that is the reason why the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic is ready to converse with the Russian people in order of establishing good friendly feelings in connection with the independence of both Powers.

KHOISKY,

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan Republic.

[E 483/166/44]

No. 78.

Major-General Sir J. Stewart to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 4.)

Aden, February 5, 1920.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward, by request of His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, a full report by Major A. S. Meek, C.M.G., on the negotiations resulting in the release of Colonel Jacob's mission from detention in Bajil.

I feel it incumbent on me to make a few remarks thereon:—

- (a.) A Court of Enquiry was held on the conduct of the 7th Rajputs—they were absolved from all blame.
- (b.) The strictures on Dr. Richardson, the political officer, are open to question.
- (c.) Colonel Jacob's attitude has already been the subject of much correspondence. I am only concerned in his unwillingness, in spite of orders, to recognise that when a prisoner he had no *locus standi*. No doubt, too, his judgment was affected by his surroundings.
- (d.) I have frequently expressed my conviction of Mahmud Nadhim's untrustworthiness. Long before the surrender of the Turkish garrison I had formed this estimate, and have never had reason to change it.
- (e.) I have already brought to notice Major Meek's able conduct of the negotiations and am grateful that they have received the ready recognition of Government.

The services of Khan Bahadur Ali Jaffer I am representing in a separate letter. Further copies will be sent as soon as they have been typed.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General,  
Political Resident, Aden.

Enclosure in No. 78.

Report on Operations for the Release of the Jacob Mission.

I ARRIVED in Hodeidah on the 5th October, 1919, charged by the Resident of Aden, Major-General Sir Walter Delamain, with the duty of effecting the release of Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob and his party, who had been held prisoners in Bajil by the sheikhs of the Quhra tribe since the month of August. The party consisted of—

Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob, C.S.I.,  
Major Reilly, O.B.E.,  
Captain Richardson, M.C.,  
Captain Brock,  
Captain Nasir-ud-Din, and an escort of twenty-five sowars of the Aden troop under an Indian officer.

Mr. Richardson, O.B.E., who had been vice-consul at Hodeidah for many years before the war, and had been for some time a prisoner in the hands of the Turks during the war, had acted as political officer at Hodeidah during the British occupation of the town, and I relieved him of that office on the 6th October. Mr. Richardson was ill at the time of his relief, and we did not have much opportunity of discussion before his departure on the 6th October; but he informed me with bitterness that, though he had been entrusted with full powers of negotiation for the release of the mission, Colonel Jacob had opposed him, and had prevented the sheikhs of the Quhra tribe from accepting his invitation to meet him in Hodeidah, so that he, Mr. Richardson, had been unable to make any advance in



negotiation. Colonel Jacob himself had held continual fruitless discussion with the sheikhs, who subjected him to continual indignity and insult in a spirit of insolent truculence, all of which Colonel Jacob withstood with infinite patience.

2. The position I found on my arrival I will now describe. The town of Hodeidah was deserted and dead. Of a normal population of from 45,000 to 50,000 people, it was reckoned there were from 1,000 to 1,500 left. The bazars were closed; there was no trade with the town by sea or land; there was great poverty and starvation; the people were hostile to the British, though grateful for the doles of grain being issued, and for the charity of the 1st Brahmans, whose sepoys gave away their surplus food. The recent raid of from 40 to 80 men of the neighbouring tribes, who had held the town for five hours, and looted all there was to be had in the shops and in many houses, after killing a number of Arab and Rajput guards and Indian followers, had added to the general bitterness; and the Arab attack on the town, which followed the raid and was repulsed with heavy loss, and which led to military measures involving the destruction by fire of a large number of huts in the town, and the search of houses and theft and destruction of property by inconsiderate sepoys of the 1/7th D.C.O. Rajputs, heightened the popular ill-feeling. The bitterness of the inhabitants towards the British Government and the 1/7th Rajputs, which had been the only regiment of the garrison at the time of the raid and subsequent attack, was reciprocated by that regiment, which had been subjected to some disgrace in the raid, and which regarded with ill-will the townsfolk, who had not been concerned in the incident. Beyond the town, in the interior, the British were regarded with intense hatred. The Tehama had, in spite of the flow of supplies through Idrisi ports, suffered heavily in common with the Yemen, as a result of the blockade of the coast; failure of rain had added to the general distress, and starvation stalked the land, trade and industry dead. Hope had been held out that with the armistice and the surrender of the Turks the blockade would be raised, and the tribes were anxious to see the last of the Turks, who had brought on them misfortune, and to welcome the English, who, they believed, would succeed the Turks and bring to the country food and prosperity. But there was great delay in the removal of the blockade, and when, after many months of continual suffering, the orders for its removal were issued, they were not given effect in Hodeidah, which I found in a position of virtual blockade on my arrival there. The result was a feeling of intense indignation and hatred for the British throughout the tribes of the Tehama with whom I had been called upon to deal. This feeling was bound to react unpleasantly on the agent of Government at Hodeidah and, while the blockade was still in force, called for the exercise of great tact on his part. It is germane to the subject of this report to show that not only were no effective measures taken to end the blockade when its removal was ordered, but that the political officer displayed an attitude callous and contemptible towards the people, tribesmen and townsfolk, which resulted in the raid and attack on Hodeidah, and all the loss of life and ill-effects which occurred, materially and politically, and which came within an ace of costing him his life, the object the raid was designed to secure. My report of the 12th October on the circumstances leading up to the imprisonment of the mission in Bajil takes note of this fact of the hatred entertained towards the political officer. How closely it bears on the fate of the mission will be further emphasised when I relate that Suleiman Hassan Bakheit, the sheikh of the Aboos tribe, stated to me that prior to the departure of the mission his agent had come in to warn the political officer that it should not proceed, had been refused an interview, and been treated with disdain, and had left Hodeidah in high dudgeon declaring he would have the political officer's life. The sheikh took his revenge by allying himself with the Quhra sheikhs, and acting in conjunction with them all through till his defection was secured. To effect the release of the mission, I had a greater service to Government to perform; it was essential to break down the bad feeling of the country, to win the good-will, respect and confidence of the people, to build up in place of hatred the foundations of a new prestige for the British name. The capture of the mission was the final blot on that name, a blot the deeper from the indignity of its own conduct of negotiations and of the conduct of its captors.

3. Before proceeding to an account of my work in Hodeidah, reference will be made to the proposals put forward to Government by Colonel Jacob prior to my arrival and on my views with regard to them. Colonel Jacob's first telegrams to his Excellency the High Commissioner in Egypt recognised the impossibility of handing over Hodeidah to the Imam, and advocated the gift of the town to Mahmud Nathim, the Turkish Vali of the Yemen. Later, on the 24th September, Colonel

Jacob reported that Mahmud Nathim had taken over negotiations from the Quhra sheikhs with their consent, and he supported the Vali's proposal for the reintroduction of Turkish troops to Hodeidah, showing the Vali's further proposal that if eventually Turkish power were ruled out of the Tehama by the final Treaty of Peace with Turkey, there should be a Moslem Governor of the Tehama to stand for Shafai interests under the British Government's support. Again, on the 4th and 5th, he telegraphed his advocacy of the same policy, showing the Vali's public attachment to Shafai interests and defiance of the Imam, and his demand for replacement of British by Turkish troops in Hodeidah. He noted the Vali's praise of British justice, and went on to argue the advisability of appointing Mahmud Nathim as a permanent independent ruler in the Tehama backed by British arms and money. But to this scheme he showed preference for restitution of Turkish rule pure and simple.

4. Perusal of Colonel Jacob's telegrams and of his letters to Aden, which are not before me here, convinced me of the impropriety of leaving negotiations in his hands, it seeming clear that he was not taking a dispassionate and calm view of the situation, a frame of mind not to be ordinarily expected from a prisoner in such harassing position as that in which Colonel Jacob was. When required, therefore, to proceed to Hodeidah, I wrote a note in Aden before departure showing the view that negotiation could not properly be conducted by a prisoner; that it could not be conducted from Bajil and Hodeidah simultaneously by two officers; that the Hodeidah officer should alone act and have full authority. I further showed that in my view it was wrong that Government should accept dictation of terms as a condition of the release of the mission; that, recognising the position of the Tehama as then disclosed, Government should consider the needs and aspirations of the Tehama tribes, fully and with sympathy, but that no such discussion should be entered upon till the mission had returned; that the offending sheikhs should be promised immunity from punishment for their seizure of the mission, but that to secure this they must surrender the mission unconditionally. These views were accepted, and I proceeded to carry out this policy in Hodeidah.

5. On the 6th October, I intimated to Colonel Jacob my arrival and the policy to be adopted, showing my view that parleying in Bajil was undignified, and that a stronger line of action would not endanger the safety of the mission. I stated that I had been given to understand that Mahmud Nathim was a scoundrel, that he was in the Yemen in contravention of orders to surrender himself, and that he was an adventurer whom to recognise in other guise would be a mistake. I requested Colonel Jacob to send the Quhra sheikhs to see me in Hodeidah, and, my instructions enjoining me to consult Colonel Jacob when possible before taking any important step, and my own wish being to secure his co-operation to the fullest extent possible, I invited him to regard me as the instrument in his hands, he being a prisoner and I a free agent, and to give me the benefit of his advice and information. In reply Colonel Jacob declined to surrender negotiation to me solely without direct orders from Foreign Office, on the ground that his negotiations had gone too far to admit of fresh beginning. He disagreed with my estimate of Mahmud Nathim, whom he styled all through the negotiations as the Vali of the Yemen, even after the Resident's intimation that he could not be recognised as holding any official position in the country. Colonel Jacob held that it was impossible to refuse him recognition, and the Quhra sheikhs had selected him to represent them; and he maintained that Nathim was genuinely anxious to serve His Majesty's Government and this part of Arabia. He stated his acceptance of my programme in the event of the proposal for the return of the Turks being negatived. He declared himself unable to ask the sheikhs to visit me in Hodeidah owing to his position in respect of Mahmud Nathim. Mr. Richardson's complaint that Colonel Jacob would not allow the sheikhs to come in to see him will be recalled here. It was his desire to deal with the matter himself, and Nathim has shown that, at a later stage, immediately prior to his departure from Bajil, he sought to obtain from the sheikhs a written declaration that they would recognise no one but himself. Throughout the period of his imprisonment he insisted again and again that the difficulty could be solved only in Bajil, and only by himself, he being on the spot and at the very heart of the trouble. He only, he maintained, could see the truth and understand the facts, the officer in Hodeidah having no knowledge but what he gained in hearsay.

6. The position then as between Colonel Jacob and me was difficult from my entry on the scene. He had got himself into a series of difficulties, had the mortification of having to declare his Yemen policy impracticable, and had thrown himself into the hands of an enemy Turk whom he regarded as actuated by the most friendly,



altruistic, Anglophile motives, and whose proposals he seconded, this at a time when highly dangerous Turkish propaganda was rampant throughout the Near and Middle East, and in spite of all the official utterances which had been made in recent times in respect of the Arab and Turkish policy of His Majesty's Government and their allies. Mahmud Nathim had been engaged since the armistice, as before it, in anti-British propaganda, and when he was posing as Colonel Jacob's friend in Bajil he was disseminating falsehoods as to Turkey's position, England's treachery to Islam, the coming insurrection of British Mahomedans, and Britain's downfall.

7. In reply to Colonel Jacob's letter refusing to hand over sole control to me, I agreed to await the instructions of the Foreign Office, but I pointed out that control must be undivided and decisive, and showed that in the event of my assuming sole charge I would require to make a clean sweep of all past negotiation in Bajil, and the cessation of all further discussion there. In the meantime preparations were pushed on.

8. Letters were addressed to all the sheikhs of the countryside, informing them of my arrival, of the termination of the blockade, and of Government's desire to re-establish trade and prosperity. I invited them to come to Hodeidah and see me. Steps were taken to secure the practical re-establishment of trade and, though the blockade had ceased some time before I arrived, I was hailed throughout the country as the author of its termination. In Hodeidah I studied every means of winning the good-will of the people, moving freely among them, making my house and office free to all at all times, inviting the notables to meet the officers of the garrison, securing modification of distasteful military regulations, in which matter Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Douglas, in command, was anxious to co-operate, providing medical aid and extended provision of doles for the poor, enquiring into the many cases of destruction of huts for military reasons and awarding compassionate grants to the sufferers, many of whom had lost all their belongings in the burning of the huts, and in many other minor ways. I called a meeting of merchants for the consideration of matters of local importance, appointed the former mayor of the town to his old post, appointed a kazi, and ordered the reparation of the chief mosque of the town, which had been badly damaged by shell-fire in the naval bombardment of the town during the war. Results came rapidly, and the inhabitants of the town became very friendly, all sympathetic in the work for the release of the mission, and many volunteering their active services. The leading merchants of the town and the two headmen of the neighbouring village of Manthar, which I frequently visited, busied themselves in propaganda, some of the merchants and the two headmen stumping the country for that purpose. Before I left Aden an Arab merchant there had called attention to the failure of the political officer in Hodeidah to enlist the aid of the mansabs, the leading sayids, who wield great power in the Tehama. Letters were addressed to the leading sayids from Zaidiyah to Zabeed explaining the position, showing Government's good intentions, and using all possible diplomatic persuasion in the enlistment of their aid. The Mansab of Hodeidah, a refugee at Doraihim, returned and became one of the growing number of lieutenants. The news of the new régime in Hodeidah spread as news spreads in the East; friendly letters came in from sayids and sheikhs, who came in themselves to see me in gradually increasing numbers, and left with a present, pledged to do their utmost for the release of the mission; refugees came in to claim compensation for huts destroyed, and remained; others with no claim returned in gradually increasing numbers to their old home. "The sea is open; the land is open; the past was all a mistake, and the British Government has no thought but the welfare of the people and the prosperity of the country. The detention of this mission is foolish, for while it lasts it prevents the re-establishment of those conditions Government is seeking, and if it persists and Government is driven to take military action all the good now set in train will be undone and the country will go back to suffering worse than it has already experienced; for the British Government will not continue to brook insult from petty sheikhs, and is strong to punish, it being false that Turkey is victorious and England defeated, and it being false that England seeks the ruin of Islam." Such was the message sent out over the country, and thus was popular opinion influenced and finally completely changed. On the 11th October the orders of the Foreign Office placing entire control of negotiations in my hands were conveyed to Colonel Jacob. Till about that time no notice had been taken of the Quhra-Aboos sheikhs, but I had written to Sheikh Munassar of the Northern Zeranik a letter showing him that I was aware of his association with the Quhra in the matter of the mission, and warning him that friendship with Government would pay him better than hostility.

This caused him to deny any part in the conspiracy, and to declare himself a friend; but all through he acted a double part which, however, was of no importance.

9. On the 10th October a friendly letter was addressed to Saiyid Abdul Kadir, the Mansab of Marawaa, who is the leading mansab of the Tehama and wields much influence with the Quhra and Aboos tribes. This man had been for long the friend and associate of the Vali Mahmud Nathim, who had been accustomed to deal with Aboos and Quhra tribal affairs through him. He had been living in Bajil since the imprisonment of the mission, the chief agent of Mahmud Nathim and the principal figure in the drama, the sheikhs ordering their conduct—Abu Hadi, the head sheikh of the Quhra, in great measure an exception—according to his suggestion or command. It became quickly evident what the character and part of Saiyid Abdul Kadir were, but my work was rendered exceedingly difficult and the detention of the mission prolonged, by Colonel Jacob's persistence in esteeming him one of his best friends and as devoted to the cause of the mission's release. Colonel Jacob would not accept my estimate of Mahmud Nathim, though he at the end of his imprisonment admitted Mahmud Nathim's anti-British propaganda; but that was a logical position and he could argue not that he had fallen under the spell of this clever Turk, but that he knew him personally, while I did not. But he not only refused to accept my warnings as to Saiyid Abdul Kadir, but defended the mansab with such heat as to desire me with much asperity to desist making unpardonable conduct of his friend; and greatly was I astonished when at the very end of the mission's imprisonment I was informed by my Bajil messenger and by Major Reilly, one of the mission party, that Colonel Jacob had had his first meeting with Saiyid Abdul Kadir and had suffered disillusionment as to his character. Colonel Jacob confirmed this himself, showing the mansab just such a man as would be a fit tool in another's hands. The very false estimate of Saiyid Abdul Kadir, and what must be termed the stubborn refusal to accept warning from Hodeidah, must be attributed in part to Captain Nasir-ud-Din, an Indian Officer of the Political Department on the mission staff, who acted as scribe and A.D.C. to Colonel Jacob. This officer visited the mansab and acted as go-between; and he took so much part in affairs and talked mission and general politics so harmfully in Bajil that I had to beg Major Reilly in October to endeavour to silence him altogether. No more success attended this object than attended the effort to secure the silence of Colonel Jacob himself, whose persistence in close and intimate partnership with Mahmud Nathim and continual discussion with the sheikhs acted in direct opposition to the purpose of Government as sought through Hodeidah. The mansab did not reply to the letter addressed from Hodeidah, but the Quhra sheikhs wrote to say that they had put the Bajil telegraph office in order and requested me to open the Hodeidah office that communication, which they had interrupted after imprisoning the mission, might be resumed. This was done and I took the opportunity offered of informing the Quhra sheikhs of my assumption of complete charge of negotiation, inviting them to Hodeidah.

10. In respect of the raid and attack on Hodeidah, I had let it be known that Government would take no action against offenders who came in. The leader of the raid, a well-known highwayman and camel-driver of the Rabasa clan of the Aboos tribe, showing himself anxious to come in and explaining his action as due to hatred of the former political officer. I sent him safe-conduct, but for some days he hesitated and had to be coaxed, lying up often outside the town armed to the teeth, and on one occasion amusing himself by drawing a bead on me as I talked to some camel-men outside the picquet line. His advent was regarded with much popular satisfaction, for it broke the ice and made possible my plan to win over the Aboos tribe and detach it from the Quhra. The man at once became an ally and all his friends came in, going away pledged to secure the allegiance of the whole tribe.

11. On the 18th October Sheikh Ismail Baghawi, of the Jamadia clan of the Quhra tribe, sent a long telegram referring to his advice to Mr. Richardson that the mission should not leave Hodeidah, to the slaughter of his people in the attack on Hodeidah and other matters. In reply I acknowledged his advice to Mr. Richardson but showed him that he and Sheikh Abu Hadi had accepted responsibility for the safety of the mission by moving off with it to Bajil. I offered him pardon if the mission were released, promised to hear the wishes of the tribes and assured him of Government's good intentions towards the country. I dealt with other matters in his letter and invited him to Hodeidah, giving him safe-conduct.

12. At the same time, I wrote to Mahmud Nathim a letter intended to make plain to him that I did not share Colonel Jacob's estimate of him, and to disturb his security in his position with Colonel Jacob. Colonel Jacob was greatly incensed



at this attack on his friend, who was at that time doing his utmost to damage the British Government in the interests of Turkey and himself. The letter informed him of my assumption of sole charge of negotiation for the release of the mission and of the discontinuance of discussion in Bajil. I referred to his friendship with Colonel Jacob, and thanked him for his good offices, and I showed him I regarded him as having acted privately and as holding no official position. The proposal to reintroduce Turkish troops into the Tehama had not yet been negatived by Government, but I made plain to the ex-Vali that the proposal could not be accepted. I referred to the anomaly and danger of his position, and to his disobedience of orders to surrender, advising him to accept the hospitality of Government and leave the country. I touched on the offence of the sheikhs in detaining the mission, gave warning that continuance of the offence would lead to disaster, and showed that the interests of the tribes would best be served by compliance with my demands, Government undertaking to safeguard the interests of Hodeidah and of the neighbouring tribes, and to give opportunity for discussion of affairs in Hodeidah. I had, prior to that, represented to Government that the settlement of the question of the Tehama should not be dictated by the temporary considerations involved in the release of the mission, but as a result of the reasoned examination of the subject in all its bearings, and that it would be improper to evacuate Hodeidah till settlement of the whole question had been effected, Government having assumed definite responsibilities towards the people of the town by their evacuation of the Turks and occupation of the place by their own troops. This view was accepted.

13. On the 20th October a second letter was issued to Saiyid Abdul Kadir, reproving him for his failure to reply to the first communication. I dwelt on the dishonour of the Quhra sheikhs in imprisoning the mission, stated my terms, referred in flattering language to his influence, and gave warning of the result of the failure of the sheikhs to comply. I added that Arabs imprisoned in Aden in connection with troubles in Hodeidah would be released on release of the mission.

14. At this stage great advance had been made in winning over the people of the country. Bajil remained closed against me, but I was assured on all hands that Bajil would certainly succumb to the onslaught of popular feeling. I was quite confident of that myself, but allowed myself to be discouraged by Colonel Jacob, who wrote that my work had had no effect on the Quhra sheikhs, who were beyond my influence, and who still demanded the return of the Turks, evacuation of Hodeidah, and supply of arms for defence. Giving credence to this, I reported to the Resident that Colonel Jacob's letter led me to expect the necessity of seaplane demonstration, a message not at that time justified by the actual position.

15. The remark that Bajil was closed should not be read in literal sense. It means that I had not won the place over, that the feeling there remained bad. The Hodeidah-Bajil-Sanaa road was open, the Quhra camel-men were coming to Hodeidah daily, and were in contact with the friendly feeling there and throughout the country generally. The town and garrison were purchasing their increasing daily supplies from Quhra men and women, who disclaimed any connection or sympathy with the sheikhs. The people of Bajil were drawing their supplies from Hodeidah, and knew exactly all that was occurring there, as we knew in Hodeidah very accurately through general and confidential agency what was going on in Bajil. Secret agents in the Tehama towns added the general news collected from the continual flow of visitors from all directions. In Bajil, on the other hand, Colonel Jacob, who so positively insisted that he alone was in touch with the problem to be solved, was fed on information prepared for him and, absorbing readily the nourishment proffered by his cunning jailors, he grew to their mental measure and became in their hands an instrument against himself and against me, the agent of Government.

16. On the 21st October the Quhra sheikhs, Abu Hadi excepted, wrote to acknowledge my letter to them. They declared they were anxious to meet me in Hodeidah to discuss the subject of the mission and effect a settlement "conformable to the wishes of Government, without prejudice to our rights and security, our demands being considered according to the laws of the freedom of nations." They stated that the matter was one affecting not themselves alone, but the whole Tehama, and that it would serve no purpose for them to come to Hodeidah. They invited me to go to Bajil for discussion there, and offered me safe-conduct. Colonel Jacob was desirous that I should go to Bajil, but after despatch of the sheikhs' letter he warned me of intended treachery. I received many letters from people of the country warning me of the sheikhs' designs against my person, but I had no intention

of going to Bajil, as such procedure, even if safe, would have been undignified and improper. It was for the sheikhs to come to me. Seeing so clearly the hand of Mahmud Nathim at the helm of the Bajil ship, aware of his propaganda, and influenced also by Colonel Jacob's false appreciation of the situation, I recommended to the Resident that military operations should proceed, intending thereby that plans should be got ready for the application of force should such measures become necessary, and not, as appeared to have been thought, that such measures should actually be proceeded with. All along I had been making use of indirect threats, showing my many visitors and friends that, while Government were anxious to benefit the country and forgive the Quhra sheikhs, their patience under affront was strictly limited, and that, if force were resorted to, it would be thorough and disastrous, not only to the Quhra, but to the whole country. By the 24th October it had become evident that the Quhra clansmen, as apart from the sheikhs, were becoming anxious and were pressing the sheikhs to give way. The sheikhs, too, had been shown to have become uneasy and a little suspicious of Mahmud Nathim. They, Colonel Jacob wired to the Foreign Office on the 24th October, spoke of acceptance of a ransom in the event of Government's rejection of the proposal to reintroduce Turkish troops.

17. On that date Saiyid Abdul Kadir wrote to me excusing his failure to reply to my communications at earlier date, explaining that he had gone to Bajil at the request of the sheikhs to protect them from the Imam's designs against them, attributing the seizure of the mission to misunderstanding, and showing himself and Mahmud Nathim engaged in efforts to effect its release. He pledged my safety if I went to Bajil. The mansab holding the position of power among the tribes which he did, I did not show him or anyone outside my office that I regarded him as the chief villain in the play. I thanked him for his good work, and sent a consignment of rice as a gift to members of his family in Marawaa, the Saiyid village twelve miles from Hodeidah, which had been a boiling cauldron of ill-will towards the British, but which I was rapidly taking off the boil. These gifts were well received, and created good impression. Similar presents were made to other mansabs further afield. It was in Marawaa the raid and attack on Hodeidah were planned, and there also were hatched plots for further ventures against Hodeidah, which we heard of and prepared for from time to time, but which did not mature.

18. On the 24th October, when Saiyid Abdul Kadir professed his good intentions, he caused to be drawn up a document, the parties to which declared on oath that they would co-operate against the British Government as also against the Imam and any other power, and that they would under no circumstances go in to Hodeidah. The Quhra sheikhs, Sheikh Suleiman of the Aboos, Saiyid Ali Bari, and a few others signed the document. It was the result of the success of Hodeidah propaganda in Marawaa, one of the leading sayids of Marawaa having gone at that time to Bajil to remonstrate with Saiyid Abdul Kadir.

19. Mahmud Nathim had agents in Hodeidah, the chief of whom were the telegraph clerk, formerly in Turkish service, and Zuhdi Bey, formerly Director of Customs in the Yemen. The more Mahmud Nathim knew of affairs in Hodeidah, the better, and I treated these men well and employed Zuhdi Bey in local affairs, endeavouring to influence the ex-Vali through him, as the ex-Vali endeavoured to influence me by the same medium. Zuhdi would show me letters written to him by Nathim, illustrating his warm attachment to Colonel Jacob and efforts in his and the British Government's interests. One such letter declared that the ex-Vali regarded Colonel Jacob with the affection of a brother and averred that when I came to know him personally I would lose my mistrust of him and become one of the fraternity. It is of interest to note here that recently Mahmud Nathim has sent me a verbal message from Sanaa calculated to discredit Colonel Jacob, a matter previously referred to. Zuhdi Bey left Hodeidah in November, when he saw the game was lost, proceeding to the Hedjaz.

20. After some hesitation on the subject and with the advice of the Mansab of Hodeidah the chief men of Hodeidah agreed to circularise the sheikhs and mansabs of the whole country, showing the salient facts of the war in the Turco-British aspect, the defeat of Turkey, the British position in respect of Islam, Government's good intentions towards the Arabs and the Tehama, and the offence and folly of the action of the Quhra sheikhs. Special messengers of influence and persuasion carried the message to various centres. It made a great impression, and so great was this in Bajil that the present Kazi of Hodeidah, who delivered the message there, was in danger of his life and had to be smuggled out of the place the same night.



It is noteworthy that one of the sayyids in Bajil declared that he had been entirely misled as to the British position and that he would henceforth work for the release of the mission.

21. On the 27th October the sheikhs sent to the signatories of the circular and to the political office clerks a telegram accusing them of selling their faith for Christian gold; calling the curse of God on them; stating that Hodeidah was the property of the Quhra and Aboos tribes; giving six hours for the full renunciation on penalty of the extermination of themselves and families. After consultation, reply was sent denying any lapse in religion or harm to the tribes; maintaining that the circular was a declaration of fact; calling on the sheikhs to meet them at a rendezvous for discussion; and showing that the interests of the sheikhs and themselves were identical. This brought a friendly reply from the sheikhs, who promised to meet the elders of Hodeidah in Marawaa, a meeting which, however, did not take place. The Marawaa sayyids wrote to disclaim any connection with the Quhra sheikhs and to state their disapproval of their conduct, and further efforts were made to enlist their active assistance in securing the release of the mission, a certificate of pardon to the sheikhs if the mission were released being issued. I showed Colonel Jacob that good progress was being made, warned him to make no terms as to ransom, and stated that we could safely take a strong line. Colonel Jacob at this time noted the dissatisfaction of the Quhra people with the action of their sheikhs; and at the same period the first Zeranik sheikh to visit me came in. He showed the Zeranik to have no sympathy with the Quhra sheikhs, Sheikh Munasser of the lesser northern section being alone in his connection with them, his action prompted by avarice and by his desire to keep on good terms with Nathim, whose creature he has long been.

22. On the 28th October a respectable merchant of Sanaa, Mahommed Abdullal Swaid, visited me. My Arabic clerk had been formerly the British agent in Sanaa, and when in the month of June he was attacked in his house by a gang of men employed by the Imam and Mahmud Nathim, he escaped and sought shelter with Mahommed Abdullal Swaid, who kept him for a month and then took him in disguise to Midi. Mahommed Abdullal stated that he had travelled with two men of note in the Yemen, a certain kazi and one Sayyid Mahommed Zabara, the Imam's governor of the Khaulan tribe. He learned from Sayyid Mahommed that Mahmud Nathim had persuaded the Imam to adopt a scheme for the thwarting of British policy in the Yemen, it being Nathim's aim to restore communication with Constantinople and to secure the re-introduction of Turkish troops into the Yemen and the resumption of the Turkish connection with that country. In pursuance with this scheme he acquainted the Quhra sheikhs of the coming of a mission, stated that it might be an allied mission, in which case it should be detained in Bajil pending his orders, or that it might be a solely British mission, in which case it should be detained, the sheikhs being at liberty to impose their own terms on it. Nathim arranged with the sheikhs that after the detention of the mission he would go down to Bajil from Sanaa in the guise of mediator and that they were to profess to make him their prisoner. The informant declared that Nathim and the Imam were in full harmony. At a later date he was posted as intelligence agent in Sanaa, and he has recently asserted that this harmony still exists and that the Vali, as Nathim is still called, has the most complete influence with the Imam. Whatever the actual detail of the plot, this man's story, which I have every reason to credit, strengthened my own conviction that there had been such a plot and that Mahmud Nathim was the author of it and the principal figure in its enactment. This became more assured as time passed, and now, six weeks after the mission's release, remains fully established.

23. A letter from Mahmud Nathim to my address was received at the end of October. It referred to his exertions for the mission's release; it denied that he had suggested the return of Ottoman troops, attributing this desire to the sheikhs. It averred that the people had eagerly expected a mission composed of representatives of the Sublime Porte and of the Great Powers, and had heard of the detention of the mission in Bajil with sorrow. The Quhra sheikhs, the letter continued, had stated that they had risen to defend their religion and native country, and would have none but the Ottoman Government. It recounted that Colonel Jacob had given the sheikhs and Nathim to understand that the Treaty of Peace would provide that the Yemen should remain an Ottoman province, with Nathim its Governor, that being the wish of the people, and Colonel Jacob's visit to the Yemen having been for the purpose of ascertaining their wish. It stated that Colonel Jacob had enjoined Nathim to take over Hodeidah and that he, Colonel Jacob, would arrange for the evacuation of the British garrison. After reference to Moslem feeling on the subject of the future of

Turkey, the letter went on to show that Nathim was Governor of the Yemen, and recognised as such by the Imam, and that Governor he would remain. The Yemen was his home, and even if he were obliged to resign office he would continue to live there. The Turkish debts in the Yemen and means of evacuating the Turks remaining in the country, were dealt with, as also the future of Syria, and the letter ended with a repetition of Nathim's good intentions in respect of the mission.

24. Towards the end of the period of the mission's imprisonment Nathim showed anxiety to stand well with me and sent me frequent verbal and telegraphic messages to illustrate his good-feeling and his efforts to second my work for the mission's release. In one of these messages he expressed regret that he had written this letter, which he said was improper. When the Aboos sheikhs and those of the other tribes of the neighbourhood came in to visit me, they all accepted without hesitation the contention of the people of Hodeidah that Hodeidah must not be evacuated by the British till an effective settlement had been arrived at. The elders of Hodeidah showed unmistakable preference for the restitution of Turkish rule, on grounds of religious sympathy and not on those of popularity of administration, but the tribal sheikhs and others of the Tehama showed no particular preference for the Turk, many asking for British control in preference to that of the Turk, a feeling latterly become more pronounced. The general feeling among the tribes was and is that a strong Government is essential, British or Turk, and the weight of preference probably for British. That the words in the mouths of the Quhra sheikhs were from Nathim's dictation is evident, when it is pointed out that Nathim had made the utmost endeavour to prevent the surrender of the Turkish garrison in the Yemen with a view to the forcible continuation of Ottoman rule after the armistice; but the tribes would have nothing to do with his scheme, refused to feed or assist to feed the Turkish troops if they remained, and obliged Nathim to give up his plan and permit the troops to depart. The tribes showed then most clearly they desired peace and that any liking they had for the Turk was a thing of no moment in their future lot. And many sheikhs have told me that at the time of the armistice they looked forward to the advent of British rule, a feeling that was subjected to change by the continuance of the blockade. As to the ex-Vali's remarks on the subject of an Allied mission, it is clear that an Allied mission had been spoken of before the Jacob mission arrived; and there seems no doubt that the report of the coming of an Allied mission emanated from Nathim as part of the machinery of his plot. Recently since the release of the mission, Nathim has professed desire to leave the country, and has sought my assistance in the matter, action I regard as probably insincere.

25. On the 29th October the chief sheikh of the Rabasa clan of the Aboos tribe came in and tendered allegiance. On the 30th October the Quhra sheikhs wired to say they had received a safe-conduct to Hodeidah through Marawaa sayyids, but that they could not act upon it and desired me to go to Bajil. The elders of Hodeidah suspecting treachery from the sheikhs, had invited them to Hodeidah in place of Marawaa for the meeting previously referred to, and this brought an irate telegram from the sheikhs on the 30th October. They charged the elders of having taken the side of infidels against Moslems, of having misled the sayyids of the country to the same wicked action. They again laid claim to Hodeidah and described the people of Hodeidah as foreigners, terminating the message with dire threats. The elders replied in mild terms, begging the sheikhs to beware of the misleading schemes of the people in Bajil and to see reason.

26. At the end of October Colonel Jacob sent me an original letter from the Quhra sheikhs, the Katabia sheikh and the Aboos sheikh Suleiman Hassan, who always styled himself also, without authority, as agent of the Zeranik. The letter was addressed to Colonel Jacob as British envoy. It recounted grievances in the matter of the blockade, Mr. Richardson's treatment of the people, the attack on Hodeidah. It referred to the fresh offence of my local work in Hodeidah, to the anger it caused to the people, who threatened to again attack Hodeidah. It went on to show that the sheikhs had visited Colonel Jacob that day and declared to him the pact made by all the Tehama tribes from the Quhra to Zabeed that they required the return of Turkish troops, the evacuation of Hodeidah by the British, the rule of the Turkish Government under the principle of self-determination, the return of arms and ammunition taken from the Turks. Failure of compliance, the letter stated, would result in popular indignation and renewed attack on Hodeidah. Colonel Jacob remained blind to the real meaning of these communications from the sheikhs, which he should have refused to accept, as he should have refused to hold discussion with the sheikhs. He accepted so completely positions placed before him, and was so



much in the hands of his captors and so entirely ignorant of popular tribal feeling that he himself backed up the protest in respect of municipal work in Hodeidah. Such ignorance would have applied to any prisoner similarly placed, and would not be mentioned had not Colonel Jacob so persistently claimed to be alone in touch with tribal affairs. He was satisfied with my demonstration of the facts, which he explained to the sheikhs, who, of course, were fully aware of the real position. The ex-Vali was hard pushed to find a good subject for agitation. Nevertheless, he succeeded in rousing the sheikhs to discuss an attack on Hodeidah and their idle threats were carried to Hodeidah and served to bring a public declaration from the now friendly Aboos in the neighbourhood of the town that raiders on Hodeidah would reckon with them.

27. It seems needless to say that the mark of Nathim stood in unusually strong relief in that letter: it seemed to stamp equally the envoy and his captors; for the sheikhs' language on the subject of Turkey and her virtual sovereignty of the Yemen during the period between the armistice and the Peace Treaty is that of Colonel Jacob in his correspondence with me. An earlier letter from the sheikhs of the Quhra tribe alone—Sheikh Abu Hadi did not subscribe to these compositions—bore as strongly the mark of the ex-Vali. Before noting on its contents, it may be remarked that in the letter above quoted the statement that a pact had been made among all the tribes of the Tehama down to Zabeed was entirely false. There are many such tribes, and the Quhra and Aboos are but a minor portion of the whole. Acting with the Quhra were only a portion of the Aboos and the sheikh of the northern or smaller section of the Zeranik, shown before as the creature of the ex-Vali. Occasionally some minor sheikh arrived in Bajil would place his seal on a Quhra document, but to suppose that the Quhra sheikhs, less their own head sheikh and with one of the two principal Aboos sheikhs acting with them, represented the Tehama is an error.

28. The earlier letter addressed to Colonel Jacob is of great length. It speaks of the popular joy at the prospect of an Ottoman-Allied mission, and the surprise and disappointment on the arrival of a British mission. It declares the determination of the people to have the Ottoman Government restored, and refers to Colonel Jacob's undertaking that he would remain in Bajil till the return of the Ottoman troops. It deals with Mr. Richardson's unpopularity and the blockade. It declares there was no ill-feeling between the Quhra and the Imam prior to the advent of the mission, and that they had regarded him with reverence as the great pillar of Islam in the Yemen. The Imam, the letter goes on, objected to the detention of the mission, but acquiesced in the Quhra's action when he understood that their object was to safeguard their country by demanding the restoration of Ottoman rule, the Imam being the great friend of Turkey and her ally by treaty. Religion and patriotism are touched on, in company with the principles laid down by the Peace Conference. Arms and ammunition are asked for, for protection against the Idrisi, in accordance with earlier promise made. Play is made on England's friendship for Islam, and her duty for acting in the interests of Islam in this case. The Imam, as the great pillar of Islam in the Shafai eyes of the Tehama, is a conception the Quhra sheikhs would not make public now in Nathim's absence. Soon after the mission's release, the sheikhs begged the Idrisi's protection against the Imam, acclaimed the Idrisi troops on arrival in Quhra territory, and they now hope to smash the pillar Nathim built for them. That Colonel Jacob should fail to find his real position with Nathim in such communications, with all his knowledge of the Arab to assist him, and with my own repeated warning to stimulate his suspicion, is a fact sufficient to show the difficulty in my extricating him from a position in which he seemed determined to act as his own jailor.

29. The defection of the Aboos clans was going on apace. They were entertained in Hodeidah when they came in, and I discussed the whole position with each party on its arrival. Great good-will was shown, and the party would swear friendship and co-operation in the work of release of the mission, by force of arms if necessary. Considerable presents were given to these Aboos clans to hasten the arrival of others, and give impetus to the undermining of the Quhra sheikhs' position, by attraction of the Quhra to Hodeidah. Presents were given to important saiyids, who visited me, as also to sheikhs of tribes other than the Quhra and Aboos, and a continual stream of people of all sorts kept me very fully employed. On the 1st November good progress was reported to Aden, but Nathim's presence made the result so uncertain that recommendation was made that preparation for aeroplanes and other measures should proceed.

30. Major Reilly informed me on the 30th October of the insolence of the Quhra sheikhs to Colonel Jacob, and of the absence in Bajil of any signs of improvement. He agreed with my estimate of Nathim. He informed me that Colonel Jacob was making no proposals to the sheikhs, who, however, continued to make suggestions to him. Colonel Jacob was, however, still taking an active part, for he sent me a letter from the sheikhs to his address, dated the 30th October. The letter acknowledged Colonel Jacob's letter of the 28th October, in which he intimated to the sheikhs that Government had decided that the Turkish Government would not be reinstated in Hodeidah, and that he was prepared to recommend to His Majesty's Government the evacuation of Hodeidah by them in favour of a representative of the Arabs on condition of the mission's release. The writers declared that if this were correct they nominated Saiyid Abdul Kadir bin Abdul Bari, nephew of the mansab, as their representative to take over charge of Hodeidah. They made a demand for arms.

31. By the 3rd November there were signs of the speedy break up of the Quhra. The sheikhs frequently changed position, and it appeared at that time that all the sheikhs, except Mahommed Zaid, were in favour of the release of the mission. Mahommed Zaid accused Nathim of the plot and of now turning traitor to the cause, and went so far as to threaten him with his jambea. Mahommed Zaid is a man of strong character, and is the sheikh of the clans lying between Bajil and Obal. When he visited Hodeidah at the time of the mission's arrival, he denounced Nathim as the cause of all the trouble. At this time he was incited to bigotry and hostility by Saiyid Ali Bari, a dangerous firebrand who did much to prevent the earlier collapse of the sheikhs, and whom I was unable to persuade to visit Hodeidah before the mission's release, fear keeping him from accepting the bait I offered, and which he greedily longed to accept, matter to be touched on again further on.

32. Colonel Jacob expressed indignation at this time that Government had not seen fit to spare a single aeroplane, which would probably have secured the immediate release of the mission.

33. Sheikh Yusuf Ali, of the Manafira tribe, paid me a visit on the 3rd November; and on that day came also to see me the first important Quhra. He was the brother of one of the headmen, and he showed that the Quhra headmen generally were for us, and that, now that he had tested our intentions, they would work for us. There were signs that Mahmud Nathim was changing his ground, as declared by Sheikh Mahommed Zaid, but very soon afterwards there was evidence of a renewal of his anti-British propaganda, and I continued to regard him as an active enemy. The Imam now seemed anxious that Nathim return to Sanaa, the mission going to Sanaa or Hodeidah.

34. Colonel Jacob now pointed out that the success of my work in winning over the country was inciting suspicion that His Majesty's Government intended taking over the Tehama. This was so, and I reported the matter to Aden, asking for the despatch of aircraft to hasten a decision. I was careful to show that Government had no intention of taking over the country, a result many people desired to see. Sheikh Bura and lesser people in the Imam's territory had asked for British protection, as also some of the sheikhs in the Tehama. Sheikh Sahel Ali, controlling the larger section of the Aboos tribe, came in on the 5th November with a large following. His visit was a great success. Suspicious at first, it was in much doubt of my intentions, he agreed to be taken out to a man-o'-war with two lesser sheikhs. The entertainment on board and description of all there was to be seen made a great impression, and his return to his country after a few days in Hodeidah was a triumphal march as the ally of England. He declared, however, that he would seek the lead of Government in any question as to the settlement of the Tehama, and act on Government's advice; and he undertook if called upon to carry off the mission by force. Sheikh Sahel Ali's visit had immediate effect on Sheikh Suleiman Hassan al Bakheit, the partner of the Quhra sheikhs and Sahel's rival and enemy. Suleiman wrote a friendly letter from Bajil to say he was now working for the release of the mission, and soon afterwards came in. I wrote at great length to Suleiman Hassan explaining in detail the history of affairs, and showing him the course I desired him to follow. His nephew paid me a visit immediately afterwards, as did Salim Hassan of the Jehba tribe and a large body of saiyids from Doraihim. Sheikh Yusuf Ali, of the Manafira tribe, also came in at this time, and akils, of the Katabia tribe, whose sheikh is a friend of Sheikh Suleiman Hassan, and had been acting on occasion with him. All were attended by large parties, and all went away enthusiastic in our cause.



35. After the release of the mission there came to light a letter composed by Saiyid Abdul Kadir in Bajil early in November. It purported to be from the Quhra sheikhs and the people of the Tehama to the Idrisi. It recounted the threat of invasion by the Imam and the agreement which they made with the Imam before the coming of the mission. It described the reports of the coming of an international mission, and the arrival of a British mission and its arrest. This arrest of the mission, the letter stated, had aroused the anger of the Imam, and the Tehama tribes therefore threw themselves on the Idrisi and sought his protection. It is not known whether this letter was ever signed and delivered, but it was after its preparation that Sheikh Khuzam of the Quhra visited the Idrisi, at which time also the Jorabih tribe, neighbours of the Quhra on the north, declared for the Idrisi.

36. It became evident at this time that there was a pact between Saiyid Abdul Kadir and the sheikhs that they would have no connection with Hodeidah, and would not go there. The notorious Saiyid Ali Bari, already mentioned, wrote to me to show that he was anxious to come in, but could not do so under an agreement which bound him, unless I could secure the permission of the sheikhs. This was the declaration of the 24th October previously described, but retained a secret till after the mission's release. Now, Mr. Richardson had averred that Colonel Jacob had prevented the sheikhs from coming to Hodeidah, Colonel Jacob had declined to ask the sheikhs to come in to me, and I will now show that after the release of the mission, Nathim sent me a document prepared, he stated, by Colonel Jacob as a draft declaration for the sheikhs that they would have no dealings with anyone but Colonel Jacob. Colonel Jacob was anxious to save his name, and there seems little doubt that he directly or indirectly did much to prevent the sheikhs meeting me in order that he should appear eventually as the saviour of the mission. And certainly he did not act on the spirit of the order that he was not to take part in discussion, prolonging my work and the imprisonment not only of himself but of the members of his mission.

37. On the 5th November news of the coming of aeroplanes reached us. I made no secret of their coming, and was hopeful that the resistance of the sheikhs would come to an end before their arrival. Speaking generally, I had now secured the good-will and allegiance of the whole saiyyid community of the Tehama, as of the tribes. Popular opinion was for the release of the mission unconditionally, and in their continued resistance the sheikhs and their inspirers and friends were isolated and acting as individuals. I spread the idea now that there was no question as to the early release of the mission, either by force or without it, and that it would be well for the sheikhs to act at once as of their own accord, thus performing a popular deed and winning themselves honour.

38. Mahmud Nathim, having failed in his first venture, nominated Saiyid Abdul Kadir to take his place as the Arab ruler of the Tehama under the new scheme proposed to, and advocated by Colonel Jacob. This prospect of kingship, so ludicrous to all outside Bajil, captivated the worthless but revered mansab, who now worked steadily for the attainment of his own glory, estranged from his own people of Merawaa, who went so far as to threaten to depose him from the mansabship. Nathim no doubt hoped to use Saiyid Abdul Kadir as his pawn in this way, to secure for himself the lordship of the Tehama, a position he himself showed he desired, and which Sheikh Ali, as Salami the Imam's agent in Bajil told me, after the release of the mission, that Nathim had greatly coveted. That Colonel Jacob's faith was still unshaken was shown by his wire to the High Commissioner of the 7th November begging that the Turkish Government should despatch to the Vali 10,000*l.* for the relief of the Turks in Yemen.

39. Nathim's propaganda fell flat in the Tehama in the face of that from Hodeidah, but it is remarkable how effective it was in Bajil itself, which remained isolated from Tehama feeling, a fact shown by the fear of the Bajil merchants in dealing with Hodeidah. Of course, the sheikhs were very fearful of punishment, and the people of Bajil no doubt felt themselves involved. So great was this fear of punishment—a useful feeling for the play of intrigue—that it remained up to the time of the arrival of the mission; and it was with a great load off their minds the sheikhs left Hodeidah a few days after the mission's departure for Aden.

40. On receipt of news of the coming of aeroplanes, I wrote to Saiyid Abdul Kadir acknowledging his offer of safe conduct to Bajil sent some time previously, and pointing out that it was not for Government's representative to go to the sheikhs. I invited them again through him to visit me. Colonel Jacob's faith in the mansab remained whole, though I assured him that all the mansab's people and intimate

associates declared that Saiyid Abdul Kadir could if he wished secure the immediate release of the mission. Colonel Jacob, a prisoner, knowing now from me how closely I was in touch with the people, stubbornly refused to accept my views, and continued on the false track on which he had set his feet at the beginning. So it was that on the 6th November I was driven to write to him that I regarded him as his own worst enemy. And so strong was my feeling at his remarkable attitude that he had been alone and unaccompanied in Bajil, I would have been inclined to leave him to work out his own salvation. We redoubled our exertions in Hodeidah, however.

41. A number of Quhra headmen came in at the end of the first week in November, and it was clear that opinion among the Quhra clans was coming rapidly to my side. Colonel Jacob argued that the Quhra cared little for Hodeidah or its trade prosperity, but the Aboos and Quhra men who visited me showed me they regarded their interests as entirely bound up with those of Hodeidah and its trade. They showed no particular wish, in free speech in Hodeidah, for the return of the Turks, desired only to have a strong Government in control, showed themselves amenable to Government's advice, and displayed their preference for the Idrisi if any Arab ruler were to be nominated, treating as humorous the idea of Saiyid Abdul Kadir as a ruler, though expressing regard for him as a religious leader. At this period Idrisi propaganda in Zeranik country was meeting with marked success, but Sheikh Munassar, of the Northern Zeranik, wrote to me to say he wanted neither Idrisi nor Imam, but sought British control.

42. The Resident at Aden, Major-General Sir James Stewart, visited Hodeidah on the 8th and 9th November, interviewed some of the local people, and found the position satisfactory. About the same time some of the sheikhs threatened to remove the mission from Bajil to more distant quarters, a threat frequently advanced.

43. On the 9th I was summoned to the telegraph office to take a message from the sheikhs. The message enquired whether I approved of the scheme of Abdul Kadir as ruler. I refused discussion and invited the sheikhs to Hodeidah. Reply invited me to Bajil. I learned afterwards that the sheikhs had not sent the message but Saiyid Abdul Kadir. Late that night I had a secret visit from akils of Sheikh Mahommed Zaid and Sheikh Ismail Baghawi's clan. They begged that their visit be kept secret from Saiyid Abdul Kadir and were sent off with letters to their sheikhs. I had given liberal presents to all Aboos men coming in, but I gave no rewards to men of the Quhra, promising them their reward on the release of the mission. All this time agents had been working on my behalf throughout the country, many visiting Bajil and corresponding with people there. On the 14th I reported to Aden that Nathim was still working against us, and on this account I adopted a firmer attitude, making use of more direct threats. I warned all visitors that Government's patience was drawing to a close, that I would use aeroplanes if speedy result were not forthcoming, that such measures would entail destruction of life and property which could not be confined in its application. I wrote in this sense to the saiyyids of Merawaa and other influential people, and a fresh campaign was started by them on these lines. I addressed a long letter to the Quhra sheikhs on the 14th November. The letter acquainted them with the arrival in Kamaran of a force of aeroplanes and summoned them to at once declare their friendship; it warned them of their responsibility for the safety and welfare of their people, and of the harm a false decision on their part would entail, the language used being that calculated to have best effect on Moslem feeling; it showed that I was ready to discuss matters in Hodeidah and that safe conduct issued remained good, stress being laid on my position as the representative of Government; it related that I was fully aware of the circumstances of their arrest of the mission and of the intrigue of which they were the agents, intrigue designed for the benefit of another at their expense; it called upon them to break away from this sinister influence and to act for their own good on their own initiative, placing their trust in Government which had demonstrated itself, through me, trustworthy; it held out the hand of friendship, offered them forgiveness as men who had not committed fault of their own motion, called upon them to deliver up the mission, and showed that thus they would escape the punishment that would otherwise be meted out to them. The letter went on to intimate the intention of Government to remain in Hodeidah until arrangements had been made which would safeguard the interests of the town and the Shafai tribes of its neighbourhood, Government undertaking not to leave Hodeidah and the Quhra and the Aboos tribes in the lurch, and to endeavour to effect a just settlement equitable to all interests. The communication ended by invitation to the sheikhs to accept the friendship offered, cease idle talk, come to Hodeidah and discuss affairs there. Colonel



Jacob was again incensed at the attack on Nathim in this letter, which he declared had made Nathim very angry.

44. On this date, the 14th November, Colonel Jacob again displayed his complete dependence on Mahmud Nathim in manner I can only describe as childlike. I would hold it ungracious to quote so freely from the record to Colonel Jacob's detriment, but his ungenerous conduct in seeking to diminish the effect of his mistakes and misfortune at my expense obliges me to disclose my position fully. Colonel Jacob went to the telegraph office in Bajil and requested me to go to the Hodeidah office for the exchange of messages. After testing his identity I informed him it was not a fact that I had asked that he alone should be brought to Hodeidah to discuss matters with me personally, as had been given out by Sheikh Suleiman. I required, I said, that the whole mission come in on my original terms. He replied in these words: "I shall tell the Vali and communicate with you again." I informed him by telegraph later the same day of my message to the sheikhs, and on the day following a letter issued to Akil Omar Saghir and all the Quhra headmen, enclosing a copy of the letter to the sheikhs, referring to their good-will towards ourselves and to our good intentions towards the tribes, and counselling them to see to it that the sheikhs take no action detrimental to their people. On the following day a party of Akil Omar Saghir's men came in. I adopted a severe tone, showed that further talk and promise were idle and that friendship must be proved by action. On the 17th November the Quhra sheikhs wrote a threat that if my interference with their people did not cease they would harass the mission in such a way as to bring me into disgrace with my Government.

45. The Merawaa sayids were given money freely for propaganda at this time, influential men of the community visiting Bajil. Omar Saghir remained in close touch with Hodeidah till the release of the mission was achieved, taking a leading place in rousing popular feeling against the sheikhs, and being supplied with money for his entertainment of his friends and following in Bajil.

46. On the 20th November I reported to Aden that the Quhra still held strongly to their demand for rifles, machine-guns, field-guns and ammunition from Turkish stock. Colonel Jacob and Major Reilly both pressed me to accept this proposal, but I could not do so on the ground that the Quhra tribe was not a controlled body and unable to use field and machine-guns, that Nathim was still present, that the supply would probably fall into the hands of the Imam and that if one Tehama tribe were armed all could claim similar treatment, a large armament of the Quhra alone placing that tribe in a position which would threaten their neighbours. The Resident agreed with my view.

47. The same day Colonel Jacob wired that Sheikh Abu Hadi had informed him that the Quhra sheikhs intended leaving for Hodeidah that evening to visit me and that there seemed likelihood of agreement with me. He asked for confirmation of safe-conduct which I gave by telegraph. Information prior to this showed the sheikhs to have become much afraid of their position and anxious to secure a safe exit from it. They sent me, however, a threatening message as the result of my visit to the Quhra village of Jabbanah a few days previously, where I had warned the people of the folly of the sheikhs, whose action, if persisted in, would entail the destruction of villages. The headman of the village had gone off to Bajil to beg his sheikh to release the mission. This threatening message was followed by a polite one to say the sheikhs were despatching a deputation to Hodeidah. The Quhra mansab was now working for me, and on the 21st letters of exhortation were issued to him, to principal Quhra headmen and all the Aboos sheikhs. Sheikh Munassar, of the Northern Zeranik, sent in a party on the 22nd declaring his co-operation and offering to send in members of Sheikh Abu Hadi's family from his country as hostages for the safety of the mission. This at first seemed attractive, but I refused the offer and declined to give the sheikh a present till he came himself.

48. The Quhra sheikhs now released Hassan Kanjooi, a clerk, whom Mr. Richardson had sent to Bajil after the imprisonment of the mission and who had himself been made prisoner. Hassan Kanjooi gave me, to begin with, a panegyric on Nathim, and it seemed evident he had been charged to execute that office. He quickly veered round, and ended by what appeared a more exact description of the Turk, showing him the prime mover in the Bajil plot and its execution and describing Nathim's friendship with Colonel Jacob while in his presence, and hostility to his interests elsewhere.

49. The deputation from the Quhra consisted of Saiyid Ahmed Murshidi, the mufti of Bajil, and Kadthi Mahommed Harwood, a creature of Nathim's who had

been a deputy for the Tehama in the Turkish Parliament, and had been a chief agent in inciting Sheikh Mahommed Zaid to hold up the mission in Bajil. It arrived on the 22nd, and the same morning an aeroplane flew from Kamaran over Hodeidah and back again via Merawaa. On that date I had news of a wrathful letter from Saiyid Abdul Kadir to Saiyid Ali Bari who had asked permission to visit me. The mansab used strong language, accused Ali Bari of consorting with infidels in language similar to that often used by Nathim, and threatened him with dire calamity if he disobeyed his behests. At the same time the Kadthi of Merawaa sent to me a letter written to him by Saiyid Abdul Kadir, and endorsed by Nathim, summoning him to Bajil urgently for conference on matters affecting the interests of Islam. The kadthi wrote that he desired to have nothing to do with Abdul Kadir, but said that if I thought he could advance my purpose in any way he would do as I desired. Similar letters were issued by Abdul Kadir to other influential sayids without effect.

50. I will quote now from a note I recorded on the use of aeroplanes in connection with release of the mission:—

"The planes will be used by way of demonstration in the first instance. The Arab believes what he sees, and, popular opinion being now generally favourable to the release of the mission, this use of the planes will combine fear with reason and bring pressure on the sheikhs to its maximum power. The sheikhs themselves will be under the influence of Mahmud Nathim on one side, employing the weapons of fanaticism, religious and secular, suspicion, greed and power, and, on the other side, of popular opinion, of faint touches of reason, of greed and of fear. The first set of influences are in continual and close operation, the second intermittent and remote. The planes will intensify the pressure of popular demand and fear . . . ."

51. The first flight was productive of great results fully up to expectation. Members of the mission were confined to their house, but Colonel Jacob, himself critical at first and anxious as to the effect, informed me that Saiyid Abdul Kadir was alarmed. This of the one man who held the keys in his hand was most gratifying to us in Hodeidah. Merawaa and the whole countryside were greatly afraid, and exaggerated stories travelled through villages of the Tehama and the Yemen. Great pressure was brought upon the mansab by the sayids and upon the sheikhs by the people, and the anxiety of the sheikhs grew. The speedy release of the mission was now assured.

52. The deputation from the Quhra remained several days in Hodeidah. They saw the plane on the morning of the first day and were duly impressed. They paid me a friendly visit and accepted an invitation to tea with me the same day. The merchants of the town and other of our friends were with them continually, showing the error of their ways, before they came to me on the third day for discussion. They brought a letter from the Quhra sheikhs in the name of the Quhra tribe alone. In this letter the sheikhs declared that for some months the mission had been negotiating with them, at all times acquiescing in their demands, asking for time to communicate with Government, and then stating Government's disapproval. They remarked on my efforts to release the mission "by intrigue and money," and endeavoured to show that my dealings with the tribesmen instead of themselves were useless, a statement their own attitude was sufficient to disprove. They stated that they had asked for the return of the Ottoman Government and Ottoman troops, and that Colonel Jacob had agreed but then gone back on his word, he thereafter of his own motive proposing that the British should evacuate Hodeidah and deliver the town to them, the owners of the land. After vague remarks on breach of faith on the Aden authorities, they demanded fulfilment of Colonel Jacob's promise of evacuation and delivery of the town, together with a gift of 1,000 rifles, 2,000 boxes of ammunition, 5 field guns with 2,000 shells, and 5 machine guns with 100 boxes of ammunition. The deputation had nothing to say and merely begged for patience. I kept them a long time, however. I explained Turkey's past and present position, British policy in Arabia and intentions as to the Tehama. I referred to blockade, world and local. I dealt with the letter from the sheikhs seriatim, showing its impropriety, and explaining that arms could not be given. I contrasted the atmosphere of Bajil and Hodeidah—the attitude of the importunate savage, knife in hand, with that of quiet and common sense and reason. They agreed on all points; said they had not understood the position of Turkey; admitted that the Quhra were not fit to use or control a considerable supply of arms; that talk of "infidels" was absurd; that they could rely on His Majesty's Govern-



ment; that it was impossible to hand over Hodeidah to the tribes. They excused the sheikhs as being mere savages and begged for patience. I dwelt then on the position of enlightened men such as themselves and the sayids, and of their responsibility as counsellors of the sheikhs and leaders of opinion. I showed I knew the part played by each actor in the mission play. I promised pardon and protection to the sheikhs in the event of immediate compliance with my demand, and full opportunity for discussion thereafter. I gave severe warning that I would brook no further delay, that no Government but the British would have shown such clemency and stayed their hand so long. They were greatly impressed and took leave, pledged to work for the immediate release of the mission and assuring me that this would be speedily effected.

53. On the following day, the 26th, the deputation met the elders of the town for discussion. They all afterwards came to me, and in my presence they set down the terms which they desired I should adopt as my final terms to the sheikhs, in slight modification of those I had myself prepared and shown them. The document gave reasons for refusal of armament, required the return of the mission, and gave the following assurances:—

- (1.) Full pardon.
- (2.) Permission for discussion by the tribes in Hodeidah of the question of a ruler, the political officer undertaking to refer their wishes to Government for consideration with Yemen matters generally, which form part of the greater considerations now receiving the attention of His Majesty's Government and the Allied Powers, the British Government remaining in Hodeidah till the question has been settled conformably with the views of the people.
- (3.) Pending settlement, protection from unprovoked aggression.
- (4.) Freedom of trade.

The document closed with admonition to accept the proffered friendship.

54. On the 25th November letters were issued to the merchants of Bajil and Obal showing the harm that would fall on them if the mission were not released, and explaining the position generally.

55. I had arranged for an aeroplane to pass over Bajil and Obal on the morning of the 26th, and had given warning through Akil Omar Saghir. The plane left Kamaran, had engine trouble, turned back, picked up again, and proceeded on its journey. When over Bajil the engine gave out again, and the plane dropped from 3,000 to 1,000 feet. There was great alarm. The pilot feared a forced landing, but picked up and went off, a number of shots being fired at him as he went. A Turkish soldier on a roof discharged his gun through a window of the mission house after shooting at the plane, and several others followed suit. One of the medical officers of the mission was shot at point blank but escaped, while a man who had proposed to me to arrange an Arab raid on Bajil for the release of the mission, and whose offer I had rejected, made rush into the house with a knife shouting death to Colonel Jacob. He was arrested. Had the pilot been forced to land he would undoubtedly have been murdered, and the safety of the mission would have been jeopardised. As it was, it was fortunate no one was hurt. Colonel Jacob wired in much excitement details of the occurrence, unaware of the engine failure, and made the following observation: "For God's sake send no more of this craft, which does not advance our cause one iota." On the 30th I received letters from Colonel Jacob and Major Reilly to inform me that the effect of the flight had been excellent, and that there was great advance towards settlement. The sheikhs, Saiyid Abdul Kadir and Nathim, all behaved well in protecting the mission on the 26th.

56. After meeting me on their arrival, the deputation had wired the sheikhs a favourable account of myself, and begged them come to Hodeidah. After the aeroplane incident on the 26th the sheikhs wired the deputation of the fact, and complained that the deputation had spoken well of the political officer who had taken this action. The deputation repeated their opinion, and wired my final terms to the sheikhs, who replied in chaste words, asked the deputation to return, and stated that there was now prospect of their acceptance and of final settlement.

57. It has been shown that Sheikh Sahel Ali, of the Aboos tribe, volunteered to release the mission by force. Many such offers were made to me by individuals of the Aboos and tribes from time to time. On the 28th November Akil Omar Saghir informed me of his pact, with certain other akils of the Quhra tribe, that it was practically certain that the mission would be released by peaceful means, but that if this failed they would release it by force. On the 1st December Yusuf Abdullah, the head of another group of akils, informed me that his group had demanded of Saiyid

Abdul Kadir the release of the mission, that Saiyid Abdul Kadir had promised release in eight days, and that they had agreed to allow that time. My confidential messenger showed that there was great rivalry for the honour of releasing the mission, and that release was assured. On the 3rd December Colonel Jacob wired as follows: "Saiyid Abdul Kadir and sheikhs have now definitely agreed to our release. They want a message from you congratulating them on this decision, and renewing your invitation and promise of honourable reception in Hodeidah to them all. On receipt of this they will escort us into Hodeidah. I recommend you to send this message by telegram." The telegram was confirmed by a letter, in which Colonel Jacob stated that he had suggested to Nathim that he should accompany the party to Hodeidah, and he asked me to issue invitation to Nathim.

58. Independent information showed that on the 2nd December Nathim, Saiyid Abdul Kadir, the members of the deputation, the sheikhs, less Mahommed Zaid, who was away in his village, and Akil Omar Saghir and another, had decided to release the mission and divide the mission treasure among them. The merchants of Bajil protested against this robbery, and demanded release of the mission intact. That evening Sheikh Mahommed Zaid came in with a party of armed men, and refused to allow the mission to leave. A quarrel ensued, and a meeting was fixed for the 4th December to settle the matter. On the 5th Colonel Jacob reported a hitch, and the same day the sheikhs wired to me to say that Abdul Kadir, the sheikhs of the Quhra tribe, and all the Shafai people had drawn up an agreement with Colonel Jacob, and they asked if I would accept its terms. I asked them to send the agreement for inspection. Later in the day Colonel Jacob telegraphed as follows: "Sheikhs have accepted your proposal for our release, but have desired me to corroborate the same over my signature. This I have done with slight alterations inserted by them, and these are logical amplifications of your text. The principal modifications are as follows: Firstly, Saiyid Abdul Kadir is chosen at once with approval of all tribes concerned to be their temporary ruler until the signing of the Peace Treaty with Turkey, when a permanent ruler is to be freely chosen by the tribes. Secondly, the general amnesty is stipulated to include release of Arab prisoners taken in attacks on Hodeidah since our occupation of town. These stipulations are in conformity with the principles of settlement laid down by you, and I have therefore taken on myself full responsibility of agreeing to them. The sayid and sheikhs now want a message from you confirming the agreement thus amended, and endorsing my action in signing it. I hope you will do this at once, as any delay affording opportunity for further discussion or reconsideration is undesirable, and the receipt of this message from you is all that is now required to effect our release. If you so desire, I will send you original draft by special messenger for your approval and signature." Now, Colonel Jacob had no authority to enter into any agreement with the sheikhs. They had accepted my terms, and there was no necessity to enlarge on them. As all through the period of my work, had Colonel Jacob shown strength and held himself silent there would have been no trouble. I had no intention of making any form of treaty with the sheikhs, the whole sense of my position having been that the sheikhs must conform to my requirements, prepared though I was to give them assurances, as I had done. Now I had the mortification of seeing Colonel Jacob, at the moment of success, taking action contrary to the principle which had guided my work all through. However, I was most anxious to cut the matter short. It did not affect the position if the Quhra elected Abdul Kadir as their ruler. There was no likelihood of such an election being accepted by all the tribes, the idea being regarded as ridiculous by tribesmen visiting Hodeidah; and the Quhra were acting alone; it was a tribal matter. That Hodeidah could be contemplated as included in the sphere of Abdul Kadir's rulership was a matter not dreamt of. The Aboos sheikhs, Quhra headmen, and people of the Tehama generally scouted the idea of Hodeidah being placed under Abdul Kadir or any other ruler from among themselves; the Quhra deputation had, as Colonel Jacob was aware, pronounced such a plan impossible; and I had all along shown that Hodeidah interests must be safeguarded. The terms presented to the sheikhs by the deputation clearly showed this position. The following answer was therefore telegraphed to Colonel Jacob the same day: "I agree generally to modifications in keeping with general tenour of my terms to sheikhs. I agree also to release of Arab prisoners." I informed the sheikhs by telegram that I would accept the terms of agreement between them and Colonel Jacob. In reply to this wire to the sheikhs, Saiyid Abdul Kadir telegraphed the same evening to enquire what exactly my endorsement of Colonel Jacob's agreement with them meant, an incident that



seemed significant. The reply, in Arabic, was as follows: "We desire to assure you that if the tribesmen elect you as their ruler pending the settlement of the future Government of the country, we shall approve of their election and congratulate you on your appointment. As to the question of future government as a permanent measure, that has been fully provided for in our letter to the sheikhs given to the deputation. The Arabs taken prisoner in operations at Hodeidah will be released, as we have previously assured you. We hope you will take steps to secure the immediate release of the mission, as the prolonged delay may exhaust the patience of Government. We welcome you to Hodeidah."

59. On the following day, the 6th December, was received a letter, No. 27, from Colonel Jacob enclosing the agreement with the sheikhs, which he had agreed to sign, and on which Saiyid Abdul Kadir required my signature. This letter and agreement excited my indignation as not only representing a final act of supreme folly on the part of Colonel Jacob but as showing in his telegram of the previous day a complete misrepresentation of facts which had secured my concurrence in his action. Fortunately that concurrence was expressed with such qualification that Saiyid Abdul Kadir was not satisfied, and insisted on my signature on the actual document. I attach this letter and its accompaniments for ready reference, a mere perusal of the documents being sufficient to illustrate the justice of my anger, which I expressed in no uncertain language to Colonel Jacob, who will, no doubt, produce the letter he received from me in the justification of his conduct, which he declared he would make in the proper quarter.

60. Examining the terms of the agreement, we find in Clause 3 a statement that the Bajil Qaza and Absiyah (referred to usually in this report as Aboos) and Zeranik tribes have elected Saiyid Abdul Kadir as absolute ruler. That is intended to imply that all the many tribes from the Quhra on the north to the Southern Zeranik on the south had elected a ruler, a complete falsehood. No tribe but the Quhra was properly represented in this agreement. Sheikh Suleiman represented only a lesser portion of the Absiyah, and though associated with the Quhra, he and his people had shown in Hodeidah that their needs were very different from those now expressed. Sheikh Manassar of the Northern Zeranik was not present, and showed in a letter afterwards presented to me that he was unaware of the contents of this document on which his seal was placed, and which is thus in effect a forgery. The document as affecting the tribes generally is null and void. If it could be held applicable at all it could apply only to the one tribe; and Abu Hadi, the head sheikh of that, the Quhra, tribe, declared to me afterwards in Hodeidah that the instrument was useless, that he disapproved of it and gave his signature in this knowledge in order to hasten the release of the mission. But danger lay in placing such a written instrument in the hands of Nathim.

61. The remaining portion of Clause 3 expressed assurance of restraint of the Imam and Idrisi from aggression against the tribes. Such assurance I had given in general effect, and the use of the word "absolutely" gave emphasis which was improper.

62. Clauses 4 and 5, 6 and 7 are of no importance.

63. Clause 8 declares that the people of the country insist on remaining under the Ottoman Government. The people of the country have never made any such declaration. As to the rest of the paragraph, the people of the country as a whole would not, were opportunity offered, accept Abdul Kadir as ruler in free election.

64. Clause 9 gives the ruler, Saiyid Abdul Kadir, authority to establish Customs at Hodeidah under the supervision and protection of the British military commander, thus recognising the control of the tribes over Hodeidah. There seems no necessity to dwell on the impropriety of such an engagement. I repudiated it entirely.

65. After perusal of Colonel Jacob's communication above considered, express letters of warning were despatched to the members of the deputation and to Akil Omar Saghir. A letter of severe warning was also sent to Saiyid Abdul Kadir, requiring immediate release of the mission. The Quhra akils replied that the whole people were determined that release should be effected, and that the sheikhs would be deposed if they refused longer to comply. The saiyids were again exhorted to urgent action. The Idrisi, who had been asked to lend his influence in the cause, took action in that sense, and sent Saiyid Mustafa to Ibn Abbas, opposite Kamaran, to keep in touch with Baijl, to which place an Idrisi deputation was despatched.

66. On the 8th a messenger from Sheikh Mahommed Zaid, Sheikh Ismail Baghawi, and Saiyid Ali Bari showed that the release of the mission was imminent and asked for 1,000 dollars each. I undertook on the 9th to make these payments on

condition the mission arrived by the 13th with all treasure and property intact. Mahmud Nathim sent me frequent messages showing that the mission was about to be released. The members of the Quhra deputation wired on the 9th that the mission would be released on my terms, and again on the 11th that the mission would be released on the 13th. On the 11th Colonel Jacob wired that he had concluded a fresh agreement similar to the first, but excluding Clause 9, and that he would arrive in Hodeidah on the 13th.

67. The mission arrived in Hodeidah on the morning of the 13th December, accompanied by all the Quhra sheikhs, Sheikh Suleiman Hassan of the Aboos tribe, and a motley following of about 1,000 men, for the most part armed. The townsfolk and garrison met them outside the town, and the occasion was one of much interest to the spectator. The sheikhs and following were entertained at the expense of Government for several days, and no trouble was experienced from the presence of so many armed tribesmen in the town. The members of the mission proceeded to Aden the same day.

68. On the following day I had a meeting with the Quhra sheikhs, discussed their conduct and pardoned their offence. The sheikhs referred to their agreement with Colonel Jacob, and asked if I had seen and accepted it. In reply it was shown them that Government's position had been explained to them in communications made to them and Saiyid Abdul Kadir from Hodeidah. It was impressed upon them that Government's one interest was to secure the best possible scheme of government for their country, and to secure their welfare, and with that they declared themselves satisfied. Later in the day it was explained to Sheikh Abu Hadi that Government could not endorse an agreement made by an officer in captivity, and he regarded this as self-evident, and stated that he was sure that in a few days his fellow sheikhs would decide to take the hint which had been given them and leave the settlement of affairs entirely in the hands of Government. It was not found advisable to refer again to the subject during the stay of the sheikhs in Hodeidah, and they on their part made no further reference to it. Soon afterwards the Imam advanced towards their borders and they placed themselves under the protection of the Idrisi, whose troops occupied Quhra and Aboos territory on the invitation of the sheikhs.

69. Sheikh Mahommed Zaid stated in Hodeidah his regret for the part he had played in the plot of Nathim and Abdul Kadir; and Sheikh Abu Hadi, who alone of the sheikhs had behaved consistently well towards the mission in captivity whatever his part in causing its arrest, showed that Nathim's presence in Bajil had not been for the benefit of the mission.

70. Considerable payments of money had to be made to the sheikhs in satisfaction of promises given and as presents to themselves and followers, for it appeared advisable to send them away contented and friendly, they having brought in the mission intact with its property, excepting such portion as had been carried off in the earlier period of imprisonment. In round figures the sum expended prior to the arrival of the mission was Rs. 29,000 and after its arrival Rs. 37,000, the latter sum inclusive of certain payments made for mission debts in Bajil. Reckoned in sterling, it is submitted that this represents small cost to Government for not only the release of the mission, but also for the prevention of further attack on Hodeidah, of military operations in the Tehama which might have become necessary, of the pacification of the country and the establishment of a new prestige for the British name in this part of Arabia. Whether the mission could have been released without the aeroplane demonstration is matter for speculation. From the history of events it would appear that the sheikhs, the mere agents of intrigue, could not have withstood the force of popular opinion and that the aeroplane demonstration served only, very effectively, to hasten the issue.

71. I laid a plan for the capture of Nathim, but Colonel Jacob's connection with him made it impossible of execution.

72. It may be noted that since his release Colonel Jacob has stated that he knew full well that Abdul Kadir could not possibly fulfil the office of ruler, and that he made the proposal to secure his release, knowing it could not be carried into effect. Colonel Jacob will give his own post-release reading of events. On this point I repeat what has been previously demonstrated, that Colonel Jacob regarded Abdul Kadir as an exalted character up till the time of his first meeting with him towards the end of his imprisonment, when the release of the mission was already assured.

73. The imprisonment of the British Envoy is an incident of history. Hodeidah is populated and its people contented; and they regard with markedly friendly senti-



ments the connection of His Majesty's Government which has brought again prosperity to their town, and a measure of internal security and freedom from crime never before known. The tribes now realise the power of the Government, which the Quhra and Aboos sought to flout, and discuss with new feeling of respect and regard the "Dowlah" which Turkish intrigue sought to belittle in their eyes.

74. In closing this report I would mention the sympathetic assistance afforded by Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Douglas, commanding at Hodeidah, and the very valuable work of Khan Bahadur Ali Jaffer. This old servant of Government has not only very materially assisted the work for the release of the mission, but his loyalty and zeal have gone far to combat hostile propaganda and to establish the good name of Government, to whose gratitude I beg strongly to recommend him. Of the chief people of the town who have done much to assist me I select for special mention Shurai Pasha, formerly Mayor of the town and now acting honorarily in that capacity; and I'ahir Rajah Effendi and Sheikh Omar Mizjaji, leading merchants of Hodeidah. Shurai Pasha's house was destroyed during the bombardment of the town, but this damage to his property did not embitter his reason nor prevent him enlisting on my side against the tribes, of whom his knowledge is great, and in the face of the then hostile popular opinion.

A. S. MEEK, Major,  
Political Officer.

Hodeidah, January 31, 1920.

#### APPENDIX.

Colonel Jacob to Major Meek.

(No. 27.)

Bajil, December 5, 1919.

I ENCLOSE the agreement which A. K. and the sheikhs wish me to sign, and to which I have agreed. It is based on the terms sent by you, and in some parts embodies your actual words. The additions are, as I telegraphed to you this morning, logical expansions of what you proposed, and in no way alter the principles of the agreement drawn up by you. I therefore agreed to them. My reasons for doing so at once were:—

- (1.) I considered it essential to strike while the iron was hot. There are undoubtedly forces here which are working counter to us, and which seize every opportunity for sowing suspicion and working for delay. I therefore did not wish to give any time for reconsideration, and decided to accept the amendments on my own responsibility.
- (2.) The sheikhs insisted on having my signature to the document, and said they would accept it.
- (3.) I regarded the amendments as merely dotting your i's and crossing your t's of your draft.

I hope you agree to (3), but if you do not I will take all responsibility on my shoulders with regard to the amendments.

The whole matter was going well until yesterday morning, and I hoped to be out of Bajil to-day, but yesterday it appeared that a hitch had occurred. Everyone was very reticent as to what the trouble was, but we heard reports from various sources that there was jealousy between the sheikhs and akils, the former accusing the latter of having received money from you to induce them to get us out by force and upset the sheikhs. Other explanations were also given such as that an anonymous letter had come from Midi (probably inspired by Enoch) telling the Cocks not to let us go. What the truth was, I do not yet know. But to-day it appears that the saiyid wants your endorsement on the agreement amended. Your telegraphic approval, for which I thank you, does not satisfy him, so I send the document itself to you for your assent and approval on behalf of Government. The saiyid is said to be much pleased with the agreement, but some evilly-disposed person, I suspect Ali Bari, who has just returned, and Ali Burra (the merchant) is putting doubts into his mind as to our *bona fides*. X has worked hard for the agreement, and is much put out at the hitch that has occurred. X has acknowledged to me that he has been in the wrong in issuing propaganda since the armistice, and I believe he is now working for our release.

I hope you can sign and return the document at once without reference to Aden or elsewhere. My principal fear about delay is that A. K. may try to improve the terms from his point of view by knocking out the temporary character of his rulership, and trying to get us to recognise him as permanent ruler, an alteration which might lead to a deadlock; for Abu Hadi has aspirations for the permanent, but not the temporary headship.

#### Explanatory Note on the enclosed Agreement.

1. The main sin of the Quhra sheikhs is the desire to be independent. For this reason they detained the mission, which they believed was bent on transferring their country to the Imam.
2. The sheikhs are very pleased with Major's Meek's declaration, but prefer that the same should be put forward by one whom they know. This is a common trait of the Arab, and no slight factor in the delay of operations after the arrival of Major Meek.
3. This engagement is only temporary, and is dependent on the will of the country after the Peace Treaty passes its fiat in the Turks of the Yemen.
4. Therefore it is immaterial whether Abdul Kadir be elected now or after our return to Hodeidah, provided we are sure of the general desire to-day of the tribesmen for his personality. The house of Al Ahdal is famous throughout the Tehama, and its influence extends North to the territories claimed by Idrisi.
5. After the declaration of the Peace Conference, the tribesmen will finally elect their future ruler. They will have, they say, to choose between the present Saiyid or one of his house, one of their own sheikhs, or ourselves.
6. For this reason, they wish to retain our military garrison until affairs are more or less settled. They further want us to stay because our presence will be able regulate trade by sea, to which they attach great importance.
7. The promise to return prisoners is, I know, beyond my province, but seems a natural sequence of the forgiveness which has extended to the marauding tribesmen by Major Meek.
8. I have taken on myself the responsibility of modifying Major Meek's terms, without, I believe, materially altering their provisos. This I have done because I know that Government expect that I be consulted as far as possible on important matters, and also because I am aware of the daily telegrams passing between the Imam and his officials in Bajil. I know the Imam's eagerness to affect our release, which will reopen negotiations between himself and us. The longer we stay here, the nearer the probability of Idrisi intervention, and the embroiling of the country in civil war, which would upset our calculations based on our endeavours to keep both the Idrisi and the Imam outside this arena until matters have arrived at a satisfactory conclusion.
9. I have, therefore, taken upon myself the full responsibility for the course I have adopted.

Text of an Agreement arrived at Bajil on ... day of December, 1919,  
with the Quhra sheikhs.

I, the undersigned, Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob, His Britannic Majesty's envoy, take oath in the name of God the Almighty, Jesus Christ, in whom all the Moslems believe, and on whom be peace, and also in the name of His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, the British Nation and Government, and on my honour, and make promise to fulfil the following conditions:

1. That whereas I am fully aware that our detention in Bajil by the Quhra was based on misunderstanding and distrust of our purpose of forcibly subjecting them to the governance of some one they did not want, I consider their conduct excusable.
2. Therefore, owing to my knowledge of the truth of their excuse, I promised to them that they will not receive punishment or slightest harm at the hands of the British Government, now or hereafter on this account.
3. That whereas Bajil Qaza generally and the Absiyah and Zaranik tribes have elected, with their free consent and will the candidature of Saiyid Abdul Kadir to be their absolute ruler, I, therefore, engage to the said saiyid and the aforementioned sheikhs and those associated with them, that the Great British Government will

[4370]

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restrain, absolutely, both Imam Yahya and Saiyid Mahommed el Idrisi from interference with the Quhra and the above-mentioned tribes by necessary means, either diplomatic or by force, so long as they, the aforesaid tribes, continue to behave well and do not disturb the peace nor act against the general welfare of Islam and dictates of humanity.

4. During the continuation of our occupation of Hodeidah our Government engages to safeguard the trade of the Yemen, export and import, to grant all postal facilities by sea to all outside places, and safety to all the people of the Yemen who may want to enter Hodeidah or go out of it, and they will also not be subjected to any let or hindrance.

5. Pardon will be extended to all tribesmen who, since our occupation of Hodeidah, have committed crimes in Hodeidah involving loss of life or property, and our acts are also condoned. Also that no one will be taken to task at all by our Government, and I, therefore, engage the release of all prisoner Quhra, Absiyah, or Zeranik now confined in Hodeidah, Aden or other places in British territory.

6. Since the sheikhs have engaged to conduct us with our men, animals and property, to Hodeidah in safety and with due respect, and leave to me the question of their honourable treatment after arrival at Hodeidah, I accept the fact.

7. The people of the Yemen will be free to travel by land or sea, wherever they wish to go, both now, before the conclusion of Peace Treaty, or after.

8. Whereas the people of the country do not want to be associated with any Government, and insist on remaining under the control of the Sublime Turkish Government, they will remain as stated in paragraph 3 above, and will manage their affairs through the medium of their Ruler-Elect, the afore-mentioned Saiyid Abdul Kadir, without our intervention or that of any other party till the conclusion of Peace Treaty with the Turkish Government, when they will be free either to continue in their present condition or come under the protection of anyone they choose.

9. Whereas the land in Hodeidah is the property of the Quhra and Absiyah, who are under the authority of the Mansab of Marawaa, Saiyid Abdul Kadir el Ahdal, and if in this circumstance the Qaza of Bajil, Absiyah and Zeranik require funds for the management and conduct of their Government, the said Saiyid Abdul Kadir el Ahdal is empowered to establish customs in Hodeidah, if he so wishes, personally or through some agency, without objection from us or any other, provided no levies are laid on articles, necessities, and all that appertains to the want of the Army of Occupation in Hodeidah, and also that the customs officer will be under the supervision and protection of the military commander of the Army of Occupation in Hodeidah.

[E 498/498/44]

No. 79.

*Notes on the Nature of the Caliphate in General and on the alleged Ottoman Caliphate, by Signor Nallino, Professor of the History and Institutions of Islam in the Royal University of Rome.—(Communicated by Mr. Bonus in letter of February 16; received February 23, 1920.)*

(Translated from the Second Edition.)

#### I.—What is meant by "Caliph."

MAHOMET founded both a religion and a State;<sup>1</sup> both had, while he lived, the same territorial extension. The religious power was always exercised by himself alone, in his character of prophet and apostle of God; such a character, as conceived by him and his followers, did not admit the delegation of spiritual powers to others, still less the transmission of such powers as a legacy after his death. As the Koran

<sup>1</sup> Be it understood that in this *pro-memoria* (written in 1916) we speak only of the Caliph of the Sunnites and not of the Caliph (or rather, Imâm) as understood by the small fraction of the Shiite Mussulmans, Persians for the most part, who do not concern us for the present.

<sup>2</sup> Mahomet became head of a State only after his migration (hijra) from Mecca to Medina in September, 622 A.D. His death took place on a Monday, which almost certainly corresponds to the 8th June, 632 A.D.; the date of his birth is not known. Under the Caliphate of Omar (634-644 A.D.) it was agreed to reckon the years (lunar) of the Mussulman calendar from the beginning of the Arab year in which the hijra took place, or from the sunset of the 15th July, 622 A.D. (since, with the Arabs, as before that with the Jews, and at one time also in Italy, the day of twenty-four hours does not begin at midnight, but at sunset); hence the error of many European books which make the 16th July, 622 A.D. the date, not only of the beginning of the Mussulman era, but also of the actual migration (not "flight") of Mahomet to Medina.

itself declares, the series of divine revelations closes definitively with Mahomet; afterwards the believers have only to follow faithfully his teachings. Accordingly there is no trace in Islam of an ecclesiastical hierarchy or of sacred priestly orders; the conception of the christian "sacraments" and of an intermediary between God and the individual believer, is entirely wanting. To find anything at all approaching the spiritual powers of the Catholic or Greek or Protestant clergy, one must come to those later manifestations of Islamism, about six centuries after Mahomet—the religious confraternities; in these alone one finds a true cure of souls, a true spiritual power, which, however, only regards the relations between the master and the disciple, who has voluntarily enrolled himself in the confraternity after his novitiate, and, in any case, has nothing to do with dogma or ritual.

The only succession for which provision had to be made, after the death of Mahomet, was that of the *sovereignty* over the whole Mussulman State, which, based on a common religion, had foundations radically different from those on which, before Islam, the various politico-social constructions of that part of Arabia were raised up.

Should one consider the political work of the Prophet finished with his death, thus returning to the old particularism of the tribe? Or, should the State that had risen at Medina remain in vigour without changes? And if so, who should rule over it? Neither the Koran (which for Mussulmans is the "word of God," not the word or work of the Prophet), nor Mahomet had given any instructions on the matter.

On the very evening of the day on which the Prophet breathed his last, after many hours of violent discussion and tumult, the prevailing opinion was that the political unity of the Mussulmans should be maintained, and so Abu Bekr was elected as *head of the Mussulman State*; it seems that to him was then given the title of *Caliph (khalifa)*,<sup>3</sup> an Arab word that signifies both "successor" in a public office and "representative" or "vicar" of a superior authority in a more restricted post. It seems not improbable that the choice of the word was influenced by two verses of the Koran referring to Adam and King David respectively.

Historically then, the Caliphs are the successors of Mahomet in the *government of the whole Mussulman State, that is, of the entire body of Mussulmans*; presupposing (as was indeed the fact for several centuries) the non-existence of any Islamic peoples under a non-Islamic rule. But here one comes on a fact inexplicable at first sight to a European; while these universal monarchs of Islam possessed, like any other Mussulman sovereign, limitless executive and judicial powers, they were *destitute of legislative powers*, legislation in the proper sense of the word could be nothing less than the divine law itself, the *sceria*, of which the only interpreters are the *ulama* or doctors. In the religious field the only duty belonging to the Caliph, as to every other Islamic sovereign, is to defend the faith with the power of his secular arm against enemies within or without, and to see to it that public worship, consisting in the common prayers on Fridays, is regularly celebrated.

This character of the Caliphate, a necessary consequence of its historic origins, is also fully recognised in the theory of the jurists and of the other Sunnite Mussulman writers. I translate here, as an example, the part referring to the Caliphate in the famous Islamic catechism of Abu Hafs Omar an-Nâsafi, who died 1142 A.D.: I choose this book, not only for its celebrity, but also because it is among the prescribed text-books in the "médrese" (that is, higher schools of theology and canon law) of Constantinople.

Mussulmans must have an Imâm,<sup>4</sup> who sees to it that the regulations of Islamic law are observed, that the punishments prescribed in the Koran are carried out, that

<sup>3</sup> It is not quite certain that this title was already given to Abu Bekr, at least officially. The fact is certain only for his successor Omar (634-644 A.D.); but in any case it is to be noted that the designation *khalifa* was always rather in historic and literary use, than in bureaucratic. In fact in the official title used in public acts, inscriptions and coinage, the Caliph, in accordance with the rule established by Omar, is designated always as *amir al-muminin* (the "miramolino" of our medieval chroniclers), that is, "the Lord of the faithful," and by this title, not by that of *khalifa*, he was addressed by officials, courtiers, and private persons.

<sup>4</sup> The theologians and jurists are wont to reserve for the first four Islamic sovereigns (Abu Bekr, Omar, Othmân and Ali) the title of "Caliph," as the only ones who, besides having been illustrious companions of the Prophet, governed with exclusive regard to the rules contained in the Koran or indicated by Mahomet; on the other hand, they call "Imâm," that is "head" (sovereign), all the later rulers, as those who introduced into the government and public administration innovations not based on the Koran and the Sunna. In fact, one reads in the book of an-Nâsafi, immediately before the passage here translated: "The Caliphate lasted thirty years; afterwards there was only a kingdom and emirate," or a government not dissimilar from that of any Islamic sovereign whatsoever. The thirty years (lunar; that is, more than twenty-nine solar years) correspond to the period running from the death of Mahomet (632 A.D.) to that of the fourth Caliph (661 A.D.).



the frontiers are defended, that the armies are ready for action, that the Islamic tenth is collected, that rebels, robbers and brigands are brought to obedience, that the public prayers of Friday and the other festivals are celebrated, that controversies arising between parties are decided, that evidence in matters of right be heard, that provision be made for the marriage of minors of both sexes who have no guardians, that war-booty be justly divided, and suchlike matters.

"It is necessary that the Imâm be visible, not hidden, nor awaited in the future; and that he be of the [kin of the] Koreish, not of others, without that, on the other hand, he should properly appertain to the sub-kin of Hâshim or to the descendants of Ali." It is not to be laid down as a condition for the Imâm that he be impeccable and infallible, nor that he be superior in merits to his contemporaries; on the other hand, it is to be laid down as a condition that he be apt for absolute and complete power, a good governor, and capable of causing to be observed the regulations of Islamic law, of warding the confines of Mussulman territory, and safeguarding the rights of the oppressed against the oppressor. The Imâm cannot be deposed on account of bad moral conduct and of tyranny."

This concise exposition of an-Nâsafi clearly shows that the *Caliph* is nothing other than the *Supreme Monarch*, to whom is entrusted the care of the interests of all the Mussulmans and the maintenance of their *political unity*; he is the secular head of all the Islamic territory, the supreme judge, the head of the army, the defender of the faith by the sword or other coercive means, but he is not the interpreter of the divine law nor the director of consciences, and he cannot interfere in matters of dogma or ritual, unless one except his duty, as the State Authority, to see to the regular performance of public worship.

It may be objected: Why then do the catechisms, which ought only to treat of religious matters, handle the question of the Caliphate? The answer is given in the books of the Sunnite Mussulmans, which speak thus: The Shiites having made of the Imâm a dogmatic question, having invested it with a religious character of divine right (thus withdrawn from the operation of man's will), they of necessity treat of it in their theological books; we Sunnites, having to oppose every heterodoxy and to eliminate every error derived therefrom, are compelled to speak of the Imâm in our dogmatic works, although it does not belong to matters of dogma or faith, just in order to guard the faithful against the affirmations of the Shiites."

The Sunnite Islamism has never admitted a supreme Head of the Islamic Church. A Church, in the sense of a sacerdotal hierarchical organisation, does not exist. Religious unity is maintained, not by the Caliph, but by the *doctors* (the *ulama*), who are "the heirs of the prophets"; they alone in the past have elaborated the *dogma*, the *ritual*, the *canon law*, without any interference from the Caliphs or other sovereigns; to them alone it now belongs to preserve unaltered the traditional doctrine, and to decide on the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of new teachings and new usages. In all these matters, it is not the will of the Caliph that counts, but the consent of the doctors; a consent that was naturally in certain cases the fruit of bitter disputes drawn out through several generations, from which a final common opinion was at last formed.

The *ulama* are not a body of men connected with the State, but those who freely devote themselves to study; eminence publicly recognised, not government authority or academic diplomas, confers on them the doctor's title; only those among them become public functionaries who accept nomination as judges (*câdi*) or as *mufti* of the Government, that is, legal government advisers on abstract theoretical questions.

\* This is a polemic against the supernatural Imâm of the Shiites, who was to disappear at a certain moment, and to remain hidden until his reappearance at some future epoch unknown, when he would return and restore the age of gold on the earth.

\* This too is a polemic against the Shiites, for whom the Imâm is such by divine right, limited to the descendants of Ali; a polemic also against the fanatical partisans of the Abbasids who, contending that the Caliph should descend from the Koreishite sub-kin of Hâshim (to which Mahomet and Ali belonged), implicitly declared that the preceding Caliphate of the Ommyads (Koreishites, but not of the branch of Hâshim) was illegitimate.

\* Further polemic against points of the Shiite doctrine.

\* In consequence of the diminished importance, in theory and practice, of Shiite doctrine, modern Sunnite Mussulman catechisms, composed in the last thirty years for school use in Turkey and Egypt, have quite ceased to occupy themselves with the Caliphate or the Imâm.

\* The Councils of Doctors summoned by the Abbasid Caliphs, are simply fantasies of the Christian Greek, Savvas Pasha, author of that most unhappy and most harmful book, *Théorie du droit musulman*, which has wrought such confusion in the minds of European students who did not know Arabic. No Councils were ever convened in the Arab world.

Books on ethics, on jurisprudence, and on the religious sciences earnestly warn off the doctors from too great intimacy with sovereigns and high State functionaries; they cite examples of illustrious *ulama* who pertinaciously refused the career of judge offered them by Caliphs, and they do not fail to set in relief that, among the causes of the falsification of the traditions relative to Mahomet, not the least was the desire "to ingratiate oneself with high political authorities, such as the Caliphs and the Emirs," by means of words or examples meant to justify questionable acts and tendencies of such personages.

Recapitulating, then, what has so far been expounded, we can say that the *Caliph* is the *Prince of the faithful*, the universal Monarch of the Mussulmans, *not the head of the Mussulman religion*; as regards dogma or ritual he is a simple believer, obliged to observe the traditional doctrine preserved by the *ulama*. He is a defender of the Islamic faith, an enemy of heresy, only in the same way that European Emperors, Kings and Princes were defenders of the faith and extirpators of heresy in bygone days.

The Caliph is distinguished from other Mussulman sovereigns (Sultans, Kings, Emirs, &c.) only by the fact that his sovereignty extends, or at least should extend, over the whole Islamic world, and that his mission is to conserve the *political and territorial unity* of all the Mussulmans, and to bring to submission all the States of the Infidels as soon as he has the means to do so. Hence it comes that the position of the Caliph in the Islamic world corresponds almost exactly to that of the *Emperor* or universal Monarch of Christendom," according to the conception of the medieval Ghibelline jurists. And as, according to these last, Kings, Princes, Dukes, &c., are rightful sovereigns of a given region only when the Emperor has conferred on them the feudal investiture for that region, thus, according to Islamic public law, only those *Sultans, Kings* or *Emirs* are legitimate to whom the reigning Caliph has delegated his own authority over a determined region, that is, has granted the temporal or feudal investiture.

It comes out clearly from the text of an-Nâsafi translated above that, according to the Sunnites, two things are indispensable for one who would be Caliph: (1) Descent from the tribe of Koreish; (2) governing capacity. This second requisite implies that one is of full age (which, according to Mussulman law, coincides with the age of puberty), since the non-pubescent is judicially incapable; it implies further the absence of grave physical defects (as blindness and deafness), mental sanity and a certain degree of culture. An-Nâsafi is silent about two other indispensable requisites, viz. (3) to be a Mussulman; (4) to be a free man; but this silence is explained by the fact that it was superfluous to mention these things, it being Islamic law that the non-Mussulman and the slave cannot exercise dominion (*wilâia*, "imperium") over Mussulmans.

One should also add that, by the jurists, the conferring of the dignity of Caliph is considered as a contract between him who accepts the office and the Mussulman community; the contract is not complete unless accompanied with the *bâia* or proffering of homage on the part of the representatives of the community." The nomination can be made either in virtue of an election when the office falls vacant, or by the previous designation of an heir to the throne made by the reigning Caliph; but also in this latter case, it is necessary that the person designated be of full age and have formally accepted, and that there have been performed previously in his favour the *bâia* by the representatives of the Islamic community. Thus also in the ages when the Caliphate was hereditary in the dynasty of the Ommyads, or Omayyads (661-750 A.D.), and in that of the Abbasids (750-1258 A.D.), the hereditary succession was always understood, either under the form of a real election by the representatives of the community, or under the form of the designation of an heir to the throne previously approved by the community itself; minors were always excluded from candidature, and the choice of an heir was freely made among the sons (first born or otherwise), the brothers, or other relatives.

Finally, to make clear something about which I shall have to speak later on, let

\* The parallel has not escaped some Arab authors. Thus Ibn Abî Dinâr, writing the history of Tunis in 1681, when treating of the efforts of Charles V against Tunis, notes how he had assumed the title of *imbratâr*, "a title that belongs to the German Sovereigns (*mulûk al-almân*), since their kingdom is most ancient and the Emperor is for them what the Caliph is for the Mussulmans."

\* The *bâia* is also used for the other sovereigns by their respective subjects; for example, at the nomination of Husein Kâmel to be Sultan of Egypt (December 1914), on his declaration of independence of Turkey by the actual Sherif of Mecca, Husein ibn Ali (1916), and is always in use for the Sultans of Morocco, the Bey of Tunis, &c.



me add here that, owing to a custom that has grown up through the abuse<sup>12</sup> of centuries in most Mussulman countries, one of the *insignia of sovereignty* is, that the benediction of God be invoked on the name of the reigning Sovereign of Islam at the *khutba* or sermon on Friday, which is held in the so-called Cathedral Mosque. According to this custom not to name the sovereign towards the end of the *khutba*, when the preacher invokes the benediction of God on all the faithful, is equivalent to a proclamation of rebellion against him; Mussulman history supplies us very frequently with examples of this.<sup>13</sup> Accordingly, when the Caliph exists, his name, as ruler of all the Mussulmans, must always be mentioned in the *khutba*; and to his name must be added that of the ruler (Sultan, King, Emir, &c.) of the region where the *khutba* is held, to whom the Caliph has granted investiture.<sup>14</sup> When the Caliph does not exist, the prayer in the *khutba* is made only for the Islamic Sovereign of the country.

## II.—The fundamental European error as to the nature of the Caliphate.

The conception which Europeans generally have of the Caliph, on which is based the policy of many States towards the Ottoman Empire and towards their own Mussulman subjects, is the following: "The name Caliph designates the head of the Islamic religion, the spiritual chief of all the Mussulmans; in other words, the Supreme Pontiff of Islam. The Sultan of Constantinople is Sultan inasmuch as he has temporal power over the Ottoman territories; he is Caliph inasmuch as he has supreme spiritual power over all the Sunnite Mussulmans, whatever State they may be subjects of."

From this completely false conception have sprung, in the European mind, the following practical corollaries, equally false:—

- (a.) As Catholicism and the catholic hierarchy are inconceivable without a Supreme Pontiff, so Islamism is inconceivable without the supreme spiritual authority of the Caliph.
- (b.) Therefore, unless one wish to commit a grave act of religious persecution, every European State which has Mussulman subjects, ought to allow free relations between them and the Caliph, whose existence and authority should be recognised and respected; just as it would not be admissible to deny to catholic subjects free spiritual and hierarchical relations with the Holy See.
- (c.) Since peculiar historic conditions would make too dangerous the union of the temporal power (limited to the Ottoman territories) and the spiritual power (extending to all Mussulmans without distinction) in the hands of the Ottoman Sovereign, a European State should show its political acumen by provoking among the Mussulmans a sort of "pronouncement" against their chief sacerdotal authority, that is, against the Caliph, and by getting recognised as the High Priest of Islam some personage taken from among the Arabs, who becomes the creature of the European power which has brought about this great change.

The *theoretic premiss*, whence these corollaries arise, is false; the blame of having introduced it into Europe and of having made it a sort of dogma for the European diplomacy of the XIXth century, rests on D'Ohsson, an Armenian of

<sup>12</sup> In the classical manuals of law, invocation of the divine favour "for the Mussulmans of both sexes" is considered as one of the five indispensable parts of the *khutba*, but they are silent as to invocation for the reigning Sovereign (whether Caliph or not). In more recent manuals, if reference is made to invocation for a special reigning Sovereign, such invocation is declared to be an innovation that is "unadvisable" (*makrûh*); notwithstanding, the preacher should retain it when, by its omission, there would be fear of bodily danger for himself or of causing a riot.

<sup>13</sup> Accordingly, in the Arab writers the expression "in such a country the *khutba* is held for X" signifies that in that country X is recognised as legitimate sovereign.

<sup>14</sup> Thus article 7 of the Ottoman Constitution of the 24th December, 1876, says: "The dismissal and appointment of Ministers, the filling of public offices, the conferring of honourable rank and of decorations, the nomination of heads of the privileged provinces on the basis of their privileges, the coining of money, the mention of his name in the *khutba*, the making of treaties with foreign States, the declaring of war and peace, the supreme command of the land and sea forces, the carrying out of military operations, the enforcing the observance of the rules of the Sharia [=Islamic law] and the laws of the State, the drawing up of regulations for the public offices, . . . the summoning or the proroguing of Parliament, the dissolving of the Chamber of Deputies . . . all this forms part of the rights of the Sacred Majesty of the Pâdishâh [=the Sovereign]."

Constantinople, who in his *Tableau général de l'Empire ottoman* (published at Paris in 1788 and the following years; a book, in other ways, of very high value) speaks precisely of "Pontife des Musulmans," of "autorité sacerdotale du Souverain," &c. This is not the place to explain by what equivocations (the chief of which is linguistic—an error as to the meaning of the Arab word *imâm*), and perhaps also for what political ends D'Ohsson made so grave a mistake, in contradiction with the very Arab legal texts which he elsewhere translates. The evil has been that this first theoretic error has had serious consequences for the Islamic policy of the European States.

## III.—The end of the true Caliphate; the alleged Ottoman Caliphate; the origin of the fable of the spiritual power of the Caliph.

The Caliphate died out definitively in 1258 A.D., when the Tartars under Hulâgu Khan sacked Bagdad, putting an end to the Caliphate of the Abbasids, whose race was destroyed. In name and in fact the Caliphs then ceased to exist.<sup>15</sup>

None the less, four years later, in 1262, a black man appeared in Egypt, who asserted that he was a member of the Abbasid family who had escaped from the Tartar slaughter. The Egyptian Sultan Baibârs I (al-Bundukdâri), of the dynasty of the Circassian or Bahrite Mamelukes, thought it would serve his own ends to believe the story, despite its unlikelihood; he solemnly recognised him as Caliph and received from his hands the investiture of Sultan of Egypt.<sup>16</sup> In this way Baibârs sought to be pardoned by public opinion for having mounted the throne through the slaughter of his predecessor by his own hand; he also counted on increasing his dignity before the other Mussulman princes, who now no longer derived their power from a supreme authority. Thus arose a new ephemeral Abbasid Caliphate of Egypt; a Caliphate purely nominal, because, besides the fact that it was not recognised by the majority of the Islamic Sovereigns, it delegated all its powers to others, renounced the right of coining money in its own name (this being one of the chief emblems of sovereignty among the Mussulmans), and only reserved for itself the office of drawing rich allowances and granting the investiture to every new Egyptian Sultan. It appears also that in course of time some princes outside of Egypt requested investiture from these caricatures of the Caliphs who, in any case, had never any religious powers, nor any moral or material authority whatsoever before the *ulama*.

In 1517 the Ottoman Selim I conquered Egypt and broke the dominion of the Mameluke Sultans. The Abbasid pseudo-Caliph al-Mutawakkil was brought to Constantinople as a private person; after the death of Selim (1520 A.D.) he was able to return to Egypt, where he died in 1543, or, according to others, in 1538. And with him disappeared for ever this artificial resurrection of the Abbasid Caliphate.

The Ottoman Sultans meantime reached the summit of their power and made Europe tremble before them. Then it was that the flattery of learned men about the court, in dedication of books, smuggled in the name of Caliph or some allusion to the Caliphate among the long list of official titles of the Ottoman Sultans; nothing but literary flattery this,<sup>17</sup> in complete opposition to the Islamic doctrine that the Caliph must be of Koreishite origin. And in fact Caliph titles do not appear in diplomas, moneys, or official inscriptions emanating directly from the Sultan, in that pompous Turkish heaping-up of titles, where, only exceptionally, there appears, among numerous other epithets, that of *khilâfet-pendâhi*, "asylum of the Caliphate."

The first example of an Ottoman Sovereign being officially and explicitly qualified as both Sultan and Caliph (be it added, in the European version an

<sup>15</sup> Naturally one cannot take account of the Caliphian longings of individual sovereigns or individual dynasties, whose aspirations were never recognised by others. For example, soon after the fall of the Abbasids, the Hafid Sultans of Tunis arrogated to themselves the title of *amir al-muminin*, "Lord of the faithful," a title peculiar to the Caliphs; but their Caliphate did not get any further than this, although they preserved this title among their other official ones until their fall, which took place in 1534 A.D.

<sup>16</sup> Contemporary Arab historians, or those who write shortly after the event, speak of the matter with small respect; thus Abulfeda, writing in Syria in 1329, entitles his chapter on the subject "Mention of the recognition of such a one as Caliph," and in the course of the chapter names the presumed Abbasid, "the black Caliph." Also a modern Turk-Arab writer, Hasin Husni et-Tueirâni, who wrote in 1891 an Arabic pamphlet favourable to the Ottoman Caliphate, considers the presumed Abbasid as an impostor.

<sup>17</sup> Be it noted that Baibârs, not being of Arab race and so in no possibility of descent from the Meccan stem of the Koreish, could never himself have aspired to become Caliph.

<sup>18</sup> One has examples of the same thing in the case of sovereigns not Turkish.



arbitrary and new signification is given to this latter title) is to be found in a treaty concluded with *strangers*; it is the treaty of *Küçük Kainargé* of the 21st July, 1774, between Abdul Hamid I and Catherine II of Russia. In this document Abdul Hamid I is always referred to by his Sultanic titles; but in the third article, where he recognises the complete independence of the Tartars of the Crimea and of Kuban, it is said that they "being of the same religious customs as the Mussulmans, and *His Sultanic Majesty* being as *Supreme* Mahometan Caliph, they must regulate themselves with regard to him as is prescribed in the rules of their religion, without, however, compromising their established political and civil liberty."<sup>19</sup> The ability of the Ottoman plenipotentiaries thus succeeded in deceiving the Russians: causing to re-enter by the window, under the false guise of a spiritual power which did not exist, that which the treaty was intended (according to the Russians) to entirely eliminate, viz., the Turkish sovereignty over the Tartars. The Ottoman plenipotentiaries played on the ambiguity and on the ignorance of their adversary; they were also favoured by the fact that the Emperor of Russia, as head of the Greek-Schismatic Church, assumed a kind of religious patronage over the Moldavians, Valaks, and other followers of the same Church in Ottoman territory; hence the invention of an Islamic Caliphate or Pontificate held by the Monarch of Constantinople, did not seem an absurdity to the inexperienced eyes of the Russians,<sup>20</sup> but might seem a just counter-change. None the less Islamism is that which it is, not that which the diplomats of Europe shape according to their own fancies; therefore, on the basis of the good Islamic laws, Turks and Tartars could not draw from the third article of the treaty any other conclusion than this, the necessity of temporal investiture for the Khans of Tartary at the hands of the Sultan-Caliph, and the sending or the nomination of Cadi, or magistrates of a judicial character, and of Mufti, also by Ottoman hands—matters that later on appeared also to the Russians as evident signs of Tartar *vassalage* to Turkey, and of *political* (not religious) dependence. Accordingly on the 10th March, 1779, there had to be signed at Ainali Kavak (near Constantinople) the "Convention explicative of the treaty of Küçük Kainargé," in which the long articles 2 and 3 try to harmonise two irreconcilable things (the recognition of a Caliph and the complete political independence of other Islamic States with regard to him), and so the effort is made to establish the fantastic distinction between the temporal and spiritual power of the Sultan, uniting the double quality of Monarch of the Ottomans and "Khalife suprême de la religion mahométane"! But facts showed once again the absurdity of the thing, for Russia was compelled to impose on Turkey the *convention* of the 28th December, 1783, relative to "the previous treaties and to the boundaries of the Crimea," which abolished article 3 of the treaty of 1774, and the articles 2, 3, 4 of the explicative convention of 1779, and thus definitely removed all Ottoman interference, even of a so-called religious or spiritual kind, with the Tartars.

The *phantasm of a religious Caliph*, then, ought to have been for ever banished from the minds of European diplomats. But soon after came the hurtful action of

<sup>19</sup> So runs the original Italian text of the treaty (in Martens, *Recueil des principaux traités*, Gottingue, 1791-1801, t. IV, p. 612), the only one furnished with the signatures and seals of the plenipotentiaries of both parties. The French translation which the Russian Government afterwards published and circulated in 1775, aggravates the error by saying, "ils se régleront à l'égard de Sa Hautesse comme *Grand Calife du Mahométisme* selon les préceptes que leur prescrit leur loi . . . ." The other French version, given by G. Noradounghian, *Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman*, Paris, 1897-1903, t. I, p. 322, is as follows: "et que Sa Majesté le Sultan est regardé comme le *Souverain Calife de la religion mahométane* . . . ." The Turkish text which, as written for Mussulmans, could not contain such a blunder, says: "since my sovereign person, stamped by equity, is the head (imâm) of the believers and the Caliph of those professing the unity of God . . . ." Similarly, what the Italian text calls "religious customs," and the French version "cérémonies de religion," are necessarily rendered in the Turkish edition *umûr i dinîye ve mezhebîye* "matters religious and of the *mezheb*," or of the hanaphite school (*mezheb*) of canon law (ritual, civil, judicial and penal)! The Turkish text is in the *Muhaddât-Mejmûası*, Constantinople, 1294-1307 A. H., vol. III, p. 256.

<sup>20</sup> Or at least they took pleasure in drawing profit out of it, if it be true what D'Ohsson writes, that the merit of the subsequent convention of Ainali Kavak is due to the Count of Saint-Priest, French Ambassador, "dont la sagesse sut conciler, dans une négociation aussi épineuse, les intérêts de la religion d'une part, et de la politique de l'autre, entre les deux Puissances contractantes." It may therefore be that Saint-Priest was the inventor of the *spiritual powers* of the Caliph.

<sup>21</sup> Nor will this appear absurd to Europeans who, not being versed in Islamic matters, judge Eastern affairs from the standpoint of Western conceptions. They cannot imagine a positive religion without a hierarchical, priestly organisation, needing no intermediary between the individual conscience and God, without spiritual powers, and at all costs they wish to find again in Islam a Pontiff, with bishops and priests, and even to see in the canonical Mussulman prayer something that corresponds to the Mass and the Christian sacraments.

the Armenian D'Ohsson, who, as was said above in § II, in 1788 developed for European use the theory of the sacerdotal character of the Caliphate. It was an *absurd* theory from the historical point of view, and also from the point of view of the doctrine of Islam, a theory no Mussulman has ever sustained, but which became for the *Turkish Government* an excellent and unexpected means for regaining by *moral influence* what was lost materially. Above all the Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), a century away from the treaty of Küçük Kainargé, well understood how this error, now diffused throughout Europe, permitted him to work effectively for the Turkish pan-Islamic hegemony, also among the more than one hundred and fifty million Mussulman subjects of Christian Powers. Accordingly, while still holding fast to the epithets that regard the dignity of the Sultan, in the official titles and the coinage, the Turkish Government ended by conquering every scruple, and decided to consecrate for the first time in a document addressed to its own *subjects* (the *Constitution* of the 24th December, 1876) its pretensions to the Caliphate. Articles 3 and 4 of this Constitution are as follows:—

Art. 3. "The sublime Ottoman Sultanate, which possesses the supreme Islamic Caliphate, will appertain to the eldest of the descendants of the race of Osmân, conformably to the ancient laws."

Art. 4. "His Majesty the Sultan, as Caliph, is the protector<sup>22</sup> of the Mussulman religion. He is the Lord (*hükümdâr*) and Sovereign (*pâdishâh*) of all the Ottoman liege-men."

In spite of this Constitution, however, in official acts emanating directly from the Monarch, the use of other titles than those belonging to the Sultan only was steadily avoided. The same Abdul Hamid II understood that it was illegal, when confronted by the majority of the Mussulmans, to assume directly the qualities of Caliph; he was content to reach his aim by indirect, unofficial methods. One of the many methods used was, for example, to have printed at Constantinople in Arabic several collections of *khutba* for Fridays, in which his name was introduced;<sup>23</sup> *khutba* that were then recited in their entirety also in the mosques of India and the Malay Archipelago, and gave by degrees the impression that the Sultan of Turkey was the Supreme Monarch of the Islamic world. But above all Abdul Hamid II ever studied to appear as the protector of the Mussulmans, also if subjects of European Governments, just as France posed for a long time as the protector of Christians in the East; and the Turkish consuls, making abusive use of the European belief in the spiritual-religious character of the Caliphate, often succeeded in gaining an excessive influence among the Mussulman subjects of other States, above all in the English possessions.

Very illuminating and characteristic, in fine, for this whole exposition, is the collection of unilateral and bilateral acts of the two contracting parties, which form the Italo-Turkish Treaty of *Lausanne* of the 18th October, 1912.<sup>24</sup> In that treaty the qualities of Caliph are solemnly consecrated for the Sultan of Turkey in the *unilateral Italian* acts (*Regio Decreto*, the 17th October, 1912); but no reference to these qualities is to be found in the *bilateral* acts (*Modus procedendi* of the 15th October, 1912; Treaty of the 18th October, 1912), and still less in the *unilateral Turkish* acts (firman of the Sultan of the 17th October, 1912), in which the Monarch of Constantinople is purely and simply a Sultan. In a solemn act like that the Turks could not assert before Mussulmans things Islamitically erroneous.

#### IV.—The Ottoman Caliphate and the Treaty of Lausanne.

The erroneous conception of European diplomacy, expounded and criticised in §§ II and III, as to the nature of the Islamic Caliphate and the alleged Caliph of

<sup>22</sup> Let it be carefully noted: "protector" (*hâmi*) and not "head;" that, for a Sunnite Mussulman, would be a heresy. See above, § I.

<sup>23</sup> Be it noted that in these *khutba* (see above, § I), whether destined for the Ottoman Empire or for abroad, the ruler of Constantinople is always called *Sultan* only, never given the title of *Caliph* or any Caliphian titles.

<sup>24</sup> The acts which make up the Treaty of Lausanne are composed of the following parts:—

(a.) *Modus procedendi*, at first held secret, which establishes the formalities to be followed.  
(b.) Firman of the Sultan, provided for in the *modus procedendi*, addressed to the inhabitants of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.  
(c.) Decree of the King of Italy regarding the same inhabitants.  
(d.) The Treaty of Peace itself.

Of these parts, (a) and (d) are bilateral; (b) and (c) are unilateral.



Constantinople, have found solemn sanction in the acts which constitute the Treaty of Lausanne of the 18th October, 1912. That treaty in fact presupposes:<sup>22</sup>

1. That the Sultan of Turkey holds also the office of Caliph (article 2 of R. D., 17th October, 1912). Compare instead all § III.
2. That the Caliph is the supreme head of the Mussulman religion and of the ecclesiastical hierarchy (a conception implied in the above-mentioned article, as well as in No. II of the *modus procedendi*, 15th October, 1912). Compare instead §§ I, II, and the second half of § III.
3. That to invoke the divine benediction on the name of the Caliph in the *khutba* of Friday, signifies the recognition of his spiritual powers, and is therefore an act of religious homage on the part of the faithful (article 2 of R. D. aforesaid). Compare instead the end of § I.
4. That the supreme Cadi of the territory is a "chef religieux," that is, a sort of Bishop hierarchically dependent on the Caliph, the Pope of the Mussulmans, and that the Naib (or local Cadi) are also "chefs religieux," that is, a sort of parish priests under the Cadi (article 2 of R. D. aforesaid, and No. II of the *modus procedendi*). Instead it is well known that the Cadi (in common with his Naib) is nothing but a magistrate administering justice according to the canon law of Islam, in name and in stead of the Sovereign who appoints him, and who can take his place whenever it pleases him. On this compare § I and, for example, articles 1800 and 1801 of the *mejella* or Ottoman Civil Code, as well as any manual of Islamic law.

Thus it comes about that from the Lausanne Treaty the following consequences flow:—

(a.) The Italian Government, recognising officially the existence of a Caliph, and obliging their own Libyan subjects to perform the *khutba* for him, in reality declared as illegitimate their own possession of Libya, and pointed out the Caliph to its inhabitants as their true and legitimate Lord.

(b.) Imposing on their Libyan subjects the recognition of the Sultan of Turkey as Caliph, the Italian Government violated the conscience of the great part of these their subjects, who know that the Sultan lacks at least one of the essential requisites for the dignity of Caliph according to Islamic tradition.

(c.) Admitting that the supreme Cadi of Libya should be nominated by the "Cheik-ul-islam" of Constantinople,<sup>23</sup> establishing that his stipend should be a charge on the Turkish imperial Government (No. II of the *modus procedendi* and firman of the Sultan), laying down finally that the Naib or local Cadi should be nominated by the Cadi; the Italian Government abandoned the local magistracy to a strange Sovereign, forewent no small part of its own sovereign rights, confirmed the illegitimacy of its possession of Libya, and also placed under the surveillance of a stranger the whole administration of the goods *aucâf* (or *vacûf*) of Libya.

(d.) Admitting a special representative of the Sultan, in his capacity of Caliph, to exercise a presumed tutelage of religious interests (article 2 of R. D. already cited); agreeing to call him "représentant du Sultan" (article cited, and No. II of the *modus procedendi*), or, as the Imperial firman calls him and as he has in consequence been styled in the acts of the Government of Italy, *Naib-ul-Sultan*:<sup>24</sup> admitting in a special article that "le susdit représentant est aussi reconnu à l'effet de la protection des intérêts de l'Empire ottoman et des sujets ottomans . . . ." (article 3 of R. D.); determining finally that his stipend should be a charge, not on the Turkish treasury, but "sur les recettes locales" (as is done for the *Vicere*, whose emoluments are drawn from the local funds), the Italian Government came to admit a kind of *Vice-Sultan* in Libya,<sup>25</sup> a defender of the natives from any possible wrongs done them by the Italian authorities. And in fact, in the two solemn discourses in which Shams ad-din<sup>26</sup> announced to the natives, both at Tripoli and at Bengasi, the mission conferred on him by the Sultan and the decree of the same for their

<sup>22</sup> As I said at the end of the preceding paragraph, these erroneous presuppositions are only found in the unilateral Italian acts of the treaty.

<sup>23</sup> Thus article 2 of R. D. already cited. But the firman of the Sultan, of the same date, says with greater truth: "Nous Nous réservons . . . la nomination du Cadi."

<sup>24</sup> That is, "vicar" or "substitute" of the Sultan. The ambiguous expression was evidently chosen by the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to give the idea that this personage was a "Vice-Sultan."

<sup>25</sup> The matter appeared all the clearer in the eyes of the Mussulmans because the Turkish Government in none of the acts, bilateral or unilateral, of the Treaty, recognised the sovereignty of Italy over Libya, and limited itself to granting to the inhabitants of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania "une pleine et entière autonomie" (Firman of the Sultan).

<sup>26</sup> The "Naib-us-Sultan," sent to Libya December 1912.

autonomy, his exact words were: "I come to you as vicar of the Caliph and as watchful patron" (*naïban 'ani-l-khalifa wa waliyan shâhidan*).

(e.) Admitting that the supreme Cadi of Libya should be nominated by Turkey, as was said in letter (c), and that the Naib or local Cadi should be nominated by him, the Italian Government procured new embarrassments for itself. In canon law the Turks follow the hanafite school which, in the second half of last century, they imposed also on Libya, where, on the other hand, the inhabitants by an uninterrupted tradition of centuries professed themselves followers of the malikite school. Accordingly, in 1912, shortly after the Italian occupation, the inhabitants of Tripoli requested and obtained, first verbally and then in an official manner (decree of General Caneva, commander-in-chief of the expedition, dated the 30th July, 1912), the restoration of the malikite law. In the stipulations of the Lausanne Treaty no thought had been taken for such an eventuality; accordingly, if the treaty should have been applied in its entirety, a hanafite Cadi would have come from Constantinople who would have nominated his Naib or local judges of the hanafite school, according to which last Islamic justice would have been afresh administered, despite the solemn pledge given to the inhabitants.

Based on erroneous premisses that completely contradicted the real Islamic institutions, the Treaty of Lausanne, like that of Küçük Kainargè was seen at once to be impossible of realisation, because its application would have been a continual source of offence to the Sovereignty of Italy. Such action had to be taken that neither was the Cadi nominated, nor had he the nomination of the Naib or local judges; on the other hand, through want of the Cadi, the administration of native justice and that of the goods *aucâf* (or *vacûf*) was irregular; in the end thorny questions constantly arose, either with the Ottoman Government or with the natives, from which only the declaration of a fresh war with Turkey freed us, followed by the decree that annulled the agreements of Lausanne (R. D. 22nd August, 1915). Here also the analogy with the end of the agreements of Küçük Kainargè is marvellous.

How slightly Turkey cared for the religious interests, in the agreements entered into with Italy, evidently appears from the fact that the Treaty of Lausanne does not contain a word about a Reis-ul-ûlama, a college of ûlama, Mufti, Imâm, or other persons who have to do with religious matters, and are without political influence, holding no government office; according to the Treaty of Lausanne the "religious heads" are instead the Caliph and the Cadi! It is worth while repeating that this error of considering Caliphs and Cadi as "religious heads" is only found in the unilateral Italian acts of the Treaty of Lausanne; in the unilateral or bilateral Turkish acts good care is taken by the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to avoid such heresies. Here again one recalls the various editions of article 3 of the Treaty of Küçük Kainargè.

Some journals and some politicians justified at the time the dispositions of the Treaty of Lausanne, declaring that it conformed in substance to that of the protocol between Austro-Hungary and Turkey for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (26th February, 1909). But in reality the analogy is limited to the right of *khutba* for the Sultan "as Caliph," a right that has remained as a curious relic from the period 1878-1908 of the Austro-Hungarian administration under the high Ottoman dominion, and which, in a country where the Mussulmans form hardly one-third of the inhabitants, has very much less importance than it has in Libya, entirely Mussulman. For the rest, the difference is enormous. In an explicit manner the Turkish Government recognised the complete sovereignty of Austro-Hungary over Bosnia-Herzegovina,<sup>27</sup> a thing they did not wish to acknowledge for Italy in the case of Libya. And accordingly, there is not a trace in the Austro-Turkish treaty of all those symbols of Ottoman sovereignty which were heaped up in the Treaty of Lausanne: no sending of a Naib-ul-Sultan, no sending of a Cadi, and therefore no interference with the Islamic magistracy and the administration of the goods *aucâf*, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Bosniac agreement there is a slight trace of relations with Constantinople only for the Reis-ul-Ulema; but here it treats of a person of a

<sup>27</sup> Article II of the protocol says: " . . . Le Gouvernement ottoman reconnaît d'une façon expresse le nouvel état de choses en Bosnie-Herzégovine créé par ladite décision " (that is the autograph letter of the 5th October, 1908, from Francis Joseph I to Count Aehrenthal, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which the Monarch declared that the rights of his sovereignty extended over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that accordingly those territories were annexed to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy).



true and exclusive religious character, head of the commission of the *ulama* or doctors, set up to care for the religion and worship of Islam; he is nominated by the Emperor of Austria-Hungary from a list of three proposed by a Bosniac electorate, Austrian subjects, which electorate (and not the Austro-Hungarian Government) after the Imperial nomination, begs of the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Constantinople a diploma of investiture for the newly elected. He must, further, be an Austro-Hungarian subject, and can be deprived of his office by the Emperor. The Bosniac Reis-ul-Ulema, therefore, does not in any way correspond to the Libyan Cadi.

At Lausanne, on the other hand, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries succeeded in turning to the advantage of Turkey some ambiguous and innocuous formulæ of the Austro-Turkish protocol of 1909. In article IV of that protocol one reads: "Les droits des fondations pieuses (vakoufs) seront respectés, comme par le passé, et aucune entrave ne sera apportée aux rapports des musulmans avec leurs chefs spirituels qui dépendront comme toujours du Cheik-ul-Islamat à Constantinople, lequel donnera l'investiture au Reis-ul-Ulema." Who are these "chefs spirituels"? The protocol says nothing anywhere about it; and since in the Bosniac agreement, save the above-mentioned investiture *pro forma* of the Reis-ul-Ulema, there is no trace of relations of Mussulman functionaries with Constantinople, and since, on the other hand, the *ulama* (that is, the only men to whom, *cum grano salis*, the title of spiritual heads could be applied) are learned private persons, as already explained, it is evident that the Austro-Hungarian Government does not in reality concede anything and only offers words deprived of effective content. That was possible for two reasons: because the Young Turks, only a few months in power and full of Western ideas, often ill digested, were incredibly ignorant of Islamic religious matters, and because one of the two Ottoman signatories was the Armenian Christian Gabriel Noradounghian. The passage just referred to, which in substance was therefore a clever humbugging of the Ottoman Government on the part of the Austrians, was transformed thus in article 2 of R. D. 17th October, 1912: "Les droits des fondations pieuses (vakouf) seront respectés comme par le passé et aucune entrave ne sera apportée aux relations des Musulmans avec le chef religieux appelé Cadi, qui sera nommé par le Cheik-ul-Islamat, et avec les Naibs nommés par lui-même . . . ." After all that has been said above, it is not necessary to add a single word in order to show that, while we thought we were treading in the footsteps of the Austro-Turkish protocol, we in reality did something very different.

#### V.—The so-called arguments in favour of the Ottoman Caliphate and the possession of the Holy Places of Islam.

In order that, in these days of ours, a Caliph may once more securely establish himself, one *first* and indispensable condition is that he not only have his own direct territorial dominion, but also that the great majority of the Mussulmans recognise him, and that, as a consequence, the other Sovereigns or Princes of Islam (Sultans, Khan, Bei, Emir, &c.) consider themselves nominally as his vassals, and confirm the legitimacy of their power by his regular investiture. If this condition be wanting, it is evident that one will have, not a Caliph, but a simple aspirant to the Caliphate. Now it is well known that no independent Mussulman Prince (in Arabia, Afghanistan, Beluchistan, &c.) has ever gone or goes to the Sultan of Constantinople to have his own sovereignty legitimated by means of a diploma of investiture,<sup>21</sup> an evident sign that in our days the Islamic Princes do not recognise the effective existence of a Caliphate, whether Ottoman or otherwise.

A *second* condition, based on past history and on sayings attributed to Mahomet, is required of a Caliph by the public canon law of Islam that he be descended from

<sup>21</sup> Be it noted that, in virtue of the Austro-Turkish treaty of the 21st April, 1879, for the whole period (1879-1908) of Austrian administration under the high Ottoman sovereignty, the supreme Cadi for Bosnia-Herzegovina, with residence at Sarajevo, was sent by the Turkish Government. The protocol of 1909 has simply suppressed him.

<sup>22</sup> Needless to say, the people of Morocco have always disdainfully resisted any Turkish effort at interference in their affairs, and every Caliphian aspiration on the part of the Ottoman Sultans. It is also a typical fact that in Algeria, during the Turkish domination (direct, or under the form of a protectorate), which ceased only with the French occupation, the Ruler of Constantinople was always regarded only as Sultan, never as Caliph; this appears clearly, not only from the historians, but from the official inscriptions on public monuments, in which the titles specially characteristic of the dignity of Caliph are entirely wanting.

the great tribe of *Koreish*, to which the Prophet and the majority of his contemporaries dwelling at Mecca belonged. Also this essential requisite is lacking to the Turkish Sovereigns.

How then could, or can, the Sultans of Constantinople be Caliphs?

The *European* books do not speak of the first difficulty; as to the second, they assert that it was overcome thus: When Selim I conquered Egypt in 1517 and brought to Constantinople the supposed Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil (compare § III, first part), this latter was made to give up his right to the Caliphate. If this were true, the cession would have been illegal and void from the Islamic point of view.<sup>22</sup> But in reality we are dealing with a simple *fable*, which Europeans found in the book, already cited, of D'Ohsson, of 1788. Of an event which would have had such capital importance for the entire Mussulman world, no mention is to be found in the ample Turkish and Arab chronicles of the period;<sup>23</sup> no reference in the Histories, official or otherwise, composed later by Arabs and Turks; so that to find any such reference in Islamic authors one must come to our contemporaries, who have learned this great fact from European books! And the silence of the historians is confirmed by what has been explained in § III: that officially the Sultan of Constantinople appears as Caliph for the first time in the treaty of 1774 with Russia, where the title serves only as a clever diplomatic expedient to *trick* the Russians and to preserve actual sovereignty over the Tartars, declared independent; while with regard to his own Mussulman subjects, the Sultan officially proclaims himself Caliph only in the constitution of 1876.

In *European* books another argument is used in favour of the Ottoman Caliphate, an argument only to be found in germ in D'Ohsson, but which seems to have assumed great importance in the eyes of several politicians after the *European* war broke out; I mean, the effective possession of the *Holy Places* of Islam, that is, of the sacred territories (*haram*) of Mecca and Medina, which the respective Sharifs (Barakât ibn Mohammed at Mecca) ceded to Selim I in 1517.<sup>24</sup> The argument is very ingenuous, and confounds in a strange manner the effect with the cause. A Prince does not acquire a special right to become Caliph because he in fact possesses the Holy Places; but whoever is recognised by the Islamic community as Caliph becomes *ipso jure* master of the Holy Places (as of all the territories inhabited by Mussulmans); he has the right of governing them directly or of entrusting the lordship over them to a Prince (Sultan, Emir, &c.) through regular investiture, in that case reserving to himself the high dominion alone. In the times of the Caliphate the absolute independence of the Holy Places, as of any Islamic territory whatsoever, would be a legal nullity; it would be an abnormal state of affairs, an act of rebellion in no way invalidating the theoretic rights of the Caliph,<sup>25</sup> which, even without having recourse to arms, would in the end be recognised by the rebels themselves, under the pressure of Mussulman public opinion. If the Sultan of Turkey were really a Caliph, the actual revolt of the *Sharif of Mecca* with the proclamation of himself as "King of Hijâz" (of which, for the rest, he possesses only a part) would not have any consequences for the Caliphial dignity of the Sultan.

<sup>22</sup> And that for the following reasons: (a) that a Caliph has not the right to abdicate in favour of another person, but can only appoint, in agreement with the Mussulman community, his successor after his own death, as was said in § I; (b) that in any case the *baia* (see § I) would have been necessary in favour of the Caliphate of Selim I, while we know from history that this *baia* never took place; (c) that Selim I, being a Turk and not of Koreishite origin, could not receive the Caliphate.

<sup>23</sup> Which, on the contrary, inform us how Selim I after having conquered Egypt and Syria loved to be addressed by the title of "Servant of the Holy Places," a title up till then used by the Mameluke Sultans of Egypt.

<sup>24</sup> This took place when Selim I had conquered Syria and Egypt, putting an end to the dynasty of the Circassian or Bahrite Mamelukes, who ruled there. Mecca and Medina were under the high sovereignty of the Mamelukes; on their fall, the Sharifs of the two holy cities hastened to recognise the sovereignty of the conqueror, and it is said also that the son of the Sharif Barakât, head of the embassy sent to pay liege-man homage to Selim, presented him at Alexandria (May or June 1517) with the keys of the Kaaba on a plate of silver. There is naturally in all this only an act of recognition of high sovereignty over the Holy Places, and not a recognition of the quality of Caliph, as has been wrongfully repeated by many in Europe since D'Ohsson.

<sup>25</sup> History gives us various cases in which Mecca (with or without Medina), was for longer or shorter periods withdrawn in fact from the supreme dominion of the Caliphs: in the later days of the fourth Caliph Ali (who reigned 656-661 A.D.) by the Othmanid party; from 681 to 692, under the Caliph Abd al-Malik, by the anti-Caliph Abd Allâh ibn az-Zubair; in the tenth century by the Carmat heretics; in the thirteenth century by the Zeldt Imâms of Sanaa. But no one ever concluded from these facts that the Caliph and his rights had fallen.



VI.—*Practical consequences of the errors of Europeans regarding the actual existence and the nature of the Caliphate.*

It results from what was said in § I, that to recognise as Caliph the Sultan of Constantinople or any other Islamic potentate, signifies for every good Mussulman, to recognise in him the *political sovereignty* (not the spiritual) over all those who follow the religion of Mahomet, also if subjects of European Powers; signifies the seeing in him the Monarch who, with the help of God, will finally re-establish the broken unity of the peoples professing Islamism, and by degrees will free them from the yoke of the unbelievers and from the innovations contrary to the *Sharia* which these last have brought into the territories of Islam. To recognise a Caliph is to nourish the hope of a final and complete recovery of the Mahometan world in face of the European world.

In truth for Mussulmans the *Caliphate was, in fact, dead for centuries*; it remained only a glorious memory of a better age now gone. It is owing to the slight knowledge which European Governments generally had of Islamic affairs that the idea of a Caliph was revived in the century just past. Having large Mussulman territories under their dominion, these Governments thought to win the good-will of their new subjects by providing for their spiritual needs, seeing to it that they did not lack a Caliph, that is, as they thought, an Islamic Supreme Pontiff; and in their artlessness the Europeans thought that this high office belonged to the Ruler of Constantinople, who should therefore be temporal Sultan of the Ottoman territories and at the same time spiritual Caliph of all the Mussulmans.

In the second half of the XIXth century the Mussulmans found the time had come to profit by this most grave error of the Europeans. Turkey now appeared as the only Islamic State capable of confronting the Christian States, the only one to which the Sunnite reaction could look with confidence as a bulwark against the European encroachment, which absorbed one by one the territories of Islam and sought to impose its will on those few still independent; and so, Europe being accomplice through her ignorance, it was an easy matter for the Sultan Abdul Hamid II to develop his very clever Pan-Islamic policy. For *Caliphate and political Pan-Islamism are one and the same thing*. As clearly results from what has been said at the end of § I, the faithful, subjects of a European State, when they pray for the Sultan as Caliph, in the khutba of Friday, do not recognise his spiritual authority, but simply his political suzerainty, with an implicit declaration of the illegitimacy of the Christian dominion. In this way, as Snouck Hurgronje, the eminent Dutch authority on all Islamic matters, has written more than once, the Sultan receives, through the unconscious aid of the Christian Powers, "a confirmation of his pretensions, but in a diverse manner from that intended by these Powers, and in a manner more conformable to the historical and legal principles of Islam. The great majority of the Sunnite Mussulmans end by overcoming the grave difficulties which their own doctrine raises against the Caliphate of the Ottoman Sultan, because they have need of a *centre of political action* against the European dominion."

Whoever follows the native press knows quite well that those Mussulmans who, without being subjects of the Ottoman Empire, turn their glance to Turkey, do so, not because they find that the Islamic faith is in danger, but only because they hope Turkey will restore the unity and political independence of Islam. It would be easy to collect a long catena of quotations in proof of this statement; I shall confine myself to citing a small part of an article of enormous length, inspired by hatred of Italy, which an Indian, on his return from Cyrenaica, published in the nationalist journal *al-Alam* at Cairo (25th September, 1912). Alluding to the talk of a speedy peace between Italy and Turkey, the writer waxes indignant; recalls the steady occupation of Mussulman territory by Europeans; declares that Turkey is the only State capable of resisting and hindering such a tragedy, and concludes: "This conviction is properly the cause why the khutba is performed in the name of His Majesty the Sultan in all the Islamic countries," although in them the Ottoman Government have not effective political power." Nothing could be more explicit.

Accepting the *Ottoman Caliphate*, or any other *Caliphate* whatever, the peoples of Islam have the clear consciousness of deceiving their Christian rulers and making

<sup>27</sup> An exaggeration of the writer; for example, in Morocco, in Algeria (after the French conquest), in the independent States of Arabia and in those of Central Asia, the khutba has never been performed for the Sultan of Turkey.

a continual act of political protest against them. It is truly an extraordinary thing how European States disquiet themselves to revive artificially an institution that died spontaneously many centuries ago, which, if it did exist, would be completely opposed to their domination of territories inhabited by Mussulmans. It can never be repeated often enough that the Caliphate is nothing else than the universal monarchy of Islam, nothing else than political Pan-Islamism; and that the doctors, or *ulama*, whose duty it is to maintain the unity and integrity of the religious doctrine, never have stood in relations of dependence—spiritual, moral, or hierarchical—to the Caliphs. To recognise a Caliph does not signify, for a European State with Mussulman subjects, to provide for the religious or spiritual needs of these last, but only to introduce into its own Islamic domains a disguised, but none the less dangerous, foreign sovereignty, and besides that, to place itself in grave political embarrassment when, at some time, unforeseen, the majority of the Mahometan peoples might come to recognise a different Caliph; it signifies, finally, the helping to keep alight in the heart of Islam the belief in a resurrection, perhaps near at hand, of that glorious ideal past when infidel States trembled before the power and the conquests of Islam.

CARLO ALFONSO NALLINO.

[E 492/3/44]

No. 80.

*Vice Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 23.)*

(No. 152.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, February 21, 1920*

I COMMUNICATED to the Minister for Foreign Affairs verbally on the 19th February contents of your telegram No. 123 of the 16th February.

Commenting on re-ervation as to possible modification of decision of Conference in the event of continued Turkish misbehaviour, I took an opportunity to enumerate various instances of such misbehaviour on the part of military authorities and of organisers of national movement, insisting very strongly that Government could not disclaim responsibility for activities of latter [? groups omitted] of my observations follows by bag.

Later on same day I informed my French colleague and my Italian colleague of what had passed. Neither of them had been formally instructed in the sense of your telegram under reference, though both accept decision to keep Turks here as *fait accompli*, and French High Commissioner had used language based on that assumption in conversation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 18th February.

I desire to draw your attention to fact that there has latterly been noticeable military liveliness in provinces, especially among Nationalists, and situation shows signs of tension. There has been, of course, no time as yet for my communication to Ministry of Foreign Affairs to become generally known in provinces and, though I anticipate it will produce sedative effect, I feel that we should have sufficient military strength locally to render impossible any action against us by Nationalists similar to attack on French in Cilicia. To this end I consider reinforcements of A.B.'s desirable.

[E 725/3/44]

No. 81.

*Consul-General Wratislaw to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 27.)*

(No. 18.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.

*Beirut, February 21, 1920.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Americans, who left Marash with French, estimate number of Armenians already massacred in or around Marash at 5,000. They think Armenians remaining there and at Aintab are doomed.

According to Armenian reports received here from Adana, certain number of Armenians escaped from Marash on heels of French, but many were cut off.

(Sent to Constantinople.)



[E 618/1/58]

No. 82.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis).*(No. 95.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, February 27, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 89 of 20th February.

It has been decided by the Supreme Council that an Allied garrison at Batoum shall be retained for the present, contributed in equal proportions by Great Britain, France and Italy.

Please repeat to Constantinople, Tehran and Batoum.

[E 752/47/44]

No. 83.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 1.)*

My Lord,

*Aden, February 12, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 12th February, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General

Enclosure in No. 83.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Lord Allenby,

*Aden, February 12, 1920.*

THE following is a summary of news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 28th January, 1920:—

*Imam.**Tehama.*

Our news agent at Taiz reports that on the 13th December, 1919, the imam telegraphed orders to his amil at Taiz, Syed Ali-al-Wazir, to send 500 men with two guns to Zabeed. The guns were immediately sent. Another order was sent on the 17th idem for the despatch of 200 more men. The agent heard from two Zabeed merchants that the imam's amil there, Syed Mahomed-ad-Dari, was causing trouble. He tried to despatch Syed Ahmed-al-Ambari, the Kadi of Zabeed, to Sana, but the latter refused to go, and has collected his tribesmen and besieged the Zeidis in Zabeed. A reinforcement of 100 to 150 Zeidis left for Zabeed on the 21st December.

A Hodeida report states that the Idrisi's popularity is increasing, and that efforts are being made to win over Syed Ahmed-al-Ambari to the Idrisi side. It is not considered difficult to overcome Youssef Hassan, the ex-Kaimakam of Zabeed.

Syed Ambari has advised Mahomed Ibrahim Mokhawi, the Beit-el-Fakih merchant, that imamic force is shortly expected to arrive at Zabeed with big guns, and that they will proceed against the Zaraniks.

This refers apparently to the force reported to have left Taiz.

He also stated that the hostages taken from the sheikhs will be sent to the fort of Al Dan.

It is reported that Syed Ambari has also written to Ibrahim Mokhawi that since all the people are averse to the imam, he can no longer adhere to his allegiance to him.

Three hundred soldiers have since arrived at Zabeed with one gun of the largest size that has ever been seen at that place before.

The Idrisi has lately increased his customs duty on imports and exports. This appears to have irritated the merchants in Hodeida and Mansuria, who do not now wish for the Idrisi rule.

Sheikh Sahel Ali of the Aboos has written to Major Meek saying that he has been deposed by his people owing to his suspected leanings towards the imam and his hesitation in accepting the Idrisi's suzerainty. Major Meek has made him a suitable reply.

The tribe of Ar Rakk, near Zabeed, has gone over to the Idrisi, and has agreed to co-operate with the Idrisi troops on their arrival. Saiyid Miftah, the Mansab of Ramia, is said to be in correspondence with Manasira, Wsaria, Al Hadadia and the Takarir (near Reima), urging them to resist the imam.

It is reported that on the 19th January, 1920, the imam telegraphed to Syed Abdul Kadir suggesting a mutual understanding between himself and the Quhra, whereby each party confined itself to its own borders. To this the Quhra sheikhs are said to have sent a reply to the effect that they will not keep quiet until the imam has evacuated the whole of the Shafia country on their frontier. The imam telegraphed on the 20th idem intimating that Sef-al-Islam Syed Ahmed-bin-Yehia (the eldest son of the imam) was ordered to proceed against the Quhra via Sanfoor with 1,000 men, and that Seyd Abbas was ordered to proceed via Menakha with 800 men and 2 guns.

It is further reported that Sheikh Nasir of the Beni Makatil (Haraz tribe) went to Beni Saad with 100 men, acting as a mediator between the imam and the Idrisi. The Idrisi's commandant there refused to agree to his proposal that each party should confine himself to his own borders.

The sheikhs of the Aboos, Zaranik and others are reported to have gone to the Idrisi's commandant at Bajil, asking him to send Idrisi soldiers to them. The commandant has referred their requests to the Idrisi.

The news agent of the Political Officer, Hodeidah, at Beit-el-Fakih, under date the 18th January, 1920, reports that the Zaranik, the Sowh, and Ma'sila had jointly raised a force of 1,000 men at Beit-el-Fakih to attack Zabeed, but they had to desist at the request of the Mansab of Zabeed, Saiyid Awad Handaj.

The Bajil correspondent of the Political Officer, Hodeidah, reports on the 20th January, 1920, that on the 24th December Sheikh Hadi-bin-Ahmed Makrani and Sharif Ahmed-bin-Husen, with about 300 soldiers of the Idrisi, have arrived at Bajil. Sharif Mahomed-bin-Hamood, with the Sheikh of Zabeed and 100 men of the Hashid and Bakil, and 100 Idrisi men, also arrived on the same day.

Fighting took place between the men of the Idrisi and the imam on the frontier on the 17th January, 1920, in which the imam's men were defeated with heavy loss. On the 26th January, 1920, an Idrisi gun was posted on Husn (fortlet) Al Sharaf (on the eastern side of Jabel Ad-Damir) and fired against the house of Sheikh Abdul Bari, the Sheikh of Bara. There were about 100 men of the imam in the house, and the imam's men fled after suffering some loss.

On the 25th January, 1920, some eight men from Jabel Reima, who were in the service of the imam, arrived at Bajil with an intimation that the people of Reima were only awaiting the arrival of the Idrisi troops in Reima to rise against the imam. These men stated that Sheikh Ali Mikdad, one of the imam's lieutenants, sent his sons to the imam, who treated them very badly, confiscating their arms and horses, and turning them out of Sana. In consequence, Sheikh Ali Mikdad has declared rebellion against the imam, and asked the Idrisi to send his soldiers to the frontier. All the hillmen are said to be ready for action on the arrival of Idrisi men.

Idrisi soldiers continue to arrive in Bajil under various commanders. The Idrisi has occupied Suk Attar (near Jebel Bura), Zera'i on Jebel Bura and Mekfal. All these places are within the imam's territory.

An informant from Bajil gives the disposition of the imam and Idrisi forces as follows:—

There are 500 Idrisi men in Bajil under Sheikh Mahomed Sharif Hamood-bin-Ahmed. Sheikh Mahomed Hadi Hajj\* of El Wa'adat, Sheikh Hadi Makrami of Zeilia, and Sheikh Ahmed Ali Dos of Khoba are also there. The Idrisi force consists of men from Asir and Hashid and Bakil. The Quhra men are posted at Methal between Obal and Hujjeila. The Idrisi has also posted his men on the Aboos-Bura and Bahari borders. The total number of Idrisi men in Quhra-Aboos territory is about 800. The Idrisi rations his own men only.

The imam's force (strength not known) is stationed on the other side of the hills. The imam is collecting a large force and intends to advance after a few weeks. The informant says that if Methal falls to the imam he will easily capture Bajil. The Idrisi has five guns, and unless he brings more he will not be able to hold Methal. The Idrisi is said to be sending more guns.

Writing on the 31st January, 1920, Major Meek states that Sheikh Manasseer of the Northern Zaranik has been forced to declare himself with the tribe generally,

\* Made submission to the Idrisi after the evacuation of the Turks in Asir.



which was on the point of falling on the imam's people in Zabeed a week ago, but desisted. The Zaranik are now wholly for the Idrisi in the imam-Idrisi conflict.

The Idrisi irregulars now occupy the Qubra-Aboos border, by invitation, and Idrisi orders have been promulgated in Merawa. The imam appears to be collecting forces and is spreading tales of his might and allotting specific objects of plunder to individual leaders. He would seem to have the pull over the Idrisi in numbers of men in positions, but I do not think he could advance into the Tehama while his own Shafai tribes are disaffected. And as far as Hodeida is concerned he could not support a large force far from his own borders in hostile country. He has asked for return to the *status quo ante*, but the Qubra and Idrisi have refused, knowing the man they have to deal with.

Major Meek says that local people declare that Hodeida is better behaved now than at any period of its history. The town is now full of people and business brisk, and there has been practically no crime. And this in spite of there being regular police, and no military police. The so-called Arab police in mufti are chiefly employed at the picket gates. Since Colonel Jacob arrived the tribesmen have been coming into the town armed, as they did in the time of the Turks. The townspeople protested against this liberty, and predicted dire results. In order to show the tribes that we gave them our trust and had no fear of them, the privilege was allowed, and Major Meek says that the result has been excellent. The tribesmen are not allowed to prowl about the town with arms, but armed men coming in deposit their weapons in their place of abode. Major Meek says people in Hodeida appreciate our administration there, and even the women of the town declare that they want neither imam nor Idrisi, but hope the English will remain. The notables have, however, in their statement of wishes, put the return of the Turks as their first desideratum.

Major Meek says that one of the Turkish officials *en route* to Aden recently stated that Nathim was still giving out that the Turks will be back in the Yemen in two months. Nevertheless, he seems to be assisting his people to get away.

Jemil Bey is still in Hodeida. He now states that Mahmud Nathim is unable to get his family away and so cannot leave himself. Jemil Bey has been trying to get Major Meek to use Mahmud Nathim as Government's instrument, but Major Meek thinks that all the messages to him from Mahmud Nathim about his desire to quit the country are a mere blind.

A copy of a letter written by Jemil Bey to Mahmud Nathim has been sent to me. In this among other matters, the writer asks Mahmud Nathim to advise the imam to cease his activities in Dala and Upper Yafa within our protectorate, pointing out the disadvantages likely to result from his present hostile attitude against the British Government.

#### Idrisi.

According to information received by Captain Fazluddin, I.M.S., liaison medical officer at Loheiya, the line of the Idrisi troops on the Jebel Milhan front extends from Jebel Milhan to Jebel Ashraf, and from the latter place to Jebel Wasta. The imam's amil has gone to Jebel Dara. The Idrisi's next move appears to be on Jebel Dara and Jebel Hutash.

The Hashid Sheikh, Nasir Makhoot, is reported to have captured Hajja and turned out the imam's troops from the place. Captain Fazluddin says that the whole of the Qadha of Hajja has accepted the authority of the Idrisi, but he has received no confirmation of this report, but he is certain that a part of the Qadha is already under the Idrisi. The cause of the Qadha coming under the Idrisi appears to be the imam's high-handedness with the Sheikh of Hajja, Syed Yahiya Shaibani, who has been imprisoned in the fort of Sana and put in chains, probably owing to his intrigues with the Idrisi.

Captain Fazluddin says that from repeated reports received by him from different sources it appears that wherever the savage Zeidi hordes entered the Shafeite Tehama, they invariably brought in their train pillage, rapine, destruction and desecration. A story is recounted to show the ruthless savagery of the Zeidis even with their own soldiers.

"A Zeidi soldier, who, having lost his son in a recent fight between the Idrisi and Imam, went to the amil to claim the 'diat' (blood money) to which the Zeidi soldiers are entitled at 16 rupees per head, was told that his son was only wounded. The Zeidi persisted in saying that his son was dead. On this he was taken to the place where his son lay wounded. He saw the boy wounded in the chest and still alive. The father then took out his dagger and thrust it into the wound and said to the amil,

'Look there, he is dead; how do you say he is living?'" This story is probably due to Idrisi propaganda, but shows the feeling of the Shafeis about the Zeidis.

Captain Fazluddin says that the cause of the Idrisi's success does not lie in his military strength, but in the atrocities and outrages committed by the imam's troops. Deputations and letters of invitation continue to reach the Idrisi from various places in the Yemen, recounting the Zeidi barbarities and invoking his help.

#### Aden Protectorate.

The King of Hedjaz's mission returned from Sana and left for Jeddah in the last week of January. The envoy Sharif Nasr-bin-Shokr stated that on his arrival at Sana he asked the imam as to the cause of the trouble between him and the Amir of Dala, and advised him to patch up his differences with the latter.

The imam explained that the Amiri territory belonged to his ancestors, and that the Turks during their reign in the Yemen had usurped his rights over this and other places. During their occupation of Lahej, the Turks had appointed their kaimakam at Dala, who ill-treated the Amir, and the latter complained to the imam, asked for his help and left his brother as a hostage in token of his submission. The imam thereupon asked the Turks to remove their kaimakam, and they complied. The imam has now merely sent his own Amir to take charge of the place. This is a mere matter of internal administration. The Amir has, however, proved disobedient and resisted the Zeidis.

Sharif Nasr says that after this explanation he asked the imam to issue instructions to his amil not to take further action until the arrival of a British mission, when matters could be amicably settled. The imam did so and gave him a letter to the resident on the subject. (A copy of this letter was sent with my letter No. C-152, dated the 17th February, 1920).

Sharif Nasr stated that his intervention in this matter was actuated by the desire to prevent bloodshed, and by no other. He asked that the Amir may be instructed similarly to refrain from hostile acts pending the arrival of the mission.

He did not disclose the object of his mission to the imam, but in conversation with one of the Arabic interpreters of this office he implied that one of the objects of his mission was to bring about an alliance between the King of the Hedjaz and the imam. He said that Sharif Husein did not give him full powers, otherwise the arrangements would have been concluded.

Sharif Nasr said that the King advised the imam through him to enter into friendly relations with the British Government in the interests of his own country. The imam's intentions, he said, were very friendly towards the British Government, and he hoped that an understanding would be arrived at very soon.

Referring to the Idrisi, he said that Sharif Husein's intentions towards him were also good, and he hoped that matters would be adjusted between them before long.

Our news agent at Taiz, who lately arrived at Hodeida, reports a rumour in Taiz that the imam is planning a descent on Lahej, via Taiz and Dala. He gives the Zeidi strength in Taiz as 3,500 with seven guns, and in Mavia as 500, with two Turkish officers and two machine guns. He says that the Shafai population is anxious for the advent of some strong Government who would protect them from Zeidi tyranny.

Another report says that the imam's intention is to occupy all the Tehama ports as well as Aden.

It is reported that Zeidis intend to advance on Tafwa and Suhaib in the Alawi territory well within our protectorate, and only about 25 miles from Lahej. The Alawi is very nervous, and presses for our troops to be moved up to Suhaib. He says if the Zeidis advance on Suhaib he will leave his country and come to us with all his family and hold us responsible for all damages, as we are not protecting him in accordance with our treaty.

It appears from the information given by the Sheikh of Jol Madram in Haushabi territory, near Nobat Dakim, that 500 Zeidis from Taiz, Ebb and Dala have lately arrived in Mavia, in addition to the 200 already there. The object of their coming is to take possession of 100 cases of ammunition and 500 rounds of shrapnel which are believed to be buried in Sheikh Mahomed Nasir Mukbil's house. The house was searched, but the result is not known.

According to the information received by the same sheikh the imam intends to take the offensive against the British Government in March or April. He was quiet at present because he is storing up provisions which he is purchasing in Aden.



After a protracted delay of one year the Haushabi Sultan has come in to Aden to renew his treaty with us and his agreement with the Abdali. He is the last of those who had gone over to the Turks at Lahej to be restored to favour. He came in in January 1919 to make his submission, but was told that he had first to settle with the Abdali, and his case would then be considered. In February 1919, after consultation with the Abdali, the latter was asked to come to Aden and to bring the Haushabi with him formally to renew his treaty with us and the agreement with the Abdali. The latter wrote to him several letters, but the Haushabi excused himself under some pretext or other. He repeatedly asked for the payment of his stipend, but was always told that it could not be paid until he had come and renewed his treaties. He has now come in, and his stipend will be restored to him from the date of his visit in 1919, as all matters between him and the Abdali have been settled.

He has brought with him two letters written to him by the imam's hakim of kamairah at Mavia Hassan Abdul Wahab-al Warith. In one the hakim complains of delay on the part of the Haushabi in coming to see him. The writer tells him that he has nothing to fear, and that none of his privileges will be curtailed. On the contrary, he will be held in great esteem before the Amir-al-Muminin (imam). The writer hints at the imam's intention of going in the direction of Aden.

In the second letter the Haushabi is threatened with invasion if he does not come within three days. The writer draws his attention to the case of the Amir of Dala, who placed his reliance on our promises, which we did not fulfil, and has consequently suffered. He refers to the Koran, and referring to us says: "God and His Prophet said their characteristic is to deceive the Muslims."

The Haushabi says that the letters are genuine and are written in the hakim's own handwriting and signed by him, but that he thinks they have been sent by Warith on his own initiative, without orders from the imam, merely to show his cleverness to the imam hereafter.

The allusion to the fate of the Amir of Dala is of interest. We have been unable to afford protection to the Amir, and this of course makes all our protégés nervous. As we were cooped up in Aden all the war, our prestige in the Yemen is naturally nil. Members of Colonel Jacob's mission tell me that the Arabs look upon the British as mere money-bags to be squeezed. The men of the nation have no courage, but attempt to gain their objects by bribery on every occasion. If this fail they employ Indian mercenaries, but never put themselves into danger. The sight of a British officer and the aeroplane which flew over Bajil filled them with amazement, as they were fully convinced that the British never fought themselves.

No further advance of imamic troops within our protectorate is reported, but rumours of reinforcements and of concentrations at Taiz for a descent on Lahej are insistent. Taiz, however, appears to be the base for operations in the Zabid area against Aden, and I can hardly conceive that the imam would wish to embroil himself further with us while his hands are full with the Idrisi. Our military prestige is so small, however, and the imam appears to have such a good opinion of his own prowess that an advance against Lahej is a possibility, and we should be prepared. I am accordingly taking measures to keep myself fully informed of the situation.

The Barhimi sheikh (Subehi) has received two letters from the imam's revenue collector at Mokha asking him to come to him in order to arrange about the payment of tithes by the Barhimi to the imam. The writer is the brother of the Kaimakam of Mokha, and I have asked the Abdali Sultan to write to the kaimakam to stay his brother's interference with tribes within our protectorate.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 864/3/44]

No. 84.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 1.)*

(No. 176. Very Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, February 29, 1920.*

MY telegrams Nos. 109 of 6th February and 152 of 21st February.

Situation between Allies and Turks is subjected to a daily increasing strain, owing to successive incidents which indicate clearly that influences making for resistance to decisions of Peace Conference are more than ever in the ascendant. I am constantly asked by General Milne to take up with Foreign Office matters in which Turkish

military authorities disregard his instructions given under article 20 of the armistice and to formulate the demands arising out of such incidents. While fully in agreement with Milne as to propriety of his demands, I find that, whether I act alone or conjointly with my colleagues, only result is evasion or procrastination, with a tendency of late to open defiance. No individual incident of this kind is sufficiently important in itself to justify military action to enforce demands, but the aggregate result is that Allied High Commissioners are flouted, and that not by responsible Government, but by Nationalist organisation, which the Government is powerless to control. This places High Commissioners in hopelessly false position. What is even more important, it emboldens Nationalist leaders to think that programme of resistance to the drastic peace terms can be carried through to the end of the chapter with the same ease and impunity with which they now disregard our wishes, even if matter most directly arises out of the armistice. I have come to conclusion that it is useless for High Commissioners to continue to address Porte demands they evade or reject, which is foregone conclusion, and that preparations should be made at once for effective action to be taken whenever Nationalist defiance passes the limits of endurance or when other developments in situation may make it desirable. Either may happen in very near future. By effective action I mean occupation of Constantinople, followed by such other measures as military authorities then considered necessary and feasible. Chief drawback to this course is danger which might be created for Christians in the interior and for Allied subjects, including military and other representatives.

It would have to be carefully considered what announcement should accompany action in order to deter Turks from massacres, and what, if any, other safeguard could be provided. Question of advisability of such action, question of moment for taking it, and question of possible safeguards for Christians all turn very largely on intentions of Peace Conference. My French colleague, with whom I have fully discussed situation, is equally ignorant with myself under this head, except as regards Constantinople. We have both got the impression in last couple of weeks [apparently part of telegram omitted here] stiffened in direction of very drastic peace, giving Smyrna and Thrace (including Adrianople) to Greeks. If this impression is correct, peace must be imposed by force of arms. Military authorities and High Commissioners should be informed in good time, but very secretly, and the sooner necessary steps are taken to consolidate military situation here the better it will be. If our impression is wrong and peace is to be comparatively lenient, we should be informed less secretly, with discretion to divulge peace prospects to Sultan and other possible elements in counter-Nationalist movements. These elements can be enlisted in support of acceptance of peace terms only if they are comparatively lenient—i.e., if they include maintenance of some purely Turkish sovereignty over Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople, suzerainty at least over substantial portion of eastern province of Asia Minor. In that case we could start at once, with fair prospect of success, to create *bloc* round Sultan strong enough to get upper hand of Nationalists.

[E 918/289/44]

No. 85.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 3.)*

(No. 181.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 2, 1920.*

FOLLOWING from Ryan for Mr. Vansittart:—

"Scheme set up [*sic*] in Foreign Office telegram No. 150 of 21st February has been examined by Mr. Waugh in consultation with Legal Adviser of French High Commissioner. Results are embodied in High Commissioner's telegram No. 180 of 2nd March. If it is necessary to have two parallel jurisdictions I agree with Mr. Waugh that scheme enclosed in High Commissioner's despatch of 12th June, 9th October is preferable to that now proposed by French. I also agree that once we have good scheme it may as well be ?group omitted]ed at once in Peace Treaty, provided that there is adequate provision for revision. I certainly think that matters of personal status should be reserved for Consular Court until further notice. At the same time I am bound to say that fundamental principle of proposed system seems to me fantastic.

"Future of Turkish State must be one of three things, viz., (a) entirely independent, (b) fully controlled, or (c) independent subject to foreign control of particular sections of administration. In practice, choice lies between (b) and (c). Personally I favour



(b), subject to formula designed to protect sham appearance of independence. If that solution were adopted there would be no need for parallel jurisdictions for natives and foreigners. Our scheme of jurisdiction could be taken as model for single judicial system to deal with all matters except personal status in matters reserved on restriction [*sic*] basis for Moslem religious courts. Present proposal is based on alternative (c). In my opinion, if there is to be foreign control of judicial system without complete tutelage of Turkish activity, it should be control of entire judicial system, and last sentence of preceding paragraph again applies. Is it realised that under proposal for two parallel jurisdictions for non-Moslems, Ottoman natives will be under thumb of purely native courts in lawsuits between themselves or with Turks and in criminal matters? How can such result of treaty be reconciled with Prime Minister's last speech? Do not think Turks' opposition to treaty will be sensibly diminished by leaving one-half of judicial system under his direct control.

"Chauvinists will fight Mixed Courts for mixed cases as hard as complete control, and Moderates will accept complete control if anything more readily than Mixed Courts. As regards transition stage, until new judicial system is put up it may be advisable to define foreigners entitled to benefit of Capitulation."

[E 919/3/44]

No. 86.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 3.)*

(No. 184.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 2, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 168 of 27th February.

Colonel Butler, Divisional Intelligence Officer just returned from Alexandretta and Mersina, please see my telegram to Admiralty No. 917 Z, 26th February, sent with request to repeat to you. French appear to have sufficient forces in Adana and Mersina district to prevent outbreak and massacre there. As regards Marash, undoubtedly large numbers of Armenians have perished in and around the town. Colonel Butler's information states that possibly between 15,000 and 20,000, but that it is difficult to judge numbers. A considerable number who followed the French retreat perished from blizzard. Only way, in my opinion, to establish facts and number of victims would be for Inter-Allied Commission to be appointed to investigate on the spot. I much doubt, however, whether French would agree to such a proposal, as their local officials undoubtedly mishandled situation, and they had under-estimated difficulties and dangers of occupation.

Colonel Butler found them most uncommunicative and suspicious, and they would be unwilling that facts should be made public.

[E 966/289/44]

No. 87.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 270.)  
My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 22, 1920.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 107 dated the 6th February, I have the honour now to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of letters, dated the 31st January and the 1st February, received from the French and Italian High Commissioners, notifying me of the re-establishment of their respective consular courts.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 87.

*French High Commissioner to Rear-Admiral Webb.*

*Haut-Commissariat de la République française,  
Constantinople, le 31 janvier 1920.*  
M. le Haut Commissaire,  
J'AI l'honneur de vous faire connaître que le Gouvernement de la République vient d'autoriser la réouverture du tribunal consulaire français. Ce tribunal jugera

les litiges pendants soit entre Français, soit entre Français et étrangers, à condition que les autorités dont relèvent ces étrangers acceptent de reconnaître les jugements dudit tribunal et accordent l'accès de leur propre tribunal consulaire aux Français demandeurs ou tiers intervenants.

Veillez agréer, &c.

A. DEFRANCE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 87.

*Italian High Commissioner to Rear-Admiral Webb.*

*Haut-Commissariat italien,*

*Constantinople, le 1<sup>er</sup> février 1920.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que mon Gouvernement vient de m'autoriser à rétablir le tribunal consulaire italien à Constantinople. Ce dernier exerce dès à présent sa juridiction dans les mêmes conditions qu'avant la déclaration de guerre.

Veillez agréer, &c.

MAISSA.

[E 969/3/44]

No. 88.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 273.)  
My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 23, 1920.*

I TOOK the opportunity afforded by my return visit to the new Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 19th February to read to him your Lordship's telegram No. 123 of the 16th February, relative to the future of Constantinople.

2. I thought it advisable, in view of the endeavours which will certainly be made by the Extremists of the national movement to exploit the decision of the conference as a victory achieved by them, to speak very frankly to the Minister about the present situation, and the attitude of antagonism to the Allies taken up by the "national movement." I had been authorised, I said, to make a statement which should be very comforting to the Turkish Government and all patriotic Turks. That assurance, however, was not unaccompanied by reservations. In the part of the telegram containing these reservations, I noted specially the references to "massacres of Armenians," to "Allied troops," and to "attacks."

3. It was true, I said, that the only places in which Armenians were now being massacred were in Cilicia; that I had no particulars of such massacres beyond the undoubted fact that Armenians had been massacred in several villages; and that these massacres were the outcome of the deplorable incidents at Marash and elsewhere. I would not repeat what I had said on previous occasions about these incidents, but in the present connection I desired once more to emphasise my view that the incidents were the fulfilment of a threat deliberately formulated by Mustafa Kemal Pasha some time ago, and any massacres arising out of them were massacres committed under the auspices of the national movement.

4. I had also accentuated, I said, the words "Allied troops" and "attacks." "Allied" included, for His Majesty's Government, not merely the French and Italians, but also the Greeks. "Attacks" included not only attacks by regular troops, but also attacks by the so-called national forces. On the Minister's observing that the Government could not be held responsible for all the acts of the national forces, I insisted, and I repeated several times subsequently in the conversation, that the present Grand Vizier had taken office with a programme of conciliating the national movement; that after the opening of Parliament, he had secured an unanimous vote of confidence after negotiations with the national movement, which culminated in the sacrifice of three of his Ministers; and that in these circumstances the Government could only be regarded as a reflex of the movement.

5. The Nationalists, I observed, claimed to be patriots, but they were serving their country very ill; they had been consistently disloyal to their own Sovereign, whose authority they had done their best to diminish. Instead of working for peace and the

[4370]

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true happiness of the Turkish people, they had fomented strife and disorder, and had done so more particularly by following a policy of irritating and provoking the Allies.

6. I spoke of the attitude of the Turkish military authorities. I instanced a recent request by the Ministry of War to move troops from Broussa to repress some local disturbances at Bigha. General Milne had refused the request, and I fully concurred in his refusal, because there seemed to be no military necessity for the movement, and because it had been a consistent policy of the Allied authorities to avoid anything which might lead to civil war. General Milne, I said, looked at things from a military and not from a political standpoint. He was applying to the present request the same rules which he had applied when Damad Ferid Pasha wished to send troops against the Nationalists.

7. I directed the Minister's attention to another case in which the Turkish military authorities seemed anxious to find a pretext for redispersing troops, and that in an area specially interesting to His Majesty's Government, namely, South-Eastern Kurdistan. The military authorities had made use of a cock-and-bull story of threatened attacks by Armenians and Nestorians on Moslem tribes in the south of the Van Vilayet. I asked the Minister to read carefully the note which I had just sent him on this subject (see my despatch No. 249 of the 19th February).

8. I also drew the particular attention of the Minister to the latest collective note of the High Commissioners demanding respect for the "Milne line" in the Smyrna area (see my despatch No. 259 of the 20th February). I refused to be drawn into a discussion, in which he sought to engage, regarding the merits of the delimitation, or of the possibility of atrocities by Greeks if the Turks receded. The delimitation had been undertaken, I said, in order to give satisfaction to the Turks, who in the summer legitimately wished to know where they were. When it had been effected, the Turks were the only people who refused to respect the decisions.

9. It appeared to me, I observed, that when the Turkish Government wished to use force it was never at a loss for troops, but that when it was a question of satisfying the Allies it always proclaimed itself powerless. In this connection I once more mentioned the recent raid on the arms and ammunition dump at Ak-Bash in the Gallipoli Peninsula. The Grand Vizier had told me he disapproved entirely of this raid. The Porte had officially expressed regret, and had said that they were making every possible enquiry. Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had given the show away by printing in a Konia newspaper a letter claiming the whole credit of the Ak-Bash incident for the national forces, and vaunting the exploit, including the arrest of Allied guards, as a victory achieved by a brave comrade of his from Balikesser. Mustafa Kemal had signed this letter on behalf of the committee of the movement, a committee most of whose members were now in Constantinople.

10. The Allied representatives had, I said, done their best to show confidence in the Turkish Government. They had scrupulously refrained from meddling in internal politics. A striking example of their trust had been the repatriation of Turkish prisoners of war from Egypt. I had had more than one report of the recruiting of these men for the national forces.

11. I adverted to representations which the Minister had made to me two days previously about the working of the Allied censorship of the press. These representations were identical with representations made to a member of my staff by the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior. I said I believed myself to be right in thinking that the great importance attached to this matter by the Government was due to a desire to placate the deputies. I had made enquiries. I would not now go into the whole matter, but I would mention one fact which I had elicited, namely, that the speeches of some of the deputies themselves were of such violence that they had far better be kept within the four walls of the Chamber than be reported for popular consumption here, or telegraphed to the European capitals in which the fate of Turkey was being decided. Nor was it only in the Chamber that inflammatory language was held. I called the attention of the Minister to the deplorable impression created by the speeches made at a meeting graced by the presence of the Heir-Apparent (see my telegram No. 85 of the 28th January).

12. Incidentally I drew the attention of the Minister to the prosecution of two Armenian journalists for printing an attack on the national movement, which had been passed by all the censors, and asked him what impression he thought such a prosecution must create when the press of the national movement was using the most unbridled language throughout the provinces. I obtained a promise that the proceedings against the two Armenians would be stopped.

13. After a passing reference to the state of the Turkish prisons, on which the

Inter-Allied Commission had just reported, I brought my statement to a close. I repeated that I had been authorised to make a reassuring statement, but that I had been instructed to accompany it with a warning stated in concise but serious terms. I had given his Excellency my personal commentary. I felt, I said, that in using language of extreme frankness, and even severity, I was rendering a service to the cause which everyone had at heart, namely, the conclusion of a speedy and satisfactory peace. I had every hope that we should not now have long to wait, but an interval must elapse, and the nature of the final conditions might be very much affected by what happened in that interval.

14. I have not thought it necessary to reproduce the replies made by the Minister to the various portions of my statement. He used all the arguments with which the Porte has familiarised the Allied representatives for months past, including the injustice of the occupation of Smyrna, the iniquity of the Greek action which followed it, and the responsibility of the French themselves for recent trouble in Cilicia. The most interesting feature of what he said was the extreme emphasis with which he insisted that even now the Government was something very distinct from the national movement.

15. As I reported in my telegram No. 152 of the 21st February, I informed my French and Italian colleagues on the same day on which I saw the Minister for Affairs of the contents of your Lordship's telegram, and of what I had said to the Minister. I found that neither of them had had instructions to make any statement regarding the decisions of the conference regarding Constantinople. This creates a little difficulty in regard to the question which I am now considering, viz.: what, if any, public announcement should be based on your telegram in order to bring its contents to the knowledge of the general Turkish public. The Porte have refrained from making any announcement, probably from a disinclination to publish the reservation regarding massacres and attacks on Allied troops. In the meanwhile I am letting the substance of the telegram become widely known by word of mouth.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
High Commissioner.

[E 994/56/44]

No. 89.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 4.)*

(No. 182.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Cairo, February 28, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 159 of 23rd February.

Following for Malkin from Hurst:—

"Egyptian chapter of Turkish Treaty.

"Following represents views of Lord Milner and members of his mission:—

"Articles 3 to 7 may stand. Provisions on following lines relating to Soudan should be added: High Contracting Parties declare that they have taken note of convention between Government of His Britannic Majesty and Egyptian Government defining status and regulating administration of Soudan, signed on 19th January, 1899, as amended by Supplementary Convention relating to town of Suakin, signed on 10th July, 1899.

"Soudanese shall be entitled when in foreign countries to diplomatic protection of His Britannic Majesty.

"Article 1 of draft should, if possible, provide recognition by all High Contracting Parties of British Protectorate of Egypt and for renunciation by Turkey of all rights over country.

"First paragraph of article 2 may stand except that after 'renounce' in first sentence there should be added 'in favour of His Britannic Majesty.'

"Second paragraph should be omitted and provision substituted for closing of consular courts and acceptance on behalf of foreign nationals of land régime to which British nationals may be subjected.

"If above can be obtained we can carry through fusion of mixed and consular courts without separate agreement with each Allied belligerent capitulatory Power which participates in Treaty with Turkey.

"Will telegraph separately as to native courts."



[E 946/3/44]

No. 90.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 4.)*(No. 183.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Constantinople, March 2, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 176 of 28th February crossed my telegram No. 176 of 29th February. Latter was sent after full discussion of whole situation with my French colleague, who saw translation of my telegram and who has telegraphed to Paris in the same general sense. We decided not to take our Italian colleague into our confidence. I have fullest confidence in personal character and loyalty of Italian High Commissioner, but there are, unfortunately, too many evidences that official Italian policy here is strongly pro-Turkish. Although, therefore, I immediately communicated your telegram No. 176 of 28th February to persons indicated in last sentence, I decided to see French High Commissioner separately before discussing it with my French and Italian colleagues jointly. We met this afternoon and decided to hold meeting with Italian High Commissioner to-morrow. When it has taken place I will telegraph full expression of views. Meanwhile general conclusion arrived at by French High Commissioner and myself is that no recommendation can usefully be made to Supreme Council until latter have considered my telegram No. 176 of 29th February and corresponding telegram from French High Commissioner. I desire to reiterate with emphasis that nature of any action to be taken in the near future must depend very largely on nature of peace which Conference proposes to offer Turkey. I feel most strongly that course to be followed by Allies should not depend for its direction or jurisdiction on what has happened in Cilicia; what has happened there is deplorable, but it would be hard to say whether Turks or French are more responsible for letting situation drift into massacre. Leaders of national movement have doubtless grave responsibility for creation of situation which did so drift. Turkish Government is theoretically responsible for acts of leaders of national movement. This is mere theory, however. No action that can now be taken here will retrieve situation in Cilicia. What we have to face and what we have to adjust our action to is the wider issue raised by Nationalists to resist drastic peace and apparent intention of Peace Conference to impose one. I think my French colleague would agree with previous paragraph also, though for obvious reasons I have not been able to put it to him as I have put it to your Lordship. We both agree that naval Allied demonstration on Cilician coast would be useless. If any naval action at all in those waters should be considered desirable it had better be left to French to take it alone. French admiral states that he is prepared to take necessary action and has adequate forces. I have seen General Milne; he agrees generally with my views. Arising out of my telegram No. 176 of 29th February, he considers that, if and when time comes for Allied occupation of Constantinople, administration should be in hands of High Commissioners, who should directly control working of all Government Departments here.

[E 1001/3/44]

No. 91.

*Consul-General Wratistlaw to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 4.)*(No. 19.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Beirut, February 29, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 8 of 27th February.

French authorities calculate that, as there were previous to hostilities 20,000 Armenians in Marash and now only 8,000 remain, number of massacred in town was 12,000, not taking into account what may have happened in neighbourhood of which they are ignorant. They do not consider that Adana and Mersina are in danger. Mustafa Kemal has asked them to provision Marash, which they seem inclined to agree to.

Reports current here, mainly from Armenian sources, place number of victims as high as 30,000, but in my opinion all estimates of numbers are conjectural. There is no doubt that bad massacres have taken place.

[E 384/289/44]

No. 92.

*Earl Curzon to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*(No. 184.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Foreign Office, March 4, 1920.*

YOUR telegrams No. 107 of 6th February and No. 148 of 19th February: Consular Court and Inter-Allied Tribunal.

2. Judge Grain returns to Egypt at the end of April and will be able to go from there to Constantinople whenever required. Consular Court may therefore be opened officially now, suitable person being put in charge of the offices.

3. As regards temporary Inter-Allied Tribunal, legal difficulties are considerable. We appear to be much less interested than the French and Italians, and conclusion of peace now seems less remote. We therefore propose to take no action unless approached by French or Italians.

[E 1042/3/44]

No. 93.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 5.)*(No. 188.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.*Constantinople, March 5, 1920.*

TURKISH Government resigned on evening of 3rd March.

[E 994/56/44]

No. 94.

*Earl Curzon to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).*(No. 196.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, March 6, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 182 of 28th February.

Modifications in draft treaty are noted, but if decision on the lines indicated in your telegram No. 119 is taken involving definite separation of Soudan from Egypt, will clauses relating to Soudan, as outlined in your telegram under reply, still be appropriate?

[E 946/3/44]

No. 95.

*Earl Curzon to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*(No. 187.)  
(Telegraphic.) D.*Foreign Office, March 6, 1920.*

THE Supreme Council have carefully considered the possible alternative policies which the Allies could pursue at this juncture at Constantinople.

The first of these is the suggestion contained in your telegram No. 176 of 29th February that the Allied Powers should form a bloc with the Sultan and the moderate and well-disposed Turks to resist the irreconcilable attitude of the extreme Nationalist Party. But the condition of this policy is what you have described as a comparatively lenient peace. It would appear from your definition of such a peace that it is far removed from the terms of the treaty which we are discussing and must sooner or later impose.

For your confidential information, in no circumstances to be divulged except to the Allied High Commissioners and naval and military commanders-in-chief, these terms involve provisionally the cession of Thrace up to the lines of Chatalja to Greece, complete international control of the straits, the presence of an international force in that zone, close financial supervision of the Turkish Government to be exercised from the capital, the cession of Smyrna to Greece, subject only to Turkish suzerainty, the creation of an independent Armenia, including Erzeroum, the probable recognition of an independent Kurdistan.

These terms are sufficiently drastic to preclude the successful execution of the bloc policy. If this be so, they will clearly require sooner or later to be imposed by force. The questions to be answered accordingly are these: What are the steps to be taken?



At what time and where should they be taken? And with what military or naval forces should they be imposed?

The opinion of the Supreme Council is—

1. That in any case the capital ought to be occupied at once by the Allied forces under conditions to be indicated presently;
2. That the Turkish Government should be required to dismiss Mustapha Kemal, Governor of Erzeroum, whose responsibility for the recent occurrences in Cilicia is not open to doubt;
3. That the Turkish Government should be informed that the military occupation of Constantinople will continue until the terms of the Peace Treaty have been accepted and put into execution; and
4. That, if there is any recurrence of these or similar outrages, the proposed terms will be rendered even more severe, and the concessions already made withdrawn.

Instructions are being issued at once to the naval and military commanders to take steps for the military occupation of Constantinople. This should include the occupation of the Turkish War Office, and the control and censorship of all military orders or despatches issuing therefrom. But it should not in our opinion involve the general assumption of civil administration in Constantinople, as contemplated in the concluding words of your telegram No. 183 of 2nd March.

Please consult at once with your colleagues on these points and as to any steps other than those already indicated which ought to be taken either to secure the submission of the Turk or to protect the Christian minorities in Turkish territory from further attacks.

[E 1093/3/44]

No. 96.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 7.)*

(No. 191.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 5, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 183 of 2nd March.

Allied High Commissioners met on 3rd March and again on 4th March. We are agreed in considering: (1) that events in Cilicia, however grave they may be, do not constitute true basis on which action of Allies here should be founded in immediate future; (2) that action in Constantinople of kind contemplated by Supreme Council would act merely as irritant and not as deterrent to Turks really responsible for any massacre which may have taken place as accompaniment of this conflict between French and Nationalists; and (3) that naval action on coast of Cilicia would be unproductive of results.

We discussed at great length general Turkish situation as it exists to-day, and as it may be expected to develop, having regard to apparent intention of conference to formulate drastic terms of peace. We agree in anticipating violent resistance to such terms. Beyond this point agreement was impossible, and we had to renounce intention of addressing identical reply to Supreme Council. My French colleague and I argued (1) that armed resistance would be opposed to drastic peace terms by all sections of present Nationalist movement and portions of Moslem population swayed by it; (2) that this resistance would be attended by grave danger to Christians in interior; and (3) that if Allies are determined to impose drastic peace, they ought to forestall and so diminish resistance by fortifying their position at once in only place possible, namely, Constantinople. We considered that this could best be achieved by converting present position of Allies here into definite occupation and amongst other measures taking strong action against Nationalist leaders. At first meeting, Italian High Commissioner listened to these arguments without demur. At second meeting, he refused flatly to associate himself with proposal to recommend occupation of Constantinople. He maintained that such action would be calculated to precipitate the very consequences (especially massacre of Christians) which French High Commissioner and I considered likely to ensue at later stage from announcement of drastic peace terms, and which we wished to avoid. He refused to admit our argument that moral and material effect on national movement of strong action taken here now would hamper the efficiency of movement, though it would not by any means stifle it, and would reduce danger of massacre, which, on hypothesis of drastic peace, must be incurred sooner or later.

When asked for positive suggestions, in view of obvious desire of Supreme Council for leading from High Commissioner as regards action called for, not merely by Cilician situation, but by situation in Turkey generally, Italian High Commissioner declined to commit himself. He appeared to cling to the hope that Conference might alleviate peace terms, even after first presenting them to Turks, sufficiently to make them acceptable to many adherents and some leaders of national movement. He suggested at one moment that it might be advisable to summon Turkish delegates to Paris, not to receive cut-and-dried treaty, but, in appearance at least, to treat with them. My French colleague and I expressed belief that Supreme Council would not consent to treat Turkey differently from other defeated enemies, or to modify essential features of treaty once they had presented it to Turks. We recognised that if drastic peace is to be imposed, future teems with difficulties, and is fraught with possible danger for Christians in the interior, but we persisted in belief that least evil course would be to forestall Nationalists by taking strong positive action on lines indicated above, accompanied by categorical announcement that even occupation of Constantinople did not prejudice fate of city, and that future would still depend on the conduct of Turks pending signature of treaty. It was agreed that each High Commissioner should report separately. French High Commissioner will base his report on draft of identic telegram, which he prepared between first and second meeting. He has promised me copy. I will telegraph further on receipt of it.

[E 1094/3/44]

No. 97.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 7.)*

(No. 192.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 5, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 191 of 5th March.

Situation is complicated by resignation of Turkish Cabinet.

See my telegram No. 188 of 5th March. Cabinet had not been in contact with Chamber since 9th February, when it received practically unanimous vote of confidence. Crisis is result of increasing evidence of impossibility of satisfying both Nationalists and Allies. No single immediate cause can be assigned for it, though news from Cilicia and insistence of High Commissioners on demand for surrender of equivalent of arms recently raided by Nationalists near Gallipoli doubtless produced weakening effect.

There is great difficulty in settling on new Government. Tewfik Pasha has been asked to form it, and has refused. Izzet Pasha, whose selection would mean a Government of definitively Nationalist complexion, is much spoken of. Probabilities (5th March) are, however, that choice will fall on some inconspicuous person considered "safe" by France, like Salih Pasha, hitherto Minister of Marine.

[E 1128/139/44]

No. 98.

*Consul General Wratislaw to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 8.)*

(No. 7.)

My Lord,

*Beirut, February 18, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the copy of a telegram sent by the Committee of the Syrian Reform Party in Beirut to the President of the Peace Conference in Paris, protesting against any idea of ejecting the Turkish State, as representing the Caliphate, from Constantinople, and stating that the Committee would consider any attack on the integrity of really Turkish territory as an aggression against Islam itself.

This document reached me by post to-day, enclosed in a covering letter, in which the President of the Committee begged me to communicate it to His Majesty's Government. He at the same time forwarded a photograph of the names of the persons who signed the communication. They are headed by the Cadi of Beirut, and are fully representative of the Mussulman community in the town.

I have, &c.

A. C. WRATISLAW.



## Enclosure in No. 98.

*Telegram from Committee of Syrian Reform Party, Beirut, to the President of the Peace Congress.*

LE Comité supérieur du Parti de la Réforme syrienne soumet, au nom de tous les musulmans de Beyrouth, à la présidence du Congrès de la Paix, ce qui suit :

"Nous protestons énergiquement contre toute idée tendant à faire évacuer de Constantinople l'État ture, qui représente le Khalifat de l'Islam, à le démembrer ou le contraindre à un régime du protectorat.

"Nous considérons toute tentative faite contre l'intégrité du pays proprement ture comme une atteinte à l'Islam même.

"Nous vous prions, M. le Président, de transmettre cette protestation au Congrès de la Paix et d'y soutenir nos desiderata."

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Dr. KODDOURAH, *Président.*

[E 1125/3/44]

No. 99.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 8.)*

(No. 201.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 7, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 191 of 5th March.

French High Commissioner's draft of identic telegram originally proposed is now before me. It has, I understand, served as basis for telegram addressed by French High Commissioner to Paris as expression of his own views. Draft sets out at length reasons, on which all High Commissioners are agreed, for considering action on lines suggested by Supreme Council neither opportune nor likely to be effective. It emphasises lack of official confirmation of news of massacres in true sense of the word [? Turks' massacres in Cilicia]. It further points out injustice, apart from futility, of arresting late Ministers, and especially Grand Vizier, whose only fault was powerlessness to control Nationalists, and who has now resigned.

Draft proceeds to sum up general situation, and reiterates conviction frequently expressed by all three High Commissioners that drastic peace can only be imposed by force. It notes that, contrary to expectation, which appeared to be justified some weeks ago, Conference seems to be moving now in direction of a peace which will deprive Turks of Smyrna, Adrianople and Erzeroum, and leave Sultan in Constantinople with personal guard only. Treaty of this kind will meet with violent resistance, and High Commissioners have to envisage a situation in the near future even graver than that of to-day.

Can Allies face that situation and impose their will in whole of Turkey?

Answer depends on measures which Allied Governments are prepared to take, but enforcement will be difficult, and preparations should be made without loss of time. If Allies cannot be strong everywhere they should at least be strong at important points, and first and most necessary steps should be to strengthen their position in Constantinople by adoption of measures more severe and more efficacious than those contemplated by Supreme Council with the limited object of bringing home to Turkish Government responsibility for massacres. Primarily steps should be to convert present status of Allies here into effective occupation, carrying with it control of public departments, police, gendarmerie, telegraphs, posts, &c., not the arrest of impotent Ministers, but of Nationalist leaders and dangerous members of C.U.P.; perhaps also closing of Chamber. This action would be based on following grounds, which would be explained to public in proclamation: Violations of armistice and disobedience to instructions given under it; hostile attitude and attacks by Nationalists; fomentation of disorder and massacres of Christians; powerlessness of Government to enforce its authority; obligations of Allies to guarantee security of Sultan, Government, Allied forces and population generally. Proclamation would include declaration that measures taken did not prejudice future of Constantinople, which still remained for Conference to settle.

Draft recognises that action suggested might have serious consequences and carry Allies very far. Formation of Government might be possible, officials might go on

strike, and attitude of Sultan, Parliament and population generally would be uncertain. Christians in Asia Minor might be exposed to danger from explosion of Nationalist anger. All these possible consequences have to be considered beforehand, together with means of dealing with them: military and naval reinforcements; supply of officials for essential services; expenditure on such services, including payment of salaries; measures necessary for repression of possible, though not probable, popular rising.

Draft concludes by saying that, in spite of all this, it is the duty of High Commissioners to submit above suggestions and considerations with request for early instructions, and by pointing out urgency of matter, as action might have to be taken at any moment, and might more easily be taken in anticipation of, rather than simultaneously with, announcement of peace terms.

[E 1189/3/44]

No. 100.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 9.)*

(No. 204.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 8, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 187 of 6th March.

French High Commissioner and I have agreed on following preliminary reply as result of exchange of views following on conversation between General Milne and myself this morning:—

Three High Commissioners will meet to-morrow morning, and Military and Nava Commanders-in-chief will be requested to make necessary preparations.

M. de France and I desire to observe straight away that telegram under reference crossed those sent by us to our Governments on 5th March, in which we set out measures required in our opinion for effective action, possible consequences of such measures, necessity which may confront us of taking over administration of city and reasons for which Italian High Commissioner considered himself unable to join with us.

Military dispositions required will take only a few days. We therefore beg our Governments to inform us urgently, and after perusal of our telegrams up to date, whether Supreme Council maintains its instructions or whether we are to await further orders before finally proceeding.

General Milne's instructions from the War Office are such as will enable him to proceed with preparations and actual occupation on being requested to do so by High Commissioners.

In view of great secrecy hitherto observed (very desirable in my opinion) it is disconcerting to read in the American wireless circulated here to-day quotations from "Écho de Paris" and "Daily Telegraph" giving substantially accurate account of immediate intention of Allies. This disclosure may considerably affect march of events here.

[E 1093/3/44]

No. 101.

*Earl Curzon to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 197.)

(Telegraphic.) D

*Foreign Office, March 9, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 191 of 5th March.

We are considering suggestions contained in French High Commissioner's draft, but in the meantime we presume that you have already acted upon instructions contained in our telegram No. 187. Please telegraph at once what steps have been taken.



[E 1273/56/44]

No. 102.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 10.)*(No. 226.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, March 9, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 196 of 6th March.

After consultation with Lord Milner, I have sent Keown-Boyd to Khartoum with a view to prepare, in consultation with Governor-General, concrete proposals to carry out policy indicated in my telegram No. 119 of 10th February.

Immediately on his return proposals will be submitted to you, and will no doubt be discussed with Lord Milner.

Meanwhile, it appears desirable that in Turkish Treaty a way should be left open to secure recognition of proposed settlement if approved.

(Repeated to Khartoum.)

[E 1296/3/44]

No. 103.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 10.)*(No. 210.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, March 10, 1920.

MY telegram No. 204 of 8th March.

High Commissioners met on 9th March.

I have previously seen General Milne. In view of publicity already given to decision to occupy Constantinople he was of opinion still more that all idea of sudden coup must be abandoned, and that occupation had better be preceded by invitation to Grand Vizier and Minister of War to wait on High Commissioners and Commanders-in-chief some hours before occupation. They would be informed at this interview of decision of Supreme Council regarding occupation and invitation to facilitate its execution in orderly fashion. I communicated this opinion to my colleagues. We discussed whole matter in all its bearings, but the most questionable were left for final settlement until after meeting of naval and military commanders which General Milne had proposed to hold on 10th March.

It was decided on principle to proceed with all arrangements for about six months' occupation. I undertook to draft instructions in general terms to be issued by the three High Commissioners to Commanders-in-chief. Italian colleague made reservation that he must withhold actual signature until he received direct instructions from his Government, from whom he had nothing so far.

As regards date of occupation, I told colleagues that General Milne was in favour of the 13th March. They were inclined to think this somewhat too soon. Both would like to have quite definite instructions from their Government, and I think that French colleague is reluctant to commit himself too far pending arrival of General Franchet, who might, he thought, arrive on 11th March.

General Milne and I are anxious to carry matter through as soon as possible. I hope to get colleagues into line after meeting of Allied, naval and military commanders.

Meanwhile High Commissioners agreed with French High Commissioners to address identic telegram to our Governments regarding possible consequences of decision to impose peace terms now contemplated. See my telegram immediately following.

[E 1297/3/44]

No. 104.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 10.)*(No. 211.)  
(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, March 10, 1920.

IDENTIC telegram (English translation).

French, British and Italian High Commissions have now been apprised, by telegram from London 6th March, containing instructions of Supreme Council regarding occupation of Constantinople, of conditions of future Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Smyrna and all Thrace, including Adrianople and shores of Sea of Marmora, to go to Greece, Erzeroum to Armenia, &c.

High Commissioners will naturally do all in their power to carry out instructions which may be given them and to enforce decisions of Supreme Council, whatever they

may be, but they consider it their duty to express once more their unanimous opinion on the consequences of presenting treaty of such severity. These consequences may be as follows:—

1. Refusal to sign treaty, or if it is signed to ratify, or if it is ratified to execute it.

2. Rising of the whole of Turkish elements, abdication or deposition of Sultan, flight of Parliament to Anatolia, accession of new Sultan and creation of new Government in Asia, widespread massacres of Christians in Thrace and Asia Minor. There is danger of these consequences and notably massacres ensuing as soon as stipulations of treaty become known.

3. Indefinitely continued attempts in Europe at common action between Turks and Bulgarians against Greeks.

4. Possibility for future of combined action in Asia between Turks and Arabs and Bolsheviks.

[E 1189/3/44]

No. 105.

*Earl Curzon to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*(No. 207.)  
(Telegraphic.) D.

Foreign Office, March 10, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 204 of the 8th March.

The Supreme Council have carefully considered the proposals made by the French High Commissioner in your telegram No. 201, with which it is understood that you agree. The Council are opposed at present either to assuming charge of the civil administration or to dissolving the Turkish Parliament or to issuing a general proclamation. They adhere to the instructions contained in my telegram No. 187 of the 6th March, which should be, if they have not already been, carried out at once.

It may be necessary, however, that the Allied Powers should occupy the posts and telegraphs, as well as the War Office, in order to prevent the issue of secret communications, and that they should also assume complete control of the police.

The arrest of dangerous Nationalist leaders would be in accord with policy previously pursued.

You have authority to act in all these respects.

You will doubtless advise, in consultation with naval and military commanders, whether any steps require to be taken for the protection of Christian minorities in other parts of Turkey.

[E 1328/3/44]

No. 106.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)*(No. 189.)  
My Lord,

Constantinople, February, 5, 1920.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 107 of the 24th January regarding the resignation of Djemal Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, and Djavad Pasha, the Chief of Staff, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report dated the 28th January, which I have received from the military authorities, relative to the present position of the Cabinet.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 106.

*Military Attaché to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.*

THE following copy of a report received from the Control Officer, Mecca, dated the 26th January, is forwarded for your information:—

"My agent has had a talk with the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and reports:

"The Sheikh-ul-Islam was very much pre-occupied, and at once brought the conversation on the resignation of the Minister of War. He stated that the British

[4370]

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General-in-Chief, for reasons known to himself, disliked and became annoyed with Djemal Pasha, and decided to get him removed from the War Office. The British General, he said, brought pressure to bear on the Allied High Commissioners, who unanimously demanded the withdrawal of the Minister of War within forty-eight hours. The Cabinet, seeing that this was not directed against the whole Cabinet, but was only a private misunderstanding between the British General and the Minister of War, decided to sacrifice the latter instead of tendering its resignation to the Sultan.

"The position of the Cabinet," continued the Sheikh-ul-Islam, "is very unpleasant, and we find ourselves pressed between two mill-stones. The leaders of the National forces have now openly assumed an attitude of control over the Government. We declare that, as the National Assembly has been opened, the Anatolian forces should not only abstain from interfering with Governmental affairs, but that they should submit to the orders of the Imperial Government. However, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his colleagues wish to control and direct the Parliament exactly as the C.U.P. used to do, and in a very short time this untenable situation will reach a climax, and either they will submit unconditionally to the Government or we shall be obliged to resign."

For Major, General Staff,  
Army of the Black Sea,

Captain, General Staff.

G.H.-Q. "I," Constantinople,  
January 28, 1920.

[E 1334/27/44]

No. 107.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 196.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 5, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of the minutes of the meeting held on the 28th January between the Armenian-Greek section of my staff and the representatives of the Armenian and Greek Patriarchates and the Greek High Commissioner.

2. I have sent a copy to General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 107.

Minutes of the Thirty-First Meeting between the Armenian-Greek Section and the Armenian and Greek Representatives held at the British High Commission at Constantinople on January 28, 1920, at 11.40 A.M.

Present :

Lieutenant-Colonel Graves.

Mr. Hurst.

Lieutenant Tucker, R.N.V.R.

Captain P. Hadkinson.

M. Pallis, Representative of the Greek High Commission.

Dr. Theotokas, Representative of the Greek Patriarchate.

Dr. Tavitian, " " Armenian Patriarchate.

M. Tchakirian, " " " "

#### 1. Public Security.

Dr. Theotokas read a report from the Greek Patriarchate.

A Greek from the vicinity of Miriopolito had been found murdered close to the town.

In the Gallipoli peninsula the band of a certain Tahir, about forty strong, was ravaging the country side. The chief of police at Gallipoli—Ismail Hakki—was in connivance with him, and it was suggested that he be dismissed. The French military authorities had been informed about Tahir, and troops were on his traces.

A Greek who had gone into the forest to cut wood near Ermenikeuy had disappeared, and his body was subsequently found, and two other Christians had been killed at Courfaji. These localities were in the Chatalja sanjak.

Dr. Tavitian said that a number of cases of robbery by Laz had been reported from the Ismid district.

Two Armenian girls had been carried off from Duzje.

Some twenty-five Armenians had been killed in an affray close to Marash. Marash and the mountainous region of Cilicia had for long been a centre of Turkish chauvinism, and it would be desirable to make an example there.

Colonel Graves recalled a recent incident at Marash, when the local Moslems had hauled down the French flag. He asked whether the Armenian Patriarchate kept the French authorities informed of happenings in French zones which came to their knowledge. The reply was that they did.

Captain Hadkinson informed the meeting that, according to the Turkish accounts, the Marash incident arose from an Armenian being appointed assistant to the governor. The French had subsequently bombarded the town.

Dr. Tavitian stated that a number of meetings had been held at Konia urging the unqualified return to Turkey of Cilicia and Smyrna. At Broussa prominent Unionists had been acquitted by the court, and some of them had even been elected deputies. The Nationalists, whose movement in that vilayet was spreading, had imposed a levy of £ T. 1,000,000.

Colonel Graves asked whether any further information was available on the subject of impediments to travelling for Ottoman Christians living in the interior. Dr. Tavitian gave one specific instance as follows: Two Armenians of Samsoun had wished to go to Diarbekir recently. The local authorities at Samsoun had telegraphed to those at Diarbekir for permission for them to proceed; the vali of Diarbekir had replied that this could not be granted without the sanction of the Ministry of the Interior.

Dr. Tavitian proceeded to give certain detailed information from Van which had been supplied by a chemist who had left that town for Constantinople via Erzeroum on the 18th October. This was the first report they had had from Van for a considerable time.

There were now 500 Armenians, of whom only thirty-five were men, left in the town, these being those left from 2,500 who remained behind and withdrew to the island of Akhtamar, in the lake of Van when the Russian troops retreated. They had after three months been forced to surrender, and had then been deported to Diarbekir and thence immediately sent back to Van again.

At first, after the Armistice, these Armenian survivors had been well treated by the Turkish authorities, who had given them food. Midhat Bey, who succeeded as vali, had discontinued this, and the Armenians were now badly off.

There were no longer any Americans at Van. Furthermore, it was impossible to remit there.

Dr. Tavitian then proceeded to give certain political information supplied by his informant. The Kurds generally were opposed to the Nationalists; they had held a Congress - Kurdish Nationalist and anti-Turkish - in the town itself. A certain Simko, who was the chief of one of the most important tribes, had, with his followers, openly declared against the Turks, and was now on the Turco-Persian frontier.

Colonel Graves stated that it would be interesting, if possible, to obtain confirmation of a report that demobilised Anatolian soldiers were being encouraged to settle down in the eastern vilayets in order to create an artificial Turkish element.

Dr. Tavitian said that 600 demobilised Armenian and Greek soldiers had, by the order to Mustafa Kemal, been forced to work in mines in the Erzeroum district. Dr. Theotokas gave certain precise information in this connection. Forty-five Greeks of the 11th Van division demobilised last May had at Erzeroum been pressed into the 12th Labour Battalion. Twelve of them were being forced to work in the mines of Liza Kurkudli, near Erzeroum. The fate of the others was not known. A complaint had been addressed to the Porte, but the orders of the Ministry were disregarded.

#### 2. Relief.

M. Tchakirian said that a number of houses had been requisitioned for Armenian refugees during the preceding week or two, and he hoped that in the course of a few



days all the refugees from the camp at Haidar Pasha would be more suitably housed elsewhere. It would be easier to find work for them now that they were on the European side of the Bosphorous. The number of permanent Armenian refugees at Constantinople was from 2,000 to 2,500.

Colonel Graves asked what help was now given by the Turkish Government, and Dr. Tavitian informed him that they no longer gave anything, either money or food.

### 3. Islamized Women and Children.

M. Tchakirian had seen General Fuller about the new arrangement for setting aside some members of the Inter-Allied police force exclusively for duties under this head; the Inter-Allied police would in future hand over the child direct to the bearer of a demand note for conveyance to the Neutral house, thus eliminating the Turkish police as intermediaries.

### 4. Restitution of Property.

M. Tchakirian said that the Armenian Patriarchate were making a translation of the new Restitution Law; beside the new law, the project of Commander Heathcote-Smith, formerly of the High Commission, and that of the Armenian Patriarchate would be placed in parallel columns.

Dr. Theotokas said he had studied the law. The conclusion was that it was useless. Three principles had originally been considered essential. Firstly, that all properties usurped should be restored without exception. Secondly, that usurpers refusing to abide by the stipulations of the law should be punished. Thirdly, that disputes should be settled before special commissions, *ad hoc*, and not by the Turkish courts. The above three principles had been in the main accepted by the Turco-Armenian Commission formed several months previously to draft a law.

The new law was most unsatisfactory. It only dealt with properties of those actually deported, whereas many not deported suffered gravely. It made an indefensible and ludicrous distinction between movable and immovable property. As regards the latter, the community concerned does not (according to the new law) get these properties where all heirs to them are dead; they go to the State.

Colonel Graves pointed out that this was the exact contrary of what the Allied High Commissioner had demanded of the Turkish Government; it upheld the "Emvali Metroukeh" Law.

As regards movable property all heirs to which were dead, Dr. Theotokas said that this did go to the community concerned.

The Government, according to the new law, was to restore what usurped Christian property it held. As regards private individuals, there was the same obligation. If, however, they did not indemnify or restore their property to the owners, these latter were required to apply to the Turkish Government which would pay through the Ministry of Finance. Dr. Theotokas laid stress on the interminable postponement in obtaining satisfaction which such clauses would involve, and stated that the withdrawal of the whole law was essential.

Colonel Graves agreed, adding that the repeal of the "Emvali Metroukeh" Law was also most necessary.

(Meeting ended at 12 40 P.M. Next meeting, Wednesday, 11th February.)

[E 1340/1340/44]

No. 108.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 203.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 9, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a telegram, dated the 27th January and of a report of the same date, which I have received from Lieutenant G. Whittall, a relief officer attached to this High Commission, relative to the situation in the Dardanelles and Gallipoli districts.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 108.

Lieutenant Whittall to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

(Telegraphic.)

Chanak, January 27, 1920.

POLITICAL situation aggravated. First-hand information states that on 26th January fifty-two Greeks were blindfolded, taken captive near Kangirli by a band of approximately thirty armed Turks. In that vicinity on 25th January several sailing-vessels were held up at Pergaz pier, the skippers being either taken as hostages or ransomed. Later reports to-day state that armed men have taken captive both French and Turkish guard at Ak Bash Liman and stolen small-arms and ammunition in some sailing-vessels, said to be those held up at Pergaz. Eziné reports also disquietude. Civil Governor recently visited Eziné and Pergaz. Writing.

Enclosure 2 in No. 108.

Report on the Political Situation in Dardanelles and Gallipoli Districts.

I CONFIRM my cyphered telegram of this day, as per copy herewith, the latter part of which reads "visited and Eziné Pergaz," but should be interpreted "visited Eziné and Pergaz," which I trust you will have understood.

As stated in the above-mentioned telegram, the political situation here has been greatly aggravated by the appearance of armed bands of Turks who are undoubtedly backed up by some influential party and are committing lawless acts without end.

On the 25th January several sailing-vessels were held up at Pergaz pier and the skippers were taken prisoners by armed men who have taken up their quarters in the café on the beach and stop every passing sailing-ship which happens to drop anchor off Pergaz pier.

Some of these captains were made to give up all the money they had on their persons, and most of them were not allowed to go back to their ships where the remainder of the crews were to be found.

Two Greek captains would have shared the same fate, had they not had the presence of mind to say that they would be returning to the café to get an answer to a letter of introduction they were given for a merchant at Pergaz, and which they forwarded to that village in the presence of five of the armed bandits. The latter thinking that they were sure of their prey, allowed these two captains to return to their ships, but never saw them again, notwithstanding that they called out to them to land, and fired over 200 rounds at the sailing-vessels with their rifles. The names of the two Greeks are Stamatis Asproulis and Paraskevas Leondaras, of the sailing-vessels "Aghios Ioannis" and "Evangelistria" respectively. By lying flat in the ballast they managed to escape, and after dark hove up and came to Chanak to report.

Stratis Christodoulos came to me to report as follows:—

At Kangirli, near Pergaz, he was going along the road which leads to Lamsaki, when three of his companions, who were walking ahead of him, were stopped by a band of about thirty armed men, and after being blindfolded were led away. These armed men had already gathered all the Christians who were working in that neighbourhood and treated them in the same way. They numbered fifty-two in all. My informant beat a hasty retreat into the village of Kangirli, where he was hidden by some Turkish women who knew him before the war. He remained in a cellar for several hours, and came out some hours after sunset, when it was dark. The bandits had surrounded the village and searched it for Christians, but did not find Stratis Christodoulos, whom they fired on when he was leaving the village. Over 200 rounds were fired at him, but he escaped unhurt and walked to Chanak.

This incident took place on the 26th January at about 16.30 hours.

To-day, another captain has reached Chanak from Ak Bash Liman, which is the port of Yalova, and reports that the Turkish and French guards, who were there to keep watch over the ammunition depôts, were attacked by armed men who also had sailing-vessels on the beach and taken prisoners. The Chétés then broke open the ammunition depôts, from which they extracted a lot of ammunition and rifles, &c. From all accounts about 400 machine guns fell into their hands, 8,000 rifles and 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition. One of the French guards was killed, I understand.



This must have taken place during the night of the 26th January, and the lighters used must have been those of Pergaz.

At Chanak this morning the Turkish police discovered in the ruins of the burnt part of the town a big bomb which had been dropped there recently. Who placed it there no one knows, but I would be inclined to think that this is a blind to cover our local authorities, who are, I feel convinced, in league with the bad characters in this district. The Mutessarif has quite recently been on a visit to Pergaz and Eziné, in both of which places trouble is in preparation.

At Eziné Tzepeoglou Riza, a renowned C.U.P. member, has admitted that an ex-officer dressed in civilian clothes and a Hodja, called a meeting of all the most influential Turks of that place and asked them to assist them financially and with volunteers. The Eziné notables refused on the plea that if these national defence members wished to fight the bad characters in the neighbourhood, they should apply to the local authorities, who would doubtless assist them. As long as there was a Government the Eziné inhabitants could only give assistance to the Government and to no one else. If the present Government backed up the officer and his companion they would willingly do so too.

The Turks are said to boast openly that now that few British troops are stationed at Chanak they will soon drive out the balance.

To come back to the Ak Bash Liman incident, I am of opinion that in one night it is quite impossible for 50 or 100 men to transport so much ammunition and so many weapons into lighters and then across the Straits (where they would have to be landed) without leaving any traces behind. This theft of ammunition must have been going on for some time past, and it is now covered by this raid. This may also account for the action of the Turkish Government in connection with the building material at Ak Bash Liman and Yalova, which, if handed over to the Christians, would have prevented a systematic pilferage of arms by the Turks.

During the summer months I had pointed out the fact to Brigadier-General Nisbet that the ammunition depôts at Yalova and Ak Bash Liman were very accessible to thieves, as they were open and but poorly guarded. I received as a reply that practically the whole of Asia Minor was armed and it was useless trying to disarm the Turks or prevent them from getting weapons.

I have given the above information to our commanding officer here, who is taking action, and send you this report as it might prove of interest.

G. WHITTALL, *Lieutenant,  
Relief Officer.*

Chanak, January 27, 1920.

[E 1352/3/44]

No. 109.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 222. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 11, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of two reports received from the Constantinople branch of the M.I.L.C., regarding the situation at Marash and in Syria.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 109.

*The Situation at Marash.*

(HA/473. Secret.)

FOLLOWING from T. 26/7 :—

The Vali of Sivas, telegraphing to the Ministry of the Interior on the 29th January, after describing the rising of the inhabitants of the Marash district and neighbouring villages against the French, reported that on the 24th January twelve carts loaded with ammunition, on their way from Islahie via El-Oghlou, with an escort of 150 men in French uniform, were captured. The escort was turned back with their arms bound, those who had fired on the inhabitants being killed.

The Vali further reported that the national forces surrounding Marash were preparing for a general attack, but that with a view to avoiding bloodshed they had

sent a note to the French commander. A time limit had been given for the reply. The contents of the note are not stated but are doubtless those referred to in report No. HA/471.

The Vali further stated that according to an unconfirmed report the inhabitants of the districts round Marash had assembled at Aintab and proposed to march on the former town to save their brethren at all costs. He feared that the movement would spread to Aintab and Killis.

2. The Vali of Sivas telegraphed to the Ministry of the Interior on the 27th January as follows :—

"It has now become impossible to allay the excitement which I described in my preceding telegram. Letters are continually arriving from the districts protesting against the events at Marash and Aintab, and demanding that the Central Government shall take steps to draw to them the attention of the Moslem world. There are signs that it will be difficult to safeguard the lives of the non-Moslems, and I fear that it will be impossible to protect them if a repetition of the Marash incident is not prevented. I will send you a daily report of the situation."

3. A telegram received from Sivas on the 31st January reports that at Albistam an appeal to the inhabitants has been published by the Nationalist Committee of that town, stating that the French have outdone the Greeks in atrocities and have set fire to the town of Marash and the neighbouring villages. Moslems are invited to come to the defence of their country. The telegram states that if this movement is not put a stop to it will certainly spread right through Anatolia.

4. T. 26/4 reports that telegrams have arrived at the Grand Vizier's office from Fabrie, Eski Shehir, Angora and Castamouni protesting against the policy of destruction which the Armenians are pursuing towards Moslems in the districts in which they form a majority, and demanding the interference of the Islamic world. Preachers have been sent to work up the Kurdish and Arab tribes round Aintab and Killis.

The Committee of National Defence is discussing the advisability of making representations to the Grand Vizier with a view to action on the part of the Government and on that of the Caliph as head of the Moslem world.

The advisability is being discussed of holding a meeting at Constantinople to protest against the situation at Marash and Aintab.

5. The opinion is held by the Sublime Porte that the French will experience considerable difficulty in extricating themselves from the situation at Marash. It is admitted that they have considerable forces at Adana, but it is thought that the situation there does not allow of the movement of troops to Marash or elsewhere. It is considered that the outbreak at Marash will spread to all occupied territory, and that the French will be obliged to yield to Moslem wishes and withdraw.

6. Following from T. 26/8 :—

According to information obtained by the Ministry of War, the destruction of some villages on the Islahie hills by the French set on foot a considerable rising among the local population. The village of Imali was defended by the inhabitants, who captured arms, ammunition and mules belonging to the French and destroyed two guns. The French resumed the attack after having been reinforced. The Nationalist forces subsequently came to the aid of the inhabitants and severe fighting ensued, in the course of which seventy French soldiers were killed and a quantity of material was captured. The opinion is held at the Ministry that the movement is likely to spread.

It is also reported that the Armenians of Zeitoun have commenced to deport the inhabitants of the neighbouring Moslem villages and have captured certain local officials; also that fighting has commenced between them and the Ketmenli tribe. The French have armed some 800 Armenians at Marash.

A telegram of protest against the incidents at Marash and Aintab has been received from the Officer Commanding XXth Army Corps, who states that they have produced a most unfortunate impression on the population.

Constantinople, February 3, 1920.



Enclosure 2 in No. 109.

*Situation in Syria.*

(HA/474. Secret.)

T. 26/8 reports that the following telegram has been received by the Ministry of War:—

*"Diarbekir, January 27, 1920.*

"The movement against the troops of occupation in Syria continues. The Arabs in the desert have risen. Ibn Saoud, Sheikh Yahia, Ibn Reshid, and the minor tribes which acknowledge their rule, will shortly constitute a force of 200,000 men. They have sworn not to lay down their arms as long as any foreign forces remain in Syria and on the littoral. Ibn Reshid with a force of 50,000 men is marching on Damascus. From the neighbourhood of Maan to the north of Aleppo, including the Hauran district, the Government is enclosed in a narrow zone along the railway. The Sherifian Government of the Hejaz is in touch with the above forces between Maan and Tibouk. The French, who have occupied the whole littoral from the south of Sour, are daily moving into the interior. The Arab Government is preparing to concentrate all its forces to oblige the French to evacuate the littoral, the towns and villages of which, encouraged by this support, will rise against the French. The Druzes are all with the Arabs.

*"JEVDET,**"Commanding XIIIth Army Corps."**Constantinople, February 3, 1920.*

[E 1354/3/44]

No. 110.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)*

(No. 226.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 13, 1920.*

I HAVE not had occasion since the date of my despatch No. 1836 of the 10th October last to submit to your Lordship any complete review of the course of political events in this country, though I have in numerous despatches and telegrams drawn attention to particular events and aspects of the situation. I take the opportunity afforded by the changes in the Turkish Government, reported in my telegram No. 118 of the 10th February, to present a somewhat more connected view.

2. The point which I sought to emphasize in my despatch No. 1836 was that the fall of Ferid Pasha amounted to what I called a minor revolution, and marked the triumph of the so-called "national movement" in Constantinople itself. I pointed out that this did not necessarily mean that the leaders of that movement, however hostile to the Allies, would at once join issue with them. The event justified this forecast. The new Cabinet exerted itself to reassure the High Commissioners, and, in their efforts to avoid a critical situation here, were forced into an attitude of opposition to the leaders of the national movement over a good many questions of detail. The Ministry of War, however, became the directing centre of nationalist activities. The result was that, after a couple of months, the Cabinet found itself divided into two groups of moderates and extremists. The former, headed by the Grand Vizier, endeavoured to hold the nationalists more or less in check, while the extremists, headed by the Minister of War, worked steadily, though as unostentatiously as possible, on nationalist lines.

3. Notwithstanding this polarisation the Cabinet preserved an appearance of solidarity. No success attended the efforts of the adversaries of the nationalists to oust it from power and to reinstate Ferid Pasha. The counter-movement organised with their approval in the region between Broussa and Balikesser, under the leadership of Ahmed Anzavur, with the object of opposing the nationalist movement by force in the interior, dwindled to nothing after a few preliminary local successes. The nationalists moved their headquarters from Sivas to railhead at Angora, and improved their communications with Constantinople. For the rest they were content to bide their time. The military side of their movement had even the appearance of declining, but they improved their propaganda work at home and abroad.

4. The next definite development in Constantinople was the opening of Parliament on the 13th January. In my despatch No. 13 of the 3rd January I explained the

significance, in my opinion, of a Turkish Parliament at the present juncture. The Chamber is in the main a body of nationalist nominees, and is intended to be the political counterpart in Constantinople of the military organisation in the interior. The difficulty of obtaining a quorum was overcome by the simple device of inventing a new theory, according to which all that is needed is an absolute majority (half plus one) of the deputies from places in which elections have been held. This having been settled the Chamber proceeded to elect as its President on 31st January Reshad Hikmet Bey, a diehard of the old Union and Progress gang, and reputed to be an intimate of Talat, with whom he is said to have been in touch during a recent visit to Switzerland.

5. This last period, coinciding roughly with the month of January, was marked by other indications that nationalism was ready openly to claim its own in Constantinople. All the best-known leaders of the national movement, with the exception of Mustafa Kemal himself, came to the capital. Bekir Samy was followed by Reouf, Reouf by the renegade Bilinski, alias Ahmed Rustem. A new note was struck in certain public utterances, notably at meetings held at the University, a hotbed of chauvinism, on two successive Fridays, the 23rd and 30th January. At the first, which was held in honour of Pierre Loti, under the presidency of the Heir Apparent, Suleiman Nazif Bey, a leading light in the movement for the defence of the eastern vilayets, proclaimed that the Turkish nation had gone blithely into the war, while another orator confessed that his admiration for Muhammad the Conqueror was tempered by a feeling that that monarch's magnanimity to the conquered had produced in our day ungratifying results. The second meeting was held to celebrate the recognition of Azerbaijan independence. The orators hailed this event as a fruit of Turkey's moral victory in the war, and sugared wonders for the future success of a regenerated Turkey and its new-born brother Moslem State in crushing the head of a reptile *entente*.

6. During the week which followed the election of Reshad Hikmet Bey to the presidency of the Chamber the Government was in negotiation with the nationalist leaders regarding the reception to be accorded to it on its first meeting with the new Chamber. For several days it presented the appearance of a person stripped for bathing, but deterred from the plunge by the obvious coldness of the water and the added uncertainty of not knowing whether a rock lay below the surface. At last, on the 7th February, a composition was arrived at, and the Grand Vizier was assured of the support of a *bloc* in the Chamber on condition of parting company with the Ministers of the Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs. The reconstructed Cabinet presented itself before Parliament on the 9th February and the vote of confidence was passed by a majority of 104 to 2.

7. I enclose a French translation of the Ministerial statement rewarded with so unanimous an expression of approval.\* It is a repertory of old *clichés* and new grievances. If it contains anything remarkable at all it is that the Government still have the courage to proclaim the need for foreign assistance in the reform of Turkish administration.

8. What was of course important in the eyes of the nationalists was not the programme which the Government might publish, but the composition of the Government itself. They had to choose between driving it from office in order to replace it by men of their own and compromising with the existing Grand Vizier. In choosing the latter course they were probably actuated by fear of trying either the Sultan or the Allied Powers too high. The Sultan had shown some independence by refusing to appear at the opening of Parliament, and might have embarrassed them by refusing to accept a Grand Vizier of their choice at a moment when they were not themselves prepared to join open issue with him. The Allies had given proof of their quality by compelling the retirement of the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff, an incident to which I have not adverted in the above survey, but which happened at an important moment, i.e., the 21st–22nd January, a week after the opening of Parliament and just when the nationalists from the interior were adapting themselves to the new atmosphere of Constantinople.

9. The new Minister for Foreign Affairs is Sefa Bey, formerly Minister at Bucarest and Sofia, and acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during Ferid Pasha's absence at the Peace Conference. He is a person of secondary importance and purely official antecedents. His personal sentiments are nationalist and he can be relied on to do the bidding of his nominators.

10. Hazim Bey, Governor-General of Broussa, replaces Damad Sherif Pasha as

\* Not printed.



Minister of the Interior. Sherif Pasha might have retired in any case owing to the sudden death of his wife, an Imperial Princess, to whom he was much attached, but the main reason for his elimination appears to have been that he was too conservative and too much imbued with an old-fashioned palace official spirit for the nationalists. His successor held high administrative posts in the provinces. He endeared himself to the nationalists some months ago by flouting in an insubordinate telegram the then Minister of the Interior. He is, I believe, a rather pretentious person, with a good knowledge of French and a tincture of European culture.

11. The departure of the Minister of Justice was unexpected, and is instructive. One of the recent causes of quarrel between the extreme nationalists and Ali Riza Pasha's Government was the publication of the reform scheme of the 6th January, a copy of which I sent home in my despatch No. 62 of the 12th January. The nationalists criticised the judicial reform proposals on the ground that they tended to compromise Turkish independence, and maintained that no further steps should be taken without their approval. This attitude towards a scheme, which certainly did not err on the side of giving away too much to foreign controllers, is symptomatic of the whole spirit of the nationalists. The late Minister of Justice was to foreign eyes rather a crusty old gentleman, whose one preoccupation seemed to be not to acquiesce in any encroachment on Turkish sovereignty even during the Armistice. He seems, nevertheless, to have been made a scapegoat for the reform proposals. He is succeeded by Kiazim Bey, chief public prosecutor, a person of exclusively magisterial antecedents, and little known outside the Ministry of Justice, but believed to be devoted to the nationalists.

12. Shortly before these changes Ismail Djenany Bey, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, resigned, and was replaced by Fahrudin Bey, a gentleman of the same general type as Sefa Bey, though fatter and more amiable. The Minister of Agriculture, Hadi Pasha, has also resigned, independently of the three principal Ministers involved. He had given offence by some recent public statement. His department is to be carried on provisionally by Abdurrahman Sherif Bey, President of the Council of State, one of the oldest and most respectable of the Union and Progress Party.

13. These events would merely constitute another scene in the perennial comedy of Turkish politics were it not that they form the second stage in the establishment of complete control by the nationalists over the administration of this country. Even now it suits that party to cloak their designs and to effect a certain deference for the *Entente* here in Constantinople. There has, however, been no interruption of the process described in my despatch No. 1836 of the 10th October. It was inevitable that sooner or later the nationalist movement should come into collision with the Allies. The conflict was definitely engaged when it became necessary to demand the removal of the late Minister of War and the Chief of General Staff. That was merely the first round in the struggle, and victory lay with my colleagues and myself. Let it not, however, be supposed that each succeeding stage will be as easy. I have the full concurrence of my French colleague in thinking that if the Allies now desire to impose a drastic peace on Turkey they will have to impose it by the use of armed force against the national movement.

14. I need not labour this point further, because I have in my telegram No. 109 of the 6th February submitted to your Lordship a detailed statement of the grave situation which exists to-day viewed in more general aspects than those treated in this despatch.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
High Commissioner.

[E 1357/3/44]

No. 111.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)*

(No. 228.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 14, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Lordship the following information, received from a very secret source and based upon the report of a Moslem agent, considered trustworthy, who visited the headquarters of the Nationalist organisation at Angora about the middle of last month.

2. This agent states that Reuf Bey, in the course of conversation, informed him that a large quantity of arms and ammunition had been collected and stored, and that up till that time over 25,000 rifles had been distributed among the villagers of Anatolia.

3. Reuf Bey is reported to have also stated that the Bolsheviks had proffered monetary assistance for the Nationalist movement, but that this had been declined with thanks, as the Nationalists were unwilling to sell their principles.

4. As regards communication with other Moslem communities, the agent was informed by Reuf Bey that a deputation of adherents of the notorious Yasin Pasha had been received, with the object of enlisting the assistance of the Nationalist forces in driving the French out of Syria. On the other hand, Reuf Bey is reported to have stated that no direct communication had been established with either India or Afghanistan, although missionaries had been despatched to both countries. It appears from other sources that news had been received of their safe arrival at the Indian frontier, but it would seem that they have not as yet been able to report any definite results of their mission.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
High Commissioner.

[E 1358/3/44]

No. 112.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)*

(No. 235.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 17, 1920.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the recent incidents in the Marash area, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note and enclosures from the Sublime Porte, and copies of two notes to the Porte, copies of which have been communicated to me by my French colleague.

2. Having observed a tendency on the Turkish side to attempt to play the British off against the French in this business, I sent Mr. Ryan with a message to the Grand Vizier on the 5th February. In this message, which was delivered with the concurrence of my French colleague, I said that I had been apprised of the terms of the French representations to the Porte regarding the Marash incidents, and that I wished it to be understood that I was entirely in agreement with the French point of view. The replacement of British by French troops in Syria and Cilicia was the result of the decision of the Peace Conference. The announcement of that decision had been the signal for an organised agitation on the part of the so-called National movement. Mustapha Kemal himself had issued a manifesto couched in terms of violent menace. While I had no independent information, and while I deplored, as much as the Grand Vizier himself, the situation which evidently now existed, I could only suppose that the French troops charged with the execution of the decision of the Conference had been attacked in fulfilment of Mustapha Kemal's threat. The Turks accused the French of brutal and provocative conduct, but the French had no interest in outraging the local population, unless they were compelled to take drastic action in self-defence.

3. Mr. Ryan pointed out that the French contention that formations of the regular army were implicated in the attack on the French was borne out by what we ourselves knew of the connection between the regular army and the national forces in General Milne's area. He also reminded the Grand Vizier that one of the first acts of the High Commissioner's, after his advent to power, had been to warn his Highness that the national forces could only be regarded henceforward as part of the forces of the Turkish Government.

4. The Grand Vizier, who was very depressed, refused to admit that the French had been the object of attack, or that Turkish regulars were in any way concerned in the activities of the Nationalists. He took note of my declaration of solidarity with the French, but, speaking personally, he accused them bitterly of having themselves fomented the National movement.

5. Mr. Ryan delivered a similar message to the new Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the absence of the Minister, who was indisposed.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
High Commissioner.



Enclosure 1 in No. 112.

*Réhid Pasha to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.**Sublime Porte, le 2 février 1920.*

A LA suite des graves événements qui se déroulent malheureusement dans certaines parties de l'Empire se trouvant sous l'occupation française, la Sublime Porte croit devoir faire parvenir ci-près, à titre d'information, au Haut-Commissariat de Sa Majesté britannique, copie des différentes notes et mémorandums adressés à ce sujet au Haut-Commissariat de France.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères saisit, &c.

M. RÉCHID.

Enclosure 2 in No. 112.

*Réhid Pasha to M. DeFrance.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

*Sublime Porte, le 25 novembre 1919.*

JE me permets d'attirer la très sérieuse attention de votre Excellence sur le fait que les troupes qui ont occupé Marach, Ourfa et Aintab sont en majorité composées de troupiers arméniens natifs de la région. La haine de race qui anime ces hommes fait qu'ils se permettent toutes sortes de vexations envers les musulmans. En présence de cette situation et des multiples incidents regrettables auxquels la présence de troupiers arméniens a donné lieu dans le vilayet d'Adana, les populations musulmanes des susdites régions sont en proie à une vive agitation et craignent qu'elles ne soient en butte aux mêmes violences.

Aussi, la Sublime Porte espère-t-elle que votre Excellence, dans sa haute appréciation de la situation présente, voudra bien user de son influence pour mettre fin à un état de choses qui est créé par l'hostilité d'un élément n'ayant aucun rapport avec la noble nation française, mais qui n'en est pas moins de nature à porter préjudice à l'amitié séculaire de la nation turque envers elle.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

M. RÉCHID.

Enclosure 3 in No. 112.

*Aide-mémoire communicated to French High Commissioner.*

LES soldats arméniens qui se trouvent en grand nombre parmi les troupes françaises arrivées à Marach ont, dès leur entrée dans la ville, pris une attitude hostile envers la population musulmane. La sentinelle qui montait la garde devant la résidence officielle du gouverneur local a été attaquée. Plusieurs agents de police et des habitants musulmans ont été insultés et battus. Des femmes musulmanes ont été forcées de découvrir leur visage. Le nommé Tchakmakdji Saïd et un laitier ont été battus et blessés. Un musulman a été assassiné aux environs de la ville.

A la suite de ces graves incidents, les habitants ont été obligés de fermer leurs magasins et bazars.

Un officier français s'est présenté le vendredi, 3 octobre, à la gendarmerie et a demandé à ce que les drapeaux ottomans qui flottaient sur ladite résidence officielle du gouverneur et sur la forteresse fussent amenés.

Le commandant de gendarmerie a été forcé d'obtempérer à cette demande faite avec insistance.

*Sublime Porte, le 30 novembre 1919.*

Enclosure 4 in No. 112.

*Réhid Pasha to M. DeFrance.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

*Sublime Porte, le 23 décembre 1919.*

A LA suite de l'occupation par des troupes françaises de Marach, Killis, Aintab et Ourfa, votre Excellence avait bien voulu me déclarer, sur les instructions qui lui étaient parvenues de son haut Gouvernement à ce sujet, qu'il ne s'agissait que de la relève

des troupes britanniques qui occupaient ces régions et de leur remplacement par des contingents français, et que cette mesure provisoire et purement militaire n'impliquerait ni n'entraînerait aucun changement dans l'administration des localités laissées à l'occupation française.

D'autre part, la proclamation publiée par M. le Colonel Félix Sainte-Marie, conjointement avec le général commandant des troupes anglaises d'occupation, affirmait que la tâche incombant aux troupes françaises était identique à celle des troupes britanniques et que la situation administrative ne subirait aucune modification.

Or, d'après les informations, tant officielles que privées, qui sont parvenues à la Sublime Porte, de Marach, Killis et Ourfa, l'attitude adoptée par les commandants des troupes françaises qui y sont arrivés ne s'harmonise ni avec les assurances précitées de votre Excellence dont la Sublime Porte avait pris acte, ni avec la teneur expresse de ladite proclamation qui avait réassuré en quelque sorte la population.

En effet, tandis que l'occupation britannique maintient son caractère purement militaire, les autorités militaires françaises interviennent aussi dans les affaires relevant de l'administration civile à laquelle on désire manifestement donner la forme actuelle de l'administration dans le vilayet d'Adana. En outre, tandis que l'occupation anglaise n'avait pas été étendue au delà de Marach, la ville de Zéitoun vient aussi d'être occupée par les troupes françaises. Je demande la permission de votre Excellence pour signaler à son attention éclairée, quelques-uns des faits qui se sont produits dans les villes occupées et qui sont de nature à confirmer ce que je viens de lui exposer.

Le général français, arrivé à Killis le 1<sup>er</sup> décembre, a prévenu le caïmacan que les autorités françaises participeraient à l'administration des districts d'Ourfa, de Marach et d'Aintab, que la gendarmerie relèverait exclusivement des autorités militaires occupantes et qu'un officier serait désigné pour exercer le contrôle des finances.

A Ourfa et à Marach, deux officiers français ont été en effet investis de la qualité de gouverneurs. L'officier qui remplit ces fonctions à Ourfa a déclaré aux autorités locales qu'elles auraient à se conformer aux prescriptions à édicter par l'administrateur en chef d'Adana, faute de quoi elles en seraient tenues personnellement responsables.

Ceux qui n'obtempéraient pas à cette injonction n'auraient qu'à abandonner leur poste.

Le commandant de la gendarmerie locale a été éloigné de son poste, de même que l'officier dirigeant le bureau de recrutement militaire.

A Birédjik, le colonel français arrivé de Djérabliss a déclaré aux fonctionnaires que leurs appointements avaient augmenté et que, dans tous les cas, ils devraient avoir recours aux autorités occupantes.

A Marach aussi, le mutessarif a d'abord été éloigné de son poste et les drapeaux ottomans qui flottaient sur la résidence officielle du gouverneur et sur la forteresse ont été amenés.

L'officier français arrivé dans cette ville a demandé l'affectation d'un local dans la résidence du gouverneur pour établir ses bureaux.

D'un autre côté, les Arméniens, qui se trouvent en grand nombre parmi les troupes d'occupation, ont pris une attitude nettement agressive envers la population musulmane. L'aide-mémoire remis au Haut-Commissariat de la République en date du 30 novembre dernier renferme des détails sur l'incident de drapeau et sur les événements qui ont suivi l'entrée des soldats de nationalité arménienne dans la ville de Marach.

Je remets ci-inclus à votre Excellence la traduction d'une proclamation publiée à Killis et qui établit avec quelle dureté est traitée la population, malgré que leur pays ait été occupé pacifiquement.

Le Gouvernement ottoman ne saurait mettre en doute la sincérité des assurances et déclarations officielles citées plus haut; aussi puisse-t-il que les faits relatés ci-dessus ne pourraient être attribués qu'à l'insuffisance ou l'imprécision des instructions données aux autorités militaires françaises subalternes chargées de remplacer les troupes britanniques par des contingents français. Il est convaincu que, si lesdites autorités étaient mieux éclairées sur le caractère et la portée de leur mission et munies d'instructions en conséquence, des frictions entre elles et les autorités Impériales seraient empêchées de se produire et des incidents regrettables seraient évités.

En laissant ce qui précède à l'appréciation éclairée de votre Excellence, je la prie de bien vouloir provoquer l'adoption des mesures nécessaires afin de mettre fin à la situation anormale créée par l'occupation française dans les régions dont il s'agit.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

M. RÉCHID.



Enclosure 5 in No. 112.

*Réhid Pasha to M. DeFrance.*

APRÈS le départ d'Aintab du général britannique et des troupes qu'il commandait, M. le Colonel français Félix Sainte-Marie a visité les autorités civiles et militaires de la susdite ville. Le colonel a déclaré que les appointements des employés qui montrent de l'assiduité dans l'accomplissement de leur devoir seraient augmentés et que les mesures nécessaires seraient prises pour venir en aide aux pauvres.

Les appointements des fonctionnaires étant fixés par le budget de l'État, cette promesse n'a pu être exécutée par lesdites autorités.

*Sublime Porte, le 4 janvier 1920.*

Enclosure 6 in No. 112.

*Réhid Pasha to M. DeFrance.*

LA Sublime Porte est informée qu'une colonne de troupes françaises, composée de 300 hommes, 3 canons et 5 mitrailleuses, aurait détruit plusieurs villages entre Marach et Islahié et tué quelques habitants. Malgré les protestations de la population, les mauvais traitements contre les musulmans continueraient.

La population, déjà fortement affectée de la conduite de ces troupes, est encore portée à s'inquiéter davantage par l'absence prolongée du gouverneur de Marach; des télégrammes affluent demandant à ce que celui-ci rejoigne au plus vite son poste.

La Sublime Porte aime à espérer que le Haut-Commissariat de la République voudra bien intervenir d'une façon pressante pour que des mesures de nature à apaiser l'inquiétude populaire soient prises et que le voyage du nouveau gouverneur de Marach soit rendu possible au plus tôt.

*Sublime Porte, le 24 janvier 1920.*

Enclosure 7 in No. 112.

*Memorandum communicated to French High Commissioner.*

PAR ses différentes notes, la Sublime Porte n'avait cessé, depuis l'occupation de certains points d'Adana par les contingents français, d'attirer l'attention du Haut-Commissariat de la République française, tant sur l'immixtion des autorités militaires dans les affaires administratives que sur les inconvénients graves résultant du fait que dans certaines localités le gros de l'effectif de la force armée était recruté parmi l'élément arménien indigène.

Les mesures d'une sévérité exceptionnelle édictées par les forces d'occupation et la présence dans le pays de l'élément arménien sous l'uniforme français contribuent beaucoup à blesser profondément le sentiment de la population musulmane.

Un télégramme d'Aintab parvenu du 4 décembre informe que le colonel français commandant la zone de Killis a fait savoir qu'il prenait directement en main la police et la gendarmerie du "Liva."

Le commandant du bataillon français se trouvant à Killis, M. le Commandant Jettorier[?], a fait au sous-gouverneur une communication écrite de la teneur suivante :

Au cas où des troubles se produiraient dans le pays, le commandant des troupes françaises prendrait les mesures suivantes :

"1. Comme les rues seront balayées par le feu des mitrailleuses, par des grenades et des obus à gaz, tout le monde devra rester dans les maisons.

"2. Toute maison de laquelle partirait un coup de feu sera entièrement brûlée.

"3. Les droits et les pouvoirs des fonctionnaires turcs seront provisoirement suspendus et passeront au commandant militaire. Un conseil de guerre sévère sera alors formé qui aura le pouvoir de vie et de mort sur toute la population.

"4. Tous ceux qui seront trouvés en possession d'armes seront fusillés sans jugement. Pour chaque soldat français tué ou blessé pendant les troubles deux personnes désignées par le sort seront fusillées."

De pareilles proclamations ne sont pas faites pour créer une atmosphère de quiétude et dissiper la méfiance que provoque la présence en grand nombre de l'élément arménien sous l'uniforme français. Ainsi il résulte d'une communication des autorités de Darindé, en date du 13 novembre 1919, que parmi les troupes françaises qui occupèrent Marach se trouvaient 3.000 Arméniens qui, aussitôt entrés dans la ville, se mirent à déchirer les voiles des femmes musulmanes qu'ils rencontraient dans les rues leur enjoignant de s'abstenir désormais de se voiler. Des incidents sanglants, musulmans et Arméniens portant uniforme français, eurent lieu à la suite des provocations susmentionnées. En outre, au moment où on procédait au désarmement de tous les musulmans, des armes étaient distribuées à la population arménienne de Zéitoun et de Marach; à Killis en particulier les musulmans dont les armes ont été confisquées furent malmenés et détenus en prison. Trois soldats portant l'uniforme français ont tiré sur le muezzin qui se trouvait sur le minaret de la mosquée du quartier Tchoukour-Ova à Marach, et trois Arméniens ont essayé de faire sauter à coups de bombe ladite mosquée.

Pour ce qui est de l'immixtion des autorités militaires dans les affaires administratives des localités occupées, le Département des Affaires Étrangères avait déjà signalé par ses mémorandums que les déclarations faites par des officiers supérieurs à la population n'étaient pas conformes avec l'esprit et le teneur de l'Acte d'Armistice. Ainsi le Général Kézrin (?) arrivant à Aintab, le 9 décembre, a déclaré à des visiteurs, qui étaient venus le voir, que les Français n'étaient pas venus en conquérants, mais suivant un accord intervenu entre Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et la République française pour travailler en pleine harmonie avec les autorités ottomanes. Dans une proclamation que le général adressa à la population d'Aintab, d'Ourfa et de Marach, il déclara que tous les habitants de ces trois sandjaks sont sous la protection française et que, d'accord avec Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, la République française étend sa protection sur la Syrie, la Cilicie et les pays du Levant.

Le Département des Affaires Étrangères, par sa note en date du 23 décembre 1919, avait pris acte de la déclaration de son Excellence le Haut-Commissaire de la République française, déclaration établissant que la tâche incombant aux troupes françaises était identique à celle des troupes britanniques, qu'il ne s'agissait au fond que du remplacement de ces derniers par des contingents français, que cette mesure provisoire et purement militaire n'impliquerait ni n'entraînerait aucun changement dans l'administration des localités laissées à l'occupation française. Le Département Impérial avait exprimé à cette occasion l'espoir que les frictions qui se produisent malheureusement souvent entre les autorités ottomanes et les officiers subalternes des troupes d'occupation seraient évitées si ceux-ci étaient mieux éclairés sur le caractère provisoire de l'occupation et sur la portée de leur mission.

Or, d'après les renseignements parvenus à la Sublime Porte, les troupes françaises à Adana tendent continuellement à élargir le champ de leur activité en poussant des pointes à l'intérieur du pays vers les directions d'Alexandrette à Marach, de Mersine à Karspazar et à Zéitoun, et cela sans aucune nécessité d'ordre public. C'est ainsi que dans la première dizaine de ce mois des villages musulmans, situés au sud de la ville de Marach, ont été assaillis à coups de canons et mitrailleuses de la part des troupes françaises, causant la mort de sept paisibles habitants.

De pareils procédés, incompatibles avec les clauses de la Convention d'Armistice, sont de nature à provoquer de l'agitation parmi les indigènes et à engendrer des troubles graves.

En effet, la population musulmane de Pazardjik, alarmée par les attaques ci-haut mentionnées, a déjà manifesté sa ferme résolution de se défendre par les armes si des forces militaires étrangères où l'élément arménien entre en grand nombre essaient de pénétrer dans leur village.

A en juger par les multiples protestations qui parviennent de différentes localités d'Adana contre les mesures de coercition et de violence édictées à l'égard des indigènes, il serait fort à craindre que cet exemple ne soit suivi par les populations musulmanes de toute la contrée.

Dans ces conditions, la Sublime Porte se permet d'attirer encore une fois l'attention du Haut-Commissariat de la République française sur les conséquences fâcheuses que pourraient entraîner toute avance ultérieure des troupes françaises dans cette région ainsi que l'immixtion constante des autorités militaires dans chaque branche de l'administration locale, et enfin le traitement violent subi par la population musulmane.



Aussi, confiant dans les traditions séculaires de la France et se basant sur les dispositions de la Convention d'Armistice, le Département des Affaires Étrangères se croit en droit d'espérer que, conformément aux assurances formelles ci-haut mentionnées de son représentant à Constantinople, la protestation qui forme l'objet de cette note sera prise en bonne et due considération.

Enclosure 8 in No. 112.

*Memorandum.*

DANS son mémorandum en date du 25 courant, le Département des Affaires Étrangères avait fait pressentir ses appréhensions en ce qui concerne l'attitude prise par l'élément arménien, encouragé par le fait qu'un grand nombre de leurs conationaux portaient l'uniforme français et la méfiance et la nervosité qui en résultaient parmi la population musulmane des contrées occupées. Les derniers renseignements parvenus au Gouvernement Impérial ne font malheureusement que confirmer ces craintes et jettent une vive lumière sur les agissements machiavéliques auxquels même les chefs religieux arméniens prêtent la main au lieu de tâcher de remplir le rôle de pacificateur et de bon conseiller qui leur incombe. Ainsi les autorités ottomanes à Diarbékir ont pris connaissance, par la censure, des textes de deux lettres, dont l'une adressée par le prélat arménien en Cilicie, Kavod Kendighian, qui a fait, dernièrement, une tournée à Diarbékir, puis à Kharpout, au patriarche arménien Zaven, l'autre écrite par un certain Bedros Zareschian au nommé Djirdjess demeurant au couvent arménien catholique sis à Sakis Aghatche, Péra. Les teneurs de ces deux lettres établissent d'une façon péremptoire les menées auxquelles se livrent les Arméniens dans lesdites régions pour mettre à feu et à sang le pays.

En effet, dans la première de ces missives, le prélat susnommé s'exprime dans les termes suivants :

"A Diarbékir, dans la localité dite Zeit, quatre comités arméniens ont fusionné. Nous avons pu y inaugurer l'embranchement de notre Association centrale d'Adana et de Mersine ; les quatre personnes connues sont arrivées ; nous en sommes fort contents. Jeudi soir, vers 8 heures, il y a eu une réunion à l'église ; nos chers nationaux chaldéens et arméniens y ont assisté. Les délibérations ont pris fin samedi à 11 heures du soir. On a réservé à l'église la place du Général, notre allié. Je vous informerai de nos succès dès que nos fortes bandes d'Alep viendront ici. Celles-ci ne ressemblent en rien aux comités "Tachnak" d'antan ; elles sont composées d'hommes sûrs et fidèles à leurs paroles. Désormais, l'étoile des Turcs est à jamais éteinte. Nous célébrons ici votre bonne étoile pour les succès que vous avez remportés par ailleurs ; je compte vous faire part des notes sous peu."

Quant à la seconde lettre, elle est libellée dans le sens que voici :

"Nous verrons bientôt la fin réservée aux musulmans. Il est temps que nous agissions à leur égard comme eux ont agi envers nous. Deux prêtres déguisés sont arrivés d'Adana. Un meeting sera organisé à l'église pendant les secondes fêtes arméniennes. Des inspecteurs français sont attendus. Le délégué arménien a apporté avec lui 6,600 livres turques qu'on a distribuées aux pauvres, ainsi qu'aux comités, &c., &c."

Des indices recueillis sur place, les autorités ottomanes sont arrivées à la conviction que les Arméniens avaient tout préparé pour provoquer des troubles le jour de l'arrivée du Colonel Normand à Diarbékir et lui fournir ainsi l'occasion de faire occuper la contrée par des troupes françaises.

D'autre part, le 15 janvier, les populations musulmanes de Diarbékir ayant eu vent des machinations susindiquées des Arméniens, une grande effervescence s'en est suivie.

En présence de l'état de surexcitation des esprits et en vue de parer aux tentatives criminelles des Arméniens et d'éviter toute effusion de sang, le commandant militaire ottoman s'est cru obligé de prier par écrit le Colonel Normand de remettre son voyage à Diarbékir, n'ayant pu prendre sur lui la sécurité de sa personne.

Le 26 janvier 1920.

Enclosure 9 in No. 112.

*Memorandum.*

PAR ses différentes notes et notamment par son mémorandum en date du 21 courant No. 20143/31, le Département des Affaires Étrangères avait relevé l'inconvénient provenant de l'immixtion injustifiée des autorités militaires d'occupation dans les affaires civiles et administratives ; il n'avait pas manqué d'attirer l'attention du Haut-Commissariat que ces procédés incompatibles avec les clauses de la Convention d'Armistice provoqueraient fatalement de l'agitation parmi les indigènes et engendreraient de graves troubles.

Les nouvelles reçues aujourd'hui même ne donnent malheureusement que trop raison à cette prévision :

Le 21 courant, les notables de Pazardjik s'étaient rendus au Konak de Marach où se trouvait le Général Kéret, auquel ils exposèrent la situation exaspérée de la population décidée à ne souffrir en aucune manière un contrôle étranger sur les affaires intérieures du Gouvernement. Le général, après avoir écouté les susdits notables, leur promit de leur faire connaître plus tard sa décision et quitta le Konak.

Mais, à la suite des déclarations provoquantes des Arméniens de vouloir occuper de force les bureaux du Gouvernement de Marach, tous les magasins de la ville furent fermés.

Le lendemain, une délégation composée de trois notables s'étant présentée de nouveau pour prier le Général Kéret de ne pas enlever l'administration locale des mains des fonctionnaires turcs, elle fut tout simplement arrêtée et détenue.

En outre, le mutessarif, le commandant de la gendarmerie, et les notables musulmans de Marach ont été convoqués auprès du Général Kéret, qui leur reprocha le fait que des soldats français avaient été l'objet de certaines attaques de la part de la population, en cours de route. Sur la réponse négative de quelques-uns d'entre eux, le général vexé de leur délégation, les fit immédiatement arrêter.

Aussitôt après, il ordonna le bombardement de la ville.

Les mosquées et les édifices publics essuyèrent pendant trois jours le feu des canons et des mitrailleuses. C'est alors que la population s'empara des armes qui se trouvaient dans le local de la gendarmerie et se défendit contre le feu des troupes. Des rencontres sanglantes s'ensuivirent. On n'a pu jusqu'à présent évaluer le nombre des victimes, entre lesquelles se trouve le président du Tribunal pénal, qui tomba au moment où il rentrait chez lui et dont la dépouille mortelle n'a pu pendant trois jours être enlevée par suite de l'intensité du feu.

Les détenus des prisons d'État, ayant réussi à s'évader, se rendirent maîtres des armes trouvées dans le Konak et prirent part aux rencontres ci-haut mentionnées.

D'autre part, des habitants de Berghuis, redoutant les représailles de la population arménienne, se réunirent dans la mosquée et prêtèrent serment de combattre tout acte contraire aux clauses de l'armistice ou tendant à les séparer du reste de l'Empire.

Le 26 janvier 1920.

Enclosure 10 in No. 112.

*Réchid Pasha to M. De France.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Sublime Porte, le 28 janvier 1920.

LE Gouvernement impérial avait eu déjà à plusieurs reprises l'honneur d'attirer la sérieuse attention de votre Excellence sur la situation inquiétante de Marach et des pays environnants. Il n'avait pas manqué à diverses occasions de relever que l'incorporation de soldats et de gendarmes arméniens, loin de produire un apaisement dans ces contrées, était de nature à envenimer les rapports entre musulmans et chrétiens, d'autant plus que ces derniers, animés d'un ressentiment très prononcé contre les musulmans et forts de l'appui qu'ils espèrent rencontrer auprès des corps occupants, se permettent d'abuser de la bonne foi de ces derniers et de commettre des excès au détriment des populations musulmanes.

La Sublime Porte vient d'apprendre avec le plus vif regret qu'il règne dans Marach et les environs une grande effervescence à la suite d'actes d'hostilité que se commettent dans lesdites régions. En effet, un bombardement violent et continu serait ouvert sur ladite localité et un vrai état de guerre déchaîné depuis quelques jours. Il est donc à craindre que cette situation alarmante ne revête un caractère désastreux.



Le Gouvernement ottoman est d'autant plus peiné de constater que cet état de choses est dû à l'extension nullement justifiée de l'occupation, extension qui est du reste incompatible avec les stipulations de l'armistice.

Pas n'est besoin de dire que c'est dans le but de mettre un terme aux calamités de la guerre que le Gouvernement ottoman avait cru devoir souscrire à la conclusion d'un armistice avec les grandes Puissances alliées. Son désir tendant à mettre fin à toute effusion de sang par la conclusion de cette convention n'a malheureusement pas été atteint complètement. En effet, des actes d'hostilité se produisent en plein état d'armistice dans certaines régions occupées. Si un terme n'était pas mis au plus tôt à ces événements sanglants, ceux-ci, à en juger par la surexcitation qui règne actuellement, pourraient prendre des proportions inattendues dont le Gouvernement ottoman décline dès à présent toute la responsabilité. Aussi ne saurais-je assez prier votre Excellence au nom du Gouvernement Impérial de vouloir bien inviter télégraphiquement qui de droit de cesser d'urgence tout acte de violence contre les populations musulmanes qui cherchent simplement à se défendre.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

M. RÉCHID.

Enclosure 11 in No. 112.

*M. De France to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

M. le Ministre,

*Constantinople, le 2 février 1920.*

PAR ses lettres des 26 et 28 janvier dernier, son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a attiré l'attention du Haut-Commissaire de la République française sur les événements qui se sont récemment produits à Marach et sur les agissements auxquels se seraient livrés les Arméniens dans les régions occupées par les contingents français. Son Excellence Réchid Pacha a cru devoir en même temps, au nom du Gouvernement ottoman, tenter de décliner la responsabilité des incidents qui ont déjà eu lieu et de ceux qui pourraient se produire dans ces régions.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française rappelle que les troupes françaises sont simplement venues relever les troupes britanniques dans les districts d'Aintab, de Marach et d'Ourfa, et qu'elles n'avaient, comme ces dernières, d'autre tâche que de faire respecter les conditions de l'armistice et de faire régner l'ordre.

Malheureusement l'ordre et la sécurité de ces régions ont été gravement compromis, non par les contingents français, mais par les attaques dirigées contre ces derniers par des bandes formées par les organisations dites nationales ou composées de malfaiteurs que les autorités ont laissé faire, ou auxquels, ainsi que le fait est reconnu dans le mémorandum joint à la lettre de la Sublime-Porte du 26 janvier, elles ont ouvert ou laissé ouvrir les portes des prisons.

En ce qui concerne les accusations portées dans les communications de son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères contre l'attitude des populations arméniennes de la région, le Haut-Commissaire de France constate au contraire que, d'après les renseignements recueillis par les autorités françaises, ce sont les Arméniens qui ont été en butte aux pires traitements. Onze Arméniens ont été tués ou mutilés à Sarular par une bande de 400 hommes vêtus d'uniformes turcs; vingt bûcherons arméniens ont été massacrés à Tanatlou et Kalalidès; le nombre des Arméniens tués dans le sandjak de Marach, dès les premiers jours du mois de janvier, est évalué à [sic words missing in original] portaient l'uniforme turc et étaient bien pourvus d'armes et des munitions. Des officiers de l'armée régulière ont été vus, notamment à Bazardjik, distribuant des armes, et beaucoup sont signalés comme faisant partie des bandes dites nationales.

De ce qui précède, il ressort que l'action des troupes françaises à Marach et dans la région n'a pas provoqué les incidents que son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a cru devoir signaler, mais qu'au contraire, cette action est purement défensive, qu'elle a été postérieure aux faits mentionnés ci-dessus et qu'elle a été nécessitée par ces faits, ainsi que par les menées agressives et hostiles fomentées contre les troupes françaises et contre les populations par les autorités ottomanes ou par les organisations dites nationales, organisations que le Gouvernement ottoman a le devoir ou de dissoudre ou de maintenir sous sa direction et de l'attitude desquelles il est en tout cas responsable.

En ce qui concerne le voyage du Colonel Normand, entrepris dans les conditions et dans le but indiqués d'avance par le Haut-Commissaire de France, l'accueil fait à cet

officier supérieur par les autorités locales d'Ourfa, de Mardine et de Sévrek a été correct et même cordial en apparence, sans doute en conformité des ordres que son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères avait bien voulu faire envoyer à ce sujet, mais il est avéré que ces mêmes autorités ont incité, ou laissé inciter par les agents des organisations dites nationales, les populations à des manifestations hostiles, dont le résultat fut qu'au cours de son voyage de retour, le Colonel Normand a été menacé de mort et a même été attaqué à coups de fusils.

Aujourd'hui des constatations nombreuses et précises ont été faites; il en résulte que les organisations dites nationales et leur chef, avec le concours ou la complicité d'autorités officielles ottomanes et d'officiers de l'armée régulière, ont fomenté et dirigent tout un vaste mouvement destiné à provoquer des alarmes et des désordres, à soulever les populations et à mettre en danger la sécurité des troupes françaises, voire même à les attaquer ou à les faire attaquer par des bandes ou par des forces régulières.

La situation qui en est résultée sur les confins du vilayet d'Adana et dans les régions d'Aintab, de Marach et d'Ourfa est très grave. Le Haut-Commissaire de France en rend compte au Gouvernement de la République et déclare que la lourde responsabilité tant de ces actes hostiles commis sciemment et avec méthode contre les troupes françaises, en période d'armistice et en violation de la Convention du 30 octobre 1918, que des conséquences qu'ont déjà entraînées et entraîneront nécessairement ces actes et ces violations réitérés retombe entière sur le Gouvernement ottoman.

DEFRANCE.

Enclosure 12 in No. 112.

*M. De France to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

M. le Ministre,

PAR sa note du 26 janvier, le Haut-Commissaire de France a signalé à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères que dans la région de Koniah une agitation était fomentée par des éléments de désordre.

De nouvelles informations font connaître qu'à Mouth, près de Sélefke, se groupent des bandes de brigands qui seraient encadrés par près de 500 réguliers, et distribueraient des armes et des munitions aux paysans qu'ils contraindraient à s'enrôler. Une vive agitation règne dans la région et l'on prévoit l'attaque du sandjak de A ke par les bandes de Mouth et Karaman réunies. Ismail Ahmed Effendi, député, Ali Effendi, capitaine d'infanterie, Emirza Bey de Mouth, et Hadafe Bey, Mufti, seraient à la tête des bandes.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française en signalant au Gouvernement ottoman ces faits, qui confirment malheureusement sa note du 2 février, le prie de bien vouloir envoyer d'urgence les ordres nécessaires pour faire cesser ces coupables agissements.

DEFRANCE.

*Constantinople, le 3 février 1920.*

[E 1304/3/44]

No. 113.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)*

(No. 209.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 9, 1920.*

FOLLOWING is list of new Cabinet:—

Grand Vizier, Salih Pasha, ex-Minister of Marine, which portfolio he retains temporarily; Sheikh-ul-Islam, Ibrahim Haidari Zade; War, Fevzi Pasha; Foreign Affairs, Sefa Bey; Interior, Hazim Bey; Justice, Jelal Bey; Public Works, Tewfik Bey, ex-Minister of Finance, which portfolio he retains temporarily; Public Instruction, Abdur Rahman Sheref, ex-President of Council of State, which portfolio he retains temporarily; Commerce and Agriculture, Zia Bey; Pious Foundations, Omer Khulussi Effendi.



[E 1432/106/44]

No. 114.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 12.)*

(No. 287.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 26, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter of the 11th February, which has been received from the Sublime Porte, drawing attention to the arrival of Greek reinforcements in the occupied zone of Smyrna, and to the preparations which, it is alleged, are being made with a view to a renewal of offensive action on the part of the Greek Army.

2. This letter was, at the instance of the Italian High Commissioner, put on the agenda for discussion at the Allied High Commissioners' meeting on the 13th February. Discussion was, however, adjourned until the subsequent meeting and the proposal finally withdrawn, so that no local action has been taken on the Sublime Porte's note.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 114.

*Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.**Ministère des Affaires Étrangères,**Constantinople, le 11 janvier 1920.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

LA Sublime-Porte voit malheureusement se confirmer les informations qu'elle reçoit sur les grands préparatifs militaires auxquels se livrent activement les autorités militaires helléniques. Les cinq divisions hellènes qui se trouvaient jusqu'ici sous le commandement du Général Nieder ont été renforcées par des troupes métropolitaines, notamment par des formations d'artillerie lourde, et groupées en trois corps d'armée désignés sous l'appellation générale d' "Armée d'Asie Mineure," dont le Général Miliotis a pris le commandement en chef. L'arrivée de celui-ci à Smyrne a été le signal d'une recrudescence d'activité sur le front grec.

Ces derniers jours, les troupes hellènes, dispersées dans toute la Thrace, ont été concentrées sur quatre points et deux régiments de la neuvième division, se trouvant à Xanthie, ont été embarquées à Cavalla pour Smyrne. Le reste de la division suivrait bientôt.

Aujourd'hui, six divisions hellènes se trouvent concentrées dans la zone de Smyrne; en outre, la division de l'Archipel se trouve comme réserve générale à Mytilène. Des formations techniques en grand nombre sont arrivées aussi. Les détachements formés par des Grecs indigènes, la gendarmerie et les bandes ne sont pas compris dans ces formations.

D'autre part, le Sous-Secrétaire d'État à la Guerre, Général Grivassi, le Généralissime Paraskévopoulos et le chef de la mission militaire française, Général Gramma, se réunissent fréquemment en conseil et auraient décidé de ne pas démobiliser les troupes auxiliaires dont le licenciement avait été décidé auparavant, et de garder aussi sous les armes la classe de 1915 qui allait être renvoyée ce mois-ci. En outre, il serait question de l'appel hâtif des recrues de la classe de 1921.

Le Gouvernement Impérial ne peut cacher son inquiétude devant ces grands préparatifs auxquels se livrent les Hellènes. Tout porte à croire qu'on se trouve à la veille de nouvelles opérations militaires des troupes helléniques.

C'est pourquoi je viens prier votre Excellence de bien vouloir attirer la sérieuse attention de son Gouvernement sur ces préparatifs des Hellènes, afin que des démarches soient faites dans le but de s'opposer à toute action offensive qui menace, au moment où la conclusion de la paix est prochaine, de compliquer encore les choses et de plonger à nouveau l'Anatolie dans le feu et le sang.

Veuillez agréer, &amp;c.

(Pour le Ministre),

Le Sous-Secrétaire d'État,

R. FAHREDDIN.

[E 1435/1435/44]

No. 115.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 12.)*

(No. 292. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 26, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a report, received from a secret source, giving certain details relative to the relations between the Italian High Commission in Constantinople and the Ottoman Government.

2. It is obviously impossible to obtain confirmation of this report, but the general attitude of the Italians to the Turks in this country is such as to justify the belief that it may be devoid of foundation.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 115.

*Turkish Foreign Minister and Italian High Commissioner.*

T. 26/7 reports that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote to the Italian High Commissioner on the 4th February, 1920, appealing for financial assistance to enable the Turkish Government to meet the difficulty which it was experiencing in paying the salaries of its officials, and recalling the verbal promise which the Italian High Commissioner had made to him. The Foreign Minister stated that, as previously arranged, a committee composed of Zia Pasha, an ex-Ambassador, Raghib Bey, of the Turkish Foreign Office, and Reshid Safvet Bey, of the Finance Ministry, had been appointed to discuss details with the Italian High Commissioner.

The letter also stated that, in recognition of the benevolent attitude towards Turkey of the Italian High Commissioner, the Sultan had written him an autographed letter of thanks which would be presented to him on the 7th February.

The existence of this document is confirmed by agent T. 10/4.

*Constantinople, February 17, 1920.*

[E 1462/3/44]

No. 116.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 12.)*

(No. 220.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 12, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 197 of 9th March: Constantinople.

Position up to evening of 9th March is described in my telegrams Nos. 204 of 8th March and 210 of 10th March.

Meeting of Allied naval and military commanders was held on morning of 10th March and was followed by further meetings of High Commissioners. Result was practically complete agreement on procedure proposed by General Milne and concurred in by me, i.e., all preparations to be made for effective military occupation on afternoon of 13th March, following at interval of a few hours on official announcement to Turkish Government. Occupation was to include occupation of Ministry of War and Ministry of Marine, establishment of necessary controls and arrests judged necessary by military authorities. Details, such as the issue of proclamations, &c., were also considered.

Important naval and military preparations are complete. Details need only finishing touches. On afternoon of 11th February [sic], however, French colleague showed telegram from his Government, which said that telegrams containing proposals of High Commissioners and instructions of Governments had crossed, and that in matter so grave French Minister for Foreign Affairs considered decision should only be taken after ripe reflection, and more particularly that we should defer execution until our proposals have been examined by Governments.

This delays everything. In absence of reply from your Lordship to my telegram No. 204 of 8th March I am not clear as to whether Governments now wish to delay at



action or whether intention is to proceed with occupation, but to consider further views of High Commissioners regarding precise nature of peace terms.

Meanwhile General Milne informs me he has received instructions from War Office to proceed with military measures for occupation on receipt of orders from me. He suggests 16th March as suitable date.

In the circumstances I beg for urgent instructions how to proceed. If War Office instructions mean that His Majesty's Government intend to act even independently of French and Italians I must have your authority to instruct General Milne without further reference to Allied colleagues beyond informing them.

If, on the other hand, His Majesty's Government still intend only to take action concurred in by French and Italians it is very important that all three High Commissioners should receive without delay categorical and identic instructions.

I venture to remind your Lordship that question of occupation of Constantinople is distinct from question of precise nature of peace terms. If Constantinople is to be occupied at all it had better, in my opinion, be done now as preparations are complete, and undesirable state of nervous tension already exists.

[E 1457/134/58]

No. 117.

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).*

(No. 325.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, March 12, 1920.*

FOLLOWING for the President, League of Nations:—

"The Supreme Council at one of its recent sittings unanimously accepted the proposition that Armenia should, in accordance with the pledges repeatedly given by the Allied and Associated Powers at various stages of the war and since its conclusion, be constituted a free and independent State. It had been hoped for long that the mandate for this State under the League of Nations might be accepted either by America or by some European Power. In the absence, however, for the time being, of any Power willing to undertake the task, the Supreme Council have expressed the desire, which it is proposed to incorporate in the text of the Turkish Treaty, to place the future Armenian State under the protection of the League of Nations.

"This appears to them to be the sole effective guarantee at this juncture for the successful creation and the future security of the proposed State.

"In these circumstances, the Supreme Council are anxious to know, with the least possible delay, whether the Council of the League now sitting in Paris will be disposed to accept the obligation.

"In connection therewith arises the question of the provision of adequate armed forces to enable Armenia to maintain her independence, and of the material resources required to promote her future economic development. The first of these subjects has been carefully examined by a special commission, whose report has been accepted by the Conference.

"The Armenians of Erivan have at present an army of some 25,000 men, partially officered by trained officers of the former Russian army. This is a framework on which the necessary measures of self-defence could be developed, and they express confidence in being able to raise 40,000 men if arms and equipment are provided. The Allied Powers are assisting in this task, and it is hoped that the first instalments will shortly be delivered.

"The League of Nations, if it assumes the general protection of Armenia, will be able as time passes to assist materially in the prosecution of this undertaking. The Armenian representatives here, who are imploring the protection of the League, earnestly plead for the help of foreign officers and volunteers, if regular forces are not available, and in any case for the supply of military and civil advisers.

"There remain the other categories of material aid that may necessitate either now or at a later date a public appeal, which no authority could issue with an authority comparable with that of the League of Nations.

"It is not thought desirable at present to make any statement with regard to the boundaries of the new State, but full information can be supplied on this subject to the Council of the League if it is so desired.

"Before proceeding further with the matter, the Conference would like to know if they may hope to receive the co-operation of the League of Nations in the projected undertaking. They need not emphasise its vast importance for the settlement of the peace of the East."

[E 1607/3/44]

No. 118.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay (Washington).*

(No. 269.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Foreign Office, March 12, 1920.*

FOLLOWING for your own information:—

Prior to the reassembly of the Peace Conference in London, I asked the American Ambassador whether his Government desired to be represented; he replied negatively, but added that he would be glad to receive any information I might be able to give him during the Conference. I therefore invited Mr. Davis to call on 6th March.

I explained to him the events precedent to the handing over of Cilicia and Syria to the French, and the latter's military difficulties, culminating in the recent serious events at Marash and elsewhere.

The Americans were directly concerned in this situation owing to their philanthropic activities in those regions. Two American citizens had been murdered and others compelled to evacuate Marash with the French, leaving the schools unprotected. It was well-nigh impossible to determine the exact degree of responsibility of the Turkish Government for these atrocities, but their relations with Mustapha Kemal were so intimate that they could not possibly be acquitted.

The matter had been carefully considered by the Peace Conference, both locally with regard to Cilicia and in its broader aspect with regard to measures to be taken at Constantinople. With regard to the first, the French had assumed responsibility for the restoration of order, and I understood that they were about to reoccupy Marash. The question of a naval demonstration off Cilicia had also been considered, but, while the French had sent vessels, the Allied authorities in Constantinople decided that the British fleet would be more useful near the capital.

With regard to the second, the Allies were unanimous that only the most drastic action would meet the case, and the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople had been asked for suggestions. Simultaneously a telegram was received on 29th February from the British High Commissioner, in which, without reference to the Cilician massacres, he emphasised the critical position at Constantinople and the necessity of prompt and decisive action. He and his colleagues were consistently confronted with evasion or defiance. The Nationalist leaders were determined to resist drastic peace terms. In these circumstances the High Commissioners concluded that preparations should be made for effective action by the occupation of Constantinople and other military measures. Such a decision was, however, dependent on the intentions of the Peace Conference. Were the terms to be lenient, i.e., were the Turks to be left Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, with Turkish suzerainty over a portion of Turkish Armenia, he suggested the policy of creating a moderate bloc round the Sultan to overcome the Nationalist extremists.

A few days later, and after the receipt of our telegram, the High Commissioner, after repeating these views, pointed out that the Cilician incident must be dealt with on its own merits; the Allies had to face the wider issue of Nationalist resistance to a drastic peace, and he reiterated his conviction that Allied occupation of Constantinople was inevitable. The Conference then despatched a further telegram to the Allied High Commissioners recognising the impracticability of the bloc policy failing a lenient peace, and expressing the view that Constantinople should be at once occupied by the Allied forces until the terms of the treaty had been carried out, that Mustapha Kemal should be dismissed and the Turkish Government informed that, in the event of any recurrence of outrages, the peace terms would be rendered even more severe and the concessions withdrawn. The High Commissioners were asked to confer as to these or other measures to secure the submission of the Turks and the protection of Christians.

I explained that military occupation of Constantinople would include the occupation of the War Office and the control and censorship of its military orders and despatches, together with such other military measures as the Allied commanders might consider desirable, but not the assumption of civil administration.

I justified my exposition to Mr. Davis on the grounds, firstly, that the Americans were directly interested in the events in Cilicia; secondly, that, though the American Government had desisted from the Conference and had given no intimation of their future policy with regard to Turkey, nevertheless there were many who refused to believe that American interest in Turkey had altogether abated, and who even thought that America might at a future date assume some share of the responsibility which it



had once been hoped that she would voluntarily undertake; and thirdly that, though the Powers were resolved to take this action by themselves, they did not wish to take it without previously informing the American Government.

I added that it was not for me to formulate any request, still less any demand. His Government would decide on their own responsibility what action, if any, they would take. Even if they were willing to participate, geographical conditions might render this difficult or impossible, but I added that on our part we would gladly welcome their co-operation in an essentially international policy of which the consequences must be far-reaching.

[E 1483/1483/44]

No. 119.

*Baron Moncheur to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 13.)*

*Ambassade de Belgique, Londres,  
le 12 mars 1920.*

Milord,

VOTRE Seigneurie n'ignore pas l'intérêt que porte mon Gouvernement à la situation financière de la Turquie vu l'importance des capitaux belges qui y sont engagés.

Si les Puissances décidaient de créer une Commission internationale de Contrôle des Finances ottomanes, mon Gouvernement attacherait beaucoup de prix à ce que la Belgique fût représentée au sein de ce nouvel organisme par un délégué belge.

Je suis chargé de faire part à votre Seigneurie de ce désir.

Le rôle important joué par la Belgique au cours des événements qui ont abouti à la défaite des Puissances centrales, la cordialité des relations du Gouvernement belge avec toutes les nations alliées indistinctement, enfin la grandeur des intérêts des Belges en Turquie, où ils participent à beaucoup d'entreprises industrielles, indépendamment du fait qu'ils se trouvent être parmi les porteurs les plus importants de titres de Dette ottomane, sont autant de circonstances qui justifient l'admission d'un Belge dans l'organisme de contrôle international qui serait créé dans l'Empire ottoman.

Mon Gouvernement se plaît donc à espérer que le Gouvernement britannique accueillera favorablement cette idée et prendra l'initiative d'en proposer la réalisation.

Je saisis, &amp;c.

MONCHEUR.

[E 1462/3/44]

No. 120.

*Earl Curzon to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 221.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, March 13, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 220 of 12th March: Constantinople.

My telegram No. 207 of 10th March, which was sent after meeting of Supreme Council on 10th March, at which it was read out and unanimously approved, gave you and your colleagues full authority to act, and we are at a loss to understand further delays.

Discussion as to nature of peace terms is about to take place at a further meeting of Supreme Council, but should not delay steps already authorised, which we agree with you in thinking are an entirely distinct question.

If your Allied colleagues are unable to act with you, notwithstanding orders of Supreme Council, you should instruct General Milne to proceed on his own responsibility.

[E 1595/2/44]

No. 121.

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).*

(No. 901.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, March 13, 1920.*

THE French Ambassador called upon me this morning with reference to the news that had come from Syria as to the proclamation of the Emir Feisal as King of Syria by a Congress assembled two or three days ago at Damascus.

As soon as information had reached us a few days ago of the impending assemblage and probable action of this Congress, the French Government, represented by M. Berthelot, and I had discussed the matter and had sent an agreed telegram to Lord Allenby urging the Emir Feisal to take no action that might compromise the proper settlement of the question, which was in the hands of the Conference now sitting in London, and inviting him to return to Europe to state his case before the only tribunal by whom the future of those territories could be determined.

It now appeared that this communication from us either was too late or had been ignored.

M. Cambon read to me a telegram from General Gouraud describing an interview with the Emir, in which the latter had warned him that the Congress had decided to meet. Speaking from recollection, I think the message went further and intimated that it had already been held, one result being the proclamation of the Emir as King of Syria.

Our own information was more precise. I informed the French Ambassador that we had heard yesterday evening that this self-constituted Congress, of the composition, authority or credentials of which we knew nothing, had been held; had nominated the Emir Feisal, not only as King of Syria, but as King of Syria, Palestine and Mosul; and, further, that it had also appointed his brother, the Emir Abdullah, King of Mesopotamia.

These operations, we agreed, were an unwarranted and intolerable exercise of authority by this unknown body in Damascus, and they compelled the French and British Governments to act in complete unison, as they had hitherto done, to repudiate the intentions of the Congress, and to reaffirm the position that the future of those territories could be determined only by the Allied Powers now assembled in London, in whose hands lay the construction of the Peace Treaty with Turkey and the settlement of the future of the areas belonging to the old Turkish Empire which it had been decided to sever therefrom.

The Ambassador, who had received instructions from M. Millerand, was anxious that a further identical telegram should go out from the British Government to Lord Allenby, and from his own Government to General Gouraud, indicating that we were united in the matter; that we declined to recognise the authority of the Damascus Congress; that we regarded its proceedings as null and void; and that we could not allow the settlement to be taken out of our hands.

I said that, for my part, I was quite willing to send such a telegram, and I read to the Ambassador, and handed to him, a form of words which he readily accepted, and which it was agreed that I should send out in the course of the day to Lord Allenby, indicating the point of view and intentions of His Majesty's Government.

M. Cambon, for his part, undertook to telegraph this draft to M. Millerand at once, and he assured me that M. Millerand would, in the course of the day, send identical, or at any rate analogous, instructions to General Gouraud, the text of which he would communicate to me.

So far, therefore, as our immediate action was concerned, the two Governments were in complete agreement, and no point of immediate importance remained to be discussed between us.

On the other hand, I said to the Ambassador that, while I thought it vital that we should stand together, and that there should be no shred of discord between us, I felt bound to take advantage of the opportunity to point out to him that the present situation had arisen, not from any action on the part of the British Government, but solely, so far as I could see, from the proceedings of the French Government and their officials. I reminded him that, over and over again during the past six months, he had come to me and made protests—as I alleged, and indeed had demonstrated, without any sufficient foundation—concerning the supposed intrigues of British officers and of the British in general against the interests of the French in Syria; and he had repeatedly urged that the French should be allowed to take charge of Cilicia and Syria, where they not only had traditional interests of great importance, but where they would be warmly welcomed by the people. Over and over again I had informed him that this confident prediction on his part did not tally with the facts as they had been reported to me; that, on the contrary, I had every reason to believe that the French were regarded with no sort of favour by the peoples of the territories concerned; and that their appearance on the scene, so far from producing peace or harmony, would result in grave disturbances. The Ambassador had consistently disputed the validity of these warnings. Only a few days before, at a meeting of the Allied Conference, M. Berthelot had assured me that the Emir Feisal had gone back to Syria with a signed



agreement with the French Government, to which they were convinced that he would be loyal and to which he had pledged himself to secure the adhesion of his countrymen. I had replied that our information was quite to the contrary, and that, so far from an agreement having been concluded which the Emir had pledged himself to carry out, he had merely accepted an agreement subject to submission to his countrymen, and had never attempted to commit the latter to its acceptance. M. Berthelot had entirely disputed my account of what had passed, had treated the matter as settled between the French and the Emir, and had indeed presented to us for consideration the form of French mandate for Syria to which he believed the Emir to have agreed, and which should be the basis of discussion between ourselves with regard to the future, both of Syria and of Mesopotamia. Now, I said, the truth of my prophecies and the small foundation for the French confidence had become apparent. As long as the British were in occupation of Cilicia and Syria no trouble had occurred; nor did I believe that, had they remained in occupation, recent events would have happened. In deference, however, to the insistent pressure of the French Government, we had in November last evacuated both Cilicia and Syria, not without warning the French Government of the serious results that might ensue if they attempted to extend their military occupation of the latter.

What had happened? In Cilicia there had occurred the lamentable events at Marash, by which had been placed in jeopardy not only the position of the French in Cilicia, but the entire fortunes of the Allies in the Middle East. In Syria General Gouraud had persisted in disregarding the warnings we had given him about any occupation of the Bekaa, and he had created a sense of irritation in the Syrian people which had culminated in the incidents we were now discussing. Thus the future of France and Great Britain in those parts of the world was imperilled because of the way in which the French Government, in pursuance of traditional or historical aspirations, had insisted on forcing themselves into areas where the French were not welcomed by the inhabitants.

I explained to M. Cambon that I did not make these statements with any idea of uttering reproaches against the French Government, who had evidently been misinformed; but, inasmuch as by their action we had now been driven into a situation which compromised us both, I felt it necessary to place on record that the responsibility was not ours, but belonged in the main, if not exclusively, to the French. These considerations would not, I said, deter me from acting loyally and steadily in accord with them, as far as possible, to redeem the situation. But at least I wished to make it clear that the present position had been brought about by a course of action which we had foreseen, but which, owing to the pressure placed upon us by the French Government, we had been powerless to resist.

The Ambassador listened in silence to these remarks, and did not attempt to dispute a single one of my propositions. Indeed, I cannot help thinking, from the tenor of his previous conversations with me, that he recognised their essential truth.

Upon the main facts of the case we agreed, as I have said, to reaffirm our contention that the fate of Syria could not be determined by an irresponsible body in Damascus, but could be settled only by the Peace Conference in London or Paris; and we decided to repeat the invitation, which had appeared in my earlier telegram, to the Emir Feisal to come and state his case before the Conference in Paris.

I added that there was one special feature in the proceedings of the Damascus Congress which concerned the British Government even more than it did the French. It was that the Emir in addition to the inclusion of Palestine in the area of Syria over which he had been proclaimed King, appeared actually to have incorporated Mosul as well, while it seemed that his brother Abdullah had simultaneously been proclaimed King of Mesopotamia. His Majesty's Government could not possibly allow the fate of these regions to be determined in such a manner. Indeed, what a Congress of Syrians, of whatever element it was composed, could have to say to Mosul or Mesopotamia it was difficult to imagine. I therefore proposed, in the telegram which I was about to send and of which I gave a copy to the Ambassador, to add a special reservation on our part with regard to those regions.

M. Cambon did not dissent from any of my observations, and we parted with a common affirmation of the intentions to which I have already referred.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1580/47/44]

No. 122.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.*

(No. 7.)

My Lord,

*Aden, February 28, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 28th February, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 122.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Lord Allenby,

*Aden, February 28, 1920.*

THE following is a summary of news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 12th February, 1920:—

*Tehama.*

There does not appear to be much change in the situation on the Quhra frontier. Fighting has been going on in the region of Bura'a, which seems to have changed hands at least once. Bura'a was reported to have been occupied by the Idrisi in January, but the latest reports speak of a fresh Idrisi advance against Bura'a and Suq Shatta in the neighbourhood of Raima, in which the Zaranik and Aboos have taken part on the side of the Idrisi. Hajjaila was occupied by the Idrisi on the 4th February, but had to be evacuated owing to imamic threats from the flanks.

Turks who have come down to Aden via Hodeidah state that, although the imam has recovered some of the villages of Milhan, he will be turned out again from there, as the people of the place are generally in favour of the Idrisi, and this news is confirmed by Captain Fazluddin, according to whom the reverse was only temporary, and the Idrisi has reoccupied all the villages. It appears that the Idrisi commander there had advanced on Jabel Adra without leaving an adequate reserve at Jabel Zahar, thus enabling the enemy to cut off his communication. The Idrisi force was consequently forced to retire to its former base and had to fight its way back through the enemy ranks, losing about twenty men. On receiving this news a reinforcement of 500 men was despatched by the Idrisi under Sheikh Ahmed-bin-Hadi-el-Hajj Pasha, the principal sheikh of the Waazat, but the enemy was driven away from Jabel Zahar before their arrival. The enemy lost two guns and a number of men.

As already reported, the hesitation of Sheikh Sahel Ali of the Aboos in accepting the Idrisi was due to his enmity with his rival, Sheikh Suleiman Hassan-al-Bakheit. The Idrisi commander imprisoned both these sheikhs in Bajil till they made a bond of friendship. Akil Omer Saghir, who took a prominent part in securing the release of the mission, is also imprisoned in Bajil for failure to co-operate with his sheikh, Ismail Baghawi. Major Meek thinks that the real cause is the desire of Syed Abdul Kadir and the Quhra sheikhs to pay him out for his mission work. Major Meek has advised Omer Saghir to be loyal to his sheikh and tribe now, and settle his personal differences later on.

Ali-al-Mikdad of Anis, who is a Zaidi, has applied to the Political Officer, Hodeidah, for the post of Governor of Anis and Reima under the Idrisi, the latter being under British protection. Ali Mikdad was Sheikh-al-Mashaikh of the Qada of Anis in the time of the Turks. He rebelled and served with the imam against the Turks. Recently he has held no position and has been at enmity with Imam Yahia. He holds an influential position among the people of Anis.

The Idrisi commander at Bajil has started a levy of dues on goods passing through Bajil which is regarded as excessive. The commander objected to Syed Abdul Kadir's interference in Quhra affairs, and the latter has returned to Merawaa, declaring that he is disappointed with the Idrisi, and that he sees no hope outside British rule. Merawaa is his house, and he had not been there since the mission arrived in Bajil.

An akil of Beni Saad came in to Hodeidah at the beginning of February. He told Major Meek that, from the sheikh down to the last man, the Beni Saad hated the imam. They liked the Idrisi, but would much prefer British rule. According to him



there were about 800 Idrisi men in his country. The imam's men had retired (*vide* Kamal Effendi's report below).

Yusuf Hassan, the ex-Kaimakam of Zebid, a Turk, lately visited the Idrisi, and claimed to have assisted in the release of the mission. The object of this visit is not clear, but apparently it was to see if he could secure a post under the Idrisi. He has since returned to Bajil. On receipt of a letter from the Political Officer, Hodeidah, warning him against Yusuf Hassan, Sayed Mustafa replied, saying he knew him well as an intriguer, but considered it best to scotch his activities by employing him.

The Amil of Bura'a has addressed threatening letters to Sheikh Mohamad Zaid (Quhra) and to some of the akils accusing them of joining "one whose support is illegal according to Sharia." He warns them of very severe punishments unless they hasten to tender their submission to the imam, but this they are unlikely to do, as Jabel Bura'a is besieged by Arab tribes acting on behalf of the Idrisi.

The head sheikh of Al Karasha, Abdo Ibrahim Baghash, copies of whose letters have been sent to me by Captain Fazluddin, entreats Sayed Mustafa to send his representative to Zebid to form an alliance with him. He assures Sayed Mustafa of the friendship of Sayed Ahmed Abdul Rehman-al-Ambari for the Idrisi. The sayed is at present cadi and officer commanding the Zebid under the imam. During the reign of the Turks he was a cadi and nakib of the Ashrafs, and his uncle, Sayed Abdul Kader Hason, was the Mufti of Zebid. He still holds that position. Their fathers held the same posts. Their grandfather, who was given the title of the small shafai, was a friend of Sayed Ahmed-bin-Idrisi. Sheikh Abdo says that Sayed Ahmed Abdul Rehman-al-Ambari is ready to place himself under the Idrisi provided the latter gives him a written guarantee that he will be retained in his present post and his privileges will not be curtailed. Sayed Ambari has made arrangements with all the sheikhs, and can eject the imam's representative and garrison from Zebid in a week's time. All the people of the district as far as Taiz are submissive to him. He, however, wants the Idrisi to give him assistance in money and arms and ammunition, and about 1,000 men. Sheikh Abdo entreats Sayed Mustafa to write a letter to Sayed-al-Ambari.

The Sheikh of Rakb, Awad Ali Tarbeh, writes to Sayed Mustafa that before the imam's advent in Zebid he felt the want of a strong Government owing to the lawlessness among his tribesmen and their refusal to acknowledge his authority. He looked towards the west, but found that the Christians possessed influence there; he looked towards the Idrisi, but found the distance too far. He was between the devil and the deep sea. So he agreed under certain conditions to let in the imam, who had been sending him continuous telegrams. His idea was that the imamic Government was a good Government, but he now finds that he was mistaken, and wants the Idrisi to come to his rescue.

Kamal Effendi, late of the Ottoman Telegraph Department in the Yemen, arrived here on the 16th instant from Hodeidah. He was interviewed, and gave the following information:—

On the evacuation of the Turks from the Yemen his services were placed at the disposal of the imam by Hilmi Bey, the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. He remained at the capital for about a year, and was then transferred to Suq-el-Khamis, Zebid, Ibb and Taiz in succession, and was ultimately brought back to Sana. He received a salary of 15 dollars per mensem from the imam, but was paid very irregularly. He resigned in January, and proceeded to Hodeidah to be repatriated.

Kamal Effendi was at Hujjaila on the 28th January, 1920. A few days later he learnt that a Zeidi force which had been despatched from Sana on the 27th January to resist Idrisi aggression had, on arrival at Hujjaila, looted the whole village, including the houses of Hamza Abdulla, the imam's amil, and of the Sheikh Mahomed Ahmed Mashoor.

Sheikh Ismail Baghawi (Quhra), with seventy men, was in occupation of Ubal.

Sheikh Mahomed Zaid (Quhra), with a mixed force of 600 men, was operating in Jabel Bura'a against the Zaidis, whose force consisted of 450 men under Sayed Abdulla-bin-Kasim and one old mountain gun. The Idrisi had no guns opposite Jabel Bura'a. The imam was sending big reinforcements with some guns to Jabel Bura'a.

The garrison of Jabel Reima consisted of 800 Zaidi soldiers, who had two serviceable mountain guns with trained Arab gunners.

There was a strong imamic force of 1,500 men stationed in Beni Saad under Sherif Abdulla-ed-Dumain and three Turkish officers, viz., Lieutenant-Colonel Suleiman Bey, Lieutenant Adil Bey, and a gunner, Lieutenant Nazmi Bey.

Kamal Effendi was detained at Bajil by the Idrisi's amil from the 29th January

till the 4th February, during which time his services were commandeered for repairing the telegraph line between Bajil and Zaviah. He escaped from the latter place on the 10th February, and reached Hodeidah on the following morning.

Hassan Yussuf Effendi has been appointed Idrisi Governor of Hodeidah, but is at present assisting in the administration of the Quhra country.

Sheikh Suleiman Bakheit was at Bajil with other akils of the Aboos tendering submission to the Idrisi's representative.

The Zaranig chief and all the sheikhs of Jabel Reima had sent in hostages to Bajil, and had applied for Idrisi troops for operations against the imam in their respective districts.

Kamal Effendi stated that the telegraphic line was working in the highlands between Manakha and Sana, and also between the latter place and Taiz.

There was no telegraphic communication with Hais or Zabid, and the line was being repaired between Hujjaila and Menakha.

Communication between Taiz and Mavia was being re-established, but the imam was very short of wire for his lines.

#### *Yemen (Upper and Lower).*

The Turks who have come in to Hodeidah stated that there are about 2,000 trained soldiers in Sana, who are reviewed by the imam every Friday. They are trained and commanded by Kanaan Bey. There are ten or twelve Arab regulars in Sana who, the Turks believed, were formerly in the Yemen infantry in Aden. Kanaan Bey is said to be the only Turkish officer who wants to remain in the Yemen. He has a French wife, who is with him.

The Turks said that twenty-eight Somalis, who worked with Said Pasha and subsequently took service under the imam, absconded from Jabel Milhan to the Idrisi with their rifles.

The following account given to Major Meek by one of these Turks, Mahomed-as-Shaoosh, shows the importance attached by the imam to the Idrisi move in the direction of Hajja:—

Mahomed stated that subsequent to the surrender of Hajja to the Idrisi and his Zeidi allies there has been general talk of the Idrisi's advance against Mohwit and Amran, which alarmed the imam. He therefore summoned Haj Hizam-as-Sa'r Pasha, the Sheikh of Amran, and Rajeb Sa'ad, the Sheikh of Ayal Sarih, of the village of Jorban (between Amran and Sana), for the purpose of arranging with them for the defence of those places. The former replied to the imam that he was unable to give him any men because he had no control over his tribesmen except in the town of Amran and four or five villages in its suburbs. He would not force people to enlist in the imam's service against their wish.

The other sheikh, who is loyal to the imam, has supplied him with men, and the imam has already despatched his father-in-law, Saif-al-Islam Mahomed-bin-al-Mutawakil, from Sana, and his eldest son, Saif-al-Islam Syed Ahmed-bin-Yehia, from Shahara, to the Hajja front. The imam's father-in-law is said, however, to have no interest in this fighting, owing to his relationship with Nasir Makhoot, the principal sheikh of the Hashid, who is leading the Idrisi forces. The imam's father-in-law is married to Nasir Makhoot's sister.

Mahomed-as-Shaoosh says that Haj Hizam-as-Sa'r, and the majority of the Hashid and Bakil and Arhab, are ill-disposed towards the imam, and are in collusion with the Idrisi. In fact, says Mahomed, the whole country hate the imam on account of his harsh treatment and grasping nature.

In a letter dated at Taiz on or about the 6th February, 1920, to one Fareh Saeed in Aden, Sheikh Mahomed Hassan of Mirab, referring to taxes levied by the imam, states that the people of Hujjaryia are paying 50 per cent. more than those demanded by the Turks, the inhabitants of Udain from 100 to 200 per cent. more, and the tribesmen at Shurman 75 per cent. more. In short, he adds that the tribesmen generally are being terribly oppressed.

Sheikh Mahomed Hassan observes in the same letter that he can say on good authority that the imam has ambitions in the direction of Mecca and Medina.

Sheikh Mahomed Ahmed Noman of Hajjaryia is said to have returned from his visit to the imam at Sana, and is at present at Turba. He recently summoned the Maktari sheikhs with a view to demanding payment of taxes for the imam.

It would appear that Mahomed Noman gave an undertaking both to the imam and to his amil at Taiz (Ibn Vizier) that he would collect taxes in the Maktari country.



The uncle of Mahomed Noman, Sheikh Abdul Wahab, is said to have taken umbrage at the attention shown to his nephew by the imam during the former's visit to Sana, and owing to his being entrusted with Maktari affairs. In consequence he has started intrigues in the Yussufian country with its principal sheikh, Abdul Jalil Jazin. He has liberated Abdul Jalil's son, who was kept by him as hostage on behalf of the imam, and instigated him to oppose the imam's designs in the Maktari country. All the other hostages in the keeping of Abdul Wahab were sent to Taiz at the request of the amil, Ibn Vizier. The latter, not finding the son of the Yussufian sheikh amongst them, sent some soldiers to that sheikh to demand his surrender, but without result. A second detachment was sent, but was again ignominiously turned out of the country by Abdul Jalil.

It is reported that the sheikhs in the Maktari and Yussufi districts are taking measures with a view to repel Zaida aggression, and that Sheikh Abdul Wahab is secretly co-operating with them.

The Yussufi sheikh wrote to us for assistance a few days ago, but his request was politely refused.

A secret agent who lately visited Mavia reports that the whole of the Mavia district is under the domination of the imam, who is represented by an amil, Syed Hassan Warith, of Damar. Kayed-bin-Saleh, the nephew and successor of the former but now decrepit old sheikh, Ibn Nasir Mukbil, who has gone into retirement, has no authority whatever.

The agent observed no activity or concentration of Zaidi forces at Mavia. He estimates the strength of the present garrison from 200 to 300, all Zaidis. Telegraphic communication has not yet been established with Taiz.

Sickness, accompanied by heavy mortality, is said to prevail among the Zaidi troops, who had come down to Hais and Mokha. A company of fresh soldiers was recently sent from Sana in relief, but sickness has held them up at Taiz.

The nature of the sickness is not known, but cholera is reported to be prevalent among the Zaidi soldiers in Mavia and Taiz.

One of the sheikhs of the Lower Yemen, Abdul Hak-bin-Mahomed-al-Aghbari, and the nakibs of Du Mahomed and Du Husein, have written letters expressing their desire to be placed under our protection. They are members of the old Arab confederacy. They will be given a suitable reply.

Overtures have also been made by the Inyani sheikhs in the Yemen asking to come under our protection. I have instructed the officer commanding, Nobat Dakim, to send some polite answer which commits us to nothing.

#### Asir.

A news agent at Zaidya reports that the army of the King of the Hedjaz has occupied the kaza of Thanir, Zahran, Bani Shahar and the neighbourhood of Abha. Abha itself is not taken, but the sheikhs and the son of Ibn Ayad are in favour of the King, with whom they have been communicating and exchanging presents through Kunfida. Major Salim Effendi has gone in charge of the Idrisi's expedition against Rijal Abna, in the direction of Mahayel.

I have heard nothing either from the Idrisi himself or Captain Fazluddin regarding this. The latter has, however, telegraphed to me to say that he is coming to Aden to confer on important matters.

#### Aden Protectorate.

In spite of the imam's promise not to go beyond Dala in our protectorate, his troops have advanced from Dala and occupied Halmin, Mahalai and Hajeli, and his representatives have come as far as Thumer to demand the submission of the Kotaibi and Alawi tribes.

The Alawi sheikh, who has been repeatedly writing us to send our troops to protect him, has now written to say that he is tired of writing to us, but that he still sticks to his friendship for us. The Kotaibi has also written asking us to send our troops to Suleik. He says that he does not want our reply but wants to see our men at Suleik as soon as possible. A party of Zaidis under Sayed Yehia-al-Ansi have come down to Thumer in company of Abdul Hamid, and stayed in the house of Mokbil Abdulla, nephew of the Kotaibi sheikh. The Sayed then summoned the Kotaibi and Alawi sheikhs to come to him. The former declined to do so, and hid himself in the mountains. The latter came with a sacrifice in order to save his country from being

looted. He was not allowed to return home, and has been taken to Kharafa, a village near Dala. Mokbil Abdulla is said to have fled to the Haushabi borders.

Sheikh Mahomed Hassan of Mirab writes that the imam has circularised the sheikhs and his tribesmen in the Yemen notifying the arrival of his troops in the Yafa country and of the capture and imprisonment of the sultans of that district. The circular adds that the imam hopes to occupy Lahej very shortly. The circular also mentions the imam's intention of sending an expedition against the Maktaris, with a view to capturing the impregnable fortress in their country, which is said to be superior to the imam's stronghold at Shahara.

The Mausatta nakibs have come to Aden to seek our aid against the imam.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 1654/1483/44]

No. 123.

Baron Moncheur to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 16.)

Ambassade de Belgique, Londres,  
le 15 mars 1920.

Milord,

PAR ma communication en date du 12 mars, j'ai eu l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Seigneurie tout le prix qu'attacherait mon Gouvernement à ce que la Belgique fût représentée par un délégué belge dans la Commission internationale de Contrôle des Finances ottomanes, si cet organisme venait à être constitué.

Je suis chargé également par mon Gouvernement de faire une démarche auprès de votre Seigneurie à l'effet d'obtenir l'appui du Gouvernement britannique pour la nomination d'un délégué belge dans le Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane.

Par suite des événements, le délégué allemand et le délégué autrichien ont cessé de faire partie de ce conseil. Les porteurs belges de fonds ottomans ont des titres tout spéciaux pour être représentés dans cet organisme. La Belgique est, en effet, un des pays possédant la plus forte proportion de la Dette ottomane, et, d'ailleurs, le rôle joué par la Belgique dans la lutte qui s'est terminée par le triomphe des Alliés lui donne aussi des titres à être représentée dans ce conseil, si important au point de vue de la gestion des revenus affectés au service des divers emprunts ottomans.

Mon Gouvernement se plaît donc à espérer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, appréciant ces considérations, voudra bien se montrer favorable à cette demande, qui est d'un intérêt vital au point de vue des Belges porteurs d'obligations de la Dette ottomane.

Je saisis, &c.

MONCHEUR.

[E 1693/3/44]

No. 124.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 238.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, March 16, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 221 of 13th March.

Occupation was effected on the morning of 16th March.

The High Commissioners held final meeting on 15th March.

In order to obviate question relative to positions of General Milne and General Franchet d'Esperey, they decided not to issue instructions to the military authorities, but simply to record decision based on instructions of Supreme Council, and leave each High Commissioner to make any necessary communications to the military authorities.

Decision covered following points:—

1. Military occupation by the Allies as from 10 o'clock on morning of 16th March.
2. Execution by the military authorities of all necessary measures.

Such measures to include:—

3. Occupation of Ministries of War and Admiralty, indirect control of all orders, &c., emanating from them; control of posts, telegraphs and telephones; strict control of the police; issue and enforcement of all regulations necessary to maintain order in occupied area.

[4370]



Copy of this decision, with joint covering letter based on numbered paragraphs in your telegram No. 187 of 6th March, was handed to the Grand Vizier by Mr. Ryan at 9.40 on morning of 16th March. Sultan was informed as soon as possible afterwards through political officer of French High Commissioner and First Secretary of the Palace.

Grand Vizier appeared to be taken by surprise, though the Government were aware that Allies contemplated some sort of action against Nationalist leaders. Sultan said he had always wished to work with Allied representatives, and expressed regret at the occupation.

Cabinet has taken no decision regarding resignation.

General Milne's measures included several arrests early this morning. In one case resistance was offered, and in fight which ensued one British and five Turkish soldiers were killed. Occupation was otherwise carried out according to plan without incident.

General Wilson has in strong proclamation assured the public of non-interference with well-behaved persons, but threatening condign punishment in case of resistance.

High Commissioners have authorised communiqué explaining reasons for action, but noting desire of Allies to uphold Sultan's authority in places to be left under Turkish administration, emphasising the fact that maintenance or otherwise of decision not to deprive Turks of Constantinople will depend on whether they refrain from disorder and massacre; and stating that persons arrested will be held responsible for the past misdeeds and the future consequences thereof. General tone of communiqué is reassuring to well-affected Turks. Main object is to impress on all Turks, and especially those in provinces, that Constantinople is practically held as pledge for good conduct.

Communiqué has already been telegraphed to all provinces. High Commissioners were unable to devise any better means of minimising danger of massacres. Calm and circumspection have been enjoined on head of non-Moslem communities here.

Turkish Government have issued short communiqué announcing occupation and enjoining tranquillity.

Minor High Commissioners and other Allied forces and neutral representatives have been officially notified of the occupation.

Despatch follows

[E 1800]

No. 125.

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).*

(No. 955.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, March 17, 1920.*

IN the course of a conversation with me this afternoon, M. Cambon spoke seriously about the unfortunate position that had arisen in Constantinople owing to the conflict of military authority there.

Commencing with a historical account of the stages by which the present situation had been reached, he said that the general view upon which the French Government had acted, and from which they could not possibly recede, was that the command of all Allied Forces on the European side of the Straits appertained to the French, while the British were in charge on the Asiatic side. This partition had formed the basis of the agreement arrived at in December 1918, and in substance it had never been departed from since. Speaking in his private capacity, M. Cambon said that he was quite ready to admit that General Franchet d'Esperey had shown an almost complete lack of tact and judgment. Some of his proceedings which the Ambassador named had been well qualified to excite extreme irritation, and the French Government were so conscious of this fact that they were quite willing to withdraw him as soon as this could be done without conveying a personal affront and to replace him by another French commander, General Guillaumat, who was well known to the British, and had established excellent relations with them in the course of the war. But when General Guillaumat arrived upon the scene the French Government must insist that his command should be identical with that of General Franchet d'Esperey, and that he should be in supreme charge of the Allied armies in Constantinople, just as he was of all the Allied Forces in Turkey-in-Europe. The position of the French Government, M. Cambon added, would be gravely compromised if they were to acquiesce in any other solution.

I replied that our difficulties were not less serious, and indeed were even greater, because with us it was a question, not merely of national pride or prestige, but of practical expediency on the spot. I was afraid that, in existing circumstances, my Government could not accept—and in fact the War Office had never been willing to accept—the proposition that General Franchet d'Esperey was in supreme command when he entered the walls of Constantinople. On the contrary, it was the British and not the French who had been charged with supervising the military terms of the armistice. Constantinople had been specially reserved as a sphere of British military command. In the proceedings at Constantinople which culminated in the military occupation of the city yesterday, by far the greater part of the occupying force had been supplied, not by the French, but by the British. Indeed, my information was that the French and Italians had afforded as little assistance as they could, and had done their best to throw the entire onus and responsibility upon the British. Such had been their attitude at Constantinople throughout the recent crisis. General Franchet d'Esperey had conducted himself with a want of tact so supreme that I had seriously considered, a short time ago, upon the urgent request of the War Office, making a demand for his recall by the French Government. I had desisted from doing so only because of the crisis that had arisen. So long as there was an army of the East such as existed in the days when an attack upon Constantinople by land was anticipated by the Allied forces, so long was the authority of General Franchet d'Esperey not only natural but expedient. That army, however, had disappeared. General Franchet d'Esperey was usually elsewhere than in Constantinople, and it was intolerable that, at critical moments, he should descend upon the city, where the burden of military responsibility and military action had rested almost exclusively in British hands, and should oust a British commander from the post of authority. The British Government, I felt sure, would not acquiesce in any such solution.

I went on to say that, on the present occasion, General Franchet d'Esperey had shown once more how ill-fitted he was for his post, and in how high-handed a manner he interpreted his responsibilities. We had just heard from General Milne that, upon the occupation of the Turkish Ministry of War by the Allied Forces, the French General had actually insisted on appointing a senior French officer to be Minister of War. Was it possible that the British commander or the British Government could acquiesce in any such proceeding? The British Government had no objection to offer to the French troops in Constantinople being commanded and directed by the French General in command, and we should do our best to secure the loyal co-operation of our own troops and commander with them; but, in my judgment, the best solution would be, not to bring General Guillaumat or any other French commander upon the scene at the present stage, but to withdraw General Franchet d'Esperey from Constantinople, to leave the local command for the moment in the hands of the British General, and to discuss with us the best solution that could be arrived at for a definite understanding when the immediate crisis was over.

M. Cambon did not think that such a solution would be at all palatable to his Government, and we parted without getting much nearer to a settlement of the dispute.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1773/2/44]

No. 126.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 18.)*

(No 303. Secret.)

*Constantinople, March 2, 1920.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report dated the 24th February by Lieutenant-Colonel S. S. Butler, General Staff Officer (naval), on the Staff of the Naval Commander-in-chief, regarding his visit to the Syrian and Cilician coast and to Cyprus.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*



Enclosure in No. 126.

*Lieutenant-Commander Butler to Admiral de Robeck.*

Sir,

*H.M.S. "Sportive," at Sea.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on my visit to the Syrian and Cilician coast and Cyprus:—

*Beirut and Syria.*

1. *Interview with His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Beirut.*—I arrived in Beirut at 4.30 P.M. on the 16th February. I at once went ashore to call on His Britannic Majesty's consul-general, Mr. Wratlaw. The consulate is still in a considerable state of disrepair, so the consul-general and vice-consul are unable to live there, but have taken up their quarters in the principal hotel and only have their offices in the consulate.

I found that the consul-general had practically no information on the state of affairs in the interior. I gathered he had received very strict instructions from the Foreign Office not to become mixed up in anything which might give the French the impression that he was intriguing against them, and consequently had confined himself entirely to his consular routine duties, such as viséing passports, &c. He had made no enquiries as to the course of events in the interior of Syria or Cilicia, nor could he suggest anyone to me who might be in a position to assist me in the matter. Beirut is a long way from the scene of the disorders, he pointed out, and little or no news gets through, except to the French military authorities, who keep their own counsel, and such reports and rumours as did get through were very garbled and exaggerated.

The consul-general was most anxious for me to see General Gouraud at once so that he should not get the impression that my mission had any ulterior motive or that there was some intrigue afloat, a line of thought rather commonly adopted by the French in these parts *vis-à-vis* the British, I fancy.

The town of Beirut and its immediate neighbourhood is fairly quiet, but murders of French soldiers at night in the streets are of fairly frequent occurrence, the cause almost invariably being the amorous disposition of the Frenchman getting the better of his discretion, and the Levantine inhabitants of the low quarters of Beirut are pretty quick with a knife. Some weeks ago there had been trouble in the country some miles south of the town, but all these seem subsequently to have quieted down. A Syrian of standing in Cyprus told the High Commissioner there that they had some 70,000 rifles in the Lebanon and were waiting their time to rise against the French, but I rather think this was chiefly Levantine bombast and exaggeration, and, so far as Southern Syria is concerned, the French have the situation well in hand, except for the periodical acts of brigandage that occur not infrequently.

The British consulate has been opened not much over a month. It was thought that there were a considerable number of French troops in Syria on the arrival of the consul-general, most of whom have since been moved north to Cilicia. It has been very hard to get any detailed figures of the troops employed during the course of my tour, as the French have kept all their military arrangements very much to themselves.

A short time before my arrival the Emir Feisal had come from Damascus to visit General Gouraud, had remained a day only, and returned to Damascus promising to return in a few days' time when the proposals made by the French had been discussed by him with his advisers. It is understood the matter principally put forward by General Gouraud was the exact measure of control to be assumed by the French in the Sherifian territories.

The Emir Feisal's failure to return may be due to the heavy fall of snow (the heaviest for several centuries) which had upset railway communication between Damascus and Beirut.

The consul-general had seen the Emir Feisal when he was in Beirut on his return from Europe. The Emir was most sore at the situation in which he had been placed by the British Government, but it is understood that, in general, the feeling among the Arabs towards the British is now considerably better than it was when the evacuation by our troops was first announced.

There is a British liaison officer with the Emir Feisal at Damascus. The appointment of this officer was objected to by the French at first, but they have acquiesced subsequently in his retention there. It is also said that they took great exception recently to the visit to Beirut of an officer from the G.S.I. Staff, Cairo.

The situation is undoubtedly still delicate in so far as the French jealousy of the British is concerned, although doubtless the arrival of General Gouraud has done much to alleviate it. What perhaps aggravates a feeling of bitterness in the minds of the French is the dawning conviction that after all the pains they took and the lengths they went to, to get rid of the British influence in Syria, "*le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle*"; they are realising at length that they are really intensely unpopular, not an unpopularity fastened by British intrigue, as they always declaimed, but a deep-seated dislike which is now entertained towards them by the majority of the population, both Christians and Mahomedans. Were a plebiscite now held to decide whether or no the French were to remain in Syria, in the opinion of a Syrian of standing and education they would not get more than five per cent. of even the Christian votes.

Their administration is said to be unpopular and the officers ill-chosen. These officers are many of them from Northern French Africa and Senegal, accustomed to administer natives, and they try to continue these same methods in Syria. The Syrian, of course, looks on himself as being as cultured as a European, and the "African" methods, as applied to naked savages, do not go down well with them. This information about the French administrators was given me by an old Syrian employed in the consulate, and the uncle of an old friend of mine in the Sudan, the Director-General of Finance.

Young French officers are disillusioned about the delights of Syria. They find it exceedingly expensive, and their extra pay is more than swallowed up. The accommodation is bad, amusements few, and the Syrian Shylock is getting more than his pound of flesh from them. They consequently dislike and despise the people of the country and speak in a slighting, scornful way of them. This I noticed particularly.

The town is, of course, full of rumours, the most popular being that General Gouraud has several times resigned, as his Government will not send enough troops to back him up in his endeavours to remedy the situation.

It is also said that the French are leaving Syria, which they find unprofitable, and are going to concentrate in Cilicia, which is much richer. So many of the inhabitants of Syria died from famine during the war that it will be many years before the country can recover from it.

2. *Interview with General Gouraud.*—After tea, the consul-general and myself went to call on General Gouraud. He had not returned from his office, but his aide-de-camp telephoned to him, and he asked us to wait for him at his house. He arrived just before dinner and invited us to dine. His reception of us was most cordial, and he received with evident pleasure the messages I gave him from the Commander-in-chief. The consul-general explained that I had come to ask him (the consul-general) if, in view of the unsettled state of the interior, he might possibly be calling in the future on the assistance of the British Navy to protect British subjects in the areas affected. General Gouraud stated that the only places where there was trouble was at such places as Urfa, Mardin, Marash, in the interior, and that in his opinion there would be no necessity for a British warship to be sent. He was not very definite in his statements about the happenings at Marash and said he had received no written reports, but only reports by aeroplane. However, he gave the impression that he regarded the situation there as serious, although he stated that the enemy had suffered severely and that he was sending important reinforcements, which should enable the troops already there to control the situation. The enemy, he admitted, had not been entirely ejected from the town, which had suffered heavily from the fighting.

The enemy opposed to them were not merely brigands, as they had guns and machine-guns, and, in his opinion, if the regular Turkish troops were not actually taking part in the fighting, yet they must be behind the movement, or else where had the guns and machine-guns come from?

He had heard from the French military authorities in Constantinople that the Turkish army corps at Sivas was mobilising (he implied this was directed against him), and the French consul at Bagdad had also informed him that the army corps at Diarbekir was also mobilising.

He blamed the Powers for the present situation by their delay in imposing their terms on Turkey. He stated he hoped the Allied representatives in Constantinople would make representations to the Parliament to cause pressure to be brought to bear on Mustafa Kemal to cease helping people who were attacking the French. He first asked me if the Allied Powers in Constantinople were in communication with Mustafa Kemal. I replied that they were not, to the best of my belief. He then asked if the Turkish Government was, and I stated they were. He asked many questions about the political situation in Constantinople, and seemed to hope that something could be



done from there to better the situation with which he was faced. He was under the belief that if the Turkish Government were spoken to forcibly enough they could control the situation. He instanced the case of the capture of his own Chief of Staff, who was captured by "brigands" between Damascus and Beirut in Sherifian territory. In the past, acts of brigandage had frequently occurred, and when referred to for action the Sherifian Government had always replied that they could not control the brigands. On this occasion, however, they feared there really would be serious trouble if they did not act, so they took immediate steps and the release of the Chief of Staff was instantly effected.

The Emir Feisal, he thought, would keep to his contract with the French in his own interests. He had to have the *appui* of one of the Great Powers, and since Mr. George had told him he would not have British tutelage he realised he must turn to the French. He made no complaint against the Emir or the present Government in Damascus, and only referred indignantly to their past encouragement of brigands in the French sphere.

He referred with contumely to the Italians in Southern Anatolia, and spoke of them as assisting the Turks and Nationalists with arms and munitions.

It was noticeable that all the French officers I met asked how I had come to Beirut, although there is no doubt that the arrival of a British destroyer was known all over the town as soon as she came in sight. General Gouraud appeared glad to be able to get first-hand information from Constantinople, and was more anxious to have news of what was happening there than to discuss the situation in his own area. He informed me he was in favour of the Turks being left in Constantinople, as he thought their expulsion would have a bad effect on the Mahomedan population of British and French possessions throughout the world.

3. *American Committee of Relief for the Near East at Beirut.*—On the day after my arrival, the 17th instant, in the hopes of being able to get other information than that given me by the French military authorities, I visited the headquarters of the American Committee of Relief for the Near East. I was able to do so without raising suspicion, as the widow of one of their officers recently murdered near Killis is known to me in Constantinople, and I gave the desire to procure news for her as the object of my visit. I found, however, that they had but scanty information as to what was going on in the interior. I spoke to the secretary (the principal was away), but he could only tell me that he had heard the country was in a terribly disordered state in the Marash-Aintab-Adana area. It had been reported that some Americans with a party of French had endeavoured to recover the bodies of the two Americans, but had been driven back by the Arabs. It was thought that the Americans had been mistaken for French. I was again told how exceedingly unpopular the French were in Syria. It was said by those returning from the north that the French losses round Marash had been very severe, and they did not seem strong enough to do very much to put matters right.

4. *Shukair Bey, Chief Clerk to the Consulate-General.*—In the afternoon of the 17th instant I had a long talk with Shukair Bey, chief clerk of the British consulate. He is a relative of some old friends of mine in the Soudan, and is a most intelligent, well-educated old gentleman. He knew but little about affairs in Cilicia. He thought most of the French troops had been moved north from the Beirut area. He had heard that the Turkish casualties in the fighting round Marash had been several thousand, and that Marash was now in ruins. The French are reported to have hanged fifteen. They, he said, had lost the respect of all in Syria, and with the respect had gone the fear of them. The recent fighting, in which the French losses had been most severe had not improved matters in this respect for them. He made the statement (above quoted) about the bad type of French administrators that had been sent out, and, of course, referred to the great desire of all religions and sections of the population to see the British back once more. The British, he said, were so respected and behaved so well, while the French—! He said, on what authority I do not know, that the French are saying that the reason the Arabs are so well armed and organised is because the British are behind them.

5. *Admiral Marny.*—I called on Admiral Marny, commanding the French fleet in Syria, both at his office and private house, but was unfortunate in missing him in both places.

6. *Departure from Beirut.*—We left Beirut the morning of the 18th at about 7 A.M.

#### *Cyprus.*

7. *Arrival at Cyprus.*—We arrived at Famagusta at 4:30 P.M. on the 18th instant. I at once went ashore and called on the Commissioner. He informed me that the

acting High Commissioner, Mr. Stevenson, was at Nicosia, and promised to arrange for my journey there by motor trolley the next day.

8. *Interview with the High Commissioner at Nicosia.*—At 9:30 A.M., 19th instant, I left Famagusta by trolley for Nicosia. I was accompanied by Lieutenant-Commander Knox-Little, captain of H.M.S. "Sportive." Everything was arranged with the greatest care for our comfort, and we were very well received.

#### *Alexandretta and Northern Syria.*

9. *Arrival at Alexandretta.*—We left Famagusta on the morning of the 20th at 7 A.M., arriving at Alexandretta at about 4:30 P.M. the same day.

I went ashore to the house of Mr. Catoni, who had been British vice-consul before the war. I found he had died a few months ago, and his son, who will probably become vice-consul in his place, was away. He had left for Beirut some days previously, and was expected back, coming via Mersina, at any time. It appears he was in Beirut when we were there, but the consul-general had informed me that he had already left. His son, a boy of about 18, told me he was coming in the steamship "Kener," which should have left Beirut for Mersina on the 18th. Young Mr. Catoni informed me he had had a wire from their agent in Mersina that Mr. Catoni, senr., might arrive on the morning of the 21st.

I knew the Catoni family some ten years ago when I visited Alexandretta in H.M.S. "Lancaster." They are the principal firm in the place, and are always most hospitable to any of His Majesty's ships that call, and are highly respected and trusted by all.

10. *Information obtained from Mr. Catoni, Junr.*—Young Mr. Catoni had not very much information about the interior. He told me the town of Alexandretta was pretty quiet, but in the interior there was practically a state of war existing. The French were very unpopular; neither the men nor the officers were respectful to women, native or European. The consuls had been slighted. The French officers were a bad class and corruption was rife. In his own business it was found now that with bribes anything could be managed, but the bribes had to be big; with the Turks "backsheesh" was the understood thing, and 2*l.* or 3*l.* generally met the case, but with the French bribery was a much more serious affair for the merchants. He mentioned an instance of a merchant who had to pay 100*l.* for a permit to export some oil. The officers, who were not of a very good social position, found the country an expensive place and filled their pockets with bribes. It was different after the English in Syria. As a Syrian lady expressed it: "Les Anglais ont envoyés les fils de leurs 'Lords,' mais les Français ont envoyés leurs valets." French trade interests were being furthered at the expense of other nationalities, and French Government-chartered ships were competing for cargo at lower rates.

He gave me details of the affair which occurred three or four weeks ago at Kirri Khan in which a French post consisting of eight men and one officer were attacked, and the officer and most of the men killed. The officer, it was reported, was mutilated. The French shortly after this had sent several hundred troops from Antioch and had given battle to the Arabs at Hamman and defeated them, but only after their post there had been surrounded and nearly wiped out. It was said that the Arabs were 1,000 strong, with machine guns and grenades, and well trained. Fifty prisoners were made and eighty were reported to have been killed. The French say their casualties were eight only. Two of the prisoners, who were Kurdish brigands, were shot at Alexandretta subsequently. Since then as far as was known there had been no fighting of importance.

11. *Interview with French Civil Administrator.*—On the morning of the 21st, as Mr. Catoni, senr., had not arrived, I went ashore after breakfast and proceeded with Mr. Catoni, junr., to call on the French major officiating as the Civil Administrator in Alexandretta. He received me very courteously and expressed pleasure that a man-of-war had arrived in port, as he seemed to think its effect would be good. He also appeared to think it a reasonable precaution to make enquiries as to the safety of British subjects in the future. He frankly regarded the situation in the interior as far from satisfactory, and stated that the country could be considered as being in an "état de guerre." There were many bands of brigands in the country, he said. He referred to the incidents I have already mentioned at Kirri Khan and Hamman and gave more or less the same account. He said that as he was only an administrator I had better call on the Military Commandant of the sanjak, who would be able to give me details about the military situation.



12. *Interview with the Military Commandant of the Alexandretta Sanjak.*—I accordingly went from his office to call on the Military Commandant, Colonel Lebienvre, whom I found to be a most charming man and most friendly inclined towards the British.

He at once offered to explain the military situation to me. He said he had divided the Alexandretta sanjak into four districts and had a fortified post in each at Antioch, Harim (south of the Lake of Antioch) and one 15 miles north of Hamman and Kirri Khan (north of the lake). These posts were strongly defended with barbed wire and had guns. He was confident that they would withstand any attack. The strength of the garrison he did not state. In addition to this he had two mobile columns, one operating north of the lake and one south. These columns consisted of all arms and moved about wherever required.

I obtained no exact numbers on this occasion from him, but was subsequently informed by a Mr. Kennedy (an account of my interview is given later) that although the French stated that their forces in the Alexandretta sanjak were some 5,000, yet he was pretty sure the correct number was at the most not more than half of this; (this was corroborated later by the Commandant himself); and he had travelled about a lot and had had the opportunity of judging. Further, the majority of the troops consisted of North Africans and Senegalese. The interior, the colonel indicated, was in a state of war where only armed forces could move about. Since the battle at Hamman, the district had been quiet; that is to say, there had been no encounter on a large scale with the Arabs. He had heard that morning, however, that a force of 4,000 Sherifian troops had collected at Idlib (south of his area) and he was expecting them to be moved against his forces. He also expected a force might be moved northwards round his flank from Aleppo and was endeavouring to find out if this was happening. There were 200 Sherifian cavalry near Hamman, he said. The communications were in a terrible state owing to the weather. He had no aeroplanes to assist in reconnaissance; he used to have two, but they had been moved north. He was glad to see a man-of-war as he thought it would calm the populace. He had not asked for one to be sent as he could not justify it, but he nevertheless indicated that he was glad to see one, even one not French. He said the French and English must act together in these matters. He quite understood the necessity for enquiring about the safety of the British subjects and took it as a matter of course. He talked of bodies of brigands, 200 strong, moving about and said the Kurd-Dagh just north-east of his area was full of Kurdish marauders.

Before leaving on the morning of the 22nd, I had a further interview with Colonel Lebienvre. He had recently been given the C.M.G., and I took him a piece of ribbon that I had cut from my coat, which gratified him very much.

He said he had no further news of the 4,000 Arabs at Idlib. He had asked for an aeroplane to make a reconnaissance. He thought they really had the intention of attacking his post at Harim, but hoped it would be able to hold out all right. He did not expect the attack for some weeks, owing to the difficult state of the country due to the rains. He showed me a copy of his most recent report on the situation. In it he states the Arab forces against the French are in league with the Nationalists on the one hand and the Sherifian troops on the other. They have men of importance doing *liaison* work with these two parties. The bands are organised about a couple of hundred strong, and for their officers and instructors have ex-Turkish officers from the Nationalists and Arab officers and instructors from the Emir Feisal. Their aims are the total expulsion of the French from Cilicia, the complete integrity of the Turkish Empire, and the propagation of pan-Islamism. Their immediate objects are to push the French back towards the sea in the Adana area, where they are weak. In the recent battle at Hamman the Arabs hoped to defeat the French and drive them from Alexandretta.

He complained to me of the lack of support given from France and the small number of reinforcements sent. They would have to send many more later on, he said. In the southern part of his area alone 17,000 rifles had been distributed, he had been informed. At Aleppo there was a Sherifian division. As regards his own troops in the sanjak, they only totalled the strength of a regiment all told, but he had sent a lot north, where it appears the situation is considerably more serious.

Reinforcements were arriving at Mersina from Constantinople, and he inquired of me if I knew what regiment had come. He had heard a rumour just before my arrival that General Gouraud had agreed to give most of the southern part of the sanjak, including Antioch, to Feisal, but he did not believe a word of it.

I had a casual glance at a map of Cilicia on the colonel's wall, and got the impression that there was a strength of about four infantry brigades approximately in Cilicia, with of course a certain proportion of guns and mounted troops.

13. *Interview with Rev. Kennedy, of American Mission.*—After lunch I had a long and most interesting talk with Mr. Kennedy, of the American Mission. He is an Ulsterman by birth, but now speaks with a strong American accent. He moves about the country a great deal and is in touch with many persons in the interior. Not long ago he himself was mistaken for being French and shot at and slightly wounded. He had heard, he said, that the French had now evacuated Marash, and the American Commission of Relief for the Near East and 2,000 Armenians had left with them, many of the latter dying from exposure *en route*. They had retreated south towards Killis. The French had 800 casualties at Marash, he had heard. He spoke of the country in that area being in open insurrection and the French as having insufficient troops to deal with the situation. He had seen supplies going up to the troops, and could estimate from the number he saw that the French troops were not very numerous, he said.

The Aleppo railway was not now working, as the big and important iron bridge just north of Kurd-Dagh had been blown up by the Arabs.

He, too, referred to the poor class of officers the French were sending to administer the country, and to their unpopularity among both Christians and Mahomedans alike.

14. *Interview with Mr. Hadkinson.*—On the morning of the 22nd instant I went ashore early to see Mr. Hadkinson, an English resident in Alexandretta, before leaving for Mersina.

Mr. Hadkinson was employed by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force on intelligence work during the war, and now is interested in mines in the interior. I did not get much information of value from him, as he could merely repeat rumours for the most part, and his figures seemed to me very exaggerated. He belongs to the Smyrna Hadkinson family.

He corroborated my previous information about the unpopularity of the French in Syria and the state of disorder in the interior. He gave me to understand that the big iron trestle bridge which Mr. Kennedy told me was blown up had been repaired (this I am doubtful about). Several months ago, he said, a Nationalist agent had come up from Smyrna front, and since then the marauding bands had seemed imbued with a much more patriotic spirit. He blamed the French for much of the trouble through having supported Armenians too strongly. He said they (the Armenians) were getting arrogant, which irritated the Turks and led them on to acts of violence.

15. On the morning of the 22nd instant, as Mr. Catoni, *senr.*, had not arrived in the "Kenah," we sailed in the forenoon in the hopes of catching him at Mersina before he left.

#### Cilicia.

16. *Arrival at Mersina.*—On my arrival at Mersina at about 4 p.m. on the 22nd instant I went to the "Kenah," which was in port, and found that Mr. Catoni had gone ashore. I accordingly went ashore, and on arrival was met by the French commandant of the naval base, who enquired what I wished to do and where I had come from. I informed him I wished to see Mr. Catoni, and proceeded to the latter's office.

17. *Information from Mr. Catoni, Senr.*—I found Mr. Catoni in his office. He had been several days in Mersina and while there had had conversation with various people—French officers, Americans, Armenians and Turks—several of whom had just come to Marash, and was able to give me a considerable amount of information. As regards the situation at Marash, he gave me the following details, gathered, I fancy, chiefly from Turkish and Armenian sources:—

When the French occupied Marash with about 3,000 troops there was no opposition. They then brought up the Armenian troops, who a few days after occupied the town Zeitun and told the Turks to clear out. This caused a lot of fuss, and some Turkish villages round Zeitun and houses at Marash were burnt, the French military acquiescing in the proceedings. What subsequently happened I will recount later, as gathered from the diary of an American on the spot. The upshot was that the French had to leave Marash and retreat to L-lahien. Their losses at Marash were (this from a French officer) about 800. Half Marash is in ruins. After the retreat of the French, it is said that the Armenians fought by themselves for five days, but were overpowered, and what was left of them, 10,000 to 12,000, mostly massacred. Mr. Catoni estimated the Turkish forces in Cilicia and Alexandretta areas as being about 25,000 to 30,000 strong. They were for the most part, he thought, in trained bands with regular officers, and the movement was a Nationalist one and directed by the Nationalists. It was



gaining ground every day owing to Nationalist propaganda, the unpopularity of the French and their loss of prestige, due to the *débâcle* at Marash. French officers, Mr. Catoni said, stated openly they thought the situation critical if ample reinforcements did not come. Some were certainly arriving; several thousand had already landed at Mersina and had gone up to Adana for the protection of that place, and 4,000 or 5,000 had landed at Alexandretta and had left with all speed possible for Killis, the French headquarters. This was at the time of the Marash incident. At Mersina tanks also had arrived, but they had been unable to land them. French officers were talking of 30,000 reinforcements which were coming from Salonica, and others also talked of troops coming from Marseilles. Mr. Catoni did not think that in all Syria and Cilicia the French had more than about 20,000 troops, of which there might be 15,000 at the most (and those mostly colonial) in the Cilicia Alexandretta areas. He thought the figure was probably even lower.

If the French really wanted to occupy and pacify the country effectively, he considered they would have to employ a force of 150,000 men. The French, Mr. Catoni had been told, were making defences round Mersina, Adana and also between Alexandretta and Beilan.

He corroborated all previous information about French unpopularity and corruption. The officers, he said, were a poor class and not well off. They said when they arrived: "Nous ne sommes pas venus ici pour sucer le noyau d'abricot," and they certainly were not doing so. The French Government were spending no money on improving the country. All people now hoped against hope that the British might return: Christian, Mahomedan and Armenian were unanimous in this. Since the affair at Marash the bitterest enemies the French now had were the Armenians. He had heard, but I could get no corroboration of this, that the French troops had also been withdrawn from Aintab to Killis.

Mr. Catoni's account of things was possibly tinged by that exaggeration which characterises the conversation of most Levantines, but he is a pretty sound man, I think, and in the main much of what he said was corroborated by other informants and may be taken as fairly correct.

18. *Interview with French Military Administrator at Mersina.*—The same evening that I landed I called on the French Military Administrator of the town.

He expressed pleasure at making my acquaintance and told me the situation was quite satisfactory. I asked him if he had any news of the situation at Marash. He replied "yes," that they had that morning had very good news. I replied I was delighted to hear it, expecting to be told that the town was now quiet and under French control, but he continued: "We have this morning heard that our troops have successfully reached Islahieh (some 80 miles south of Marash), and during the march had only eight casualties. The poor Armenians, of course, I fear lost many from cold, they say about 1,000. And now, of course, the Turks are saying that they have been driven out of Marash. But this, of course, is laughable. The only reason we left was because in this weather it was hard to get supplies. You see the roads are bad and the villages around are destroyed!" After that, having expressed pleasure at hearing his "good news," I left him, as it did not seem I should get much of value from him. I found, however, that there had been a "Times" correspondent, Mr. Bennett by name, in the town and went to try and find him. I found him at the local Ritz and arranged to have an interview with him early next morning. He had been a fortnight in the area and spent several days at Adana.

19. *Interview with Mr. Bennett, "Times" Correspondent.*—Mr. Bennett informed me that at Adana he had had an interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Brémont, Administrateur en Chef des Territoires ennemis occupés, Nord (Cilicia). He greeted Mr. Bennett with the reassuring statement that he was very fond of the English, in fact, most anglophile, and would open his heart to him. He then went on to say that the situation was grave, and the reason for the trouble was the propaganda of British intelligence agents. Here he differentiated somewhat. He said that his experience was that British officers from India and Egypt were much worse intriguers than those from France. Having thus created a comfortable "atmosphere" he gave Mr. Bennett a résumé of the situation. As Mr. Bennett's account differs somewhat from others, particularly from the diary of Americans who were at Marash, it is perhaps worth recounting it, it being realised that it is a gallicised edition.

On about the 20th January some of Mustafa Kemal's men came down and massacred about 3,000 Armenians at Marash. The French sent a force to punish them, and found they had left, but shelled the Turkish quarter of the town. (Mr. Bennett gathered about 5,000 Turks had been killed in this affair.) Mustafa Kemal's troops were

put down by Colonel Brémont as about 25,000 in all Cilicia. These troops sent an ultimatum to the French to clear out, but they played for time, and eventually retired during the night of the 10th February. The Armenians apparently found out they were going at the last moment, and some 4,000 seem to have followed them. A French officer told Mr. Bennett they could not let it out beforehand to the Armenians or it would have got to the Turks! The French losses in Marash were admitted by Colonel Brémont to have been 800, but he stated these were all from frost-bite. In view of what I saw in the American's diary, I make bold to deny this statement. Colonel Brémont admitted to Mr. Bennett that there was really no need to have evacuated Marash.

Mr. Bennett was informed that the day after the evacuation the Turks entered the town, and the 16,000 Armenians remaining there were massacred. Of those that escaped with the French, 1,300 died on the way to Islahieh. Mr. Bennett was shown on a map the French line, which now runs, roughly, from Adana along the southern border of the sanjak of Marash to Islahieh. He believed that all the train service to Aleppo was stopped, and had heard that the insurgents were always pulling up the line.

In the opinion of Colonel Brémont, reinforcements were coming in satisfactorily, and the French, he stated, were going to take immediate steps to retake Marash, but Mr. Bennett got the impression that there were extraordinarily few French troops in Cilicia, say 15,000 at the outside. He found the town of Adana quiet, but the population very nervous and jumpy. The recent affair in the interior, he said, had put the whole Armenian population very much against the French. Colonel Brémont expressed it as his opinion that once the peace terms were published the population would settle down.

20. *Dr. Peoples, Medical Officer with American Mission, Mersina.*—I had a long talk with Dr. Peoples, the doctor at the American Mission. He appeared to be a level-headed capable man, and was in touch with all persons coming in from the interior.

He was very glad to be able to tell a "Britisher" what he thought about the situation. He gave me an account of what he had heard had taken place at Marash (which is identical with what I read in the American's diary, of which I give later a résumé). Dr. Peoples thought the situation in the interior was serious, and that, although he was of opinion that Mersina was safe, yet he would not be surprised to see an attack on Adana. The French, he said, were terribly unpopular and were liked by no one. Even the Armenians now hated them. Since the bad way they had shown up at Marash the natives neither respected nor feared them. He thought that they had behaved disgracefully in not taking more energetic measures in Marash. If they were seriously attacked in the near future he did not think their chances were rosy. They had no "pep." He thought there were some of Mustafa Kemal's men about 45 miles from Mersina and 25 miles from Selifki, at a place called Mara.

The natives would not be content if the French stopped. They wanted the Americans or British.

After a long conversation he took me to the American Mission, where I was shown a copy of the diary of Mr. Crathorne, of the American Mission, who was at Marash during the fighting.

21. *Mr. Crathorne's Diary on the Marash Incident.*—Mr. Crathorne's diary starts with the beginning of the fighting at Marash on the 21st January.

It has been very hard to get correct details as to what led up to the trouble, but the following is, I fancy, pretty correct.

The French had occupied Marash some little time before the fighting commenced with from 2,000 to 3,000 troops, of whom the majority were black. They brought up, either with or immediately after them, a contingent of the Armenian Legion and backed them up in certain acts against the Turks, such as the occupation of Zeitun, and, thus supported, the Armenians probably added fuel to the fire of Turkish wrath by their arrogance, feeling the French were behind them.

This seems to have culminated on the 21st January in the French having to arrest the mutessarif of the town, which in turn fanned the fire of smouldering resentment of the Turks into a blaze, for shooting at once started. The Turks in the town, supported by bands from outside, attacked the Armenians and French.

This is where the diary starts and goes on to show that until the night of the 10th February, when the French evacuated the place, a continual fight went on in the town in which guns, machine-guns and rifles were used.

The French commandant (General Querette) seems to have lost complete control of the situation and to have made no effort to restore order with his troops. Although



at the commencement of the trouble he informed the Americans he intended "to strike, and strike hard," all he seems to have done is to shell the Turkish quarter of the town and also set fire to certain districts, thereby causing the fighting to become more intensified (23rd January). During all this time many helpless Armenians, women and children, were being massacred most brutally by the Turks, according to the testimony of the American missionary. It is said that the victims amounted to about 3,000. He mentioned also that there were many French casualties, so it appears the French were also suffering heavily. Although it is not mentioned in his diary (to the best of my belief), yet the Turks were said by General Gouraud to have made use of two guns as well as machine-guns.

During this twenty days' "siege" the French began to run short of supplies, as three convoys coming to them were captured and the escorts killed.

The French measures seem to have been most feeble. Beyond shelling and burning certain parts of the town, they appear to have done nothing. The mutessarif was released and sent to quiet the fighting, but could do no good.

On the 27th the Turks sent an ultimatum to the French. The Armenians heard on the 28th that 700 French troops were coming to their relief and fighting hard, and finally, on the 7th February, a relief force "fought its way into the town." On the 9th February General Querrete informed the Americans that he had received orders to evacuate the town that night, but at their earnest request delayed it twenty-four hours. The evacuation was carried out in the most severe weather, and the behaviour of the French troops to the Armenians, who had tried to escape with them when they found them going, does not seem to have been of the gentlest, according to Dr. Peoples.

The accounts of the various atrocities witnessed by Dr. Craythorne in Marash or the vicissitudes of the American Mission is not necessary to relate.

The end of the story was told me by the French administrative commandant, Mersina, when he said "the news from Marash is very good, the French reached Ishahieh with eight casualties only *en route*," and there for the present the French remain, until they "strike, and strike hard" again or are possibly struck.

#### Résumé.

After so brief a visit it may be said that any attempt to gauge correctly the situation in Syria and Cilicia is presumptuous, but the following is my impression of the state of affairs in these districts.

In Syria there is discontent with the French rule, but no open resistance to it, and from a military point of view the situation there does not give cause for anxiety.

All through Syria and Cilicia the French have now become most unpopular with Syrian Christians and Armenians as well as with the Mahommedans.

This dislike has found open expression in active revolt in Northern Syria, where in the Alexandretta hinterland a state of war exists and several strong attacks had been already made on the French. The French troops are few, and unless reinforcements are sent the situation may become grave should the Arabs attack in the strength anticipated by the French commandant.

In Cilicia, however, the situation may be looked on as serious already. The French have been thrown out of the sanjak of Marash, have turned the Armenians bitterly against them and have lost any respect or fear they previously were regarded with by the inhabitants of Cilicia. The Nationalist movement is gaining strength daily from propaganda and from the dissemination of tales of the recent discomfiture of the French.

The French forces are too few, even with the reinforcements that are being sent, to do more than hold their own in the positions they now occupy, and it seems even possible that this may prove a difficult task should the Nationalist movement continue to receive the impetus it now is doing and its activities be directed and co-ordinated by some guiding hand.

To pacify and administer effectively the territories of Northern Syria and Cilicia it appears essential that much larger reinforcements than are at present being sent should be put into the country, and the estimate of 100,000 men as being the number necessary for the task, which I have seen quoted as being essential to ensure the success of the French occupation of this part of the Levant, appears to be a conservative number. Further, if the French wish to obtain the goodwill of the people as well as their subjection they must make great alteration in their method of administration and the type of man they are sending as their administrators.

Before closing this report I should like to express my most sincere thanks for and great appreciation of the unfailing courtesy and great hospitality shown to me at all

times during my ten days' stay on H.M.S. "Sportive" by the Captain, Lieutenant-Commander Knox-Little and officers.

Lieutenant-Commander Knox-Little gave me every possible assistance and facility in carrying out the duty I had been detailed to perform and I am most genuinely grateful for his ever-ready help.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the captain and officers of H.M.S. "Senator" for the hospitality shown me on my return journey from Marmarice to Constantinople.

I have, &c.

S. S. BUTLER,

Lieutenant-Commander, G.S.O. (N.).

Marmarice, February 24, 1920.

[E 1776/11/44]

No. 127.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 306.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 2, 1920.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 169 of the 27th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr. Ryan on the attitude of Seid Abdul Kadir, Sherif Pasha and other persons connected with the Kurdish nationalist movement.

2. The previous memorandum referred to in the last paragraph of the enclosed paper is that which I forwarded in my despatch No. 211 of the 28th January, 1920. I would suggest that the two papers should be read in conjunction with each other.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 127.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

SEID ABDUL KADIR, the Kurdish leader, who had not been to the High Commission since his visit to Mr. Hohler on the 8th December, came to see me on the 21st February, and made a most vehement appeal to His Majesty's Government to adopt a policy in regard to Kurdistan which would square with Kurdish aspirations.

Abdul Kadir Effendi said that we seemed to be leaving things to the French in Kurdistan. On my saying that the recent change affected only Cilicia and that, so far as I knew, there was no decision as to the wide spaces between Cilicia and the Persian frontier, he said his own correspondence from Paris led him to believe that the French were going to stretch up to Sivas, Kharput and a good deal further.

The French, he said, had made attractive advances to the Kurds. The Kurds had not entertained them, because what they wanted was to be under the regis of Great Britain in some way or other. He repeated what he has often said, namely, that he was himself the one man who could command the adhesion of all Kurdistan. Trouble, and bad trouble, was, he declared, brewing for the spring. He entreated His Majesty's Government to utilise him and his people to counteract the activities of Turkish nationalists and to hold up any Bolshevik advance.

The gist of Seid Abdul Kadir's argument regarding the future of Kurdistan was that the Kurds wanted British protection and no other; that they would be content to remain under the Turkish flag provided they had complete autonomy secured to them by His Majesty's Government; that they did not want Kurdistan to be divided up into small States under different protections, which was rumoured to be the solution now in favour in Paris; that they must not be placed under Armenian domination in predominantly Kurdish districts, for if they were, no power on earth—not even the strongest army of occupation—could keep the peace, and that, subject to this, they were willing to accept any Armeno-Kurdish frontier determined by the Conference.

I said that as regards the Bolshevik danger the Grand Vizier had spoken to me almost in the same sense as to the possibility of utilising the real strength which lay



to the back of the weak Caucasian republics as a barrier against Bolshevism. Only, I said, the Grand Vizier made no distinction between Turks and Kurds, and was offering the collaboration of Turkey as he conceived it, whereas what Abdul Kadir Effendi was offering was the collaboration of Kurds who claimed to be very distinct from the Turks and for whom the Turks behind would *ex hypothesi* be a hostile force and therefore a source of weakness. Seid Abdul Kadir insisted that all the Moslems this side of the frontier were Kurds, and that if they were to be used at all as a barrier against Bolshevism, it must be as Kurds.

On my observing on the disunion among the Kurds themselves and on the fact that the sons of Ibrahim Pasha, for instance, seemed now to have definitely gone against us, Seid Abdul Kadir once more protested that if only Great Britain would help the Kurds, the Kurds would unite and do all we wanted of them.

This is a short summary of a very long conversation. I have never seen Seid Abdul Kadir without being impressed with his sincerity. He doubtless over-estimates his influence, but I believe it to be very great. I believe him to be definitely anti-Turkish, and more particularly anti-Committee. The religious motive weighs a great deal with him, and I think it is for that reason that he now favours autonomy under the Turkish flag, as he is probably faithful at heart to the Caliphate, though disloyal to the Sultanate. I feel strongly that there is too great a tendency in Bagdad both to mistrust him and to underestimate his importance. I have no first-hand knowledge of Sheikh Taba, but I cannot see what claim he has established to confidence by anything he has done so far. If we are backing Kurdish chieftains at all, I think Abdul Kadir is a better horse to back than Taba.

I hear from other sources that Seid Abdul Kadir's fears about the partition of Kurdistan into several small States is based on a very definite prognostication in a letter from Sherif Pasha. In this letter Sherif Pasha says he understands that what is now in view is a Northern Kurdistan under French auspices and a Southern Kurdistan under British. He mentions Jeziré (the Bedrhan headquarters) as being in the southern zone, and speaks of the alleged loss of influence by Abdul Kadir as compared with Sheikh Taba in the Shemdinan area. The Kurds here infer from the letter that there is an intention of administering the French and British zones as collections of small States under local chiefs.

Sherif Pasha declares himself irreconcilably opposed to partition, and suggests that it would be better to maintain Kurdistan as an undivided whole under Turkish sovereignty, but with autonomy. The Kurds here seem divided. It will be seen by what precedes that Abdul Kadir does not reject the idea of Turkish suzerainty, but he wants guaranteed autonomy, and he wants himself to rule the roost. The Bedrhans say they mistrust the Turks, and do not appear irreconcilable to the proposed partition.

Personally, I think it probable that Sherif Pasha has been got at by the Turks. There have been various indications lately of a rapprochement between him and influential Turkish circles here.

In a previous memorandum I have suggested that His Majesty's Government should study the advisability of a new policy in this country on the basis of open opposition to the extremists of the national movement, collaboration with a *bloc* of moderate elements, the maintenance of a relatively large Turkey and effective, though veiled, foreign control (mainly Anglo-French) over the whole of that Turkey. If this policy were adopted, it should be possible to fit men like Seid Abdul Kadir and the Bedrhans into the scheme by assuring to them a considerable though carefully controlled rôle in the administration of the regions in which their hereditary and religious influence counts. I cannot but think that this would produce better results than formal separation of Kurdistan from Turkey, followed by a formal partition into English and French protectorates. Recent events justify the belief that there will be trouble wherever the French are given an exclusive position, and such trouble will, like the trouble in Cilicia to-day, invariably have reflexes on both sides of the purely French area.

A. R.

British High Commission, Constantinople,  
February 24, 1920.

[E 1777/3/44]

No. 128.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 307. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 1, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that information, which has reached me from a secret source, goes to show that the Turkish War Office, as well as the corps and divisional commanders of the Turkish army in the provinces, have generally been engaged in providing assistance in arms and ammunition to the Nationalist levies who attacked the French forces in the Marash area.

2. From this information it appears that—

- (a.) The general officer commanding, XIIIth Army Corps at Diarbekir has distributed arms and ammunition from depôts to the Nationalists, and the tribes operating against Marash and Urfa have been armed and equipped.
- (b.) The general officer commanding XVth Army Corps, Erzeroum, was making arrangements to issue to the Nationalists arms and ammunition from the Erzincan district.
- (c.) The War Office has issued orders to the general officer commanding, XVth Army Corps, Erzeroum, to distribute to the neighbouring army corps and to the Nationalists the arms and ammunition belonging to troops disbanded after the Armistice.
- (d.) The general officer commanding, XVth Army Corps, Erzeroum, ordered the divisional commander to distribute arms to the villages near Hassan Kale on the frontier.
- (e.) The War Office ordered the general officer commanding, XIIIth Army Corps, Diarbekir, to comply as far as possible with demands for arms and ammunition.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner.

[E 1784/3/44]

No. 129.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 316.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 4, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information a copy of a report by Dr. W. Nesbitt Chambers, of the American Near East Relief Organisation, concerning the disturbances at Marash, and copy of a diary written by Dr. Crathern, of the American Young Men's Christian Association, who was in Marash during the siege.

2. These papers are of a great interest as being the first detailed and reliable accounts of what has happened.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 129.

Dr. Chambers to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

Near East Relief, 13, Rue Petits-Champs, Constantinople.

I HAVE the honour to hand to you the enclosed memorandum concerning the disturbances at Marash for your use as you may think fit.

I also hand you a copy of a diary written by Dr. Crathern, of the American Young Men's Christian Association, who was in Marash all through the siege. I hand it to you for your perusal, and that you may cull from it any information that you would care to do, and I have the honour to remain, yours very truly,

W. NESBITT CHAMBERS.



Enclosure 2 in No. 129.

*Memorandum concerning the Marash Disturbances of January 21 to February 10, 1920.*

Dear Sir,

I HEREWITH hand you the following, as embodying information obtained from sources which appeared to be quite reliable, concerning the situation which developed into the sad tragedy of Marash, of the 21st January to the 10th February of the current year.

When the British gave place to French occupation on the 29th November, 1919, the situation was tranquil and the transfer was made without any untoward incident, with the exception of the shooting in the city of an Armenian in the French military service, from which, however, no serious results developed. The relationships between the Turks and Armenians were not marked by any hostile demonstration, although a considerable quantity of property had been and was being restored to the Armenians lately returned from exile. This seemed to cause some annoyance to the Turks. The return of these properties was carried out by the Turks under British auspices.

My informant declares that when the Turks heard that the British were to withdraw they were greatly elated. When it was declared that the French would take the place of the British, a pharmacist named Loutfi Effendi, a leader of the Marash Nationalist movement, declared that Marash "would become another Smyrna."

The French forces which occupied Marash were constituted of about 300 Armenians in the French military service, together with about 30 Algerian cavalry and 80 Frenchmen, all under French officers. These were later increased to about 700 Armenians and a number of other troops in the French service, bringing the total number in the occupation of Marash to over 3,000.

About the middle of December, M. Andrée, Governor of Osmanieh, came to Marash, having with him a force of mounted gendarmes, made up of Turks, Kurds, Circassians and Armenians, the latter numbering about a dozen. It was understood he came as the Governor of Marash, and he was received by the leading Turkish officials and other notables of the city.

It was the custom for the Turks to fly the Turkish flag over the citadel every Friday. On the Friday preceding M. Andrée's entrance an order had been issued that the flag was no longer to be flown. This order reached the Turks late that day and the flag was not removed. On the following Friday, however, there was much discussion amongst the Turks, and many were unwilling to go to the mosque until the flag was unfurled. Although the gendarmes who had accompanied M. Andrée were in the citadel at the time, they apparently made no objection to the raising of the flag, which was done. This all resulted in great excitement and apprehension in the city, during which a patrol of Algerian cavalry was sent through the city to keep order. Some Turks were arrested and later released. Nothing further resulted from this incident and the flag continued to fly. M. Andrée and his gendarmes left the day after and things were apparently quiet until the middle of January.

Along in January a few murders occurred in the neighbourhood. The French sent out troops to punish Turkish villagers who had attacked French troops. These destroyed some houses, but burnt no villages.

About the middle of January it was noticed that the Turks were repairing walls, and making other changes in their streets, causing anxiety to the Armenians, who feared that something serious was intended.

At this time the French began more seriously to interfere with the civil administration, and on Sunday, the 18th January, the Turks sent a communication to the French in which they demanded that there should be no interference with the civil administration on the part of the French, that no objection should be made to the flying of the Turkish flag, and that the Armenian volunteers in the French army should be sent away. Following this, about 500 of the Armenian volunteers were sent away, leaving between 200 and 300 still in the service in Marash. At the same time, the Turks made a proposition to the Armenians, to come to an understanding with them, to which the Armenians gave an indefinite answer, and asked advice of the French. A second Conference of the Armenians and Turks was to have been held on the 20th January, but on that day the chief hodja of Marash, Dai-zadé, sent word to the Armenians that they need not come, as an understanding was no longer possible. The French military officer in command at Marash at this time was General Querette, who was in Marash about fifteen days. Since the 18th, the day of the Turkish

communication with the French, no Turks had opened their shops. The Armenians also kept their shops closed, and the market was empty. The Armenians had begun to crowd in the churches, for there was great apprehension, since armed Turks from outside the city had come in in considerable numbers.

On the morning of the 21st, the French called to headquarters a number of leading Turks, officials, and civilians, including the Mutessarif, the Chief of Police and the Gendarmerie Commandant. The last two returned shortly to their duties for the preservation of order in the city. The others remained at French headquarters. Later, the Mutessarif was also allowed to return. Later, in the forenoon, my informant saw a large number of Turkish civilians massed at the citadel along with the gendarmes. The civilians soon scattered to different quarters of the city. Then he saw the gendarmes issue from the building of the citadel and crouch behind ramparts. In a short while shots were fired from that point. At this signal thousands of rifles rang out from all over the city. A French guard at the entrance to the American hospital was among the first to be killed. The Turks were very well armed and used machine-guns and also dum-dum bullets. They probably secured their arms from Albustan and Ba-akjik, and military depots and other places. The Armenians had comparatively few arms, and seldom fired unless their houses were attacked.

The fighting continued for twenty-one days; the first day the French did not reply. Many of the inhabitants were killed by the rifle-fire, but the Turks also set fire to the various buildings, where Armenians had taken refuge, and in one place about 800 were burned. They likewise carried out massacres in isolated and defenceless quarters. It is estimated that during the days from the 21st January to the 10th February, between 3,500 and 4,000 Armenians were killed, about half the city ruined. It is impossible to give any estimate of Turkish casualties.

On the evening of the 10th the French evacuated the town.

They had their headquarters in one of the American buildings, and French soldiers were quartered in various parts of the city. On the 7th February the advance guard of a relieving column was seen approaching the city. It bombarded the Turkish positions, causing evident consternation amongst them. The Turks were seen to be withdrawing across the hills, and on the 10th Dr. Mustafa got into communication with the Americans with a view to coming through them to an understanding with the French. Unfortunately, during an attempt at a second interview, Dr. Mustafa was shot. There is ground for believing that the Turks were anxious for cessation of hostilities at the time when the French abandoned the city on the night of the 10th. Their withdrawal was evidently intended to be secret, since no information was given to the Armenians, and the Americans were informed of it almost at the last moment.

About 2,000 Armenians in the immediate vicinity of the French headquarters learning of the withdrawal were able to come away with the French. Of these about 1,800 reached the railroad at Islahieh in a condition of destitution. Another party, estimated to be about 2,000, a few hours later, attempted to follow, but were cut to pieces before they could get out of the city. Only about 200 got away, and of these only about a score succeeded in getting through to safety.

It is estimated that there were about 4,000 troops in the French relieving column, and that during the trouble the French had about 3,000 troops in the city, of whom it is said they lost about 800. Food had become very scarce.

It is estimated that there were 22,000 Armenians in Marash when this began. Of these 3,000 to 4,000 perished at the time of the French withdrawal; 2,000 were killed in an attempt to leave the city immediately after the French withdrawal, and about 1,000 perished on the trek with the French forces between Marash and Islahieh, constituting a loss of 6,000 or 7,000 Armenians up to the 13th February. Since that date we have no definite information as to the condition of the Armenians in the city. There should be between 15,000 and 16,000 remaining, but a late telegram received from the Americans in Marash speaks of 10,000 destitute people. The Americans seem to be safe.

W. NESBITT CHAMBERS.



Enclosure 3 in No. 129.

*Extracts from Diary of Y.M.C.A. Secretary Crathern concerning the Siege and War in Marash, January 20 to February 11, 1920.*

SECRETARY CRATHERN had been in Marash for the purpose of organising a Y.M.C.A. On the 20th January he attempted to return to Aintab in an A.C.R.N.E. auto, with Paul Syder as chauffeur and Miss Schultz and Lieutenant Czoonery of the French army and three Armenians as passengers. On reaching the hill leading to the summit of the mountain we ran into a pitched battle between the Algerian cavalry and Turkish bandits. We deemed it advisable to turn back, and on doing so a hundred or more shots were fired at us by the bandits on the mountain. Several bullets penetrated the car and one hit and splintered the cross-section of the steering-wheel, fragments of which flew into the faces of the chauffeur and Secretary Crathern. Mr. Crathern waved an American flag from the car, hoping that the firing would cease, but it had no effect on the Turks. By a miracle the car escaped, being negotiated down the hill at 40 miles an hour which was the only thing that saved the party. We returned to Marash without further incident and reported the matter to the General Staff.

January 21.

On the 21st January Secretary Crathern sent the following telegram to Consul Jackson at Aleppo, Admiral Bristol, of Constantinople:—

"American flag fired on repeatedly and the lives of American citizens threatened and imperilled in Marash and Aintab.

"Inform Major Arnold of the Relief Commission and Y.M.C.A. headquarters.—  
C. F. H. CRATHERN, Secretary."

These telegrams were O.K'd by General Querrete, of the French Staff, and I was assured by Turkish and French officials at the telegraph office that the telegram would be sent without fail within half-an-hour. After sending this telegram I walked through the city with Mr. Kerr and an interpreter. The bazars and the shops were all closed and the Turks were getting together in little groups all over the city; only a few Armenians were to be seen in the thoroughfares. About 1 o'clock, while at the dinner table, we heard the crash of guns, and knew that the conflict that had been threatening so long had now broken out. Before the first shot was fired I found, on reaching the missionary compound, a company of Turkish officials including the Mutessarif, a Turkish hodja and other notables. These, I understood from Mr. Lyman, had come to interview me for a purpose which I did not learn. As I found later that they had been detained by the French officials and placed under arrest. This, I presume, was the cause of the first shot being fired by the Turks. The French commandant had informed us earlier in the day that they had determined to strike and to strike hard.

After the first shot was fired we ran to the front balcony where we had a commanding view of the whole city. There was quite a long cannonading and many of the houses of the city were turned into small forts from which the sound of shooting would issue every few minutes, answered by the machine-guns of the French. The Armenians were very much alarmed and are in fear of their lives. Hundreds of the poor have been caught in one of our compounds where they came to receive old clothes, and will have to stay all night as it will be unsafe for them to go home. The fighting and firing have been going on all the afternoon and now it is nearly midnight and there is no cessation. A French sentinel guarding the entrance to the American hospital was shot dead and another wounded. Bullets also passed through two of the nurses' rooms and wounded an Armenian girl. What the morning will bring forth we do not know. I fear that the worst is not over.

January 22.

We were awakened this morning by the boom of guns, and saw quite early the flash of exploding shells. The Turks are firing from a number of houses, and as they are using smokeless powder it is impossible to see where the bullets come from. The French soldiers have suffered seriously, and many of them, we hear, are now lying dead and wounded in the streets, and their companions are unable to render them any assistance until night because of the danger arising from the sharpshooters. The American hospital has again been attacked, and doctors and nurses have had very

narrow escapes. The mission buildings have as yet escaped damage, and we do not anticipate any assault as the Turks are not prepared for aggressive warfare. The French general with his staff officers was on our balcony this afternoon to sight approaching Turks who were coming over the mountains on their way to the city. The general gave orders for a gun to be fired with sixty-five shells, which soon scattered them in all directions.

January 23.

The battle is still on, but there is no way of getting now into or out of the city. Everything is at a standstill. To-day we have been watching the bombardment of the city by the French. In some sections it is very severe, and created great consternation. It gave many opportunities for looting and pillage, and, I fear, massacre. Through our glasses we could see Armenians escaping from their houses and fleeing before the Turks, who were shooting them down like jack-rabbits. Other Turks were hiding in the fields behind rocks, trees and manure heaps, and shooting at those who had escaped the Turks in the city. It was pitiful to see them throw up their hands and scream, while attempting to escape. We watched them fleeing over the hills until they reached our compound, some dropping wounded by the way, and others staggering into the mission grounds with wild eyes and purple faces, telling of an awful massacre just beginning.

January 24.

This is the fourth day of the battle of Marash, and every day becomes more pathetic and tragic as time wears on. This morning we held a consultation and decided to interview the French general to learn the plan of campaign and to lay before him some facts that had come to our knowledge regarding the massacre of the Armenians in the Coined quarter of Marash. This was the region from which he had seen the Armenians running for their lives across the fields. In order to be fortified with the actual facts, as coming from the mouths of eye-witnesses, we interviewed the people who had escaped this massacre. They told most harrowing stories. One woman saw seven killed before her eyes. Mothers had children taken out of their arms and ripped up with knives. One man said two hundred perished in one street. The shrieks of the tortured we could hear a mile across the ravine, which they had to cross to reach our compound. Others gave similar accounts of awful experiences. We laid these facts before the general and his staff, who listened very respectfully, and said the situation was very grave, and that they would take strenuous efforts to cope with it. Wounded soldiers are being brought in to our hospital and several operations have been performed. Yesterday the Mutessarif was released from French custody for the purpose of interviewing the leaders and bringing about a cessation of hostilities. He went back to the Government building under the protection of a white flag with an ultimatum from the general that if the Turks did not surrender in twenty-four hours he would bombard the city. To-day the Mutessarif telephones to headquarters that it was impossible for him to prevail with the leaders to cease operations, as he had no control over them, and was even in danger of his own life. At 3 o'clock, when the time of the ultimatum had expired, we heard the booms of guns, and knew that the bombardment of the city had commenced. The guns were kept busy for two hours. At 5 o'clock the colonel came to the house and said they had decided to burn certain sections of the city from which the Turks were sniping Armenians and soldiers whenever they appeared. At night the city is in total darkness.

Whenever we go from one compound to another we have to creep under the walls in order to escape shot and shell. There is the most intense excitement every minute of the day, and every compound is thronged with frightened refugees who have escaped during the night, and are alarmed lest their people, whom they have left behind should become the victims of massacre, or fire, or starvation. Women are giving premature birth to children, and women are going crazy with fear. The A.C.R.N.E. are feeding nearly 2,000 orphans and refugees, and with only a few days' supply of bread the problem is a grave one. To-day we raised the American flag, but no sooner had we raised it to the mast than the salute of a dozen guns sent us scampering to cover. I have just timed by my wrist-watch thirty-three shots in one minute. The machine-guns are picking away like so many giant woodpeckers, and the sharp crack of the rifle is continuous. Last night five Armenian soldiers were sent out by the French disguised as Turkish gendarmes to reach the nearest telegraph station at Isahie, 75 miles away. Each was the bearer of a long telegram in cipher from the general



asking that supplies and reinforcements be sent immediately. Whether they will reach their destination or not we do not know. It is risky business, as the whole country is in a flame of revolt. How soon the issue will be decided it is hard to determine. The capture of the last two caravans of munitions and foodstuffs by bandits between Marash and Aintab make that way of escape or relief impossible. But while the days are exciting the nights are increasingly so. For while the great guns are booming, soldiers are creeping stealthily forth with benzine torches and hand-grenades to set fire to different parts of the city. It is sometimes like Dante's Inferno. I have had to move my bed back into a safer quarter of the room, as a bullet came through the window into the hallway and nearly passed through the door.

*January 25.*

The situation here is unique. We are besieged by an invisible army. There are few enemy soldiers in sight, and these are seen only through our glasses, running for cover, or hurrying out of their trenches, or stealing over the mountains in little groups to reach the city. We have not been out of our own compounds for seven days, and even behind our own walls we are not safe against attack. The French have no wireless, no aeroplanes, no telegraph, no armoured cars, and, to make the situation worse, neither food nor ammunition for an extended siege. They have to conserve their supplies, not knowing how long the siege may last or whether the rest of Turkey is in the same state of war or not. They are doing all they can under the circumstances, but with the small force of troops under their command they cannot make any attack on the city with the certainty of making it surrender. Hundreds of Armenians are trying to reach our compounds from many parts of the city, but are failing in the attempt, and the light of the fires that the Turks are making in Armenian quarters render escape impossible, and those who flee from smoke and flames fall victims to the sword or the axe. News came to-day that scores of women and children huddled in one house were butchered with knives and hatchets after the men had been taken out and shot. They surrendered on the promise of protection, but were cruelly betrayed. To-day in one of our orphanages a woman was killed while standing in the doorway, and others were shot and wounded in the college compound.

*January 26.*

We are still in the throes of most terrible war that involves not only the armed forces of the opposing armies, but also the unfortunate Armenians who are the victims of the most hellish cruelty imaginable. The crescent moon, the cold-blooded symbol of Moslem fanaticism, is rising to-night on a city in whose streets to-day have been enacted tragedies that ought to stagger humanity, and send a shudder of protest to the Throne of God. I have read much, and heard more, of the atrocities the Armenians have suffered in the past, but I never expected to witness first hand the barbarities that are a disgrace to civilisation and a stain on the escutcheons of the Great Powers that can permit such a Government to exist. And yet what I have seen and heard during the last two days is but a small part of the horrors that are registered for ever upon the brains of those who have escaped bleeding and wounded, to tell their tale upon the operation table in the hospital, or to babble in an incoherent way from their sick beds of the inferno from which they have escaped. Some of the most revolting stories ever heard have been told us to-day by those who have come limping into our compounds from different parts of the city. Little girls, 8 and 10 years old, and wrinkled women of 70 years were agonising with pain from dum-dum bullet wounds which tore great pieces of flesh from arms and legs, while soldiers have had to have limbs amputated or to pay the supreme sacrifice. Children have been brought to the hospital with their brains oozing from jagged holes in the head, and elderly people while sitting in their own homes have received shots which have shattered both mind and body.

*January 27.*

This morning one of the native helpers of the A.C.R.N.E. came to tell us of his escape. He had been waiting for several days for a favourable opportunity to flee. It came about 3 o'clock this morning. He tells us that the Turks are killing hundreds of people in the city, and that they are not content with using such weapons as shot and shell, but resort to the brutal use of the axe and knife. At this very moment there is in our own house a young woman who tells us that with a hundred other persons in a cellar she prayed for five days and nights for help, but no help came. Then the Turks asked them to surrender, promising to give them protection if they would. Being desperate,

they threw themselves on the mercy of the enemy. The men were told to come out of the house and her own husband was the first to leave. He was shot immediately in the doorway by one of their own Turkish neighbours whom she knew, and who was a gendarme in the service of the Government. After the men had been taken out there was a scene of indescribable horror as the Turks came in with axes and knives and began their murderous work. In the general mêlée she with one of her children escaped. One child was killed. Two young women teachers from the college were killed in this way. Another escaped and stood in water for eight hours hoping to elude the Turks, but in a fatal moment she ran for her life and was killed by a bullet. The Turks have sent an ultimatum to the French demanding their surrender, or they will attack them to-morrow morning at 4 o'clock. The French hope they will.

*January 28.*

Rumours are flying wild and fast. This morning the startling news was spread abroad that Captain Fontaine and 700 men coming to the relief of Marash had been killed and only one man escaped. We learn this evening that he is still fighting his way to the city, and that a supply train of waggons was captured in the morning and many of the convoy killed. We had a pitiful case this morning in the hospital. It was the Rev. Solakian's wife, pastor of the third church. When she reached the hospital she was suffering and bleeding from three bullet and three dagger or knife wounds, while a child of 18 months had been taken from her breast and slain with a knife, and an older girl killed with an axe. To add to the sorrow of it the woman was pregnant and had a miscarriage as soon as she reached the hospital. The poor woman is lying in a precarious condition and she will not recover. Several new cases came in to-day and we are troubled to find room for them. The crowded compounds are also a grave problem. In one of them we have over a thousand refugees and we can give them but one meal a day, as the food supply is nearly exhausted. Many are poorly clad and many are weak. Several soldiers are going out to-night to try to take into one of the compounds a thousand Armenians who are finding refuge in a church and fear that the Turks will set fire to it.

*January 29.*

It is nearly midnight and I have just come in from a service of sorrow. The pastor's wife of whom I wrote you yesterday, died to-day and was laid to rest in the seminary compound. This afternoon we had a conference of all American workers to decide what to do in case of emergency. We shall all gather in the college compound and await the final issue. What that will be we do not know. Graves are multiplying in our midst and tales of horror come to us nightly from those who escape from house or cellar. The soldiers who went last night to rescue a thousand Armenians were not able to pass the Turkish trenches. Another orphanage was attacked, but the assault was not successful. Several soldiers came down from the mountains to-day with frozen hands and feet, some of which must be amputated.

*January 30.*

As yet no news of relief from the French authorities. Yesterday was rather quiet from the military point of view. There was only a little cannonading and only a few soldiers killed and wounded. The uncertainty of the situation is a great strain on the nerves of the ladies of our party, but they are brave and cheerful and busy all day ministering to the needs of the unfortunate. Dr. and Mrs. Wilson have moved over to the college compound to live as they think it a little safer there in case of attack. They invited me to go with them, but I feel there is no immediate danger and prefer to wait a few days to watch developments. We have all decided to hang together rather than take our chances on hanging separately.

*January 31.*

War still holds on and no relief in sight. Men, women, and children, about nine of them, were shot in the college grounds to-day and some of them quite seriously wounded. Fortunately, we have plenty of wheat now, and by keeping the women grinding from sunrise to sunset we can feed the people for quite a while. We are obliged to keep the people under cover as walking in the open is too dangerous, and our hospitals are already full.



*February 1.*

The weather has been very cold and we have had several cases of severe frost-bite among the soldiers. More children have been shot in the orphanages. The refugees are much alarmed at the success of the Turks. Several houses have been burned in the city. The hospital still continues to be attacked.

*February 2.*

The war is coming a little closer, for to-day a shell fell on the hospital roof and burst in the attic just above the floor where we had a great many patients. The rifle shots have also been a little more personal as one plunged into a wall a few feet ahead of me, and the second hit a tree as I was creeping along a wall to my room. The Turks tried to set the Bartell orphanage on fire to-day, and the French retaliated by burning the would-be incendiaries houses. There was considerable bombarding to-day but not many wounded. There is no news of reinforcements and we fear that other cities and towns may be besieged as we are and help may not reach us for some time. Last night we sent a message to the A.C.R.N.E. and to have it telegraphed to Adana and Constantinople. It will probably be seven days before it can reach its destination.

*February 3.*

I suppose no one in the outside world realises the seriousness of our situation or surely an aeroplane from Beirut would drop us a message of cheer. This is the telegraph that we sent to Consul Jackson to Adana and Constantinople:—

"Situation in Marash extremely desperate, reign of terror in city since the 21st January, hundreds of men, women, and children massacred daily no power to stop it as French are on the defensive forces, ammunition and food insufficient. Americans have little hope in case French are overpowered, no assurance of help as large forces of bandits bar all roads. Leave nothing undone to relieve situation as lives of all Christians are seriously threatened, our auto and flag fired on repeatedly 20th January our institutions under fire and many orphans and refugees wounded on American property."

Bullets still continue to enter American buildings. We have all had very narrow escapes. The French horses and mules are slowly starving and they will have to kill them and feed them to the hungry multitudes. The French are living in hope that help will come soon.

*February 4.*

This has been a tragic day. New stories of fresh massacres reached us this morning. In one case nearly 200 surrendered to the Turks under promise of protection, but nearly all of them were butchered. One man who escaped by stabbing a Turk told this gruesome story. Deep pits were dug, and men tied in bunches of three and led to the edge of it, and then shot and dumped into it dead or alive. One young girl of 19 was shot in the abdomen while getting a bit of wood. No news yet of help but we shall not give up. We are resolved to stay here at all hazards. God help the Armenians if the Americans leave them, and God help us all if the French leave.

*February 5.*

This morning, Dr. Wilson and Reverend Lyman and I, interviewed the French General and his Staff. Word reached us that Turks were encroaching on Armenian homes and might soon attack the hospital. While we were on our way to headquarters the Turkish officials, who were prisoners in the buildings, asked to see us. The General gave permission, and we had an interview with them. They pleaded with us as Americans to persuade the French officers to stop the war. They promised that if they were released that they would do all they could to bring the Turks to terms. The General would not release them. I proposed that they should write a letter to the Mutessarif and ask him to persuade the leaders to request a conference. This evening the letter from the Turks came and will be sent as soon as possible to the Turkish Government. The French to-day have decided to kill the horses and mules, as there is no food for them. We had a mule roast to-day and we like it fine. We like it better than horse-meat. A fierce bombardment took place this evening. A

perfect hailstorm of bullets rained through our compound. A young woman in the basement of the house was mortally wounded. This has brought the war to our very doors.

*February 6.*

This is the eighth day of the siege of Marash, and this morning we had a joyful surprise. An aeroplane flew over the city and dropped several messages. Unfortunately the wind was very high and carried the messages into the Turkish part of the city, but we know now that help is near and that we are not forgotten. More victims for the operating table and more graves in the cemetery. This afternoon we had another glimpse of an aeroplane, and the French headquarters sent up signals so that they might know where to land if they wished. Everybody is elated to think that communication with the outside world has again been established. We had an answer to-day from the Mutessarif, in reply to our letter which accompanied the communication sent by the Turkish officials. He regretted that he could do nothing without consulting the commander of the forces, but appreciated our interest and thanked us for our kind offer of mediation. I hope help will come before all the Armenians have to pay the awful price of this needless war.

*February 7.*

At last reinforcements are in sight and are already fighting their way into the city. The guns in the plain are shelling the hills over which the scouts expect to reach the barracks. We heard to-day that all the girls in the rescue home have been killed. There were about eighty of them. To add to the horror of the crime the Turks this afternoon set fire to the building and we had the gruesome necessity to witness the scene without being able to lift a hand to save them. The first church is also on fire.

*February 8.*

The French troops are in the valley and their guns are shelling the hills, but it may be some days yet before they can encircle the city and close in on the enemy. The wounded continue to come, and new deaths take place daily. This afternoon we spent with the French General and his Staff, in the upper storey of the college building, watching the battle in the plain and the attempt of the French relieving troops to make connection with the soldiers in the barracks. This they did later in the day. In the evening we had a thanksgiving service in the college.

*February 9.*

General Querrete informed us to-day that he has received orders to evacuate the city at midnight on the 9th. This news caused alarm all through the compounds. Everybody is terribly excited. Women and children are crazed with fear. We have urged him to delay their departure, as the Turks are on the point of surrender. He said his orders were imperative, but he would try to secure a delay of twenty-four hours. If they evacuate the city we are not sure what treatment we will receive at the hands of the Turks. We shall remain, however, at our posts of duty, to do what we can to shield the Armenians and protect American interests. We hope for the best but fear the worst. Our hope is in God. We trust Him where we cannot trace Him, and believe that in some divine way our lives will be spared, but if not, God be with you all until we meet again. I thank my God upon every remembrance of you.

*February 10.*

The French General, in response to our earnest entreaties, has granted a delay of twenty-four hours before leaving the city. We are hoping to bring about an understanding with the Turks that will prevent further massacres. The French took most of their wounded out of the city last night, but left twenty in the emergency hospital. The Armenians in the compounds are frantic and desperate. They are determined to leave the city with the French, as they fear massacre if they remain. The scenes are indescribably pathetic and tragic. Our greatest concern is for Miss Buckley, in Bathshalon Orphanage. We fear the Armenians in other compounds have not been notified of the French withdrawal. We have been fitting out the refugees for the journey, giving them food and clothes to the extent of our supplies. Many of the elder orphan boys and girls will leave with the exiles. Dr. and Mrs. Wilson will remain and all the missionaries. Dr. Elliott, Miss Schultz, Miss Powers, and Miss



Doherty will leave with the troops. I had decided to stay but as two or three thousand are going without a shepherd Dr. Wilson thinks I had better go to take charge of them and find for them food and shelter at their destination. It is a long hard trek of nearly 75 miles through mountain and plain, and I fear many of them will not be equal to it. It is winter and God help them if the weather should be severe. We are trying to arrange terms of peace, and if the French forces would remain only a few more days in the city I believe the Turks would lick their hands in abject surrender. We have just had an interview with Dr. Moustafa, the leader of the Turkish forces, and he has agreed to call the notables of the city together to-morrow, for the purpose of considering terms of surrender. But the fact is he is unaware of the positive withdrawal of the French troops to-night. The troops and refugees left the city about the hours of 6 and 9. The French General and his staff left about 10:30. I accompanied them. It was a bitterly cold night. The city was in flames. Guns were booming from the hills covering our retreat. After three or four hours we arrived at the camp on the plain, and at 2 o'clock on Wednesday morning the long column moved out of Marash on its three days' journey to Islayieh.

February 11.

As the column moved away from the city it was a blaze of splendour. The great barracks just evacuated by the French was on fire, silhouetted against the sky. Through the long moonlight night the column marched until noon, when it reached the village of Euloglou and rested for the remainder of the day.

February 12.

At 6 o'clock A.M. the column started on its long march to Bell Pouner. The weather was severely cold and many of the weak ones dropped by the wayside to freeze or to starve. At noon the column rested for two hours and reached Bell Pounar about 5 P.M. Turkish villages were burnt by the soldiers after the column had passed through. There were very meagre accommodations in the village, and multitudes were encamped in the open to suffer seriously from hunger and exposure.

February 13.

During the night a snowstorm raged and at 6 o'clock the column prepared to move forward while it was yet dark. The snowstorm increased during the early morning hours to a blizzard and continued all through the long dreary march. From twelve to eighteen hours the soldiers and civilians plodded their way through the storm and snowdrifts. All along the line the weak and the infirm dropped out from sheer exhaustion. It is estimated that before the column reached Islayieh more than a thousand of the refugees had perished in the snow, besides many of the soldiers. It was a tragic ending of a tragic exodus.

February 14.

We did our best to care for the poor refugees in Islayieh. Many died after reaching their destination. No accommodations were available in the village and very little food. I interviewed the Turkish Governor and the French Commandant, and secured their co-operation in doing something for the refugees. A bakery was secured to furnish bread and a mill to grind flour. I left with the French wounded on the evening train for Adana to confer with Dr. Dodd of the A.C.R.N.E. and Dr. Chambers of the American Mission, to see what could be done to help these unfortunates in their distress. Milk and blankets were despatched immediately and further supplies prepared to meet the urgent necessity of the situation. All the American forces in the city have put themselves at the service of these stranded Armenians. It is hoped that eventually they will be brought to Adana, where the pastors of the city are preparing to receive them and house them in their churches and other institutions in the city. I am now trying to return to my station at Aintab by way of Beirut and Aleppo. Dr. Chambers, who is on his way to Constantinople to plead the cause of the Armenians before the representatives of the Entente Powers, will carry this message with him as a record of the events that transpired in Marash during those crucial weeks.

[E 1743/3/44]

No. 130.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 18.)*

(No. 245.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 17, 1920.*

COLONEL JAR TAYAR, Commander of Turkish troops in Thrace, informed General Milne's representative at Adrianople on 6th March that on account of British action at Constantinople—

1. He has assumed supreme control in Adrianople vilayet, and will not accept orders from Constantinople.
2. Similar procedure would be followed in Asia Minor east of Ismidt.
3. He had cut all telegraphic communications with Constantinople.

He wished General Milne to be informed—

1. As concerns Adrianople vilayet, the terms of the armistice with Turkey are no longer in force.
2. Entry of any Allied forces into vilayet will be opposed by force.
3. He proposes setting up an independent Government in vilayet, and hopes to be able to protect lives and property of Christians.
4. Unless peace terms are accepted by a representative Turkish Government (and not one under the coercion of Great Britain) he will resist with all the forces at his disposal such terms.

(Repeated to Egyptforce, No. 17; Bagdad, No. 22; Tiflis, No. 38; Sofia, No. 21.)

[E 1894/3/44]

No. 131.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 247.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 18, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 238 of 16th March.

Protest has now been received in form of a note from Grand Vizier in reply to collective note handed to his Highness on 16th March. Protest is based on absence of justification, it being submitted that no disorders existed or could have been anticipated in [group omitted], where Allied forces were ample to prevent them. The movement in Anatolia, continues the note, owes its origin to Greek occupation and its consequent horrors, but was further intensified by rumour of intention to create a big Armenia and a Greek Pontus.

The Central Government disapproves and disavows the excesses committed in this movement, for which, however, it was not responsible and which it was unable to control in consequence of circumstances arising out of prolonged armistice conditions and limits placed on its authority.

As regards Marash incidents, Grand Vizier refers to previous explosions and renews invitation to institute enquiry by Mixed Commission. (This invitation is now being considered by my colleagues and myself.)

Note concludes with expression of confidence that no further disorders will occur, and that in any case Supreme Council will not hold the Ottoman nation responsible for acts of individuals to the extent of still further stiffening the terms of peace to the disadvantage of Turkey.

Text follows by next bag.



[E 1949/289/44]

No. 132.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 249.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 19, 1920.*

FOLLOWING is repetition of my telegram No. 180 of 2nd March:—

"Your telegram No. 149 of 21st February.

"Scheme has been carefully examined. It is not good enough to form basis of discussion. It places the Allies on same footing as other Powers, and does not even include possibility of nomination of German judges.

"Article 6 creates honorary Turkish presidents, following Egyptian precedent.

"This is unnecessarily costly and unfair to foreign judges, in view of inferior material of Turkish judiciary. Article 2 gives to Court of Cassation legislative functions which should be entrusted to special body.

"Article 14 deals with pre-war disputes arising out of interpretation of capitulation. It seems undignified to insert in treaty a string of trivial disputes, but a provision should be inserted that during interval of signature of peace and opening of Mixed Courts all questions of interpretation of capitulation shall be decided by three Allied representatives.

"The scheme is silent on important question of bankruptcy, which must be entrusted entirely to Mixed Courts, as was provided in draft sent home in my despatch No. 1990 of 12th June.

"It leaves entirely untouched purely Turkish Courts, for which it is important to create foreign inspectors.

"I strongly recommend that this scheme be put aside in favour of that sent home by me and my French colleague, which has been approved also by my Italian colleague. Our draft should be inserted in peace treaty with any modifications which may be found necessary after consultation with three High Commissioners. One addition might be made to article 37, paragraph 2, to indicate that amongst laws to be drafted by Legislature Commission should be one on real property and land registry department."

[E 1997/37/44]

No. 133.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 258.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, March 20, 1920*

FOLLOWING thirteen Turks have been arrested by Allied Military Authorities in connection with occupation of Constantinople by Allied forces:—

1. General Djemal Pasha, ex-Minister of War.
- 2.\* Lieutenant-Colonel Cholak Kemal Bey, Commander of Tenth Division.
3. Colonel Galatali Skevket, Commander of Defence of Straits.
4. Hussein Reouf, ex-Minister of Marine.
5. Kara Vassif, Deputy for Sivas.
6. Nouman Ousta, Socialist Deputy for Constantinople.
7. Faik Bey, Deputy for Adrianople.
8. Sheref Bey, Deputy for Adrianople.
9. Hassan Tah Sin Bey, ex-Vali of Erzeroum and Damascus.
10. General Choruk Solueli Mahmoud Pasha, Senator.
11. Dr. Essad Pasha, President of Red Crescent Society.
12. General Djevad Pasha, ex-Chief of General Staff.
- 13.\* Dj[one group undecypherable]ar Elbasa, Member of Central C.U.P. Committee.

These prisoners have been despatched to Malta in His Majesty's ship "Benbow" for safe custody.

\* Numbers 2 and 13 are deleted by Constantinople telegram No. 272 of March 24, 1920.

[E 1993/3/44]

No. 134.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 262.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 21, 1920.*

FOLLOWING is translation of French text of communiqué issued by Allied High Commissioners:—

"Five and a half years ago the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, who had got into their hands the destinies of Turkey, allowed Germany to impose her will upon them and caused Turkey to participate in the general war. The results of this ill-omened policy are known. The Turkish Government and people, after a thousand disasters of every kind, suffered such a defeat that the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress saw no solution but to conclude an armistice and take to flight on the conclusion of the armistice. A heavy task devolved on the *Entente* Powers. This task was to lay the foundations of a peace which would ensure the future happiness and development of social and economical life of all the peoples inhabiting the former Ottoman Empire, without distinction of race or creed. While the Peace Conference was engaged in the performance of this task, certain persons representing the ideas of the fugitive leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress organised a so-called national organisation, which, taking no account of the orders of the Sultan or of the Government, forcibly recruits men already exhausted by the war, extorts from the population forced contributions for its own ends, and multiplying the causes of dissension everywhere, seems to wish to open a new era of hostilities. The Conference pursued, none the less, its work of pacification; it adopted the tranquillising [in Turkish: *sic*], comforting to Ottoman hearts, decision to maintain Constantinople under Turkish Administration, but on condition, as the Sublime Porte was warned, that the Christians in the provinces should no longer be exposed to danger, and that all attacks against the forces of the *Entente* and their allies should cease immediately. The adherents of the alleged national organisation, however, far from seconding in this matter the good-will of the Central Government, sought on the contrary to hamper it [in Turkish: *sic*]. Although the Central Government, confronted with this warning, showed good-will up to a certain extent, the persons working under the assumed name of national organisation were unfortunately unwilling to abandon their agitation. On the contrary, they sought to make the Government participate in their own movement. This situation, so prejudicial to the conclusion of the longed-for peace, compelled the *Entente* Powers to consider the measures necessary for ensuring the execution of the peace terms to be decided on in the near future. There was but one means—namely, the provisional occupation of Constantinople. As this measure is now being put into effect, the following points are brought to the knowledge of all:—

- "1. The occupation is provisional.
- "2. The *Entente* Powers do not intend to destroy the authority of the Sultanate; they wish, on the contrary, to strengthen that authority in all places which will remain under Turkish Administration.
- "3. The *Entente* Powers maintain their intention of not depriving the Turks of Constantinople, but if, God forbid, widespread disturbances or massacres should occur, this decision would probably be altered.
- "4. At this critical time it is the duty of everyone to go about his ordinary business, to contribute thereby to the maintenance of public security, and not to be led astray by those whose misguided conduct tends to destroy the last hope of building a new Turkey on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. In a word, it is the duty of everyone to obey the orders issuing from the Sultanate [in Turkish: *sic*] from Constantinople, still the seat of the Sultanate.
- "5. Certain persons concerned in the incitement mentioned above have been arrested in Constantinople; they will naturally have to answer for their acts and for such future consequences as may result from those acts."



[E 1951/3/44]

No. 135

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 22.)*(No. 263.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, March 21, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 239 of 19th March.

My telegram No. 262 of 21st March gives exact English translation of French text. Turkish text, though necessarily free translation owing to importance of using style which would appeal forcibly to the Turks, agrees closely with French. I have given a literal translation in Turkish of three passages when agreement is less closely [group omitted] than elsewhere.

Your telegram No. 207 had not reached me when High Commissioners held final meeting on 15th March. Only knowledge which High Commissioners then had of views of Supreme Council regarding proclamation was derived from telegram received by French admiral regarding decision of Supreme Council. High Commissioners understood that to mean that they were not to issue proclamation involving assumption by Allies of full authority in occupied area. To avoid misunderstanding they decided to issue statement (which had already been prepared in form of proclamation) as communiqué, with necessary changes of wording.

High Commissioners were unanimously and strongly of opinion that issue of a statement defining reasons for, and scope of, action was imperative, if only to minimise danger to Christians in the interior. Special steps were taken to have it telegraphed without delay to provinces.

Communiqué had excellent effect here. It is not likely to be published in provinces generally, but it will be in hands of Nationalist leaders and their associations. It will tend to divide their councils, and will impress on all necessity for respecting lives of Christians in view of warning based on your telegram No. 187, that concession made to Turks regarding Constantinople will probably be withdrawn if massacres occur.

[E 2075/757/44]

No. 136.

*M. Paravicini to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 24.)*Légation de Suisse, Londres,  
le 23 mars 1920.

M. le Comte,

PAR note du 26 février 1919, M. le Ministre Carlin s'était adressé à votre Seigneurie aux fins d'apprendre si, en raison des intérêts suisses importants qui se trouvent engagés dans les finances de la Turquie, il serait possible que le Gouvernement fédéral fût représenté au nouveau Conseil de la Dette ottomane. Votre Seigneurie avait bien voulu répondre le 18 mars que bonne note avait été prise du désir exprimé par le Gouvernement suisse et que les représentants du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté s'en souviendraient lors des délibérations concernant le statut futur de l'Administration de la Dette publique de l'Empire ottoman.

Le règlement de la question turque faisant actuellement à Londres l'objet de conversations officielles et le Traité de Paix entre les Puissances alliées et la Sublime Porte devant vraisemblablement se conclure dans un avenir qui ne saurait être lointain, mon Gouvernement me charge et j'ai dès lors l'honneur de vous rappeler l'échange de notes intervenu entre votre Seigneurie et mon prédécesseur, en vous priant de bien vouloir consentir à donner aux représentants du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté dans les commissions et conseils interalliés les instructions nécessaires pour que cette affaire si importante pour mon pays reçoive une solution conforme au vœu exprimé par le Conseil fédéral.

Dans l'attente des obligeantes communications que vous voudrez bien me faire parvenir à ce sujet, je vous prie, &c.

C. R. PARAVICINI.

[E 2202/1729/44]

No. 137.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 26.)*(No. 276.)  
(Telegraphic.) Secret.

Constantinople, March 24, 1920.

MY telegram No. 243 of 17th March.

French High Commissioner convened meeting of High Commissioners on 22nd March to discuss position of Allied representatives on controls necessitated by occupation of War Office, Admiralty, and Department of Posts and Telegraphs.

French and Italian High Commissioners admitted that commissions exercising control must be dependent on General Officer Commanding's occupying forces, but they consider that members should be on footing of equality, and they take exception to General Milne's claim to appoint British officer as president of each commission.

I told them that I had already referred question of command to His Majesty's Government, as General Milne had received instructions which could only be based on something subsequent to and different from the decision of Supreme Council at the end of 1918, on which French base the contention that General Milne is under superior command of General Franchet.

As regards controls, I pointed out that occupation was a purely military operation, and that controls could therefore function only under, and in such manner as, General Milne might direct.

French and Italian colleagues agreed to defer to this view *de facto* in order not to delay functioning of the controls pending settlement of question of principle, as to which they made most express reservations, and which they said must be referred to Governments. I took note of reservations, and agreed likewise to refer to your Lordship.

My immediately succeeding telegram is translation of *procès-verbal* agreed on by the three High Commissioners as record of different points of view and provisional settlement arrived at.

[E 2203/1729/44]

No. 138.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 26.)*(No. 277.)  
(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, March 24, 1920.

HIGH Commissioners of France, Great Britain and Italy, after examining question of control to be established, according to decisions of Supreme Council, at War Office, Admiralty and Post and Telegraph Offices, are in entire agreement that these controls should be inter-Allied.

British General Headquarters insist, however, that in virtue of orders received from the War Office, the Inter-Allied Control Commissions should work under their control, and under presidency of a British officer.

High Commissioners of France and Italy consider, however, on the other hand that these controls should, under supervision (High Direction) of British General Officer Commanding the Allied Forces in Turkey in Europe, be exercised on a footing of equality by officers belonging to the three Allied nations.

As a solution of this divergent opinion, in order not to delay working of controls by Supreme Council, the three High Commissioners have decided that these controls shall, with immediate effect, and until such time as instructions might be received from their Governments, be exercised *de facto* under conditions required by British General Headquarters. High Commissioners of France and Italy, however, maintained their point of view and make express reservation of question of principle. They declare that their acceptance of this provisional régime is not to be taken as anticipating in any manner the definite solution of the question of working of these controls to be given by Allied Governments.

High Commissioner of Great Britain has taken note of these reservations and of this declaration.



[E 2201/3/44]

No. 139.

*Sir G. Grahame to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 26.)*

(No. 367.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Paris, March 25, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 372 of 22nd March.

His Majesty's Ambassador spoke to President of Council about this on 23rd March, and his Excellency promised to make enquiries. I have to-day ascertained that Ministry for Foreign Affairs have telegraphed to General Gouraud for further particulars, but have not yet received reply, which may not arrive for some time, as Hadjin is some 80 kilom. from Marash. Nearest French troops are at latter place.

[E 2647/56/44]

No. 140.

*Mr. Lindsay to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 26.)*

(No. 231. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Washington, March 25, 1920.*

MY telegram immediately succeeding is text of a note which State Department sent to French Ambassador dated 24th March. Under-Secretary of State asked me not to let French Ambassador know that he had communicated it to me, but I imagine it is being sent to United States Ambassador, London, by mail.

With regard to paragraph about cession to Bulgaria of northern part of Eastern Thrace, Mr. Polk told me confidentially that he thought, if necessary, President might be induced to agree that, in return for this cession, Bulgaria should be required to resign rights assured to her in the international region around Dedeagatch other than some right of transit to Cavalla and Dedeagatch for Bulgarian commerce.

[E 2243/56/44]

No. 141.

*Mr. Lindsay to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 26.)*

(No. 232.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Washington, March 25, 1920.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of note:—

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note of 12th March relative to conferences regarding Peace Treaty with Turkey and present status of negotiations between principal Allied Powers, and in reply inform you that President does not deem it advisable in present circumstances that United States be represented by a plenipotentiary at Conference. The President feels, however, that as this Government is vitally interested in the future peace of the world it should frankly express its views on proposed solutions of the difficult questions connected with the Turkish Treaty. While it is true that United States was not at war with Turkey, yet it was at war with the principal allies of that country and contributed to the defeat of those allies, and therefore to the defeat of Turkish Government. For that reason, too, it is believed that it is the duty of this Government to make known its views and urge a solution which will be both just and lasting.

"The United States understands the strength of the arguments for the retention of the Turks at Constantinople, but believes that the arguments against it are far stronger, and contain certain political elements which it would not seem possible to ignore. It was the oft-expressed intention of the Allies that the anomaly of the Turks in Europe should cease, and it cannot be believed that the feelings of Mahomedan people, who not only witnessed the defeat of Turkish power without protest, but even materially assisted in the defeat, will now so resent the expulsion of the Turkish Government as to make a complete reversal of policy on the part of the Great Powers desirable or necessary.

"As to the line given as southern frontier of Turkey, it is assumed that this boundary is meant to be the ethnological frontier of the Arab people, in which case it is suggested that certain rectifications would seem necessary. If, however, other considerations entered into the choice of this line, this Government, without any

intention to criticise, would appreciate being furnished with the arguments dictating such a choice.

"United States Government note with pleasure that provision is made for Russian representation on International Council which it is proposed shall be established for the government of Constantinople and Straits. This Government is convinced that no arrangement that is now made concerning government and control of Constantinople and Straits can have any elements of permanency, unless the vital interests of Russia in those problems are carefully provided for and protected, and unless it is understood that Russia, when it has a Government recognised by the civilised world, may assert its right to be heard in regard to the decisions now made.

"It is noted with pleasure that the questions of the passage of men-of-war and the régime of the Straits in war-time are still under advisement, as this Government is convinced that no final decision should, or can, be made without the consent of Russia.

"As for Thrace, it would seem right that that part of Eastern Thrace which is outside the zone reserved for Constantinople should become part of the Kingdom of Greece with the exception of northern part of that province. As this, the northern part, is clearly Bulgarian in population, justice and fair dealing demand that cities of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse and surrounding territory should become part of Bulgaria. Not only is the claim of Bulgaria worthy of most serious consideration on ethnic and historical grounds, but it would also seem that Bulgaria is entitled to have its claim to this territory favourably considered, in view of its having been compelled to surrender purely Bulgarian territory and many thousands of Bulgarians on its western boundary on no other grounds than the rather doubtful grounds of securing a strategical frontier for Serbia.

"In connection with proposed preferential right of three great Mediterranean Powers to furnish advisers and instructors in certain zones, this Government feels it is necessary for it to have more information as to the reason and purpose of such a plan before it can express an intelligent opinion.

"There can be no question as to the general interest of this Government in the plans for Armenia, and United States Government is convinced that the civilised world demands and expects most liberal treatment for that unfortunate country. Its boundaries should be drawn in such a way as to recognise all the legitimate claims of the Armenian people, and particularly to give them easy and unencumbered access to the sea. While unaware of the considerations governing the decision reached by Supreme Council, it is felt that special rights over Lazistan would hardly assure to Armenia that access to the sea indispensable to its existence. It is hoped that, taking into consideration fact that Trebizond has always been the terminus of the trade route across Armenia, and that M. Venizelos, on behalf of the Greeks of that region, has expressed their preference for connection with Armenia rather than Turkey, Powers will be willing to grant Trebizond to Armenia.

"In regard to the relinquishment by Turkey of her rights to Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, Syria and the islands, this Government suggests that method resorted to in case of Austria be adopted, namely, that Turkey should place these provinces in the hands of the Great Powers to be disposed of as those Powers determine.

"In regard to arrangements for Smyrna, this Government is not in a position to express an opinion, as the question is too important to be passed [sic] on with limited information this Government has as to the exact arrangement that is contemplated and the reasons for the same.

"United States Government can quite understand the difficulties that present themselves for settlement in connection with this treaty. It is easy to see the problems are complex and fruitful of misunderstandings because of the conflicting interests involved, but this Government has every confidence that the problems will be dealt with in a spirit of fairness and with scrupulous regard for the interests of victor, vanquished and neutral.

"It is evident that there is yet much to be done before a comprehensive plan can be worked out, and this Government will welcome further information on the subject of the economic clauses of treaty. Incidentally, the plan that has apparently been worked out by Supreme Council in connection with the continuation of concessions granted to aliens, and giving the right to revise or cancel concessions on payment of indemnity, referred to in eighth paragraph of your Excellency's note, has grave possibilities and would seem to require careful elucidation.

"Let me say, in conclusion, that it is the understanding of United States Government that, whatever territorial changes or arrangements may be made in former



Ottoman Empire, such changes or arrangements will in no way place American citizens or corporations, or citizens or corporations of any other country, in a less favourable situation than citizens or corporations of any Power party to this treaty—  
BAINBRIDGE COLBY."

[E 1776/11/44]

No. 142.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 254.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, March 26, 1920.*

YOUR despatches No. 211 of 28th January and No. 306 of 2nd March.

The policy at which we are aiming in the Peace Treaty, as far as it has gone, with regard to Kurdistan is neither a single protectorate for England or France, nor a divided protectorate, nor a group of States under European protection, but an autonomous Kurdistan, severed from Turkey, and not even under Turkish suzerainty.

To ascertain whether this is practicable, and how far it would be feasible to reconcile Kurdish interests with those of Armenian or Christian minorities living in their midst, we desire to consult responsible leaders of Kurdish opinion. There is no good in offering a boon to people who do not want it or would be incapable of profiting by it.

Do you recommend invitation to come to London being given to Said Abdul Kadir or other Kurdish spokesmen? Sherif Pasha is already available here if required.

We are addressing similar enquiry affecting Eastern and Southern Kurdistan to Bagdad.

Question is one of urgency, and decision cannot be indefinitely delayed.

In attempted settlement of East, there might be considerable advantage if England were known to be author of such a programme.

[E 2314/3/44]

No. 143.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 27.)*

(No. 372.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 17, 1920.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the Moslem movement in Thrace, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum from the deputies in the Turkish Parliament of the vilayet of Adrianople and the sanjak of Tchataldja.

2. Turkish and Greek feeling are alike worked up to a considerable pitch of excitement by the rumours current as to the intentions of the Peace Conference in regard to Thrace. There is everywhere a state of great nervous tension existing. A state of unrest appears to prevail, more particularly in the region between Keshan and Rodosto, and Constantinople rumours exaggerate the incidents resulting therefrom into regular massacres.

3. The moral drawn by the Greeks from this state of affairs is that the whole country should at once be placed in Greek occupation, a measure which, in my opinion, would more certainly than anything else precipitate a massacre.

4. I am convinced that if Eastern, or indeed Western, Thrace is to be surrendered to Greece, the only satisfactory procedure would be, in the first instance, to occupy the country completely with British or French troops, which should only be withdrawn gradually as and when the Greeks are able to take over effective control.

(Copy to Athens.)

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 143.

*Memorandum communicated by Turkish Deputies.*

Excellence,

*Constantinople, le 25 février 1920.*

LES soussignés, membres du Parlement ottoman des circonscriptions d'Andrinople, Kirk-Klissé, Tekfour-Dagh (Rodosto), Gallipoli et Tchataldja, ont l'honneur d'exposer ce qui suit et prient votre Excellence de vouloir bien le porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

Selon les dernières informations de la presse européenne, les limites désignées pour l'hinterland de Constantinople suivraient la ligne d'Enos-Midia, ou bien, d'après une seconde version, passeraient par Tchataldja, et que, de la sorte, les territoires formant le vilayet d'Andrinople seraient détachés de l'Empire. Nous considérons comme de notre devoir de déclarer que ces nouvelles ont produit la plus vive émotion chez la population musulmane du vilayet d'Andrinople. Votre Excellence ne doit, certes, pas ignorer que la majorité de la population de cette province est musulmane et que les 90 pour cent des propriétés foncières appartiennent à l'élément musulman; en outre, les liens historiques, religieux, culturels, et les nécessités plusieurs fois séculaires, constituent des facteurs unissant d'une façon intime les destinées de cette province à celles de Constantinople et des autres parties de l'Empire ottoman.

La valeur de ces facteurs, aussi puissants que sacrés, s'était manifestée d'une imposante façon, lors de la guerre balkanique, et non seulement les Turcs de l'Empire, mais le monde musulman lui-même avait prouvé par son attitude qu'il ne consentait pas à ce qu'Andrinople et ses dépendances fût arrachée au Khalifat et à l'Empire.

Indépendamment des considérations ci-dessus énumérées, les principes énoncés par le Président Wilson et les déclarations faites par les représentants les plus autorisés des Puissances de l'Entente, au sujet d'une paix durable, plaident singulièrement en faveur du rattachement, comme par le passé, de cette province à l'Empire ottoman.

Toute autre solution, et, notamment, celle qui préconiserait l'attribution de ce territoire essentiellement turc à une Puissance étrangère, confirmerait chez la population musulmane une conviction qu'elle s'est faite, comme quoi cette domination équivaldrait pour elle à un arrêt de mort sans grâce. Cette conviction est malheureusement née à la suite des atrocités et des traitements inouïs que les musulmans de la Roumélie ont eu à endurer pendant la campagne balkanique de la part des nations limitrophes. Aussi, au cas d'une telle perspective, ils se voient acculés à des actes de désespoir pour sauvegarder ne fût-ce que leur honneur et celui des leurs.

La population du vilayet d'Andrinople, excédée par tant de rudes épreuves, n'aspire qu'à une vie de paix et de calme, et l'attitude qu'elle a adoptée devant les crimes et violations de toutes sortes commis sur elle par les troupes hellènes, cantonnées, le lendemain de l'armistice, le long de la voie ferrée, et ceux commis par la population grecque excitée par lesdites troupes—attitude qui ne peut qu'être traduite par l'expression de "patience stoïque"—témoigne suffisamment des intentions pures de ladite population pour bénéficier d'une décision équitable réglant le sort de son pays.

Aussi, refusant tout crédit aux nouvelles en question, mais vu les perspectives graves qu'elle appréhende, la population en question sent comme une nécessité vitale de protester d'ores et déjà contre telle éventualité.

Les musulmans d'Andrinople, forts de leurs droits et confiants en l'esprit d'équité et de justice du Congrès de la Paix, ont la ferme assurance—assurance, du reste, partagée par ses représentants—que le Grand Aréopage prendra en sérieuse considération les raisons émises et qu'il évitera, de la sorte, les incidents regrettables dont la répercussion se ferait sentir aux Balkans et dans le Proche-Orient et dont l'écho se propagerait probablement plus loin; ils attendent donc avec calme les décisions justes apportant un démenti de fait aux nouvelles et insinuations diverses.

Veuillez agréer, &amp;c.

Députés d'Andrinople:

FAIT.

G. BAKLIAR.

Députés de Rodosto:

S. FAIK.

H. RAHMI.

Députés de Kirk-Klissé:

MOUSTAFA ARIF.  
BEHAEDDIN.

Députés de Gallipoli:

DJEVAL VOUR  
CHAKIR.

Député de Tchataldja:

HAIREDDINE.



[E 2327/3/44]

No. 144.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 27.)*

(No. 285.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, March 25, 1920.*

TELEGRAPHIC reports have been received here in last few days to the effect that Turkish peace has again been postponed.

It is reported *inter alia* that United States Government are once more taking the lead and that President Wilson insists on expulsion of Turks from Constantinople.

I desire to represent most strongly inadvisability of further delays. It is not too much to say that Allies may thereby lose advantage of recent *coup* in the same way as they lost chance of painlessly imposing victorious peace during first few months of armistice.

Occupation of Constantinople has so far constituted success exceeding anticipations. I do not wish to exaggerate this success prematurely, but without being a knock-out blow it has been severe blow for the nationalist movement. All indications from provinces up till now point to hesitancy on part of leaders and unreadiness in taking up our challenge and to encouragement of more conservative elements. The former is most certainly due to surprise, divided councils and consciousness of present inability to oppose effectively force of Allies.

Now therefore is the favourable moment to present terms of peace. If they are as drastic or nearly so as those indicated in your telegram No. 187 of 6th March trouble in interior [group undecipherable] necessity for employing force cannot be avoided, even supposing any Government here could be induced to sign treaty or Parliament to ratify it. Such trouble, however, would proceed from movement temporarily disorganised and disheartened, whereas further delay will permit of organisers to revive *moral* of followers and again to consolidate movement, and this may greatly be facilitated by developments in Southern Russia, Caucasus, Syria, and Mesopotamia.

If peace terms were appreciably less drastic than those above indicated, it might even now be possible to pursue policy of *bloc* round Sultan composed of elements ready to accept them rather than risk complete ruin likely to result from further armed struggle with Allies.

In that alternative likewise early decision is undesirable [*sic*] and my colleague and I should receive earliest possible intimation of probable terms in order to be in a position to seize opportunity now offered of creating suggested *bloc*.

Present position is that we have taken sides in contest between Extreme Nationalists and Moderates by declaring that we regard attitude of former as definitely hostile, and by stating that it was that attitude which compelled us to occupy Constantinople. We have not, however, any positive basis on which to found policy of collaboration with Moderates.

Prospect of tolerable peace terms would supply positive basis in question. If Supreme Council authorised High Commissioners to hold out such prospect we could oust present Turkish Government, which is still in sympathy with Nationalists and useless if not positively a danger to us, and replace it by a Government prepared to collaborate with Allies. The Sultan could without difficulty be brought to abandon present attitude of indecision, and some statesman like Ferid or Reshid Bey would become Grand Vizier more or less under Allied auspices.

I have indicated in previous telegrams what constitutes tolerable peace in Turkish eyes. Most essential features at present time are to give satisfaction to Turks in regard to Smyrna and Adrianople.

I solicit such information as can be given regarding present trend of negotiations and expression of your Lordship's views on points raised above, especially question of abandoning negative attitude in the matter of Turkish Government.

[E 2342/289/44]

No. 145.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 27.)*

(No. 290.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, March 26, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 149 of 21st February.

In addition to objections pointed out in my telegram No. 180 of 2nd March it would be a great mistake to appoint Turkish judges in proposed Mixed Courts for longer period than five years at a time.

It is important to retain power to change these judges if necessary.

My French colleague has telegraphed to Paris in this sense.

[E 2322/37/44]

No. 146.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 28.)*

(No. 295.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, March 27, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 258 of 20th March.

Undermentioned Turkish undesirables have also been arrested and sent to Malta:—

1. Djelal Nowri Bey.
2. General Ali Said.
3. Ebuziazade Velid Bey.
4. Suleiman Nazif Bey.

[E 2378/47/44]

No. 147.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 29.)*

Sir,

*Aden, March 10, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of letter, dated the 10th March, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 147.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Lord Allenby,

*Aden, March 10, 1920.*

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 28th February, 1920:—

*Tihama.*

From the reports received from Hodeida during this week, Jabel Bura appears to have been reoccupied by the Idrisi. There are, however, conflicting reports about Riqab, the imam's headquarters on Jabel Bura. It was reported to have been captured on the 18th February, but a later report states that it is besieged by the Quhras.

A large imamic force is said to have attacked Jabel Dahir and recaptured all the villages, driving away the Idrisi force to the base of the mountain.

The disposition of the Idrisi-Quhra combination on the Quhra border as given in one of the reports is as follows:—

Sheikh Abu Hadi (the Quhra head sheikh) with his men is stationed at Ain, Sheikh Yehia Ali Muzeria at Shutaba, Omer Sagheer at Attai, Sheikh Ismail Baghawi at Obal, Sheikh Abdullah Mujaikar in the vicinity of Beni Saad, and Sheikh Khuzam at Beni Hamadi.

[4370]

2 L 2



The people of Reima are reported to have revolted against the imam.

On the 17th February a party of the imam's men raided and partially burnt Sheikh Abu Hadi's village, Ain (three hours from Bajil), retiring after looting the place. Turks formed a strong leaven in this party.

The Idrisi is said to have lately sent one big and three small guns to Bajil and Jabel Milhan. Reinforcements of Idrisi troops continually arriving at Zaidiya are sent on to Milhan, Dahir and Bajil.

According to a report from Zabeed, the occupation of Dala by the imam is regarded as a great victory against the Christians [*sic*], who are said to have retreated from Dala. The news was published by beat of drums in Zabeed, the place being illuminated and salutes fired. The imam's amil in Zabeed was also informed by telegraph of other alleged victories won against the Idrisi.

The reason for this kind of propaganda on the part of the imam is obvious. The acclamation of the Idrisi by Tihama tribes and his successful advance everywhere have naturally annoyed the imam, and he can do no better than feed the people with news of imaginary victories. He is said to have sent letters to all the sheikhs and saivids in the Tihama denouncing the Idrisi, who, as our ally, is considered an enemy of Islam who is bent upon shedding the blood of the Moslems. The imam offers the sheikhs and saivids assistance in men, arms and ammunition if they forsake the Idrisi.

Saivid Ahmed-al-Ambari, referred to in my last letter, is reported to have circularised the people of Zabeed saying that, through the medium of France, the Turks and Sharif Faisal have concluded peace, and that the former will shortly return overland to the Yemen. The notification eulogises the imam, who has stood firmly by his alliance with the Turks up to now, and admonishes the people who are friendly with us and the Idrisi. The notification ends with the good news of the capture of three English provinces by Anwer Pasha.

#### Yemen.

Nasir Mabkhut, the friend of the Idrisi, is said to have completed the conquest of Hajja, and has approached Kaukaban. He has occupied Jabel Naisa, 35 miles west-south-west of Sudah, the imam's stronghold, and Afar, 10 miles north-east of Hajja.

#### Asir.

Captain Fazluddin arrived here on the 29th February. The report mentioned in my last letter about the occupation of the kaza of Thamir, &c., by the King of the Hedjaz appears to be groundless.

I am sending by this mail copies of Captain Fazluddin's diary, dated the 24th February, 1920, from which it appears that the Idrisi has now decided on his policy in the Tihama. He has occupied Jabel Bura, on account of its strategical position, to ensure the safety of the Quhra territory, but he has stopped any further advance with Jabel Reima, and in fact all other hilly districts, as a matter of definite policy. He does not intend to advance beyond Zabeed nor beyond Hujjaila on the Quhra border. In a confidential letter he has addressed to his commander at Bajil, Sheikh Tahir-bin-Radwan, the Idrisi reminds him that the main objects of his deputation were threefold, viz:—

1. To establish good government in the place of anarchy.
2. To act as the protector of the lives, property and religion of the Shafite Tihama, who had appealed to him so incessantly and anxiously against the Zeidi ravages.
3. To defend the country of the Quhra, whom he had pledged his word to defend (as a condition of the release of the British Mission) against the Zeidi advance in their country.

The Idrisi has also given Sheikh Nasir Mabkhut clearly to understand that the Hajjah affair is entirely his own, though he will continue to give assistance in money and ammunition as far as in his power.

#### Aden Protectorate.

There has been no further imamic advance since the date of my last letter, though a report from Upper Yafa states that a reinforcement of 600 Zeidis, with four guns and other material, has arrived at Kataba, destined for Lahej. Another report says that a large force is being collected to go to the Haushabi country.

The Alawi sheikh is still with the Zeidis, as also the Al Bakri sheikh, Saleh Asad. The Kotaibi sheikh has not gone over, though communications are said to be passing between him and the imam's representative. His nephew, Mokbil Abdulla, who had fled to the Haushabi country, has since returned and gone to the Zeidis.

The Alawi sheikh's son has written a letter informing me of his father's detention by the Zeidis, and complaining of our indifference to our obligation to protect the Alawis, as we are bound to do under the terms of their treaty with us.

The Upper and Lower Yafais are stated to have posted about 1,200 men along their borders. Our Upper Yafa correspondent writes that the people of Halmin, which has been occupied by the Zeidis, have removed their live-stock to the Yafai territory. Whilst they were doing so, they were pursued by the Zeidis, but the Yafais on the border fired on them and forced them to retire.

The number of the Zeidis within the protectorate is estimated at 1,400.

Later news states that the Alawi sheikh's brother and others, who returned from the Zeidis at Dobab, have brought news that 100 Zeidis have been told off to the Alawi country, and that they would arrive on Monday, the 8th instant. The Alawi's brother has warned the Alawi people not to object to the Zeidis coming into their territory, because the Alawi sheikh personally has come to an understanding with the imam's amil at Dobab.

About two-thirds of the Koteibis are said to have capitulated. The Koteibi sheikh and the rest of the Koteibis have refused to do so. The Koteibi sheikh with the sheikhs of Hajili and Ibdali have gone to the Yafais to enlist their help.

The Alawi sheikh when he went to meet the imam's amil took with him 150 dollars, half maund of tobacco, one bag of gingily seed, &c., as presents to the amil.

The arrival of a reinforcement of 400 Zeidis at Dala is reported. Their ultimate destination is said to be Musemir in the Haushabi territory. There are rumours that the Zeidis contemplate an attack on the British camp at Nobat Dakim after they have occupied Musemir.

The Haushabi Sultan writes that since he has returned from Aden he has been receiving continual messages from the Zeidis asking him to come and see the imam's hakim at Mawia. The Haushabi has sent to me a letter he has received from the officer commanding imam's troops at Taiz, in which, after the usual disparaging remarks against the Christians and infidels, he is invited to go and see the hakim at Mawia, and warned against failure. The Haushabi is asking for our troops. I have told him not to go to the hakim, and to resist any aggression of the Zeidis as far as possible, and to fall back on Nobat Dakim if he finds himself unable to resist.

The Mausatta naqibs referred to in last letter, asked for British troops to assist them in repelling the Zeidis, and for British assistance in organising their army. I have made them a present of ammunition, and contemplate sending an Indian officer into the Yafai country to interview the heads of clans and see the country. On receiving his report I will be able to determine what further action, if any, we should take to support Yafai resistance.

In my letter of the 12th February last I reported the account given by Shereef Nasr-bin-Shokr, the King of the Hedjaz's envoy, of the imam's motives in occupying Dala. Amir Nasir has now produced two letters (dated the 29th August and the 1st November, 1918) from the imam, which confirm the imam's statement about the Amir's complaint to him *re* ill-treatment by the Turkish kaïmakam at Dala. These letters further go to show that the relations of the Amir and the imam at that time were those of ruler and subject.

#### Miscellaneous.

Lieutenant-Colonel Saleh Bey, who arrived here from Hodeida last month for repatriation, and left for Suez on the 21st idem, was interviewed during his stay here. The following are the notes of interview:—

Lieutenant-Colonel Saleh Bey arrived at Hodeida from Sana on the 3rd February. As major, he commanded the 3/119 in the 7th Army Corps. He served in the Lahej Expeditionary Force under General Ali Saeed Pasha, and was in command of Lahej for two years and seven months. He commanded at Wahat for four months, and at Subar for one month. He was recalled to Sana in May 1918 by Tewfiq Pasha in connection with the examination of regimental accounts, and was at the capital when the armistice with Turkey was signed.

Lieutenant-Colonel Saleh Bey was prevented from leaving the Yemen with the other Turks owing to illness. He produced a certificate from the principal medical



officer of the Yemen Army Corps, Colonel Aziz Bey, recommending that he should remain behind in Sana for treatment.

He was not actually employed by the imam since the Turkish evacuation, but was granted an allowance of 13 dollars monthly for subsistence.

His health has been very indifferent throughout, and he has now obtained permission from the imam to leave the country.

Saleh Bey left Sana on the 20th January. He described the general situation in the Yemen as restless and uncertain, owing to Syyed Idrisi's activity in the Tibama and on the imam's frontiers. He reports friction between the imam and the Hashid tribesmen, owing to the former demanding heavy taxes and paying very poor subsidies to the sheikhs. Nasir Mabkhut-el-Ahmar is popularly believed to be in favour of the Idrisi, but Saleh Bey thinks he should be reckoned as an uncertain factor.

The Hamdan, Bilad Bustan, Beni Matar, Khoulun, and the Beni Hubheish, but chiefly the latter, are providing the imam with troops for service in various parts of the country.

There are 1,500 trained Zeidi soldiers stationed in Sana.

Between 200 and 300 men arrive at the capital daily from the surrounding districts, and are immediately despatched to replace or reinforce the troops stationed in the Taiz or Zabid areas.

Shereef Abdulla-ed-Dumain is the imam's principal commander. He is at present at Jabel Milhan.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kinaan Bey is the Chief of the Staff at Sana, but is acting as commander-in-chief during the Shereef Abdulla's absence. Lieutenant-Colonel Mahmood Bey, a gunner officer, who used to be at Lahej and Taiz during the war, is commandant of artillery.

The other principal Turkish officers at Sana include—

1. Lieutenant-Colonel Rifaat Bey of the 17th regiment, who was group commandant at Subar under Saeed Pasha. He is in the service of the imam.
2. Lieutenant-Colonel Sabit Bey (veterinary surgeon) whose services were placed at the disposal of the imam by General Tewtiq Pasha.
3. Colonel Aziz Bey, principal medical officer, Yemen Army Corps, now in the imam's service.
4. Lieutenant-Colonel Suleiman Bey, formerly medical officer at Sada, now in the imam's service.
5. Lieutenant-Colonel (Dr.) Hasan Bey, who was formerly at Lahej, and now working under the imam.
6. Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Rohi Bey, formerly commanding at Sada, but is not employed at present.
7. Lieutenant-Colonel Fezi Bey. Is sick and unemployed.
8. Lieutenant-Colonel Mahomed Ali. Is employed. He remained behind owing to domestic affairs.
9. Major Yussuf Bey. Was formerly transport officer at Lahej. He was left behind to look after the records of the army corps.
10. Colonel Ibrahim Bey. Is a retired officer, but was Chief of the Intendance during the war. Is unemployed.
11. Hussain Pasha. Retired and unemployed by imam.
12. Major Suleiman Bey. Is in the imam's army and at present directing operations in the Beni Saad region. Was at Sada during the war.
13. Major Ali Effendi. Was at Sada formerly, but is now serving under the imam.
14. Major Mahomed Agha. Attached to the imam's forces. Was a captain in the 2/120 at Lahej.

*Civil Administration*—Syed Zaid is the principal Islamic judge at the capital. The other judges include the Kadi Syed Ahmed-el-Kibsi and Syed Abdulla.

The ex-Turkish judges Asaad Bey and Mahomed Amin Bey are on the Appeal Bench.

The imam's most trusted advisers are Abdulla-el-Amri and Syed Abdulla Ibrahim.

Syed Hussain Abdulkadir is amil at Sana and president of the municipality.

Mahmud Nadhim Bey is not in favour just at present. He is blamed by the imam for the situation in the Tibama.

Raghib Bey, ex-Turkish Governor of Hodeida, is making mischief up at Sana as usual, and is misleading the imam.

*Economic*.—Rain has been scarce, but is said to have fallen since Lieutenant-Colonel Saleh Bey's departure from Sana. Grain and food generally are nevertheless cheap and plentiful.

Foreign supplies such as rice, sugar, kerosene, &c., are still expensive, but are obtainable.

*Taiz Intelligence*.—Saleh Bey knew of no particular concentration, but estimates the imamic forces at between 2,000 and 3,000 men distributed between Taiz, Ibb, Jebel Sabar, Jebel Hubeish, and Mawia.

The Kadi Abdurrahman and Syed Ahmed Pasha of Taiz are in Sana on a visit.

The imam's representative in the Taiz area is Amil-ibn-el-Wazir.

*Suk-el-Khamis*.—Nothing particular to report. The amil is Syed Mahomed-bin-Ahmed-el-Kibsi.

*Menakha*.—The amil is Syed Ali-el-Akwa. The tribesmen are being called out for service in the Tibama against the Idrisi.

*Lahej*.—This place recently fell into the hands of the Syed Idrisi, but was reported to have been retaken on behalf of the imam by Sheikh-ibn-Shaiban, whilst Saleh Bey was in Bajil.

The latter is the son of the former Sheikh of Hajjah, who was imprisoned at Shahara about two months ago for misappropriating the revenues of the place.

*Hajaila*.—Saleh Bey was here on the 23rd January. Abiulla Hamza was the amil. Sheikh Mahomed Ahmed Mashoor (Quhra) was at Menakha on business.

Saleh Bey saw neither imamic nor Idrisi troops here, but the Zeidis were expected in a few days.

*Ubal*.—On the 24th January this place was in the occupation of the Syed Idrisi. Sheikh Ismail Baghawi, with about fifty Quhra tribesmen, was in charge. The same day, about an hour or so prior to Saleh Bey's arrival, Sheikh Mahomed Zaid of Jebel Izzan (Quhra) with a mixed Quhra and Idrissian force 400 strong had left for Jebel Bura.

*Buha*.—When passing through the village on the night of the 24th January, Saleh Bey saw 200 Idrissian troops, who were stationed there. The men had been drawn from the Waydat and Beni Jama tribes.

*Bajil*.—Saleh Bey reached this on the 25th January, but was detained for seven days under suspicion by the Idrissian representative, Sheikh Mahomed Tahir Radwani. A Syrian merchant, Arif Khirsa, and an ex-Turkish kaimakam, Khalil Bey, who accompanied Saleh Bey, were arrested, as they were suspected as being imamic agents.

Saleh Bey was ultimately allowed to proceed to Hodeida at the intervention of Syed Abdul Kadir, but his two companions were detained (since released).

There are between 150 and 200 Idrissian soldiers at Bajil under Sherif Mansur. The men belong to the Sulail, Waydat and Beni Jama tribes.

Sheikh Abu Hadi was at the Idrisi's headquarters, where he had been summoned for the purpose of making arrangements for the complete occupation of the Quhra territory by the Idrisi.

*Jebel Bura*.—Fighting is in progress, but the Quhra were meeting with a stout resistance from the Zeidis. The imam has 400 soldiers and two old mountain guns in Jebel Bura, but strong reinforcements and a Mantelli gun are reported to have reached there from Menakha since Saleh Bey's arrival in Hodeida. No Turkish troops or gunners were being employed in the operations in this district.

*Jebel Reima*. No operations have taken place as yet, but the Idrisi is bent on occupying both Bura and Reima, in order to cut off the Zeidi retreat and facilitate his advance against Zabeed.

There are about 500 Zeidi soldiers in Jebel Reima under the Imamic Makdami, Abu Manassar.

*Jebel Milhan*.—No fighting has been reported from this region, since its recapture from the Idrisi by the Zeidis.

*Beni Saad*.—Everything is quiet here, and the place is under imamic occupation as usual.

*Jebel Haffash*.—Saleh Bey had no news, but believed it was still in the hands of the imam.

*Zabeed*.—Half the inhabitants, led by Syed Ahmed-el-Ambar, are in favour of the imam, while the remainder, under Abdulla Mubarak, desire to be placed under the Idrisi's protection.

*Zaraniks*.—Saleh Bey describes the attitude of the sheikhs and tribesmen as uncertain and unreliable.

*Aboos*.—He had no news of the Absyia country. He heard that Sheikh Suleiman



Bukheit and Sahl Ali, who had been under detention at Bajil for some time, had been liberated recently by the Idrissian representative there.

*Hodeida.*—Lieutenant-Colonel Saleh Bey arrived on the 3rd February. He learnt that on the day following his departure from Bajil, Sheikh Mahomed Tahir and Sheikh Khuzam of the Khadaryia had left for Buha.

He observed that the Idrissian representative and the Mansab of Marawa, Syyed Abdul Kadir, were not on good terms, and that friction had arisen owing to the high customs duties being levied on imports into and goods passing through the Quhra territory.

A customs official was stationed at Kidf Bura, about 4 miles outside Hodeida, to watch the traffic to and from that place and collect dues on account of the Idrisi.

Yussuf Hasan, ex-Turkish Kaimakam of Zabeed, was at Bajil acting as political officer on behalf of the Idrisi and was advising on the administration of that town. It is said that he was making arrangements for Syyed Idrisi's advance Zabeedwards.

Saleh Bey reports that grain in the Tihama (Hajaila-Hodeida route) was not very plentiful, and that prices were still high.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 2430/3/44]

No. 148.

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.*—(Received March 29.)

(No. 377.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Paris, March 29, 1920.

MY telegram No. 367 of 25th March.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day tell me that they have received information from Beirut showing that situation at Hadjin is disquieting and Turks maintain a most threatening attitude towards Armenians. As it is not feasible to send French troops there French High Commissioner at Constantinople has been instructed by telegraph to insist on Turkish Government taking all necessary measures to protect Armenians and inform them that if they do not do so French Government will hold them responsible for anything that may occur.

[E 2488/3/44]

No. 149.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.*—(Received March 30.)

(No. 299.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, March 29, 1920.

IT is reported that summonses have been issued for a National Council, composed of five members elected from each sandjak to meet at Angora about 3rd April. Elections will be held under supervision of so-called Committee of National Defence.

[E 2327/3/44]

No. 150.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 260.) D.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, March 30, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 285 of 25th March.

Please do not imagine that there is any unnecessary or avoidable delay in proceeding with Peace Treaty. Conference has been sitting daily for nearly seven weeks and has accomplished an immense amount of work, which you do not perhaps sufficiently realise. Remaining stages will require another three weeks and a further meeting of the Conference abroad.

The final terms will depend to some extent upon ability of Allies to enforce them, and this cannot be determined until final military advice has been given.

It is not possible at present to hold out any such prospect to Turkish Government as you indicate, nor is it clear that, even if offered, it would make a vital difference at the end.

[E 2540/47/44]

No. 151.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.*—(Received March 31.)

My Lord,

Aden, March 18, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 18th March, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 151.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

Aden, March 18, 1920.

My dear Field-Marshal,

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 10th March, 1920 :—

*Tihama.*

The Political Officer, Hodeida, telegraphed on the 8th instant that an imamic force had captured Obal on the Quhra frontier, and that it was moving on Jabel Bura to relieve the besieged party there.

Subsequently, heavy fighting was reported on the Mathalli plain between Obal and Bohib, near Duirsalem. Shortage of ammunition among the Quhras, who lost sixteen boxes of ammunition at Obal, it was thought, might lead to decisive results and to the fall of Bajil, which the people were already leaving for Dahi and Manaira.

From the latest telegram it appears, however, that the Idrisi and the Quhras have recaptured Obal, and that the Zeidis have retreated to Jabel Safan. The imamic force which took part in this fighting consisted of 800 regulars and 1,400 tribesmen, the Idrisi force consisting of 500 Idrisi men and 5,000 Quhra tribesmen. The number of the Quhras is apparently an exaggeration.

Syyed Abdul Kadir is reported to be still in Marawa. He has refused to go to Bajil in spite of the repeated requests received from the Idrisi representative there.

Showkat Bey, a native of Bagdad, who has been in the Turkish Civil Service in the Yemen for about twenty years, arrived at Hodeida from Bajil lately. He was quite recently employed by the imam at Hujjaila and Jabel Safan. He reports having seen a communication (date not known) in Abu Hadi's hands from the imam and Mahmud Nadhim, which was addressed to Syed Abdul Kadir and the other syeds and tribesmen of the Tihama. It stated that the imam had no desire to cause bloodshed amongst the Muslims, and that he intended to suspend operations against the Tihama tribesmen. The imam proposed to appoint Syed Abdul Kadir ruler of the whole of the Tihama and to assist him with guns, ammunition and money in the administration of the country, on condition that the inhabitants would abandon the Idrisi, who at one time fought against the Turks, who are also Muslims.

The imam undertakes, in case the local inhabitants expel the Idrisi from their country, not to exact taxes from the people of the Tihama, including tithes and the "fitra" or Ramadan levy, and also octroi dues and customs duties. He only expects their assistance in turning out the Idrisi and also the Christians from Hodeida.

The imam, moreover, promises not to appoint Zeidi amils in the Tihama, which will be under the full and independent control of Syed Abdul Kadir.

*Yemen (Upper and Lower).*

Syed Ahmed-ibn-Mahomed Sharafuddin, who lately accompanied his aunt, the widow of a Turkish officer, to Aden, considers the state of Sana and the Yemen highlands to be far worse and more unsettled than it was in the time of the Turks, and describes the condition of the tribesmen as deplorable. He thinks that Mahmud Nadhim has not the same influence with the imam as formerly.

Syed Ahmed estimated the regular garrison of the capital at 1,000 men. According to him the imam's most trusted advisers are Abdulla-el-Amri and Syed Abdulla-bin-Ibrahim.

[4370]

2 M



Sheikh Abdulla-bin Ali Baham, a petty sheikh of El Uzla in Yerim, came into Aden lately. He states that he had fled from the imam's oppression, and has come in to seek British protection, and incidentally to receive of His Majesty's Government's generosity. I understand that he is in search of a monthly stipend too.

The sheikh says that he can muster 1,000 men armed with rifles, and has a certain amount of ammunition but no money for the upkeep of his men. He asks for armed intervention on our part. His complaint against the imam is that the latter is demanding exorbitant taxes. The sheikh was called upon to raise troops in his district for service against the Idrisi or in the Yafa country, but he declined to respond. He is afraid that the imam will not take action against him.

This sheikh does not appear to be a man of any importance or influence. Being dissatisfied, like the rest of the province, with imamic rule, he has come here to enlist our sympathy and assistance on behalf of his clan, and at the same time to see what he can get out of us for himself.

Sheikh Abdul Wahab, the kaimakam of Hujjaryia, has sent a letter to our principal intelligence agent, Farah Saeed. The letter is intended for communication to us. The sheikh complains of having addressed us on several occasions in the past but without result. He mentions that he is living in hopes that we will come to the salvation of his country. He hints that if we have any intention of making a forward move in the Taiz direction he is ready to assist and co-operate with us. In such case he expects us to send him an official letter. He adds that there is a movement in Sana against the imam, and that internal dissensions in his camps in the highlands are increasing, and many sections of the Zeidis are ready and watching an opportunity to overthrow his power and free the country from his presence.

I have sent him a polite reply. As his country is outside our protectorate we can do nothing for him.

The Sheikh of Khokha, Mahomed Ali Othman, has sent me a letter stating that the sheikhs, akils, and notable men of the district of Zabid and its dependencies came to him complaining against the imamic government and their harsh treatment. Sheikh Ali Othman therefore gave the Zabid gentry an undertaking to the effect that he would ask for 400 British soldiers, with one officer, two or three guns, and also a quantity of arms and ammunition for arming the tribesmen.

The sheikh also got all the Zabid sheikhs, &c., to sign an agreement under which they consider themselves unitedly under the protection of the British Government. The sheikh asks for a reply, as, failing our assistance, he adds, he will have to address the Italian Government.

I doubt if all that is written in this letter is true. At any rate most of it is fiction. He is the Amil of Mokha under the imam. He came to Aden several times during the war to take supplies, and he is anxious to come under our protection. His threat to go to the Italians for help is to my mind a mere bluff, but he is quite capable of writing to them, as the Italians had something to do with him during the last Turco-Italian war. But so far as his preference of us is concerned, he would infinitely rather be under our flag than under the Italian.

Our secret agent, who returned from Taiz on the 4th instant, reported that this sheikh (Mahomed Ali Othman) was called to Sana, and had already proceeded there. He was apparently called in connection with the complaint of the people of Mokha against his oppression, which is described as being worse than that of the imam's Zeidi representatives. His letter to me is dated the 7th March, and was evidently written after his return from Sana.

Mulazim Mahmood Afandi Amin, a Turk, who lately arrived at Nobat Dakim en route to Aden, stated that no Turks can leave the Yemen without the previous sanction of the imam.

As regards the internal state of the Yemen, the Turk said that the people were oppressed by the imam's soldiers, who fleeced them. He ascribed this to the men (including their commanders) being poorly paid. The result was they extorted money from the people. The people who suffered more at their hands were the Shafais, but they were helpless, as they had no one to look into their grievances. The Turks, who were at first resolved to settle in the Yemen on account of their intermarriages with Arabs, are now sick of the place and leaving. Mulazim Mahmood is positive that if we were only to advance as far as Mavia, actual fighting would be done by the Arabs themselves. They are, indeed, praying for the advent of the British into the Yemen. Mulazim Mahmood advised that no stories of the imam's intention to attack the British camp should be believed. He said that the Zeidis were afraid of the British.

#### Aden Protectorate.

Conflicting reports continue to come in regarding the Zeidi intention to attack our camp at Nobat Dakim. No extraordinary activity on the part of the Zeidis is, however, reported.

The Haushabi Sultan continues to send in alarming reports of the Zeidi movements on his border. The Zeidis have been sending him messages continually, but so far they have not actually entered his territory.

The Haushabi has sent in a letter addressed to him by the imam's commander in Mavia enclosing copy of a letter from the commander at Dala in which the latter requests permission of the former to proceed against the Haushabi. The Mavia commander warns the Haushabi that, unless he comes and sees him, he will be attacked.

#### Miscellaneous.

Captain Jaudat Effendi, who arrived here on the 3rd instant from Taiz via Mavia for repatriation, was interviewed. The following are the notes of interview:—

Captain Jaudat formerly belonged to the 2/119 of the Yemen Army Corps, and was stationed at Menakha. Early in 1914 he was appointed to command a "Milli" battalion of Shafa'i Arabs at Taiz.

In May 1915 he accompanied General Saeed Pasha with the Lahej Expeditionary Force. On the occupation of Lahej, he was attached to headquarters as Arabic interpreter, and was frequently despatched to the Fadli, Yafai and Subehi districts on various missions.

He was at Taiz on leave when the armistice with Turkey was signed. On being recalled to Lahej, he refused to proceed, as he learnt that one of the terms of the armistice demanded the evacuation of Syria by the Turks.

Jaudat Bey is a Syrian and a native of Nablus.

Later he was summoned to Sana by General Tewfiq Pasha and Mahmud Nadhim Bey, but declined to have anything further to do with the Turks, as it was generally believed that Syria would be freed from Ottoman suzerainty.

For the same reason he refused to be evacuated with the other Turks from the Yemen, and decided to remain on at Taiz till the treaty with Turkey was signed, when he intended to return to his native land.

In October last year Syyed Kasim-el-Izzi was sent by the imam on a mission to the Taiz district. He called on Jaudat Bey with a view to inducing him to enter the imam's service, but met with no success.

Taiz.—The amil is Syyed Ahmed Pasha, who, with Naib Abdurrahman Effendi and Kadi Abdul Aziz, notables of that town, is in Sana at present, on an important visit.

The makdami, or imamic military commander, is Syyed Ali-ibn-el-Wazir, who has a force of about 5,000 Zeidis under him in the whole district, twelve guns, and seven Maxims.

2,500 men with Syyed Ali are in Taiz itself. 500 men under Sheikh Abdul Wahab and Mahomed Ahmed Noman left on the 24th February for Hujjaryia en route to Mufailis. It is hoped to strengthen this force with about another 2,000 Shafais from the adjacent districts, and to utilise it in the contemplated attack on Lahej. It is expected that this army will operate from the direction of E. Farsha.

Jaudat Bey informed that Syyed Ali intended to descend on Lahej very shortly via Mavia, and that he is waiting a consignment of flour from Yerim. Further, that Ali-el-Mikdad, with another Zeidi contingent, will come down to join Syyed Ali's forces. Jaudat Bey was offered a salary of 300 dollars a month for his services with the expeditionary force referred to.

There are at present 500 Zeidis at Mavia, under Syyed Ha an-el-Warith of Damar.

The remainder of the Taiz army is distributed as follows:—

500 men at Uddain, under Makdami Abdulla Saeed-el-Jabri; 700 at Ibb, under Syyed Muttahar (a brother of Syyed Mahomed-ibn-el-Hadi, commonly known as Abu Naib); and 300 at Makbana, in the direction of El Uraish.

The guns at Taiz consist of:—

Four mantels, three of which were recently recovered from Ali Othman, and the fourth from Hujjaryia.



Two howitzers, 12.5 cm., that were formerly at Mavia with Sheikh Mahomed Nasir Muqbil.

Four Q.F. mountain guns; two of these were brought from Mavia, where they were with Nasir Muqbil, and the other two came down from Sana with the Makdami Syeed Ali last September.

Two ordinary mountain guns. These were brought down from Sana.

Three of the seven Maxims had been recovered from Ali Othman of Mokha, and two from Sheikh Mahomed Nasir of Mavia; the remaining two came from Sana.

The imam has the following quantities of ammunition at Taiz:—

400 cases of Mauser ammunition, 262 of which had been surrendered by the Turks on evacuation and the remainder obtained from Mahomed Nasir and Ali Othman.

300 cases of big gun ammunition, of which 200 had been obtained from the Turks and 100 cases from Ali Othman.

The Turks under Syeed Ali at Taiz consist of Lieutenant Saleh Effendi (lately of the 1/119), Captain of Artillery Allahudin (described by Jaudat Effendi as a useless officer) and Zaid Agha, a Hashid Arab who served in the Turkish gendarmerie. It is possible other Turks may be sent down from Sana to join the force.

There are neither Turks nor guns with the force in Hujjaryia or Mavia.

The other Turkish officers now resident in Taiz are Captain Mahomed Ali Effendi Sharamanda, Ibrahim Effendi, formerly mudir at Dhi Sufal, Hamdi Effendi, who was a professor in the military school, and two other civilians named Anwar and Sidki.

All the above Turks are desirous of coming in to Aden, but are waiting news as regards the treatment they may expect on arrival here, as certain mischievous persons have been circulating very unfavourable reports concerning prisoners of war.

Jaudat Bey stated that the imam was bent on conquering the hinterland, and was preparing his armies for the attack on Lahej, which he expected would take place very shortly, i.e., within the next fortnight, if not before. He states he warned the officer commanding Tiban column against a surprise attack by the Zeidis, which would most probably occur at night.

The imamic makdami has summoned Ali Mana of the Haushabi to Taiz, but up to the 1st March he had not left, and was still at Museimir.

Sheikh Mohamed Nasir Muqbil and his secretary, Mahomed Abdoo Salam, arrived in Taiz on the 22nd February. It would appear that the latter was responsible for the Zeidi occupation of the Mavia and surrounding districts.

Sheikh Kayid-bin-Sala of Mavia is also at Taiz, and has gone there in connection with some dispute he has had with his uncle, Mahomed Nasir Muqbil.

Ibb.—The following officers are stationed here:—

Lieutenant-Colonel Rafiq Bey, inspector of imamic troops.

Lieutenant Mahmud Effendi.

Lieutenant Idris Effendi.

Mokha.—There are no troops posted here, the nearest imamic garrison being at Makbana.

Dala.—The Zeidis are commanded by Syeed Yahya-ibn-Mahomed-ibn-el-Mutawakkal. Their strength is not known to Jaudat. The advance guard of this force is said to have reached Thumeir, in the Kotaibi country, and only three hours' march from Nobat Dakim.

Taiz District: *Economic*.—The conditions are not described as being very favourable, and are attributed to shortage in the rainfall.

Food is very dear owing to the presence of Zeidis in the district.

Foreign merchandise reaches Taiz in fair quantities, but prices are still very high.

The trade routes are unsafe and the roads throughout the Taiz liwa are infested with highwaymen.

Telegraph.—The Taiz to Sana line is in working order, and that between the former-mentioned place and Mavia is being put into repair. It is working up to Areeba.

Jaudat Effendi attributed all the trouble in the Shafa'i districts of Yemen to the intrigues of Mahmud Nadhim. The sheikhs and tribesmen, who had a high opinion of Mahmud Nadhim at one time, had begun to find him out, and now took no notice of his advice and warnings addressed to them on behalf of the imam.

The feeling at Taiz is very strong against the Zeidi, and the imam and the people are longing for a liberator, whoever he may turn out to be.

Sheikh Mahomed Hassan is the imam's amil at Shar'ab and Makbana, and his son, Sheikh Ali, who was delivered as a hostage, is with the makdami, Syeed Ali, at Taiz.

Ali Othman is the amil in Mokha, but is at present in Sana.

*Disease*.—Jaudat Bey informs that no illness of any kind exists at either Taiz or Mavia, nor has there been any epidemic during his stay at Taiz. The report regarding heavy mortality amongst Zeidi soldiers is denied by him.

It would appear that about two months ago the Zeidi troops sent to Mokha mutinied, because the climate did not suit them, and returned to Sana.

*Secret Spies of Imam in Abdali Territory*.—Jaudat Bey informed that a certain Yahya Hayati, who is living at Lahej, is one of the imam's spies, and is in correspondence with Syeed Kasim-el-Izzi. He actually saw a letter from Yahya Hayati to Syeed Kasim in which it was mentioned that the Abdali Sultans were in favour of the imam, and that the British were very weak.

Yahya Hayati passes for a Turk, but is of Arabic origin and a Sana'ni. During the Turkish occupation of Lahej he was a clerk in the municipality, and prior to that was a telegraph linesman at Mavia.

Muhaymid-ed-Dahabili is also described as being an imamic spy, and in correspondence with Syeed Kasim Izzi. He is a merchant of Mavia, but now lives in Lahej.

Abdulla Madhaji is another spy, but is in Hujjaryia at present. He is a trader, and was in Sheikh Othman when the Turks came down. He then fled to Lahej and was put in charge of schools by Saeed Pasha. It is said that Abdulla Madhaji was the medium of communication during the war between Saeed Pasha and his agents living in Aden. Sultan Abdul Kadir used to contribute 1,000 rupees monthly for the upkeep of Saeed Pasha's forces, and the money used to be remitted to Abdulla Madhaji for disposal.

A secret agent who was lately sent to Taiz, Ibb and Hujjaryia returned to Aden on the 4th March, 1920. This agent contradicts the alarmist reports of Captain Jaudat Effendi about Zeidi activity in those districts. The agent estimates the number of Zeidi troops in Taiz at about 800.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 2613/3/44]

No. 152.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 309.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, March 30, 1920.

MY telegram No. 285 of 25th March.

Allied High Commissioners addressed collective note to Grand Vizier on 27th March pressing for compliance with demand made in note of 16th March for disavowal of Mustafa Kemal and Nationalist leaders. High Commissioners said that disavowals in notes received from Porte since occupation were at best partial, and asked for public and unequivocal disavowal.

Council of Ministers drafted form of public disavowal and submitted it for concurrence of High Commissioners, with intimation that it was furthest they could go. High Commissioners considered it quite inadequate. On 29th March they sent fresh note to the effect that existing formula would be [group undecypherable] rather as approval than as disavowal. They demanded issue of communiqué stating clearly Government's disavowal of Mustafa and other leaders, and that they have acted contrary to intentions of the Government, and calling on population to obey henceforth only orders of lawful Government.

Porte then submitted formula, which is still unsatisfactory, especially in that it retains passage in still more [group undecypherable] draft defining national organisation as one "formed in consequence of tragical events in vilayet of Smyrna and of alarming rumours which followed thereon, and aimed in principle at what they [group undecypherable] legitimate rights of Moslem population and the protection of their life and honour."

High Commissioners decided on 30th March to inform Porte that this new formula was also unacceptable and to indicate the modifications, including omission of above clause, which would alone make this acceptable. This intimation will be made on 31st March.

Text will follow by bag.



[E 2626/3/44]

No. 153.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 1.)*

(No. 310.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Constantinople, March 30, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 309 of 30th March.

Attitude of Turkish Government since 16th March, and especially in connection with question of disavowal, can have only one explanation, namely, that present Cabinet are determined to cling to office at almost any cost. This means that Nationalists' policy is to gain time, and above all, to prevent advent to power of a Cabinet which would not merely disavow movement on paper, but would genuinely join issue with it.

Opponents of National movement are doing all they can to drive Government out. If they succeed, result must be either—

1. Advent of another temporary [group undecypherable] Cabinet under either Tewfik or some nonentity; or
2. Advent of Cabinet of open opposition to National movement, in which case Damad Ferid is the candidate most in view for Grand Vizierate; or
3. No Government at all in Constantinople.

First alternative presents no advantages for Allies over retention of present Cabinet. Third is obviously undesirable. Second presents positive advantages if presentation of Peace Treaty to Turks is to be delayed several weeks longer.

Some one must relieve [? repress] Nationalist movement sooner or later. It is obviously preferable that extreme Turks should make a start now, while movement is still reeling from the shock of occupation of Constantinople, rather than that movement should be given time to rally. If it is allowed to rally, imposition of even moderate peace terms may necessitate the use of force in the interim by Allied Great Powers or the use of Greek troops with the inevitable accompaniment [group undecypherable], non-combatant [group undecypherable] and create new hatreds.

Ferid and others who might come into power in alternative (2) are cautious enough to realise that they can do little without our moral support, including free hand in the repression [group undecypherable] Nationalists. This enables us to influence present political issue considerably. In spite, however, of advantages indicated above, it is useless to take positive line if nature of terms is to be such as neither F., R., nor any other Grand Vizier could accept until attempt at armed resistance had first been made. Not even F. or R. could sign peace on line indicated in your telegram No. 187, and when he was asked to sign such peace, any armed force he might now create to combat National movement would simply be available to swell forces of resistance to Allies.

I am in constant consultation with Allied colleagues. Our action must depend on developments from day to day, but any information or guidance your Lordship can give would be most useful, especially in regard to two essential facts, namely, length of time still to elapse before treaty can be presented to Turks and present prospects as to nature of territorial conditions.

[E 2203/1729/44]

No. 154.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 1, 1920.*

WITH reference to telegrams Nos. 276 of the 24th March\* and 277 of the 24th March† from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople, concerning the controls which have been necessitated by the occupation of the city, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that, subject to the concurrence of the Army Council, he would propose to telegraph to Admiral de Robeck as follows:—

"Your telegram No. 277 of 24th March.

"We are prepared to agree to the Commissions being inter-Allied, provided that the War Office Commission is under the presidency of a British officer and that a British officer has a place in each of the others."

\* See No. 137.

† See No. 138.

2. I am to request that, if the Army Council concur in the terms of the above telegram they will telegraph in a similar sense to General Milne.

3. Copies of Admiral de Robeck's telegrams referred to above are enclosed herewith for convenience of reference.

I am, &amp;c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 2621/3/44]

No. 155.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 2.)*

(No. 317.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, April 1, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 207 of 10th March, last paragraph.

I pointed out in my telegram No. 230 of 15th March the grave danger to Christian population which will inevitably result if Turkish Thrace or Smyrna be assigned to Greeks by Treaty of Peace. It is almost inevitable that, on announcement of decisions to this effect, massacres will occur in the interior.

[Group undecypherable] massacres Allies at Constantinople are entirely powerless to prevent [sic] the only Allied forces available in Asia Minor is Greek army of occupation, and if this army were to advance into interior to crush Nationalists, danger to Christian element would be infinitely increased.

Consequence of this is that, if it is the intention of Allied Governments to impose drastic peace terms, [group undecypherable] in particular, maintenance of Greeks in Smyrna and transference to them of Thrace up to Chatalja, or extension of Armenian State into Asiatic Turkey, the only certain way to protect Christian minorities would be by military occupation, by Allied forces other than Greek, of whole of Anatolia and Thrace. This, of course, in present state of European armaments, is not feasible, and thus it follows that complete protection for Christian minorities in the interior of Asiatic Turkey is impossible.

Much might, however, be done by stationing Allied men-of-war at all coast towns. This would have effect of attracting large numbers of Christians, where they could be more easily protected than in interior, and where arrangements could be made for feeding them. Another measure would be to announce that it was firm intention of Allies themselves to undertake punishment of any officials or others responsible for massacre of Christians or guilty of failure to stop such massacres.

General Officer Commanding-in-chief and Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, concur.

[E 2635/3/44]

No. 156.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 3.)*

(No. 327.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Constantinople, April 3, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 310 of 30th March.

Turkish Cabinet resigned on evening of 2nd April.

[E 2636/3/44]

No. 157.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 3.)*

(No. 328.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Constantinople, April 3, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 327 of 3rd April.

This resignation followed on further exchange of views regarding disavowal.

High Commissioners informed Minister for Foreign Affairs verbally on 31st March that Porte revised formula was still unacceptable, indicating certain passages which must be deleted to make it acceptable in principle, one being that relative to Smyrna.

On 1st April, Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to High Commissioners long note justifying attitude of Government, and insisting on impossibility of accepting disastrous text demanded by High Commissioners.



Note did not expressly call for answer, but, on evening of 1st April, Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Sir H. Lamb verbally that answer should be sent, saying Cabinet were firmly decided to resign if High Commissioners adhered to their view. Next morning he told French and Italian colleagues that resignation had been decided on.

He no longer seemed to think it worth while to ask for answer to note.

New Grand Vizier has not yet been appointed. [Group omitted] consulting with Tewfik Pasha and Damad Ferid to form Government. Ferid is now conferring with possible colleagues.

[E 2314/3/44]

No. 158.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 3, 1920.*

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to forward herewith,\* for the information of the Army Council, copy of a despatch which has been received from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople relative to the present situation in European Turkey.

In this connection I am to enquire what number of troops the Army Council consider would be necessary in order to effect the occupation of European Turkey and what forces are now available on the spot.

I am, &amp;c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 2836/1729/44]

No. 159.

*Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.*

My dear Ambassador,

*Foreign Office, April 4, 1920.*

I UNDERSTOOD from your conversations with me ten days ago that you were about to submit to me on behalf of your Government certain proposals with regard to the Command-in-chief at Constantinople.

I handed to you a memorandum containing the views of the British Government upon the best solution of this question, and you took the unusual step of returning it to me on the double ground that it would be distasteful to your Government to receive such a communication, and that if I withdrew it you would submit proposals of your own. I have now been waiting for some time and have received nothing from you. Meanwhile, I hear from Constantinople that the deadlock continues. As I said before, the only true solution appears to be to confine the activities and the authority of General Franchet d'Esperey to his original command in Thrace.

I have, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 2746/3/44]

No. 160.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 6.)*

(No. 340.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, April 5, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 328 of 3rd April.

Ferid Pasha took office on afternoon of 5th April. My immediately following telegram gives list of Ministers. Cabinet is constructed entirely on non-party lines.

Unless Ferid has already squared leaders of *Entente Libérale* this may be source of weakness. Several of new Ministers are almost unknown men.

Imperial decree appointing new Grand Vizier condemns National movement in outspoken terms as rebellion which has already been gravely detrimental and may still further endanger interests of country.

Decree enjoins enforcement of legal sanctions against organisers of movement, and proclaims amnesty for those deluded into joining it. It expressly prescribes establishment of cordial relations with *Entente* Great Powers.

Translation will follow by bag.

\* See No. 143.

[E 2781/3/44]

No. 161.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 7.)*

(No. 373.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 18, 1920.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 238 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith the following documents:—

- (1.) Decision adopted by the French, British and Italian High Commissioners on the 15th March.
- (2.) Joint note of the High Commissioners to the Grand Vizier, enclosing No. 1 and presented to his Highness by Mr. Ryan at about 9.40 A.M. on the 16th March.
- (3.) English text of General Wilson's proclamation.
- (4.) French text of communiqué issued by the High Commissioners on the afternoon of the 16th March and telegraphed to the provinces on the morning of the same day.
- (5.) Translation of communiqué issued by the Turkish Government on the afternoon of the 16th March.
- (6.) Memorandum by Mr. Ryan recording presentation of joint note to Grand Vizier.
- (7.) Memorandum by M. Ledoux, of French Embassy, recording intimation made to Sultan.

2. The communication to the representatives of the other Allied, Associated and neutral Powers took the form of a third-person letter enclosing a copy of No. 1 above.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 161.

*Decision adopted by Allied High Commissioners.*

NOUS, Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie, nous conformant aux ordres du Conseil suprême allié, décidons:

1. La ville de Constantinople sera placée sous l'occupation militaire des Puissances alliées à partir du 16 mars à 10 heures.
2. Les autorités militaires alliées assureront, au nom des Hauts-Commissaires alliés, l'exécution de toutes mesures militaires que rendra nécessaires l'occupation de la ville.
3. Les mesures ci-dessus indiquées comprendront:

- (a.) L'occupation des Ministères de la Guerre et de la Marine, avec le contrôle et la censure de tous ordres et communications en émanant;
- (b.) Le contrôle des Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones;
- (c.) Le contrôle strict de la police et, en général, la confection, la publication et l'application de tous règlements nécessaires au maintien de la paix, de la sécurité et de l'ordre public dans la région soumise à l'occupation militaire.

A. DEFRANCE.  
J. M. DE ROBECK.  
MAISSA.*Constantinople, le 15 mars 1920.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 161.

*Allied Joint Note addressed to the Grand Vizier.**Constantinople, le 16 mars 1920.*

Altesse,  
Les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie sont chargés par le Conseil suprême allié de porter à la connaissance de votre Altesse qu'à partir du

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16 mars, à 10 heures, la ville de Constantinople sera placée sous l'occupation militaire des Puissances alliées.

Votre Altesse trouvera ci-joint le texte de la décision prise à ce sujet par les Hauts-Commissaires.

De plus, nous sommes chargés d'exiger que le Gouvernement ottoman désavoue immédiatement Moustapha Kemal Pacha, ainsi que les autres dirigeants du mouvement soi-disant "nationaliste," dont la responsabilité pour les événements et les excès qui viennent de se produire sur plusieurs points, et notamment en Cilicie, ne peut être mise en doute.

Nous devons porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement ottoman qu'en cas de renouvellement de semblables événements ou d'excès analogues, les conditions envisagées pour la paix avec la Turquie deviendraient plus rigoureuses et que les concessions déjà faites seraient retirées.

Nous sommes chargés d'ajouter que l'occupation militaire alliée de Constantinople sera maintenue jusqu'à ce que les conditions du Traité de Paix soient acceptées et mises à exécution.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

A. DEFRANCE.  
J. M. DE ROBECK.  
MAISSA.

Enclosure 3 in No. 161.

*Proclamation.*

HAVING judged it necessary to proclaim the state of siege in Constantinople for the purpose of maintaining order and causing the law to be respected in the city, I, the undersigned, in my quality as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied troops in Constantinople, declare as follows:—

With the exception of officers and soldiers of the Allied troops, as well as those persons duly recognised as attached to Allied Embassies or neutral Legations, it is forbidden to any other persons whatsoever to bear arms outside his private house;

To be considered as arms prohibited are—all kinds of fire-arms and knives and daggers with a blade more than 8 cm. long.

Any person contravening the above orders will be brought before a court-martial and condemned to death, or to a less severe penalty, if the said Court so decides.

All meetings are rigorously forbidden. Anyone responsible for the organisation of any meeting will be brought before a court-martial and condemned to death, or to a less severe penalty, if the said Court so decides.

H. F. M. WILSON, *Lieutenant-General,*  
*Commanding the Allied Forces.*

Enclosure 4 in No. 161.

*Communiqué des Hauts-Commissaires anglais, français et italien*

IL y a cinq ans et demi, les chefs du Comité Union et Progrès, qui avaient pris en mains les destinées de la Turquie, se sont laissés imposer les volontés de l'Allemagne et ont entraîné la Turquie dans la guerre générale.

Les résultats de cette politique néfaste sont connus: le Gouvernement et le peuple tures, après mille désastres de toute nature, ont subi une défaite telle que les chefs du Comité Union et Progrès n'ont vu d'autre solution que de conclure un armistice et de prendre la fuite.

A la conclusion de l'armistice, une tâche très lourde s'est imposée aux Puissances de l'Entente. Cette tâche était de jeter les fondements d'une paix capable d'assurer le bonheur, le développement et la vie sociale et économique de tous les peuples habitant l'ancien Empire ottoman, sans distinction de races ni de religions.

Alors que la Conférence de la Paix travaillait pour remplir sa tâche, certaines personnalités représentant les idées des chefs fugitifs du Comité Union et Progrès ont formé une soi-disant organisation nationale, laquelle, ne tenant aucun compte des ordres du Sultan ni du Gouvernement, enrôle, par la force, des hommes déjà épuisés par la guerre, extorque aux populations des contributions forcées, à son profit;

et, multipliant partout les causes de dissensions, semble vouloir ouvrir une ère d'hostilités nouvelles.

Cependant la Conférence poursuivait son œuvre pacifique. Elle adoptait la décision si apaisante de laisser Constantinople sous l'administration ottomane, mais à condition—ainsi que la Sublime Porte en fut avertie—que les chrétiens des provinces ne courussent plus aucun danger et que toute attaque contre les troupes de l'Entente et de ses Alliés cessât immédiatement.

Mais les hommes de l'organisation prétendue nationale, loin de seconder en cela la bonne volonté du Gouvernement central, cherchent au contraire à l'entraver.

Cette situation, si fâcheuse pour l'établissement de la paix tant souhaitée, a obligé les Puissances de l'Entente à étudier les moyens qui permettront d'assurer l'exécution des conditions qui en seront prochainement fixées. De cela un seul moyen: l'occupation provisoire de Constantinople.

Cette mesure étant en voie d'exécution, il est porté à la connaissance générale ce qui suit:

1. L'occupation est provisoire.
2. Les Puissances de l'Entente n'ont pas l'intention de détruire l'autorité du Sultanat. Elles veulent la renforcer, au contraire, sur tous les points qui demeureront soumis à l'administration ottomane.
3. Les Puissances de l'Entente persistent dans leur intention de ne pas priver les Tures de Constantinople, mais, si, ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise, des troubles généralisés ou des ma-sacres venaient à se produire, cette décision serait probablement modifiée.
4. Dans cette heure critique, chacun a le devoir de vaquer à ses affaires et de concourir ainsi au maintien de la sécurité générale, sans se laisser abuser par ceux dont l'égarement tend à détruire le dernier espoir d'édifier sur les décombres de l'ancien Empire une Turquie nouvelle; en un mot, chacun a le devoir d'obéir aux ordres émanant du Sultanat.
5. Certaines personnalités impliquées dans les menées dont il vient d'être parlé ont été arrêtées à Constantinople. Elles auront naturellement à répondre de leurs actes et des conséquences ultérieures que pourront produire ces actes.

Constantinople, le 16 mars 1920.

Enclosure 5 in No. 161.

*Official Communiqué of Turkish Government.*

(Translation.)

AS stated in a note presented to the Government this morning by the representatives of the Entente Powers, and in their official communiqué published in this evening's papers, Constantinople has been placed under temporary military occupation as from to-day. The duties devolving on the Government are being performed. In these circumstances it is recommended that every one should go about his business in complete tranquillity.

Enclosure 6 in No. 161.

*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.*

I CALLED at the Grand Vizier's house about 9.25 this morning. His Highness, who had not been forewarned of my visit, received me at about 9.40. I told him that I had been deputed by the three High Commissioners to make a serious communication, and I briefly explained its general nature. I then handed him the joint note of the High Commissioners relative to the occupation of Constantinople.

2. The Grand Vizier did not at first seem to realise the difference between the occupation now proposed and the previous military situation. After reading the note and enclosure, however, he expressed great concern, and said it was the end of the Government in Constantinople. I told him that the High Commissioners hoped not. It was not intended, I said, to interfere with the civil administration. The Allies did not wish to weaken the legitimate Government. They did wish to weaken the illegitimate Government which had existed for some time past.

[4370]

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3. The Grand Vizier questioned the necessity and justification for so grave a measure. I said that it was the consequence of a movement the object of which was to offer resistance to the decisions of the Peace Conference. I mentioned the recent events in Cilicia and the fact that hardly a single demand put forward by the High Commissioners for some time past had received satisfaction.

4. The Grand Vizier said that the Government had no power whatsoever over the national movement. I said that it was more necessary that the Allies should establish a strong position here in order to ensure respect for the decisions of the Peace Conference.

5. I impressed on the Grand Vizier the desire of the High Commissioners that all should pass off quietly, and that no resistance should be offered. He said that there could be no question of resistance. Later in the conversation he observed that no time was being allowed the Government to make preparations and issue necessary instructions. I observed that rapidity of action was essential. I expressed the hope that the Government would do all in their power to prevent untoward incidents. The High Commissioners were, I said, using their influence to prevent undesirable conduct on the part of the Christian elements, and they hoped the Government would use their influence similarly with the Moslems. I observed that in the military instructions regard for religious edifices like mosques had been specially enjoined. He said that nothing need be feared from the side of the Moslems.

6. The Grand Vizier presented the appearance of a man taken wholly by surprise. It is difficult to believe that he was wholly unaware of what was coming; but he seemed stupefied, and there was no hint of his having heard even of the arrests effected early this morning. There was no movement in or about his house. While I was with him he gave telephonic instructions for the Ministers to be summoned to meet at the Porte at 11 A.M.

ANDREW RYAN.

Constantinople, March 16, 1920.

Enclosure 7 in No. 161.

*Communication de M. Ledoux au Palais, le 16 mars 1920.*

CONFORMÉMENT aux instructions de MM. les Hauts-Commissaires, je me suis rendu au Palais Impérial, ce matin à 9 heures 30; j'ai fait appeler d'urgence le Premier Secrétaire qui était encore à son domicile à Nichantache et qui est arrivé à Yildiz à 10 heures 15.

Je lui ai remis les deux documents que j'étais chargé de faire communiquer, par son entremise, au Sultan, en ajoutant que MM. les Hauts-Commissaires avaient tenu que Sa Majesté Impériale fût informée, à l'heure même où le Grand-Vizir recevait la communication qui devait lui être faite par mon collègue anglais, de la décision prise par le Conseil suprême des Alliés.

Fouad Bey s'est empressé de se rendre auprès du Souverain et de lui transmettre la communication dont il s'agit.

Une demi-heure après, le Premier Secrétaire était de retour et me communiqua la réponse du Sultan, ainsi conçue d'une manière précise:

1. Il est avéré que Sa Majesté Impériale a toujours voulu entretenir les meilleures relations avec les Puissances alliées.

2. Tout en exprimant ses regrets que l'affaire ait atteint ce degré (soit arrivée à ce point), Sa Majesté a pris connaissance de la communication dont il s'agit.

A. LEDOULX.

Péra, le 16 mars 1920.

[E 2798/3/44]

No. 162.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 7.)*

(No. 395.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 255 of the 20th March, 1920, regarding the condition of affairs at Hajin, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a letter and accompanying document which I have received from Dr. W. A. Kennedy, the representative of the Lord Mayor's Committee at Adana.

Constantinople, March 22, 1920.

2. The first document, dated the 7th March, embodies the narratives of two of the three women who are, I fear, in all probability the sole survivors from the Armenian population, originally sixty-five strong, of the village of Kunez, near Islahieh.

3. Their story shows that the proceedings lacked none of the ruthless and insensate brutality which hitherto have characterised Turkish outbreaks of massacre, and the instance of this particular village may be regarded as typical of what doubtless took place at the time, and during preceding weeks, in other villages of the Islahieh and Marash districts.

4. The second set of papers, enclosed in Dr. Kennedy's letter, bear evidence to the undoubted gravity of the situation at Hajin, and indeed in that part of Cilicia generally. The French military authorities would appear to be unable to afford active and immediate assistance to the Armenians in that town beyond the grant of 1,000 rifles. For the rest, the evacuation on Sis of the non-combatants is counselled, and even the possibility of the complete withdrawal from Hajin of the entire Armenian population contemplated.

5. A perusal of these papers clearly points to the seriousness of the situation in Cilicia, created and fostered by Nationalist intrigues, and, furthermore, emphasises the fact that the Turk, given the opportunity, has shown himself to be entirely unchanged in his treatment of the subject Christian populations who still remain under his uncontrolled rule.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 162.

*Survivors' Narrative of Massacre of Armenians at Kunez.*

THE history leading up to the following accounts of three women who were brought into Adana to-day is reported to be:—

Owing to considerable lawlessness on the part of the Turkish chief, Kourshid Agha, a band of about 10 gendarmes, of whom there were eight Armenians (one officer and seven men), were sent to a village about six hours from Islahieh. On the night following their arrival the village was surrounded, and in the morning the Moslem gendarmes are said to have given up their arms to Kourshid's men, or to have come to some understanding with them. At any rate, the Armenians were isolated, and an attempt made to kill them. Four of them with the officer managed to escape, and the other three fell into the hands of Kourshid's men, and were said by them to have been killed. The other Armenians in the village have also been killed, according to the word of the Turks, who later attacked a neighbouring village where the three women lived. Sixty-five Armenians lived in that village, and no word has been received from any one who might have escaped.

Story of Terfunda Sahagian, aged 45. Village Kunez, six hours Islahieh:—

Five days ago, the day after Chaoush Avedis (one of the Armenian gendarmes) had escaped at dawn, the son of Kourshid Agha came to Kunez with a band of gendarmes and chetes, and, having gathered the Armenian men and women in two groups, told them that they were going to kill them. They said, "Your God is the French, and we are not going to leave one of you here." The women begged to be left, but they said, "We are not going to leave one of you. We are going to kill you all, like we did in the other village, where the only one left is the miller, who is useful to us, and whom we will kill when his work is done." They killed the men, six of them, right beside us, "as near as the wall." The men were begging and crying. They were killed by bayonets and bullets. The party of women were made up of twelve women, two unmarried girls, and one bride. There were also with them two children of about 2 years, both boys. The bride was taken away the first night and violated, and brought back in the morning. She called out that she was a Moslem, but the men said that they did not want her Moslemism now, and she must go with the others. They made the women walk two by two for ten minutes outside the village, and there they set about to kill them with bullets and bayonets. One of the men stabbed her, and as he did so she fell on the ground and lay quite still. As she lay there she was stabbed again with a bayonet. She lay there after they had gone



away. She was shivering on the snow, but with two others she got away. They slept among the bushes on the hillsides, and after two days got to Islahieh.

On examination this woman was found by Dr. Dodd and myself to have four wounds on the lower and outer aspect of the right thoracic wall. These wounds could have been the entry and exit wounds of a fine bayonet without a cutting edge. She had also a small wound in the neighbourhood in the right hypogastric region, and was very tender on pressure in the area just above the wound.

On further questioning, she said that she—Terfunda Sahagian—saw the gendarmes arrive as they passed Kunez on their way to Saghach Goez, the village of Kourshid Agha. She went towards that village with a woman—Margarite—to find out what she could. She was particularly interested in doing so because her married son was attached to the same force as the gendarmes who had arrived from Islahieh. When she approached the village she saw the brigands around it, and after seeing some of the Armenian gendarmes escape she returned to her own village. The distance between the two villages was not more than half-an-hour walking.

Miriam Sarkissian, aged 25; her son Assadour, aged 2.

This woman told the same story as the above Terfunda, and said that the men were killed beside them, "as near as the door." She said that the son of Kourshid came at "cock-crow." There were two small children in the group, one of whom was her son whom she had in her arms. Beside the children there were twelve women, one bride and two unmarried girls of 12 or 13 years of age. A man put his rifle against the baby's head and fired, shattering the child's head, and so wounding her that she fell down. As she lay on the ground one man said: "Give her another bullet and be sure"; and the other replied: "She is dead, I won't bother any more about her." She lay quite still until she was sure that they had gone away, and then she got up. No one could see her, as the women had been taken to a small wood in a valley about half a mile from the village. She found two other women, and by travelling by night they arrived in Islahieh after two days. In the day-time they hid themselves, and during one of the days they were lying in the open in the rain.

On examination she was found to be suffering from a shattered forearm on the right side. She had also a surface wound on the ulnar side of the left palm.

Mariam.

A woman of about middle age, who came into the hospital at the same time, and who had been able to reach Islahieh with the other two. She was suffering from an open wound on the head along the line of the sagittal suture. The wound was septic, and the surrounding area was involved. It was not possible to tell without a more thorough examination whether a bullet had penetrated the skull or not. The woman was too dull by reason of the wound to be able to tell us any details of herself.

On further questioning, it was believed that no French troops had been in these two villages. Mariam Sarkissian said that she had never seen French troops until she arrived at Islahieh.

Adana, March 7, 1920.

Enclosure 2 in No. 162.

Mr. W. A. Kennedy to Colonel Graves.

Dear Colonel Graves,

JUST a word in explanation of the enclosures.

Adana, March 10, 1920.

(a.) Letter from M. Damadian to the General Commanding in which he asks help for Hadjin because of the disturbing nature of the news that keeps coming from that city. This letter has not been answered.

(b.) Letter from the Chief Administrator to M. Damadian after an interview on behalf of Armenians in the district north of Adana.

(c.) Letter to General Dufieux from M. Damadian asking that at the request of a mass meeting of Armenians a delegation be granted time to-day to present an urgent appeal on behalf of the people, who, they believe, are in great need.

(d.) Letter to M. Damadian from General Dufieux in which he appoints a meeting with the deputation to-morrow. The Armenians feel that this letter shows a lack of appreciation of what threatens them as a nation locally and an unwillingness to act energetically for their protection.

(e.) Copy of resolution and request to be made to General Dufieux to-morrow.

(f.) Translation of telegram received here from Marash from the religious heads. It is open to several interpretations. It is most likely a threat to massacre if the attempt is made to retake the city. That is unlikely as the French won't care to tackle it without very thorough preparation and reinforcements. It may mean that the Turks got a bad knock at Marash from the French and don't want another. It may be too that the Mutessarif Bey is trying to be on the winning side in any case.

I am sending by hand and am asking Mr. Lee who brings it to say that he will bring back any message that you may send. I should like to hear that the High Commissioner has granted my request to have cables sent home through the Foreign Office in the same way as they are sent to me.

I am, &c.

W. A. KENNEDY.

(a.)

M. Damadian to General Dufieux.

Adana, le 8 mars 1920.

Mon Général,

A l'instant même, je reçois de Hadjine la dépêche suivante :

"Les bandes sont entrées à Maghara; Feka et Roum-nahiessi furent aussi occupés; Hadjine est assiégé. Nous avons besoin troupes, armes, munitions, secours."

"PRÉSIDENT UNION NATIONALE, TCHAVDARIAN."

Superflu de souligner la gravité de cette nouvelle. Étant donné que les armes disponibles et les préparatifs à Hadjine se trouvent trop au-dessous des exigences d'une défense efficace, il y a lieu d'envoyer en toute hâte des renforts pour éviter un malheur irréparable.

Je vous répète à cette occasion, mon Général, que nous avons des centaines—des milliers, dirais-je—de nos compatriotes qui sont tout prêts à prendre les armes pour la défense de leurs frères et qui seraient capables de changer du tout au tout la situation, si seulement vous étiez disposé de nous donner l'autorisation et les moyens d'agir.

Je vous fais un suprême appel pour les mesures à prendre d'urgence, et je vous prie d'agréer, &c.

M. DAMADIAN,

Représentant de la Délégation de l'Arménie intégrale.

(b.)

Colonel Bremond to M. Damadian.

Contrôle administratif de Cilicie, Adana, le 9 mars 1920.

VOUS m'avez demandé ce matin, de vous dire nettement si les troupes françaises iraient secourir Hadjine en cas d'attaque.

Je vous ai répondu que la question ne dépendait pas de moi, mais du Général commandant la 15<sup>e</sup> D.I.

Je viens de le consulter à ce sujet et après mûre réflexion il m'a chargé de vous faire connaître qu'il n'enverra pas présentement des troupes à Hadjine et qu'il ne peut, malgré son désir, prendre, pour l'avenir, aucun engagement ferme que pourraient démentir les circonstances.

Mais il reste entendu que son attention est portée dans cette direction et qu'il fera tout le possible pour aider ces populations.

En conséquence, je suis d'avis que le départ des bouches inutiles, femmes et enfants, soit organisé le plus tôt possible sur Sis et Missis.

Des troupes de Sis se porteront à leur rencontre à mi-route jusqu'à la région de Kesik Boghaz. L'escorte entre Hadjine et les troupes françaises serait assurée par les Hadjiniotes.



Pour ce qui est de Hadjine, je suis d'avis qu'un millier d'hommes résolus peuvent y tenir plusieurs mois. La réduction de la consommation des vivres, amenée par le départ des femmes et enfants, permettrait le ravitaillement facile.

Je puis fournir immédiatement un millier de fusils supplémentaires, qui porteront l'armement autour de 2,200.

Mais je ne voudrais pas qu'un matériel aussi important risquât d'être capturé.

J'ai, d'ailleurs, toute confiance dans la vigueur de M. Tchalian.

Le dernier télégramme que je viens de recevoir du Capitaine Taillardat me dit que le caza d'Hadjine est encore complètement intact et tranquille. Je suis persuadé que la présence des Hadjiniotes résolu maintiendra fermée cette route secondaire. Toutefois, si M. Tchalian ne trouvait pas autour de lui l'énergie qu'il a en lui-même, il y aurait à envisager le départ des hommes lors que les femmes et les enfants seraient en sûreté.

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire qu'il est du plus haut intérêt que tous ces mouvements se passent dans le plus grand ordre, le plus grand calme; il faudra désigner les chefs de groupe qui maintiennent une discipline qui fasse bonne impression.

Je donne, d'ailleurs, des ordres dans ce sens au Gouverneur de Kozan, et je ne doute pas qu'il trouvera tous les concours nécessaires.

Le secret doit être gardé le plus longtemps possible pour que le convoi de femmes et d'enfants court le minimum de risque.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

BREMOND, Colonel.

Je viens de causer encore de la question avec le délégué. Il va recruter 200 à 300 volontaires ici. Je lui donnerai tout mon concours.

B.

(c.)

M. Damadian to General Dufieux.

Le 10 mars 1920.

Mon Général,

LES milliers d'Arméniens qui s'étaient réunis hier dans l'après-midi devant votre résidence, dans l'impossibilité de vous faire parvenir leurs demandes par l'entremise d'une députation, sont allés se regrouper, d'abord, devant l'Union nationale et, en dernier lieu, dans l'enceinte de l'église arménienne, où un meeting en règle fut tenu, auquel meeting furent sommés à assister tous les représentants autorisés des Arméniens d'Adana, les chefs spirituels des trois confessions, les membres de l'Union nationale et moi-même.

Les représentants se trouvant sous l'obligation de vous présenter tel quel l'ordre du jour voté par les milliers des manifestants, je vous serai infiniment obligé de vouloir bien me faire savoir à quelle heure vous seriez disposé à les recevoir aujourd'hui en audience.

En vous remerciant à l'avance, je vous présente, &c.

M. DAMADIAN,

Représentant de la Délégation de l'Arménie  
intégrale.

(d.)

General Dufieux to M. Damadian.

Armée du Levant, 156<sup>e</sup> Division, Service des

Renseignements, Adana, le 10 mars 1920.

M. le Représentant,

JE n'ai pas besoin d'insister sur le mécontentement que m'a causé la réunion devant le quartier général de 600 ou 700 Arméniens (et non pas de plusieurs milliers). Ce n'est pas sur la place publique que je puis exercer ma charge, et j'ai assez de soucis et de travail pour que vos compatriotes m'épargnent des manifestations dont le seul résultat est de semer la panique en ville.

Je serais, néanmoins, heureux de vous recevoir demain matin, 11 mars, à 8 heures 30, n'ayant pas une minute disponible aujourd'hui ni la nuit prochaine.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

J. DUFIEUX.

(e.)

Ordre du Jour.

DES milliers d'Arméniens, de toute confession et de toutes classes, réunies en meeting ce 9 mars 1920, en l'église arménienne d'Adana, profondément émus devant la recrudescence de l'activité de bandes turques, qui, non contentes de leurs funestes exploits à Marach, poursuivent maintenant plus audacieusement que jamais leur œuvre de destruction et de massacre dans d'autres régions de la Cilicie, notamment dans le district d'Islahié, où ils ont, ces jours derniers, entre autres choses, massacré les villageois arméniens de Kunesse; alarmés et saisis d'une vive anxiété en présence de l'attaque organisée contre la ville de Hadjine, qui se trouve aujourd'hui pratiquement assiégée et isolée, ainsi que devant la menace imminente à laquelle Kars-Pazar, Sis, Ekbeze et encore d'autres localités se trouvent exposés; devant l'insécurité générale et la terreur, enfin, qui caractérisent la situation actuelle en Cilicie, ont formulé et arrêté à l'unanimité les acclamations et résolutions suivantes, qu'ils considèrent d'une importance vitale au double point de vue de la sauvegarde de la vie et des intérêts des populations chrétiennes du pays et de la civilisation européenne.

Ils demandent :

1. Que les autorités militaires, en tant que garanties par-devant les Puissances alliées de la sécurité des populations des régions occupées, prennent énergiquement toutes les mesures nécessaires pour la suppression rapide du mouvement insurrectionnel, concentrant des forces suffisantes dans toutes les positions exposées à l'attaque de l'ennemi.

2. Que le droit légitime et la détermination inébranlable des Arméniens à organiser leur propre défense contre leurs agresseurs et à concourir à la force armée dans la répression des bandes, soient officiellement reconnus et acceptés.

3. Qu'ils aient en conséquence le droit et l'autorisation à armer tous les hommes valides de leur race et qu'à cet effet des quantités suffisantes d'armes et de munitions leur soient fournies par les autorités occupantes, contre toutes garanties de loyauté que les autorités arméniennes seraient prêtes à leur donner.

4. Qu'il leur soit permis, notamment, de former des corps de volontaires et de les diriger vers les endroits les plus menacés, dont Hadjine et Zeitoun.

5. Que ces corps puissent agir librement sous la direction et le commandement de chefs arméniens.

6. Qu'en attendant la réorganisation, sur de nouvelles bases, de la Légion arménienne, ce qui demanderait du temps, les soldats et les gradés arméniens faisant partie de cette Légion soient, pendant toute la durée de la crise actuelle, mis à la disposition de la Défense nationale arménienne, et dans le cas de la non-acceptation de cette demande, que tous les légionnaires et gradés arméniens soient considérés, de suite, comme libérés de leurs engagements.

7. Que les populations arméniennes des villages et des régions les plus exposés soient transférées dans des centres sûrs, conformément à l'avis et aux suggestions des autorités arméniennes et sous la surveillance des autorités françaises.

8. Que les principaux chefs ou instigateurs du mouvement turc soient arrêtés et soumis à un châtiment exemplaire; que, le cas échéant, des otages soient pris parmi les notables turcs ou musulmans.

9. Que tous les gendarmes et policiers musulmans soient immédiatement congédiés et que, dorénavant, seuls des gendarmes et des policiers chrétiens soient recrutés.

10. Que les autorités turques de Cilicie—dont la complicité dans l'organisation et les agissements sanguinaires des bandes, ainsi que celle du Gouvernement central de Constantinople, en violation flagrante et éhontée des termes de l'armistice, est déjà si amplement prouvée—soient dès maintenant définitivement abolies et les fonctionnaires arrêtés ou chassés.

11. Que les autorités françaises prennent à tâche de mettre régulièrement les autorités arméniennes au courant de l'état exact des choses dans les diverses parties de la Cilicie, notamment dans les régions exposées, menacées ou envahies.

12. Que les autorités arméniennes jouissent de la latitude d'envoyer des télégrammes politiques à l'étranger, à vue d'exposer la situation suivant leur



appréciation et d'exprimer leurs vœux et leurs doléances, soit à leurs chefs politiques, soit aux Gouvernements des Puissances alliées et associées.

Ils décident :

De fermer leurs magasins à partir de demain mercredi, 10 courant, jusqu'à ce que pleine et entière satisfaction à ces demandes soit obtenue.

Ils adjurent les autorités arméniennes :

De soumettre, littéralement et par écrit, des demandes aux autorités de l'occupation, ainsi que de leur transmettre la teneur de la réponse écrite que ces autorités leur auraient donnée, pour agir de conformité.

(f.)

*Telegram from Armenian Religious Heads to Armenian Catholics, Adana.*

(Traduction.)

*Marach, le 6 mars 1920.*

PAR suite événements désastreux, milliers Arméniens périssent retraits Français. Grâce garantie Gouvernement ottoman, fûmes mis en état de sûreté. Notre Mutessarif Bey fait efforts extraordinaires pour assurer la tranquillité; pourtant, vu que dans éventualité retour Français, notre vie sera exposée au danger, nous vous prions, au nom de humanité, faire des démarches diplomatiques pour écarter en tout état de cause cette éventualité.

Le Chef spirituel protestant,  
ABRAHAM HAROUNIAN.  
L'Evêque arménien,  
DER GHAZARIAN.  
L'Archevêque arménien catholique,  
ARPIARIAN.

[E 2822/3/44]

No. 163.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 7.)*

(No. 341.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

*Constantinople, April 5, 1920.*

FOLLOWING is list of Cabinet formed on 5th April:—

Damad Ferid Pasha, Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Durri Zade Abdullah Effendi, Sheikh-ul-Islam; Reshid Bey, Interior, also President of Council of State *ad interim*; Mehmed Said Pasha, Marine, also War *ad interim*; Ali Rushdi Effendi, Justice; Fahrudin Bey, Public Instruction; Jemil Pasha, Public Works; Remzi Pasha, Commerce and Agriculture; Reshad Bey, Finance *ad interim*; Osman Reifat Pasha, Pious Foundations.

[E 2817/1729/44]

No. 164.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 7.)*

Sir,

*War Office, April 7, 1920.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward for the information of Lord Curzon the attached copy of a telegram from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief the Army of the Black Sea.

The Army Council understand that the question of the respective responsibilities of General Milne and General Franchet d'Esperey has already been the subject of communications between Lord Curzon and M. Cambon, and they hope that a definite decision on the question may be reached in the near future.

I am, &c.  
B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure in No. 164.

*General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, to War Office.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

(Secret.)

G.C. 450 cypher of 31st March.

Franchet d'Esperey, on my informing him, as in your 84223 D.M.O. of 20th March, that Thrace should be considered as within his zone, has replied that he has not been informed of any modification bearing on the conventions regulating the Inter-Allied command in Turkey in Europe, and that he considers these conventions still in force.

Our respective responsibilities are at present most ill-defined, and I trust that he may receive clear definition at any early date.

[E 2873/47/44]

No. 165.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 8.)*

Sir,

*Aden, March 25, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of letter dated the 25th March, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 165.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal,

*Aden, March 25, 1920.*

THE following is a summary of news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 18th March, 1920:—

*Tihama.*

From the reports received from Hodeida during this week it appears that the imam's men are still besieged at Riqab on Jabel Bura. Their early surrender is expected as they appear to be short of food. No fresh activity has been reported since the retreat of the imam's troops to Jabel Safan. The Quhra country is said to be entirely free of the Zeidis.

Showkat Bey's report *re* the communication addressed by the imam to the Quhra sheikhs and others, mentioned in the last news letter, has been confirmed. Captain Gordon is trying to get a copy of the proclamation. There is a rumour that Mahmud Nadhim has arrived at Menakha with a view to having a personal discussion with the Quhra sheikhs.

An agent at Beit-al-Fakih reports that a local merchant, Mahomed Ibrahim Mokhawi, has been informed by someone from Hodeida that Syria, Smyrna, and Aleppo have been returned to the Turks, and that the latter will shortly arrive at Medina. The merchant has also been told that Enver Pasha has conquered half of India, that the Turkish notes are honourably accepted in India, and that the value of a 1l. English note has been reduced to 7 rupees.

The imam's soldiers at Bedi Saad are reported to be starving. Many of them have already deserted. A consignment of flour appears to have been despatched to them lately from Menakha.

In my letter of the 10th instant I referred to letters alleged to have been written by the imam to sheikhs and sayids in the Tihama. The Marawa sayids are now reported to have sent a reply to the imam saying that they have not admitted a single Idrisi soldier into Marawa, but that they are guarding their own country, and that they do not wish to declare their allegiance either to the imam or the Idrisi.

Captain Gordon, Political Officer, Hodeida, in a note dated the 7th March, 1920, states that the people of Hodeida are generally contented and appreciate the security



afforded under British régime. The thinking people, however, are naturally anxious concerning their future. What they want is security, which they express in the word "dowlah." Having come to the conclusion that the British occupation is merely temporary, they desire the return of the Turks. They have no desire to see France or Italy in charge of their destiny, nor do they regard the Idrisi or the imam as capable of affording the protection they desire. They do not regard them as "dowlahts" but as "bila qunun." If either Idrisi or imamic rule were to be imposed on Hodeidah the former would be accepted in preference to the latter, not as a matter of choice but as the better of the two alternatives.

The leading merchants in Hodeida have inaugurated a poor relief fund from which 500 to 600 poor are fed daily.

Captain Gordon gives the following figures of Hodeida imports and exports for the month of February:—

Imports, 340,000 rupees.

Exports, 124,500 rupees.

The chief imports were cotton piece-goods, flour, cotton twist, tombac, spices mixed, dates, rice, sugar, kerosene oil, and jowari.

The chief exports were coffee, hides and skins, mat-baskets, cotton, and sheep.

#### *Yemen (Upper and Lower).*

Mohammed-ibn-Ahmed-al-Mikdad, Sheikh of Bilad Anis, is reported to have written to all the leading Zeidis advising them not to allow their sons to enlist in the imam's army, as his (imam's) warfare is detrimental to the country's interests. Many of the leading Zeidis have accepted this advice. This action of Al Mikdad is said to have made the imam very nervous, as he fears an alliance between Mikdad and the Idrisi, which would endanger his capital.

An agent at Menakha reports that an arrangement has been arrived at between the son of Nasir Mabkhut and Saleh Husain-al-Haidari of Arhab on the one side, and the imam on the other, through the medium of the Sheikh of Amran, under which the two sheikhs revert to their allegiance to the imam on condition that the latter pays them the same monthly allowance as they now receive from the Idrisi. The sheikhs are said to have left for Sana in company with the ex-imamic Amir of Hajja, Ahmed Shaiban.

This report is not confirmed.

A few more Turks have arrived for repatriation. They state that the imam will not permit the following Turkish officials to leave the country till his account with Turkey and his affairs with the European Powers have been settled:—

Mahmud Nedim, the ex-Vali.

Asaad Effendi, ex-Appeal Judge of the Sheria Court.

Tewfiq Bey, ex-Accountant-general of the Vilayet.

The imam's arsenal does not turn out very much ammunition nowadays. It is still under the same Austrian, George, who also supervises the working of the flour-mills in Sana.

One of the Turks, Tewfiq Bey, stated that only part of the Hajja district was in the hands of Syed Idrisi, and that there was no foundation for the reports in regard to the fall of Taweela and Kaukaban.

Sheikhs Sadik-bin-Abdalla Ali Ba Abdalla Pasha, Mahomed-bin-Hamid-bin-Ali Ba Abdalla Pasha and Mohsin-bin-Mansoor-bin-Ali Ba Abdalla Pasha, sons of the chiefs of Udain, have come in to Aden to find out our wishes informally with regard to the Yemen. If Government are willing to countenance their overtures, they are prepared to act as we wish.

They say that the imam's forces in the Tihama are small, and if Government were to move via Yafa they would engage him in the Zabid district, the people of which are conspiring with the Idrisi. They can withstand the imam for six months on their own resources, but thereafter they would need Government support in the way of material only. They are confident that the whole of the Shafai Tihama would be with them. Finally, they said that if we were not in accord with their plans they would quietly leave Aden at once without exciting suspicion. I have given them to understand that we can do nothing for them at present.

#### *Aden Protectorate.*

There has been no change in the situation, which remains the same as reported last week. The Alawi Sheikh and others are still detained by the Zeidis.

The Mausatta Naqibs and the son of the Lower Yafai Sultan have gone to Mokalla to seek aid against the Zeidis from the Kaiti Sultan. They are expected to return to Aden shortly, and will be accompanied to their country by Ressaidar Mahamad Esa Khan.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 2836/1729/44]

No. 166.

*M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 8.)*

Cher Lord Curzon,

*Ambassade de France, Londres, le 5 avril 1920.*

AINSI que je vous l'avais annoncé, j'ai fait connaître à M. Millerand les termes de notre entretien du 1<sup>er</sup> avril. Il m'a fait savoir qu'il avait consulté notre Haut-Commissaire à Constantinople, et qu'il était sur le point de conférer avec le Général Franchet d'Esperey, qui venait d'arriver à Paris. Je vous aviserai de ses propositions aussitôt qu'elles me seront parvenues.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

PAUL CAMBON.

[E 1654/1483/44]

No. 167.

*Earl Curzon to Baron Moncheur.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, April 8, 1920*

IN reply to your notes Nos. 1130 and 1189 of 1<sup>st</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> March regarding your Government's desire for Belgian representation on the proposed International Commission of Control of Ottoman Finance and on the Council of the Ottoman Debt, I have the honour to remind you that it is proposed for obvious reasons to confine the first-named body to representatives of the three Great Powers.

As regards the Council of the Ottoman Debt, when your Excellency's request was recently submitted to the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors it was felt that, as the council would shortly disappear, it was hardly worth while to set in motion the procedure necessary to secure what could only be a very transient representation of Belgian interests.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 2915/2/44]

No. 168.

*Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to Earl Curzon.—  
(Received April 9.)*

(No. 38.)

My Lord,

*Cairo, March 27, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a protest delivered by the General Palestine Congress, which assembled at Damascus on the 27<sup>th</sup> February, 1920.

I have, &c.

(For Chief Political Officer).

A. J. ROWLAND, Captain.



Enclosure in No. 168.

*The Palestine Congress.*

WE submit to you the summary of the decision given at the general meeting held in the Arab Club building, Damascus, on the 27th February, by the representatives of the three zones of the Syrian nation.

Those who met together were the representatives of the National Defence Committee—many members of the Syrian Congress—and the representatives of the political parties, viz., the Arab Independence Party, the Syrian Union, the Syrian Covenant, the Irak Covenant, the Syrian National Arab Club, the princes of the Arab tribes of Hauran, El Soukhour, El Fadle, El Kerak, the Circassians, the notables of Kus, the clergymen, the lawyers, the doctors, the journalists, the chief merchants and a big number of the students of high schools of all sects and creeds.

The Syrian nation has fully discussed the Syrian-Palestine problem, and has given the following four decisions to which they will stick to the end:—

1. We support what the nation has often and officially declared, to the effect that Palestine is an inseparable part from Syria, and they will never stop claiming this unity, and are quite ready to defend its rights till they shed the very last drop of blood they have in their veins.

2. The population of Northern Syria, as well as the natives on the coasts, consider the Zionist immigration quite dangerous to them, because it threatens their political and economical existence in future. Consequently they all still refuse that immigration just as they did in the presence of the American Committee. The people are still united to oppose the Zionists actually if the Allies persist to enforce their well-known policy.

3. The population of Northern Syria and the coasts partake with the Palestine Congress (Conference) in refusing any national government or any political meeting that might be held in Palestine, before the local authorities acknowledge the requests of the Palestinians which had been submitted to the American Committee to the effect that their zone ought not to be separated from Syria, and that the Zionist immigration should be prohibited, and that they demand the perfect political independence. They also refuse any other decision which the natives might make if it were to contradict the first one they gave, because such would likely be the result of their fear of the bayonets.

4. Whereas the national movement in this land requests the independence of Syria with its natural boundaries and the independence of Mesopotamia as well, and whereas the colonizers of the Zionist Allies separate still the word Palestine from the word Syria in all their publications in order that they may mislead the public opinion; and whereas those ideals if fulfilled—God forbid!—are going to be very dangerous to the public peace throughout all the Arab zones, therefore the population of Northern Syria and that of the coasts wish to explain to everybody that their national movement is to be directed against all those who desire to stand in the way of the union of the country, and they would never permit that any zone would be separated from the other (if the public peace is to be maintained).

(The President of the Society and Secretary of the Conference):

ABD-EL-KADER.  
EL MUZZAFAR.

This copy is conformable with the original signed by all the members.

March 4, 1920.

[E 2914/289/44]

No. 169.

*Prince Sapieha to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 9.)*

My Lord,

*Polish Legation, London, April 7, 1920.*

IN view of the fact that the Peace Conference is at present elaborating the terms of a treaty between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire, I have the honour to draw your Lordship's attention to the question of the situation of Polish nationals

residing in Turkey. I accordingly beg leave to enclose the copy of a note on this subject which the Polish Peace Delegation addressed on the 18th March, 1920, to the President of the Peace Conference.

I have the honour to submit this matter to your Lordship's kind attention, and beg leave to express the hope that your Lordship will find it possible to make use of his influence so as to introduce into the treaty such clauses as will safeguard the situation of Polish nationals, in accordance with the views laid down in the note which I have the honour to enclose.

I have, &c.

E SAPIEHA.

Enclosure in No. 169.

*M. Zamoycki to M. Millerand.*

*Paris, le 18 mars 1920.*

M. le Président,

AU moment où les principales Puissances alliées et associées vont définitivement arrêter les conditions de paix avec l'Empire ottoman, la Délégation polonaise croit devoir signaler à leur bienveillante attention la nécessité de faire reconnaître et confirmer par ce traité de paix la situation juridique des ressortissants polonais en Turquie, telle qu'elle se présente en équité et en droit.

Avant la guerre, les Polonais résidant dans l'Empire ottoman bénéficiaient pleinement des droits et privilèges du régime capitulaire comme conséquence de leur qualité de ressortissants des Empires russe, allemand ou autrichien. Alors même que ne préexisterait dans le droit public positif aucune base du maintien de cette situation après la restauration de l'indépendance de la Pologne, il eût encore été logique et équitable que les ressortissants polonais continuassent à bénéficier du même régime sous la protection de leurs propres consuls, puisqu'il serait inadmissible que leur situation juridique en Turquie devint, par le fait de leur indépendance reconnue, moins bonne que celle qui leur était assurée comme sujets des États copartageants.

Mais il s'en faut de beaucoup que des considérations d'équité et de logique soient seules à invoquer en cette matière.

L'ancienne Sérénissime République de Pologne a été, avec la France et la République de Venise, l'une des trois premières Puissances capitulaires en Turquie.

Dès 1675, la Grande-Bretagne, désireuse d'assurer à ses ressortissants le bénéfice du régime capitulaire, faisait insérer dans les Capitulations données par le Sultan Mehemed que les sujets de Sa Majesté britannique jouiraient des privilèges accordés aux Rois et Souverains de France, Venise et Pologne. Cette situation, dont le principe est rappelé dans l'acte du Sultan Mehemed, trouve une confirmation expresse dans les traités de 1621, 1672, 1679 et 1699.

Cette situation de droit public demeure entière. Car la Turquie, qui, on le sait, n'a jamais reconnu les partages de la Pologne, n'a jamais, non plus, considéré comme abrogés les traités anciennement conclus par elle avec la Sérénissime République.

Ce point de vue, enfin, semble être également celui des grandes Puissances capitulaires. Qu'il soit permis de signaler que dans un recueil publié en 1875 par Edward Hertslet, Bibliothécaire et Conservateur des Archives du Foreign Office (Londres, Butterworths, 1875, in-8°) donnant le texte des traités et tarifs régissant le commerce de la Grande-Bretagne et des Puissances étrangères, contenant des stipulations dont la Grande-Bretagne invoque le bénéfice en vertu de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée, il est fait état des traités entre la Pologne et la Sublime Porte, avec citation des textes que la Grande-Bretagne invoque pour en réclamer également l'application au bénéfice des sujets britanniques. On retrouvera notamment, dans ce recueil, à la page 8, le rappel des privilèges capitulaires concédés aux Rois et Souverains de Pologne. De même encore à la page 81 de ce recueil, on peut constater que les traités entre la Pologne et la Turquie sont cités comme étant de ceux qui étaient en vigueur le 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1875.

Cette situation de fait et de droit constitue un titre suffisant pour justifier la réintégration de la Pologne, redevenue indépendante, dans ses droits de Puissance jouissant du bénéfice des Capitulations en Turquie. En conséquence, la Délégation polonaise a l'honneur de proposer que, dans le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, il soit fait état de cette situation par la reconnaissance du principe que les ressortissants polonais résidant en Turquie jouissent de tous les privilèges et sauvegardes découlant



du régime des Capitulations, et que les consuls de Pologne en Turquie ont qualité pour assurer l'application de ces privilèges et sauvegardes dans les mêmes formes, conditions et limites que les consuls des autres Puissances jouissant *ab antiquo* du bénéfice des Capitulations dans l'Empire ottoman.

M. ZAMOYSKI

[E 2998/1729/44]

No. 170.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 10.)

Sir,

War Office, April 9, 1920.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 1st April relative to the Allied Controls which have been necessitated by the technical occupation of Constantinople, I am to attach, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, copy of telegram No. I. 8340 dated the 28th March, which has been received from General Milne.

I am to say that the Army Council anticipate that Lord Curzon will concur that as a *modus vivendi* appears to have been established, there is at present no necessity to telegraph to the High Commissioner nor to General Milne in the sense suggested.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure in No. 170.

General Headquarters, Constantinople, to War Office.

(No. I. 8340. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

(Paraphrase.)

Constantinople, March 28, 1920.

MY I. 8309 of 22nd March.

French and Italians have now detached their representatives, and these have now commenced to take part in Inter-Allied Control. This is subject to approval by French and Italian Governments of principle that Commission of Control shall be under my direction, and that Presidents of Commissions shall be British representatives.

[E 3070/134/58]

No. 171.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis).

(No. 156.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 11, 1920.

ON Thursday I saw an Armenian deputation, consisting of Boghos Nubar Pasha, the Archbishop of Erivan, and M. Aharonian, and, while explaining steps which we were taking for creation of an independent Armenia, spoke to them in the strongest possible manner about foolish and indefensible conduct of their compatriots on north-eastern frontiers of Armenia. I read out detailed list of outrages committed since beginning of year by Armenians on one hand and Tartars on other, showing a heavy balance against Armenians, and told them that we were not at all keen about giving them arms to fight Turks, which they would almost certainly use to fight Azerbaijan. I said that there was very little chance of League of Nations, or anyone else, consenting to look after Armenia in future if they showed such complete instability and love of disorder, and that their only chance was to stop these proceedings and carry out the agreement of November last. I further said that my idea would be to appoint military commissions to demarcate boundaries with Georgia and Azerbaijan after Peace Treaty with Turkey was signed, and that till then it was essential that peace should be maintained. Boghos promised to telegraph at once in strongest terms to Erivan.

[E 3072/3/44]

No. 172.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 12.)

(No. 372.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, April 11, 1920.

MY telegram No. 340 of 5th April.

Ferid visited me on 7th April; record of interview is on the way to you. Main subject of conversation was question of proposed measures to repress so-called national movement.

Ferid said Government would use full moral influence, but force would be necessary against those who still remained recalcitrant.

Anti-Nationalist movement, organised by one Anzavour in area south of Marmora, is first weapon to hand of Government; it has had considerable local success. Anzavour occupied Panderma some days ago. Now Government have legalised his position by giving him the status of Governor of Balikeser.

Germ of similar movement exists in region between Gulfs of Guenlek and Ismid.

Ferid wants to know how far Allies will support Government in organising and utilising these movements. I have held out no hope of active British co-operation in operations against national forces in Asia Minor. I have, however, taken sympathetic view, and request that we should enable Government to make the best use of movements by allowing military material to be used for equipping anti-Nationalist forces.

This is most immediate question. Others will follow, e.g., question of permission of movement of any regular troops whose loyalty Government may be able to command. In all these matters I propose to observe principle that new Government is entitled to full Allied support (short of armed co-operation) in reasonable efforts to repress Nationalists, who continue to defy its authority.

General Milne is most immediately concerned in matter of giving permission for the use of military material and movement of troops. He agrees generally with my views, and is prepared to act on principle stated in preceding paragraph, provided I, as High Commissioner, give necessary authority. I have definitely requested him to do so.

As regards other High Commissioners, I am proceeding on the principle that they must be kept generally informed and given opportunity of expressing views, but that so far as Constantinople and Anatolia are concerned, carrying out of above programme, which is logical outcome of policy of Supreme Council, rests primarily with us in the same way that it rests with French in and north of Cilicia.

Leader of inchoate movement in the region between Gulfs of Guenlek and Ismid at present looks to us for guidance. I am inviting him indirectly to collaborate with Government and Anzavour. I hope in this way whole of Asiatic shore of Marmora would be secured.

There remains peninsula between Gulf of Ismid and Black Sea, which Nationalists are making vigorous efforts to penetrate. I am asking General Milne to study the question of how this shore should be protected in order that Nationalists may be held off Constantinople on every side. Their movement will thus be confined to the interior of Anatolia and Black Sea coast, which latter we can dominate from sea in case of necessity.

[E 3109/131/44]

No. 173.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

Dear Lord Curzon,

Jerusalem (Steamship "Helonan"), April 2, 1920.

AFTER two months in Palestine, I have now concluded my visit there. I received a fortnight ago from the Emir Feisal, whom I had met several times in London, a friendly invitation to go on to Damascus and to stay with him. On personal grounds I should have been glad to accept it, but at the present juncture I thought it inexpedient. I have written a short report, addressed to Lord Allenby, on the administrative and financial matters relating to Palestine, on which he had invited me to advise. No doubt he will forward a copy to the Foreign Office. I have left with General Bols, the Chief Administrator, memoranda in greater detail on several specific points. This letter gives a summary of the conclusions I have formed on the political situation in Palestine, particularly with reference to the declarations of the Syrian



Congress at Damascus on the 8th March in favour of an independent and united Syria, to include Palestine, under the kingship of Feisal.

The movement in Palestine for its union with Syria springs from several sources.

There is a natural patriotic sentiment among the small class of politically conscious Arabs in favour of an independent Arabia, which should be as extensive and as important as possible.

There is a feeling that to insert economic divisions between neighbouring countries, which have hitherto been under a single Government, would cause much inconvenience and would be a retrograde step. Commerce and travel between Palestine, the Hauran and Syria have hitherto been untrammelled by frontiers, and there is a resistance to the economic inconveniences that would be likely to follow from political separation.

There is an anti-Zionist movement, based largely upon the anticipation that a large Jewish immigration would lead to the reduction of the rest of the population to a lower status. A united and independent Syria is regarded as the only means of combating Zionism.

There is a personal interest of the effendi class in Palestine which expects that the administrative posts under an independent Government would be filled by its own members, to a far greater degree than under a British mandate, particularly if it were combined with a Zionist policy.

There is also a social question in Palestine, the fellahs and the effendis being in antagonism to one another. The latter fear the consequences of any Government which they did not control being in a position to exact social legislation.

All these motives combine to foster the movement. It is certain, nevertheless, that it is not deep-seated. The mass of the population is not concerned with any question of general politics. Moreover, the fellahs view with suspicion any movement which is organised by the effendis, simply for the reason that it is so organised. As to anti-Zionism, the most hopeful feature in the situation lies in the fact that there is no antipathy, and remarkably little friction, between the Jewish agricultural colonies, founded in considerable numbers during the last thirty or forty years in many parts of the country, and their Arab neighbours. On the contrary, their relations, as a rule, are excellent. The Arab villagers know that they have been able to improve their methods of cultivation owing to the object-lessons furnished by the Jewish colonies. They know that there is more employment in the districts where those colonies have been founded, and that they themselves are in better circumstances than the Arabs in other districts that have been left undeveloped. When I was in Northern Galilee, a number of the sheikhs came in from the villages to tell me that they lived on the best of terms with the Jewish population, and that they disassociated themselves from the anti-Zionist meetings that had recently taken place in the towns. It is, indeed, only in the towns that the movement exists, and there the numbers that have attended the meetings have not, as a rule, been considerable. There is no evidence of anything in the nature of a widespread and formidable national movement against Zionism. The declarations of the Syrian Congress are said to have disturbed the Christian elements which had combined with Moslems to oppose Zionism. The Christians of Palestine would not at all welcome the prospect of being the subjects of an independent Moslem King, and it is reported that the unity of the Christian and Moslem Society is being impaired as the result of the policy announced at Damascus.

The Administration at Jerusalem took an alarmist view of the probable results of the Syrian Congress and the coronation of Feisal. Those events had been preceded by the collection of quantities of foodstuffs at Damascus, by the enrolment of bodies of soldiers, by aggressive action by Mustapha Kemal against the French forces in Cilicia and by the holding of anti-Zionist meetings in Jerusalem and Jaffa. They were immediately followed by reports being received in Jerusalem that the Arab army had taken the field and had occupied Latakia and strategic points commanding the Lebanon. The officers of the Administration accept, for the most part, the Zionist policy because it has been adopted by His Majesty's Government, whose servants they are, and not with any conviction of the wisdom of that policy. They had regarded rather more seriously than they deserved the anti-Zionist manifestations which had taken place. The view was held that there was an immediate prospect of grave trouble; military precautionary measures were adopted; the immediate recognition, under certain conditions, of Feisal as King of a united Syria was advised; failing that, large reinforcements of troops were asked for.

I feel convinced that no one would have been more surprised than Feisal himself and his chief supporters had he been recognised by the Powers, no matter under what conditions, as King of Palestine - unless, indeed, it were population of Palestine itself.

Such a prospect has not yet, I believe, been regarded by them as within the bounds of serious consideration. Feisal, I am told, has never even set foot in Palestine. It is universally known, and not denied, by the Arab Nationalist leaders that the Syrian Congress was quite unrepresentative of the populations both of Palestine and of Mesopotamia.

Nevertheless, it would, I am convinced, be neither just nor politic to ignore the claims of the Arabs and to oppose a mere negative to their demands.

On the supporters of Zionism lies the duty to allay apprehension by not being over-eager in the execution of their policy, and by offering to the Moslem and Christian inhabitants of Palestine opportunities of participating in their enterprises. In the course of a statement on the economic condition of Palestine, which I have sent to the local press, I have tried to remove misunderstandings as to what the proposals of Zionism, in relation to the rest of the population, really are.

But it is obvious that Zionist moderation and Zionist explanations are not enough. Although the attitude of the Administration a few weeks ago has been proved by experience to have been unduly alarmist, it is very probable that a merely negative attitude on the part of the Peace Conference would be met before long by some kind of armed action on the part of the Arabs. Their resources are small and their forces are weak, but it is none the less an obvious duty to take all reasonable measures to avoid the possibility of a conflict.

Besides, there is substance in part, at least, of the arguments that are advanced for a united Syria. It cannot be denied that the establishment of customs and other barriers between the various parts of Syria would cause inconvenience to its inhabitants and would be detrimental to its prosperity. It is true that it would be wrong to create an Arab State without access to the sea. It is true that Arab patriotic sentiment, to such extent as it exists, ought to be respected and, so far as possible, satisfied.

But to meet these contentions by the recognition of Feisal as King of Palestine appears to me to be both objectionable and unnecessary. To combine such recognition as has been suggested with the maintenance of a completely British control over the Administration would be found, I believe, to be impracticable. If not at first, certainly in a few years, the Arab Kingship would be used as a means of introducing, in larger and larger degree, Arab administrators into the higher offices of the Government, and of ensuring the adoption of a policy hostile to all non-Arab aspirations. It would be a very powerful lever for those ends.

The moral effect upon Zionism, if not fatal, would be most grave. Jews throughout the world would no longer be willing to devote their energies, their money, their lives, to the development of a country which might ultimately prove to be nothing better than one province among others of an unprogressive Moslem State. They can understand a British Administration, under a mandate, responsible to the League of Nations, leading up, in course of time, to a self-governing Commonwealth. They are willing to take the risk that such a Commonwealth, when it comes, would prove to be satisfactory. But a British Administration under Arab sovereignty would be a very different thing. At any time the course of events, locally or in Europe, might lead the British to withdraw, leaving the Arab element supreme. Then it would be Turkey over again. Such a solution would give no permanence, no security. It would take the heart out of Zionism. The movement would feel that it had been betrayed. Is it possible to find a method which would be likely to satisfy what is legitimate in the Arab demands, while avoiding the dangers and disasters which their full acceptance would entail? I believe it is. I think the solution lies in the formation of a loose confederation of the Arab-speaking States, each of which should be under its own appropriate Government, but all of which should be combined together for common and economic purposes. The seat of such a confederation should be Damascus, and Feisal might be recognised, not only as sovereign in his own State, but also as the honorary head of the confederation.

At the risk of repeating a proposal which may have already been under discussion, and may perhaps have been elaborated by others in fuller detail, I venture to append to this letter the outline of a scheme such as I have in mind. I believe that, if such a plan were approved by the Powers, a firm attitude on their part would secure its acceptance by the Arabs, and so a prospect be offered of an escape from the present impasse, with all the risks of conflict which its continuance would involve.

Believe me, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL.



Enclosure 1 in No. 173.

*Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and the Arabian States.*

THE following proposals are suggested for consideration :—

1. Five States to be constituted, which should form a loose confederation :—
  - (a.) Arab Syria, with its capital at Damascus and with Emir Feisal as its sovereign. This State should be completely independent. Its ruler should have the right to select European advisers wherever he wished, but, if the French so desired, both Britain and France might undertake not to allow their nationals to accept such posts.
  - (b.) Western Syria, administered by France under a mandate and subject to the general supervision of the League of Nations. If the French would consent, the sovereignty of Feisal might be recognised in this area. If not, not.
  - (c.) Palestine, administered by Great Britain under a mandate and subject to the general supervision of the League of Nations. The boundaries of Palestine to be those proposed by the War Office. The mandate to embody provisions relating to the Jewish National Home, which should be satisfactory to the Zionists. The sovereignty of Feisal would not be recognised in this area.
  - (d.) The Hedjaz, independent, under the sovereignty of King Hussein, who should be free to choose his European advisers as he wished. If the other South Arabian principalities could be formed into some kind of union with the Hedjaz, that would be desirable. If not, they might constitute separate units in the confederation or they might be left outside.
  - (e.) Mesopotamia, under British administration and, if desired, under an Arab sovereign. If it were decided to constitute a more purely British State at Basra and the neighbourhood, such a State might form a sixth unit.
2. To supervise the common affairs of the whole area there should be a permanent council, under some suitable title, with its seat at Damascus. It should consist of one or more representatives of each of the constituent States. Its chairman should be appointed by the League of Nations. If desired, it might be under the honorary presidency of the Emir Feisal.
3. The constituent States should engage not to make war with each other, but otherwise the union should be principally economic, and not political :—
  - (a.) There should be no customs barriers between them, and it should be one of the chief tasks of the council at Damascus to arrive at an equitable allocation of the customs revenues collected, at a uniform rate, at the ports and frontiers of the confederation.
  - (b.) The States not bordering on the sea should have the use of all the ports on equal terms with the States within whose area those ports were situated.
  - (c.) The council should exercise a general supervision over inter-State railway traffic in order to ensure co-ordination.
  - (d.) There should be no passport requirements for travellers between one State and another. The council should supervise the arrangements for extradition between the States.
  - (e.) The council should supervise also the measures for quarantine, &c.
4. In the event of the council not being able to arrive at a settlement of any matter which was in controversy among its members, reference should be made to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision should be final.
5. All these arrangements should be subject to review by the League of Nations after a period of years. (It is desirable that the period should not be a short one.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 173.

*Communication by the Right Honourable Herbert Samuel to the Press.*

I AM at the point of leaving Palestine after two months' stay in this fascinating country and, in answer to invitations from representatives of the press, I desire to make a few observations on the conditions as I have found them.

I can well understand the spell which Palestine throws over so many of its visitors. Its great historic traditions are combined with a beauty of scenery and, save under exceptional conditions, with climatic attractions which together make a unique appeal.

*Economic Development.*

I had studied the economic conditions of Palestine for some time before coming here, and my visits to various parts of the country and conversations with many of its residents whose judgments are entitled to carry weight confirm me in the view that I had formed as to the great possibilities of its development.

The country, taken as a whole, is undoubtedly under-populated and under-cultivated. With a proper equipment of roads, railways and harbours its prosperity is capable of great expansion. With modern methods of irrigation and of dry farming the question of water supply presents no grave obstacle. Now that the cause of malaria is known and the methods of its prevention established, the great hindrance to the well-being of the population of Palestine could be diminished and finally removed with no serious difficulty. The water-power of the Upper Jordan is sufficient to provide adequate electric force for all parts of the country, and its provision in the towns and villages would enable numbers of industries to be established with success. In addition, a variety of artistic handicrafts could find a home here. Now that railway communication has been established with Egypt, the tourist traffic will undoubtedly show a very great extension.

Meantime, the chief obstacle to the development of the country, apart from the difficulties of communication, which still continue as a consequence of the war, is the very excessive cost of living, causing not only an increase in the cost of building and of production generally, but also much hardship to the people. The Administration of Palestine is making the most active efforts to secure additional supplies of the principal foodstuffs from elsewhere with a view to bringing down the high prices.

*Financial Position.*

The financial position of the country is satisfactory. The growth of prosperity is already bringing an increase of revenue without any increase having been effected in the rates of taxation. Owing to the more careful collection of taxes and efficient management of revenue, the financial position allows a considerable increase, in the twelve months beginning on the 1st April, in the expenditure upon the maintenance of public security and upon safeguarding the public health. In addition it will permit a sufficient sum of money to be provided to repay the interest and the necessary instalments for repayment of a loan. Such a loan would be devoted to providing considerable sums for the construction and rebuilding of roads, for the development of postal, telegraph and telephone services, and for the erection of a number of buildings that are necessary. It is hoped to put these enterprises in hand within the next few months. The financial prospects of the railways also are satisfactory, and they too will be able to provide the resources that would justify the borrowing of money for those purposes that are urgently necessary. These include, among others, the strengthening of the line to prevent a recurrence of the wash-outs that caused such serious interruptions during the last few months, widening the line from Jaffa to Ludd, and the provision of additional rolling stock.

It is hoped that further increases in the general revenues of the country will enable a considerable extension to be effected in the provision for education, and would also allow other loans to be contracted for additional public works.

The establishment of one or more land banks or mortgage banks, to enable long-term loans to be advanced to agriculturists and others, is receiving active consideration.

*Political Situation.*

But all this work of development depends absolutely upon the maintenance of a settled, efficient and honest Government. That is the first condition for the growth of revenue and for the introduction of capital. It will be quite impossible to arrange the loans that are urgently needed for the many purposes that I have specified unless a Government exists in Palestine in which there is confidence. Only when a satisfactory solution of the question of the political status of Palestine is reached by the Peace Conference will it be possible for the economic development of the country effectively to proceed.



Nor is it necessary only that the Government of the country should be a good one. It is also essential that the various sections of the population should work together. That this is possible has often been shown, most recently in the establishment of that excellent society, "The Pro-Jerusalem," the object of which is to preserve the beauties and increase the attractions of the ancient and glorious city.

#### *The Question of Zionism.*

I have observed during my stay in Palestine the manifestations that have taken place in opposition to Zionism. They are not, in my opinion, seriously disturbing, because they are based very largely on a false idea of what Zionism is. They have assumed that the Mahomedan and Christian population are to be placed under the Government of the Jewish minority. They assume that the present possessors and cultivators of the soil may be dispossessed of their property. They assume that the ownership of the Mahomedan and Christian holy places will be affected. They assume that the administrative offices will be filled by Jews to the prejudice of others. These assumptions are untrue. Although not a member of the Zionist organisation, I am fully acquainted with its policy, and I know that none of these ideas are entertained by it. I know also that, even if they were, the British Government would never permit the adoption of such policies. I do not feel anxious, therefore, at these manifestations of hostility, because it is certain that a movement that rests upon errors cannot endure. When it is found that none of the evils which are anticipated do in fact take place, the opinion of those who now take part in such manifestations cannot fail to change.

There is ample room in Palestine for a far larger population than now exists, and those who come will arrive gradually as the conditions of the country allow; they will not be a pauper class to be a burden upon the rest, but of the same industrious progressive type as those who in the last thirty or forty years have founded the Jewish colonies in various parts of the country. They will bring with them capital which will help to promote the prosperity of the whole country, to the advantage of all its inhabitants. No one who visits the districts in which these colonies are found can doubt that if they had never been established the country as a whole would now be much the poorer; if more were established, the country would in the future be so much the richer. I have been struck by the fact, during my visits to various parts of the country, that the opposition to Zionism does not go deep. The sheikhs and fellaheen in the villages round the colonies live on the best possible terms with their neighbours. I was much impressed, on the occasion of my recent visit to Northern Galilee, by the fact that a considerable number of the sheikhs came to see me to express their goodwill towards the colonies that have been established, and assured me that their advent had enabled the neighbouring Arab villages to grow richer by giving a model for the improvement in their systems of agriculture and by increasing the amount of employment in the district. They informed me that in the Arab villages there was no opposition whatever to further immigration on similar lines.

I am strongly of opinion, and I know it is shared by the leaders of the Zionist movement, that that movement will fail in its purpose if it is not able to show that it has been of real benefit to the existing Mahomedan and Christian population of the country. They should be given a full opportunity to share in the new enterprises that are set on foot, should be helped in their educational efforts, and should be recognised as an integral and permanent element in the Palestine which is to be brought into being.

Of this also I am convinced, that it is only a policy upon these lines which would command the approval of the British Government, which in every part of the world stands immovably for equal justice to all.

I will end by expressing my very cordial thanks to all who have contributed to make my stay in Palestine an exceedingly agreeable one. I have met with nothing but kindness and courtesy from all sections of the population with which it has been my privilege to have been brought into contact in all the parts of the country that I have been enabled to visit.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

March 25, 1920.

[E 2998/1729/44]

No. 174.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 13, 1920.*

IN reply to your letter of the 9th instant relative to the Allied Controls established at Constantinople, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state, for the information of the Army Council, that after perusal of General Milne's telegram No. I. 8340 of the 28th ultimo, his Lordship does not feel able to share the view of the Army Council that an agreement has already been reached with the French and Italians. It is clear from the telegram referred to that the presidency of each of the Commissions of Control is still held by a British officer, and this, as will be recollected, is the chief subject of the French and Italian protest reported by His Majesty's High Commissioner in his telegrams Nos. 276 and 277 of the 24th ultimo.

2. I am to state that, as General Franchet d'Esperey has now been withdrawn, there is, in Lord Curzon's opinion, an additional reason for making a concession to the French authorities, and less reason to fear that any concession so made will be used to the disadvantage of His Majesty's Government.

3. I am to add that, inasmuch as this is not a purely military question, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs attaches importance to it from the political point of view, and would request that it may be reconsidered by the Army Council in the light of the considerations advanced above.

4. In view of the importance of arriving at an early settlement, I am to request that the decision of the Army Council may be communicated to this Department as soon as possible.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 3072/3/44]

No. 175.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 13, 1920.*

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to forward herewith, for the information of the Army Council, copy of a telegram\* in which His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople outlines the measure of support which, after consultation with General Milne, he suggests should be given to the Government of Damad Ferid Pasha.

2. It will, in Lord Curzon's opinion, be necessary for Admiral de Robeck to abstain carefully from raising in the mind of Damad Ferid Pasha expectations of a lenient treaty which His Majesty's Government will not be in a position to fulfil, and which may lead him subsequently to accuse His Majesty's Government of ill-faith. Subject, however, to this and to any observations which the Army Council may have to offer, Lord Curzon proposes to approve the policy put forward by Admiral de Robeck in the enclosed telegram.

3. I am to request that Lord Curzon may be favoured, as early as possible, with the views of the Army Council upon this matter.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 2075/757/44]

No. 176.

*Earl Curzon to Signor Preziosi.†*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 14, 1920.*

IN a communication dated the 23rd March the Swiss Minister at this Court addressed to me a request, on behalf of his Government, that there should be Swiss representation on the new Council of the Ottoman Debt, in view of the important Swiss interests involved in Turkish finances.

\* See No. 172.

† Also to M. Cambon.



2. You will have in mind that at the conference of foreign Ministers and Ambassadors held in London on the 31st March it was not found advisable to accede to a similar request on the part of the Belgian Government.

3. The case against the inclusion of representatives of Switzerland on the Council of the Ottoman Debt, and consequently on the Financial Commission which may be set up under the treaty as well, seems at least as strong as in the case of Belgium. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government the inclusion in these bodies of a member of any small State would create an undesirable precedent, since it would be difficult to refuse any similar requests which would doubtless be made by Greece or other small countries. The increase in the size of the two bodies would certainly result in a consequent decrease in their efficiency.

4. In regard to the particular claims of Switzerland to representation on the Debt Council, it may be observed that the Swiss Government were not a party to the Decree of Muharrem, which provided that only the Great Powers signatory to the Treaty of Berlin should have a seat on the Council Board. Moreover, as Swiss interests are identical with the interests of French and British bondholders, which, in their turn, are represented by the French and British members of the Council, it cannot be argued that Swiss holdings do in any way suffer. Further, as the clauses of the coming treaty will provide for the disappearance of the Council in 1923, it would appear unnecessary, as well as undesirable, to modify the decree and add to the number of the Council at this juncture. (This latter reason cannot of course be communicated to the Swiss Government.)

5. The object of the Financial Commission, on the other hand, will be, above all, so to administer and control Turkish finances as to ensure a sound economic development of the country. There is therefore no greater reason for Swiss than for Dutch, Greek, or Swedish representation.

6. Should the Financial Commission on its appointment desire the assistance of foreign experts, the selection of one or more Swiss experts may be found advantageous, but no valid reason is at present apparent for altering the financial clauses of the treaty so as to include a Swiss nominee on the commission, in addition to the French, Italian and British representatives.

7. I should be grateful if you would be so good as to communicate the foregoing views of His Majesty's Government to the Italian Government, and inform me in due course whether they concur therein.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 3226/3/44]

No. 177.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 416.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 28, 1920.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 373 of the 18th March regarding the military occupation of Constantinople, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a joint note, dated the 26th March, which has been addressed by the Allied High Commissioners to the Grand Vizier, demanding the immediate disavowal by the Imperial Ottoman Government of Mustapha Kemal Pasha and the leaders of the "Nationalist" movement.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 177.

*Note addressed by Allied High Commissioners to Turkish Grand Vizier.*

DANS la note collective adressée à votre Altesse du 16 courant pour lui annoncer la décision du Conseil suprême au sujet de l'occupation militaire de Constantinople, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont déclaré qu'ils étaient chargés d'exiger que le Gouvernement ottoman désavoue immédiatement Moustapha Kemal Pacha ainsi que les autres dirigeants du mouvement soi-disant "nationaliste."

La note responsive de votre Altesse en date du 17 mars n'a donnée qu'une satisfaction très partielle à cette demande. Ce qui est encore plus important, le Gouvernement ottoman n'a rien fait depuis le 16 mars pour désavouer publiquement les chefs du mouvement dit nationaliste.

Les Hauts-Commissaires ont l'honneur de signaler encore une fois à l'attention de votre Altesse qu'il s'agit en l'espèce d'une demande basée sur une décision formelle du Conseil suprême, décision que les Hauts-Commissaires n'ont qualité ni pour retirer ni pour atténuer. Ils croient donc de leur devoir d'inviter le Gouvernement impérial de se conformer à cette demande sans plus retard, en désavouant publiquement et sans équivoques Moustapha Kemal Pacha et les autres dirigeants du mouvement en question.

A. DEFRANCE.

J. M. DE ROBECK.

MAISSA.

*Constantinople, le 26 mars 1920.*

[E 3265/3/44]

No. 178.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 15.)*

(No. 390.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, April 15, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 372 of 11th April.

Government issued proclamation on 10th April condemning in unmeasured terms those who, under false cloak of nationalism, intensified disastrous results of policy which dragged Turkey into war. Proclamation gives rank and file one week in which to make submission to Sultan, and threatens leaders and those who persist with condign punishment.

It further expressly threatens with chastisement excesses by Moslems against Christians or *vice versa*.

Government publish simultaneously series of fetvas or religious pronouncements directed against Nationalists.

Effect in interior is expected to be considerable if only these pronouncements can be brought to knowledge of people. Government are considering best means of doing this. I have promised such assistance as I can give.

Translations follow by bag.

Parliament was dissolved on 12th April without incident. Government, adhering to text of Constitution, promises new election within four months. Reports from Panderma show that Anzavur is moving, but no definite news of progress is yet available.

News from Nationalist side still very vague, but striking developments in interior are not improbable.

[E 3308/289/44]

No. 179.

*M. Gavrilovitch to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 16.)*

LE délégué du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes à Constantinople vient d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement royal sur la situation de plus en plus difficile de ses nationaux résidant en Turquie, et sur la nécessité qu'il y aurait de les faire bénéficier, dès à présent et sans attendre la conclusion de la paix, du régime des capitulations.

En effet, dans une note, adressée par les Hauts-Commissaires alliés à la Haute-Porte, il est dit que "les sujets belges, hellènes, monténégrins, roumains et serbes gardent la plénitude des droits que les traités de leurs pays respectifs leur garantissent avec l'Empire ottoman en fait de régime capitulaire"; de façon que les conventions consulaires conclues avant la guerre entre l'ancien Royaume de Serbie et la Turquie sont considérées être en vigueur. Les tribunaux ottomans s'arrogent donc le droit de faire comparaître devant eux les sujets serbo-croato-slovènes, ou bien les jugent par contumace.

Sans insister sur l'anomalie de voir juger les sujets d'un pays allié et vainqueur par les autorités d'un pays ennemi, occupé par les forces alliées, ni sur le fait que la



plupart de ces personnes jouissaient, en tant qu'anciens sujets autrichiens, des faveurs du régime capitulaire—dont elles se voient privées depuis qu'elles sont devenues sujets serbo-croato-slovenes—it est impossible de méconnaître la gravité d'intérêts du royaume lésés par cet état de choses. Les autorités turques saisissent chaque occasion pour créer de nouvelles difficultés, et il est à craindre que des ressortissants serbo-croato-slovenes se voient forcés de demander la naturalisation, à seule fin d'éviter les innombrables chicanes. Le commerce se heurte à des obstacles insurmontables; le rôle des consulats, incapables de protéger leurs nationaux, devient illusoire, et le prestige même du royaume s'en trouve sérieusement atteint.

En portant ce qui précède à la connaissance de son Excellence Earl Curzon of Kedleston, le Ministre plénipotentiaire et Envoyé extraordinaire du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovenes, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, a l'honneur de le prier de bien vouloir envoyer les instructions nécessaires aux délégués britanniques à la Conférence de la Paix, en vue d'appuyer le projet d'application immédiate du régime capitulaire à tous les sujets serbo-croato-slovenes résidant en Turquie.

*Légation du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovenes,  
Londres, le 15 avril 1920.*

[E 3415/3/44]

No. 180.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 19.)*

Sir,

*War Office, April 17, 1920.*

I AM directed by the Army Council to acknowledge the receipt of Foreign Office letter No. E 3072/3/44 of the 13th April, 1920.

It is noted that the British High Commissioner at Constantinople has given authority to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief to permit the use of Turkish military material to equip anti-Nationalist forces, and to move certain regular troops.

In this policy the Army Council concurs.

In view, however, of difficulties that may arise after the presentation of the Turkish Peace Treaty, it would seem possible that the distribution of arms to irregular bands might later lead to further trouble. Such bands are under no very definite control, and might well disappear or even join the opposing forces under certain circumstances.

I am to say accordingly that if force is to be used against the Nationalists, it would seem preferable to the Army Council to permit the employment of Turkish regular troops, which under all circumstances can be more easily controlled from Constantinople than irregular bands.

I am, &c.  
B. B. CUBITT.

[E 3487/3/44]

No. 181.

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)*

(No. 413.)

(Telegraphic)

*Constantinople, April 18, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 255 of 20th March.

Dr. Kennedy has arrived from Mersina. He left Adana on 6th April. He estimates total French force in Cilicia at from 15,000 to 20,000; all black troops except a few non-commissioned officers. All wives and families of French officers have been evacuated.

Owing to poor quality of black troops and neutral attitude of their commanders, military prestige at low ebb, and French officers spoke openly of possibility of evacuation of Cilicia. Turks openly deride French, and Armenians have no confidence that they will not be again abandoned to their fate as at Marakesh. Colonel Beemond, while thinking it probable that situation would not be disturbed at Adana, could give no assurances, and suggested to Dr. Kennedy to send to Mersina all orphans who can be accommodated there with a view to evacuation to Cyprus or Egypt.

French authorities show very little interest in Armenians, and seem most anxious to get rid of as many as possible, General Gouraud having offered, on behalf of French Government, to supply necessary shipping.

Dr. Kennedy considers, and I concur, that evacuation of these people, who are indigenous to Cilicia, should be prevented if possible.

Following appears to be situation derived from various sources:—

Hadjin: Town closely invested, but Nationalist bands quiet. Women and children have not been evacuated. No news since 8th March.

Sis: French Governor still there, and possibly a small French force. Town closely invested.

Bozanti: French garrison besieged, and Turks hold south end of Tanrus Tunnel. Tunnel said to be blocked by derailed engine and tender.

Adana-Mersina Railway, although threatened by Nationalist bands, was only guarded by untrustworthy Turkish gendarmes. Large numbers of latter have deserted with arms and equipment. Adana may thus at any moment find itself cut off.

Villages on coast road between Mersina and Selefke, which were occupied by Nationalist bands, were recently shelled by a French force and French gunboat. Otherwise French seem to have acted entirely on defensive in Cilicia, except when necessary to open road for withdrawal of outlying detachments.

Ekbez: Village burnt, including monastery.

Marakesh: No news since 16th March.

Aintab: Heavy fighting for several days. Part of French garrison evacuated, but 1,200 Senegalese remained. Turks attacking force estimated at 12,000.

Armenian quarter attacked, with casualties on both sides; no assistance, except ammunition, being rendered by French garrison.

On 12th April three or four French battalions were to leave Killis for Aintab, with aeroplanes, armoured cars and artillery.

[E 3495/1729/44]

No. 182.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 20.)*

Sir,

*War Office, April 19, 1920.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward herewith a copy of a telegram from the War Office to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Constantinople, dated the 16th April, 1920, relating to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Constantinople, which is believed to be in accordance with the views of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

A similar letter has been sent to the Admiralty.

I am, &c.  
B. B. CUBITT.

*Enclosure in No. 182.*

*War Office to General Milne, Constantinople.*

(Telegraphic.)

*London, April 16, 1920.*

INTER-ALLIED control. Your I. 8340 dated 28th March.

Foreign Office refer to High Commissioner's telegrams Nos. 276 and 277, dated 24th March, and consider this is largely a political question, and are not satisfied that an agreement has been reached with French and Italians. Provided that War Office commission is under British president and that British officer has place on each of the other commissions, Foreign Office agree to commissions being inter-Allied. Provided High Commissioner has no objection, Admiralty also agree.

Please arrange accordingly, and report in due course by which Powers presidencies of Admiralty and Posts and Telegraphs are assumed.



[E 3415/3/44]

No. 183.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 355.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, April 20, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 372 of 11th April: Measures against Nationalists.

Your proposals for supporting present Turkish Government are approved, subject to following two considerations:—

Firstly, War Office consider that, whenever possible, Turkish regulars, being more easy to control, should be employed rather than Turkish irregulars.

Secondly, we must be careful not to raise in mind of Damad Ferid expectations of a lenient treaty which we shall not be in a position to fulfil, and which may lead him to accuse us of perfidy later on.

[E 3540/3/44]

No. 184.

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 21.)*

(No. 420.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, April 20, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 372 of 11th April.

Anzavour anti-Nationalist movement in Panderma area has collapsed, and Nationalists have again occupied town above named.

Anzavour had moved from Panderma via Michalich to Kirmasti, apparent intention being to occupy Brussa. On 16th instant his force was attacked at Kirmasti and suffered severe reverse, losing considerable number of prisoners. Anzavour retired to Panderma with 500 men, remainder of his force splitting up and moving further west.

By 19th instant Nationalist forces (including apparently bulk of 61st Regular Turkish Division from Balikesir and of 56th Division from Brussa) had occupied Panderma with some 3,000 men. Other detachments, about 2,000 strong in all, moved on Edinjik and Erdek.

Anzavour is believed to have gone towards Bigha, and in Dardanelles his forces have been broken up, and there seems no possibility of him [*sic*] being able to organise any further movement against Nationalists for some time to come, if ever.

Grand Vizier was arranging to send him supplies of rifles and ammunition from here provided with General Milne's consent, but for various reasons these were not sent in time before he had been defeated.

[E 3617/1/58]

No. 185.

*Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon (San Remo).*

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, April 21, 1920.*

QUESTION of Caucasus has become acute owing to fact that 30,000 Cossacks are being pursued along coast towards Batoum by Soviet troops, which are being shelled by our naval units in Black Sea. Tchitcherin telegraphs this through Reval, adding he assumes you have not received his telegram of 14th April. It is confirmed by Admiralty.

Might we not point out to him that in your telegram of 17th April you stated clearly that failing acceptance of mediation and suspension of southern offensive His Majesty's Government would be obliged to order His Majesty's ships in Black Sea to protect army in Crimea; that this applies equally to remnants of forces in Caucasus; that His Majesty's Government are asking Georgian Government not to molest these forces, but to give them asylum in Georgian territory, should necessity arise, pending arrangements to evacuate them to Crimea; that His Majesty's Government are temporarily responsible for administration of Batoum Province, and will not hesitate to use force to maintain order therein; and that any conflict between British forces engaged in this duty and Soviet forces would have disastrous effect on British public opinion and on pending economic negotiations? At the same time I would suggest telegraphing to Georgian Government asking them to give refuge to these Cossacks pending early arrangements for their evacuation from Poti or most convenient port.

Question also arises of adequate defence of Batoum. War Office enquire whether we accept full responsibility for defence of Batoum at all costs, i.e., at risk of garrison. Latter would have to be reinforced from Constantinople, where we are already dangerously weak. There is no sign of any French or Italian reinforcements yet. Perhaps you could press for their immediate despatch. My reply to the War Office must evidently be dependent upon this.

Mr. Wardrop reports that three Caucasian Governments have come to fresh agreement to sink their territorial and other differences. I am therefore making further appeal to War Office to send out at once small quantity of arms now available from Denikin's last packet. I would suggest that if they can be despatched we should intimate to three Governments that they are being sent in fulfilment of our promise, and as indication of our approval of recent agreement, and that their distribution will depend on its fulfilment. Stokes might go out with them accompanied by a few officers to be stationed in the disputed areas; he could undertake distribution, and he could use this fulfilment of our promise as a powerful argument in favour of a policy of confederation. Before arms can be sent War Office require consent of Foch and Chief of Imperial General Staff. Question of payment even of small sum involved is a most serious difficulty unless Treasury can be induced to accept bond or guarantee of future payment or credit against oil and manganese.

I shall be grateful for an early reply, as our whole policy in regard to Batoum seems to be at stake.

[E 3495/1729/44]

No. 186.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 362.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Foreign Office, April 21, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 277 of 24th March: Controls at Constantinople.

We are prepared to agree to the commissions being inter-Allied, provided that the War Office Commission is under presidency of a British officer and that a British officer has a place on each of the other commissions. War Office concur, and instructed General Milne in this sense on 16th April.

[E 3594/131/44]

No. 187.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 22.)*

(No. 360.)

My Lord,

*Cairo, April 9, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship four copies of a memorandum compiled by the Right Honourable Herbert Samuel on the conclusion of his visit to Palestine.

I should be grateful if your Lordship would send one copy of this memorandum to the Secretary, the War Office, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for War.

I have, &amp;c.

ALLENBY, F.M.

Enclosure in No. 187.

*Mr. Samuel to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.*

My Lord,

*Cairo, March 31, 1920.*

ON the 20th December last I received through Lord Curzon, with his concurrence, an invitation from you "to visit Palestine with a view to investigating financial and administrative conditions there, and advising concerning the line of policy to be followed in future in these respects, should the mandate fall to Great Britain." I was glad to be able to accept that invitation, and left London on the 11th January, arriving



in Cairo on the 23rd and in Palestine on the 30th. I have spent two months in the country, half of that time at the headquarters of the Administration in Jerusalem and half visiting almost all parts of Palestine. I have received every possible assistance from Major-General Sir Louis Bols, the Chief Administrator, and his staff, and have been able to come into contact with many representative men belonging to various sections of the population. On the financial and administrative questions on which I was asked to advise I have been in constant consultation with General Bols, and I have left with him memoranda embodying suggestions on a number of specific points. It may perhaps be of service if I were to summarise the conclusions I have formed on these matters.

#### *The Administration.*

Until peace is made with Turkey and the status of Palestine is definitely settled, the Administration necessarily remains in form military. But many of the officers in charge are men who have civilian experience in the matters with which they are dealing, and who have been given military rank for the purpose of their present employment. It is admitted that the Administration is over-staffed, and General Bols is taking steps to reduce the number of his officers. This will enable some of those who are least suited to the ordinary work of administration to be eliminated. Any further changes, consequent upon the granting of a mandate, should, I think, be gradual. It would clearly be inadvisable to remove at a sweep the men who, during the last twelve months and more, have been gaining invaluable experience of the problems of Palestine and have entered into personal relations with the principal inhabitants. Many of them are well qualified to continue to exercise, under a civil administration, their present functions, and the remainder could be gradually replaced when more suitable men are forthcoming.

For some months there has been a vacancy in the post of Financial Adviser. Although the Acting Adviser is conducting efficiently the general work of his department, it is unfortunate that the Chief Administrator's efforts to find a suitable officer to fill the post permanently have not yet been successful. It is very necessary that this appointment should be made as soon as possible. There is also no permanent head of the Education Department, and this important part of the work of the Administration suffers in consequence. An Agricultural Adviser has only recently been appointed. It had been proposed to carry as far as possible the reduction in the number of British officers employed, not only in order to eliminate those who were in excess of the requirements of the work, but also in order to enable others to be replaced by natives of the country. It is no doubt right to open to the population of Palestine as large opportunities as are possible in the circumstances to share in the conduct of the government of their country, and to give no legitimate ground for complaints, such as have been made in Egypt, that a British Administration excludes capable natives from posts they might occupy with advantage in order that positions may be found for Englishmen. At the same time, in the present early stage in the development of Palestine, and in view of the conflict of interests that prevails in the country, any such process should be pursued with caution. The people have not yet had, as have the people of Egypt, a generation's experience of honest and efficient government. The only methods with which they are familiar are those of Turkey. It will take time and training to get rid of those traditions. Moreover, Palestine being divided into three communities—Moslem, Christian and Jewish—which often work in antagonism to one another, there are a certain number of the higher posts, both in the central and the district offices, to which, for some years to come at least, it is essential that impartial officers should be appointed to mete out equal justice. I believe that the necessity of such a policy would be recognised by the population in general.

Some objection has been raised, however, to the present judicial system, under which a single British judicial officer sits as a Court of First Instance. It is urged that these judges have not sufficient acquaintance with the local law; that their knowledge of the language is often not enough to render them independent of interpreters, those interpreters not being always trustworthy; and that the prospect of appointments to judgeships is almost closed to the members of the Bar. It has been decided, therefore, to compose these Courts of three judges: one British, as president, and two Palestinians. The Courts, also, have to be somewhat numerous, as the population is litigious, and it is important that arrears should not accumulate. These conditions involve a judicial establishment which is large in proportion to the population and area of the country; but in the circumstances this appears to be inevitable.

#### *Finances.*

The financial position of the Administration is satisfactory. The budget for the year 1919-20 was estimated to balance at £ E. 735,000. There will, however, be a realised surplus of about £ E. 150,000. This result is mainly due to the fact that the mandate was not, as was anticipated, been granted during the current year, that certain developments which were contemplated have consequently not been undertaken, and that there has been considerable under spending. For the year 1920-21 the revenue is estimated at £ E. 937,000. The estimates of expenditure submitted by the various Departments amounted to a total of £ E. 1,454,000. At the request of the Chief Administrator I acted as chairman of an official committee for the examination of these estimates and for the drafting of next year's budget. The Committee transferred a number of items of expenditure, which are necessary for purposes of development and which are non-recurring, to a capital account, and reduced others to lower figures. The total of annual expenditure has been thereby brought down to £ E. 907,000, leaving a balance of £ E. 30,000, out of which the interest and sinking fund on a loan may be paid. The amount of the loan should be about £ E. 350,000, chiefly for roads, posts and telegraphs and other public works. (These figures are subject to further review, but the modifications are not likely to be large.) Much of the expenditure allotted to capital account is of an urgent character. The roads of Palestine, taken as a whole, are very bad, and although their use by the army is largely responsible for this, and the cost of making good should partly be defrayed as a war charge, a considerable sum will have to be provided by the Civil Administration for rebuilding many of the old roads and for constructing new ones. The postal, telegraph and telephone services are far from efficient, and 100,000*l.* of capital expenditure is immediately necessary for their improvement. Certain new buildings must be provided in the near future. It will be difficult, however, to contract a loan for these and other purposes until the political status of the country is settled. The necessary arrangements should be made at the earliest possible date after the mandate. Meanwhile it is proposed to utilise for these purposes as a beginning the surplus of £ E. 150,000 accrued during the current year. The revenue is likely to show further expansion without increase in the rates of taxation, and there is every reason to believe that the Civil Administration will be able to pay its way without recourse to the British Exchequer. The budget could not bear, however, the cost of a military garrison. The expenditure for this year on several services, especially on education and agriculture, is very low, and should be increased as soon as the conditions allow; and further loans for purposes of development will be necessary in future years. Some of these loans will ultimately prove remunerative, but for all of them, in the first instance, interest and sinking fund must be provided in the annual budget.

The figures which have been quoted exclude the revenues assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration and certain taxes assigned to the service of pre-war Turkish loans contracted in respect of railways in other parts of Turkey. Together these were estimated to amount to £ E. 153,000 gross, and £ E. 119,000 net, in the year 1919-20. Payments have not been made during the occupation, and the revenues have been carried to a supreme account, which, on the 31st December, 1919, amounted to £ E. 317,000.

I telegraphed to the Foreign Office on the 20th February, stating my view that the future interests of Palestine required complete freedom from all Turkish obligations respecting the Ottoman Public Debt Administration and the railway kilometric guarantees as well as from the monopoly of the Tobacco Régie and from concessions for the construction of a harbour at Haifa and for other works not yet begun. I suggested that any sum properly chargeable to Palestine in respect of Turkish pre-war debt should be payable by a specified annual sum, subject to commutation, and should not take the form of an assignment of particular revenues. I have not yet seen the draft of the proposed treaty with Turkey, in which this subject no doubt finds a place.

I have made a careful enquiry into the question of a currency for Palestine, and have written a memorandum on the subject embodying proposals. I understand that this memorandum will be forwarded by the Chief Administrator for the consideration of His Majesty's Government. No action can, of course, be taken in the matter until after the mandate is granted.

I have not examined the existing system of taxation with a view to suggesting possible improvements, as such an enquiry appears to be premature. At the proper time very careful consideration will need to be given to the question whether the present system of tithe should be continued, or whether a fixed land tax, based upon a valuation, should be substituted; or whether a combination of the two



systems should be devised. Arguments can be advanced for each of these courses, and the balance of advantage has to be struck. Meanwhile, it might be of advantage to send a small commission, which should include one or two leading Palestinian agriculturists, to Cyprus to consider the method of valuing and collecting the tithe which is in force there, and which, it is said, does not give rise to the grievances of which complaint is made in Palestine.

As soon as the obligations to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration are removed, the harmful system of selling monopolies of fishing rights for the profit of that Administration, which now prevails in Palestine, should undoubtedly be abolished. It yields a very small sum, and it leads to the fishing industry, which should be large and important, being reduced to the smallest dimensions, while the price of fish is exceedingly high. Meat is very dear in Palestine, but at Haifa, situated on the coast of a sea teeming with fish, I was informed by the Military Governor that the price of fish was as high as that of meat. It would be difficult to find a clearer example of the injury done to a people by the bad fiscal legislation of its governors than is afforded by the harmful effects of the fishing monopolies in Palestine.

Similarly, when the country is freed from the monopoly of the Tobacco Régie, a great increase in tobacco cultivation and manufacture may be anticipated. And—a matter of some importance—the people will be able to obtain from their own land the kind of tobacco they like, instead of being compelled to accept, as is now the case, tobaccos which they do not like. Suitable excise arrangements could be devised to ensure the collection of a proper revenue from tobacco while no longer preventing its extensive cultivation.

#### *Economic Conditions.*

A considerable additional area of land has been put under cultivation this year compared with last, and the harvest promises to be a good one. Oversea trade shows signs of expansion. There can be no doubt that the resources of Palestine are under-developed. The population over the greater part of the country is scanty. Irrigation has hardly been attempted, and nowhere on any considerable scale. No comprehensive measures have been adopted against malaria. The large force of water-power that exists has been left unutilised. There are hardly any manufacturing industries. Communications are bad. There is no harbour. There is no cadastral survey, and the ownership of land is often uncertain.

How greatly the productiveness of the country could be increased is proved by the experience of the thirty or forty Jewish, and the two or three German, agricultural colonies which have been established in recent years. With a progressive Government, with the introduction of an additional population characterised by industry and intelligence, and with the provision from outside sources of the capital that is necessary, Palestine could offer, in a comparatively short period, a comfortable livelihood to several times its present population, and could become a thriving country. I have visited eleven of the Jewish agricultural colonies and find them full of promise for the future. They constitute the most energetic and the most significant factor in the Palestine of to-day.

At the moment the chief drawback to the economic development of the country is the excessively high cost of living—considerably higher than the cost of living in Egypt. It is a handicap upon every kind of production, and it imposes real hardship upon the people.

Owing to the prolonged delay in determining the future status of the country, nothing has yet been done to promote its development, and the fact gives rise to disappointment among the population. It sees a British Administration installed, and very few improvements effected or even begun.

Land purchase has been suspended, and private enterprises of urgent importance frequently cannot be started because the necessary land cannot legally be acquired. At General Bols's request I examined this question, and made a suggestion for a temporary solution which should not be inconsistent with the policy of prohibiting actual sales for the time being. The essence of the suggestion is that, in the case of enterprises held by the Government to be of urgent importance for the welfare of the country, parties may agree together for a three years' lease of land, with the option of subsequent purchase, on agreed terms, provided that such purchase is subject to any legislation affecting land questions which may be enacted in the interval. A proclamation has been issued on these lines, but it is at best less than a half measure.

The railways are still under military management, and all improvements have

hitherto been suspended. Heavy expense is involved by hiring rolling-stock from the Egyptian State railways instead of purchasing new stock; by the frequent wash-outs of the line which have occurred during the rainy season, and which could be avoided by reconstruction works of a simple character; and by maintaining a different gauge for the short railway from Jaffa to Ludd from that which prevails on the other lines. An expenditure of 15,000*l.* for the widening of this line having been refused on the ground that it was not necessary for military purposes, the whole of the import trade of Jaffa—still the principal port of Palestine—and the greater part of the large orange trade of the district have had to be conducted, either by transport or camels, or else by trans-shipment, at heavy cost and under primitive conditions, at Ludd Junction.

The estimates for the railways for 1920-21 show a considerable margin of revenue over expenditure. But those estimates are of a speculative character, as the amount of military traffic—a large part of the whole—is uncertain. The railways are very ill-equipped with rolling-stock and buildings, and a considerable expenditure, possibly as much as 2,000,000*l.*, must be provided in the near future to make good these defects and for construction work. This money can only be provided by a loan, and the interest and sinking-fund of such a loan must be provided from the railway revenue. It may be anticipated that this can be done. Here again no application is likely to be submitted for assistance from the British Exchequer. On the other hand, the Palestine railways could not possibly afford to repay the very large expenditure incurred by the army for strategic purposes in the construction of lines during the war.

It is most necessary that all the main line railways in Palestine should be under one management, and that management a department of the Government of the country. This will involve a settlement with the Hedjaz Railway Administration as regards the Haifa-Deraa line. The construction of light railways might be entrusted to other bodies. No doubt the Zionist organisation would be prepared to take part in these, as in other public works.

One of the first requirements of the country is the construction of an adequate harbour at Haifa, and the preliminary step necessary is a survey of the port and the preparation of a plan by an engineer of high standing. If this examination is postponed until after the mandate, it will involve a further delay of six months before actual work can be started and employment offered to labourers. The chief administrator has therefore requested authority to incur the small expenditure required for the engagement of a consulting engineer, and I trust that this may be granted. It is obviously necessary that the construction and management of the harbour at Haifa should be in the hands of the Palestine Administration and no pre-war Turkish concessions be recognised.

Another of the essential requirements of Palestine is the construction of a hydro-electric power station between Lakes Huleh and Tiberias. The water-power there is sufficient to electrify all the railways of Palestine and to supply a large surplus of power for industries and for lighting throughout the country. The problem is being studied in detail by Dr. Rutenberg, a Russian engineer with Italian experience, who is working for the Zionist Commission. The result of his enquiries will be available for the Government if it should ultimately be decided that this work should be carried by it and not by the Zionist organisation.

A cadastral survey of the whole country is an obvious necessity. Preliminary steps have been taken with a view to such a survey being begun at the earliest moment that the political conditions allow.

It is the absence of such a survey and the uncertainty that attaches to the ownership of much of the property of the country that has hindered the formation of mortgage banks and the granting of long-term credits to cultivators and to traders in the towns. As a temporary measure, the Administration has arranged for a sum not exceeding 500,000*l.* to be lent to it by the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, out of which advances are made to cultivators. Those advances now amount to a total of about 200,000*l.* and have done something to popularise the new régime, but it is open to objection for a Government itself to conduct business of this character and to stand in a direct relation of creditor and debtor with the individual agriculturist. The Zionists contemplate establishing a bank for this purpose, primarily for the assistance of Jewish colonisation, but there is room for more institutions than one and some competition would be advantageous to the population. I have discussed the matter in Cairo with Harari Pasha, of the Mortgage Company of Egypt, and understand that that body will consider extending its operations to Palestine when the mandate shall have been granted, but until the cadastral survey is advanced those operations cannot be on a large scale.



The question of land colonisation and of the establishment of the Jewish national home are too large to allow of summary discussion. I will only express my own conviction, as the result of all that I had learnt outside Palestine, confirmed by my experience of the last two months, that economically the Zionist policy is quite practicable, and that politically, if too much is not attempted at once, the difficulties that undoubtedly exist are by no means insuperable.

I have been fortunate in having had the assistance during my visit to Palestine and Egypt of Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Bassett, D.S.O., O.B.E., formerly of the Soudan Service and more recently employed in the Hedjaz, who was nominated by General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, for the purpose. I desire to express my obligations to Colonel Bassett for his unfailing and efficient help throughout my enquiries.

I am, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

[E 3595/3/44]

No. 188.

Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 421.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, April 20, 1920.

MY telegram No. 414 of 18th April.

Head of Protestant community cabled this morning (20th April) to enquire about the situation at Aintab. His own latest information about that place and Cilicia generally was based on reports brought by travellers who left Adana on 11th April. It agreed generally with mine. He spoke to me of gravity of the situation of Christians in the whole area. He pointed out in respectful but categorical language that Armenians had returned from Syria to Cilicia at [group undecypherable] British authorities, who had assured them that they could do so without fear for their future safety. He indicated as most serious feature of the situation entire uncertainty as to the intentions of the French, who are strongly rumoured to contemplate early withdrawal from Cilicia in their own interest, without regard to position in which Christians will be left in such contingency.

He enquired as to the possibility of evacuating Christians to places of greater safety, e.g., from Adana district to Cyprus, and from Aintab to Aleppo.

Evacuation of Christians on any large scale appears to me impracticable. It seems therefore in highest degree desirable that the French should [group undecypherable] and disclaim any intention of evacuating Cilicia pending general settlement, and until such time as safeguards are provided for future of Christians. To withdraw now simply as matter of military necessity affecting French only would be to ignore the fact that French replaced us in Cilicia as representatives of Allies, and inherited duties and responsibilities previously incumbent on British. Matter is thus one of inter-Allied concern, and all the more so as withdrawal in present circumstances would prejudice enormously Allied position in Turkey as a whole, and give greatest impetus to Nationalist movement. I myself discount these rumours, but they have obtained such currency in all circles that nothing but most categorical denial of their truth can mitigate dangerous effect produced by them.

[E 3653/3/44]

No. 189.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 463.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 3, 1920.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 309 of the 30th March, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the following papers relative to the demand addressed by the Allied High Commissioners to the Sublime Porte regarding the disavowal of the leaders of the so-called "national" movement by the Turkish Government:—

1. Collective note of the High Commissioners to the Grand Vizier of the 26th March.

2. Note addressed by the Grand Vizier to the High Commissioners on the 26th March.

3. French version of proposed communiqué, enclosed in No. 2.

4. Literal translation of original Turkish of No. 3.

5. Collective note of the High Commissioners to the Grand Vizier in reply to No. 2.

6. French text of revised formula submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to High Commissioners on the evening of the 29th March.

7. Curtailed version of No. 6, which the High Commissioners informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs by a verbal *démarche* of the political officers on the 31st March would alone satisfy them.

8. Note addressed by the Grand Vizier to the High Commissioners on the 1st April.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 189.

Collective Note communicated to the Grand Vizier.

DANS la note collective adressée à votre Altesse le 16 courant pour lui annoncer la décision du Conseil suprême au sujet de l'occupation militaire de Constantinople, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont déclaré qu'ils étaient chargés d'exiger que le Gouvernement ottoman désavoue immédiatement Moustapha Kémal Pacha, ainsi que les autres dirigeants du mouvement soi-disant "nationaliste."

La note responsive de votre Altesse, en date du 17 mars, n'a donnée qu'une satisfaction très partielle à cette demande. Ce qui est encore plus important, le Gouvernement ottoman n'a rien fait depuis le 16 mars pour désavouer publiquement les chefs du mouvement dit nationaliste.

Les Hauts-Commissaires ont l'honneur de signaler encore une fois à l'attention de votre Altesse qu'il s'agit en l'espèce d'une demande basée sur une décision formelle du Conseil suprême, décision que les Hauts-Commissaires n'ont qualifié ni pour retirer, ni pour atténuer. Ils croient donc de leur devoir d'inviter le Gouvernement impérial de se conformer à cette demande sans plus de retard, en désavouant publiquement et sans équivoques Moustapha Kémal Pacha et les autres dirigeants du mouvement en question.

A. DEFRANCE.

J. M. DE ROBECK.

MAISSA.

Constantinople le, 26 mars 1920.

Enclosure 2 in No. 189.

Note communicated to High Commissioners.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Sublime Porte, le 28 mars 1920.

EN me référant à la note collective que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser conjointement avec ses collègues de France et d'Italie, j'ai l'honneur de lui transmettre ci-après la traduction en français du communiqué que le Gouvernement impérial, en déférant au désir exprimé dans cette communication, se propose de publier.

J'aime à espérer que ce projet de communiqué, dont le texte turc a été déjà remis à M. l'Amiral Webb par Séfa Bey, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, rencontrera son approbation et qu'elle voudra bien m'en faire part afin de me permettre de prendre les dispositions nécessaires à ce sujet. Je dois noter que le passage souligné au crayon rouge\* dans ladite traduction a été ajouté au texte qui a été remis à M. l'Amiral Webb.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Grand-Vizir,

H. SALIH.



*French version of proposed Communiqué.*

(Traduction.)

IL est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial qu'à la suite de l'occupation militaire de Constantinople par les Alliés, des rumeurs exagérées ont pris naissance, que ces rumeurs ont revêtu surtout en province un caractère de nature à provoquer une surexcitation et qu'ainsi les organisations nationales se sont portées à certains actes excessifs.

Le Gouvernement impérial n'a été pour rien dans la constitution ni dans la direction de ces organisations, qui se sont formées à la suite des événements tragiques du vilayet de Smyrne (*événements qui ont été d'ailleurs constatés par l'enquête effectuée par les Puissances alliées*) et des rumeurs alarmantes qui les ont suivis.

Bien qu'en principe ces organisations aient surgi par suite de la nécessité de la défense de droits légitimes et de la sauvegarde de la vie et de l'honneur, le Gouvernement proclame que les actes excessifs auxquels se sont livrés contrairement à ces buts et de façon à nuire à l'État. Moustapha Kémal Pacha, qui n'a aucun caractère officiel, ni aucune position dans le Gouvernement, et quelques autres dirigeants, sont désapprouvés par lui.

Enclosure 4 in No. 189.

(Secret.)

*Literal translation of proposed Formula for Disavowal of "Nationalist" Leaders.—*  
(Communicated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Assistant High Commissioner.)

INFORMATION has been received that, upon Constantinople being placed under military occupation by the Entente Powers, the circumstance has given rise to a number of exaggerated rumours; that the said rumours have, especially in the interior, assumed a form utterly productive of excitement; and that, *inter alia*, certain extravagant acts have been committed by the National Organisation.

It is announced that, although this organisation, which came into being in consequence of the tragic events of Smyrna and the alarming reports which followed that event, and in the creation and management of which the Government had no part or lot, owed its creation, fundamentally, to the necessity for defending legitimate right and preserving honour and life; nevertheless, the extravagant acts committed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who has no official character and no position in the Government, and certain leaders—acts which go beyond the said object and are of a nature to cause prejudice to the State—are not approved by the Imperial Government.

Enclosure 5 in No. 189.

*Collective Note addressed to the Grand Vizier.*

Altesse,

Constantinople, le 29 mars 1920.

EN accusant réception de la lettre que votre Altesse nous a adressée à la date du 28 mars et à laquelle était jointe la traduction en français du communiqué que le Gouvernement impérial se propose de publier, nous avons l'honneur de faire à votre Altesse la réponse suivante :

"Les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie estiment que le communiqué dont le texte leur a été soumis est conçu dans des termes tels qu'il serait interprété par la population plutôt comme une approbation que comme un désaveu de Moustapha Kémal et des chefs qui, avec lui, ont fomenté le mouvement soi-disant nationaliste.

"Ils ne sauraient donc l'accepter et ne pourraient admettre qu'un communiqué très net notifiant clairement que le Gouvernement désavoue Moustapha Kémal et les chefs du mouvement soi-disant nationaliste qui ont agi contrairement aux intentions du Gouvernement et invitent la population à obéir dorénavant uniquement aux ordres du Gouvernement légal."

Agréé, Altesse, &amp;c.

A. DEFRANCE.  
J. M. DE ROBECK.  
MAISSA.

*French Text of revised Formula submitted to High Commissioners.*

(Traduction.)

IL est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial qu'à la suite de l'occupation militaire de Constantinople par les Alliés, des rumeurs exagérées ont pris naissance, que ces rumeurs ont revêtu surtout en province un caractère de nature à provoquer une surexcitation qui a porté les organisations nationales à se livrer de nouveau à certains actes excessifs.

Le Gouvernement impérial déclare qu'il ne s'est associé en rien à la constitution ni à la direction de ces organisations, qui se sont formées à la suite des événements tragiques du vilayet de Smyrne et des rumeurs alarmantes qui les ont suivis et qui en principe avaient pour but la défense de droits légitimes et la sauvegarde de l'honneur et de la vie des populations musulmanes.

Toutefois, le Gouvernement impérial, désapprouvant les actes excessifs qui se sont produits depuis quelque temps dans certaines localités, tient à déclarer que les dirigeants desdites organisations et Moustapha Kémal Pacha n'ont aucun caractère officiel ni aucune position dans le Gouvernement et que, en se livrant aux actes excessifs susvisés, ils ont agi contrairement aux intentions du Gouvernement.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement impérial invite la population à obéir uniquement aux ordres de l'autorité légale et à s'abstenir de tout acte de nature à troubler l'ordre public.

Enclosure 7 in No. 189.

*Revised Version of Enclosure 6.*

IL est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial que des rumeurs exagérées ont pris naissance et que ces rumeurs ont revêtu surtout en province un caractère de nature à provoquer une surexcitation qui a porté les organisations nationales à se livrer de nouveau à certains actes excessifs.

Le Gouvernement impérial déclare qu'il ne s'est associé en rien à la constitution ni à la direction de ces organisations.

Le Gouvernement impérial, désapprouvant ces organisations, tient en outre à déclarer que les dirigeants desdites organisations et Moustapha Kémal Pacha n'ont aucun caractère officiel ni aucune position dans le Gouvernement et qu'ils ont agi contrairement aux intentions du Gouvernement.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement impérial invite la population à obéir uniquement aux ordres de l'autorité légale et à s'abstenir de tout acte de nature à troubler l'ordre public.

Enclosure 8 in No. 189.

*Grand Vizier to High Commissioner.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Sublime Porte, le 1<sup>er</sup> avril 1920.

ME référant à la note collective que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 29 mars 1920, conjointement avec leurs Excellences MM. les Hauts-Commissaires de France et d'Italie, je m'étais empressé de lui faire remettre le texte du projet de communiqué concernant les organisations nationales avec les modifications que le Gouvernement impérial avait cru pouvoir introduire dans le texte du projet primitivement communiqué à votre Excellence.

Le texte modifié était le suivant :

"Il est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial qu'à la suite de l'occupation militaire de Constantinople par les Alliés, des rumeurs exagérées ont pris naissance, que ces rumeurs ont revêtu surtout en province un caractère de nature à provoquer une surexcitation qui a porté les organisations nationales à se livrer de nouveau à certains actes excessifs.

"Le Gouvernement impérial déclare qu'il ne s'est associé en rien à la constitution ni à la direction de ces organisations, qui se sont formées à la suite des événements tragiques du vilayet de Smyrne et des rumeurs alarmantes qui les ont suivis, et qui en



principe avaient pour but la défense de droits légitimes et la sauvegarde de l'honneur et de la vie des populations musulmanes.

"Toutefois, le Gouvernement impérial, désapprouvant les actes excessifs qui se sont produits depuis quelque temps dans certaines localités, tient à déclarer que les dirigeants desdites organisations et Moustapha Kémal Pacha n'ont aucun caractère officiel ni aucune position dans le Gouvernement et que, en se livrant aux actes excessifs susvisés, ils ont agi contrairement aux intentions du Gouvernement.

"En conséquence, le Gouvernement impérial invite la population à obéir uniquement aux ordres de l'autorité légale et à s'abstenir de tout acte de nature à troubler l'ordre public."

Le 31 mars, MM. Ledoux, Ryan et Galli, Conseillers politiques des trois Hauts-Commissariats alliés, ont rapporté à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères ce texte, en lui déclarant que votre Excellence et ses collègues ne pourraient y donner leur approbation qu'après la suppression des passages qui y ont été biffés par eux. Le projet de communiqué ainsi modifié était réduit, comme votre Excellence le sait, à la forme suivante :

"Il est parvenu à la connaissance du Gouvernement impérial que des rumeurs exagérées ont pris naissance et que ces rumeurs ont revêtu surtout en province un caractère de nature à provoquer une surexcitation qui a porté les organisations nationales à se livrer de nouveau à certains actes excessifs.

"Le Gouvernement impérial déclare qu'il ne s'est associé en rien à la constitution ni à la direction de ces organisations.

"Le Gouvernement impérial, désapprouvant ces organisations, tient en outre à déclarer que les dirigeants desdites organisations et Moustapha Kémal Pacha n'ont aucun caractère officiel ni aucune position dans le Gouvernement et qu'ils ont agi contrairement aux intentions du Gouvernement.

"En conséquence, le Gouvernement impérial invite la population à obéir uniquement aux ordres de l'autorité légale et à s'abstenir de tout acte de nature à troubler l'ordre public."

Ce dernier texte pourrait donner l'impression que le Gouvernement impérial considère comme rebelles tous les adhérents des organisations nationales et désapprouve tous leurs actes sans exception.

Le désaveu, au lieu de n'atteindre que certains dirigeants turbulents et perturbateurs, frapperait tous ceux qui font partie de ces organisations.

Or, ainsi que son Excellence Séfa Bey l'a exposé à votre Excellence, la plupart des éléments qui constituent ces organisations n'ont agi que sous l'empire de la terreur et de l'indignation provoquées par les massacres et les autres actes de cruauté et de violence commis par les Hellènes dans la province de Smyrne et de la crainte de voir se réaliser les bruits qui couraient alors avec persistance au sujet de la formation dans le vilayet de Trébizonde d'un État grec sous la dénomination de République du Pont et d'une Grande-Arménie. Leur seul but était de défendre leurs foyers, leur honneur et leur vie. Réprouver publiquement tous les adeptes de l'association serait non seulement une mesure inefficace en pratique, mais encore nuirait à l'accomplissement de la tâche que le Gouvernement impérial a cru devoir assumer et qui consiste à dissiper tout malentendu et à faire respecter les décisions des grandes Puissances alliées autrement que par des mesures coercitives.

Le Cabinet actuel, qui n'est inféodé à aucun parti et qui est foncièrement indépendant, a pour seul et unique but d'obtenir, par tous les moyens légitimes et pacifiques en son pouvoir, une paix équitable que sa confiance dans les sentiments de justice des grandes Puissances alliées lui a d'ailleurs toujours fait espérer.

Il est parfaitement conscient de l'inutilité d'une résistance aux décisions des Puissances et des suites très graves qu'une pareille résistance pourrait avoir pour la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement impérial trouve explicable la formation des organisations nationales en tant que ces organisations visent la sauvegarde de l'honneur et de la vie des populations musulmanes menacées par les Hellènes.

Il est à noter que la plus grande partie de la population composée d'innocents villageois, qui croient leur vie et leur honneur menacés, sympathisent avec lesdites organisations.

Jeter la désapprobation sur toute cette masse produirait dans le pays un mécontentement et une surexcitation telles que l'autorité du Gouvernement, déjà notablement

ébranlée, serait complètement anéantie, ce qui rendrait difficile l'inauguration d'une ère de paix et de tranquillité dans le pays.

Par contre, si votre Excellence et ses collègues veulent bien partager sa façon de voir, le Gouvernement impérial a l'espoir qu'il parviendra à rallier à son point de vue, par la persuasion et autres moyens pacifiques, les esprits modérés qui forment la grande masse de la population et à isoler les éléments perturbateurs, afin d'assurer l'application, sans secousses ni commotions, de la paix qui, il en a la conviction, tiendra compte des droits légitimes de la nation turque. Dans le cas où quelques perturbateurs se montreraient récalcitrants, le Gouvernement impérial pourrait toujours les déclarer hors la loi et enrayer facilement les effets de leur action subversive.

Fidèle à son programme, le Gouvernement tient à agir comme un facteur de paix et d'apaisement. Il est convaincu que les Puissances alliées elles-mêmes sont désireuses d'éviter des complications pouvant résulter d'éventuelles mesures de coercition.

Dans l'opinion du Gouvernement impérial, ces mesures pourraient devenir inutiles si les Puissances alliées lui permettaient d'agir dans le sens développé plus haut et voulaient bien lui prêter leur appui bienveillant.

Le Gouvernement impérial se considérera heureux et croira avoir bien mérité de l'humanité s'il parvient à réaliser le but qu'il vise en lui épargnant de nouvelles souffrances.

En portant les considérations qui précèdent à la connaissance de votre Excellence, j'aime à espérer qu'elle voudra bien en apprécier le bien-fondé et reconnaître qu'elles justifient la ligne de conduite que le Gouvernement s'est tracée.

Avant de terminer, je me permets d'ajouter que, vu les très graves conséquences qui résulteraient de la publication du communiqué dans la forme indiquée par votre Excellence et ses collègues, le Gouvernement impérial ne pourra, à son vif regret et malgré son désir de déférer à leur demande, le faire paraître sous cette forme dans les journaux.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Grand Vizir,  
H. SALIH.

[E 3664/56/44]

No. 190.

*Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 482.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 7, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a memorandum on the future peace with Turkey, prepared by the political officer on the staff of the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean station. I am in general agreement with the conclusions of this memorandum, but desire to submit the following remarks to your Lordship:—

2. I do not concur in the belief expressed in paragraph 1 of the memorandum, that the recent occupation of Constantinople is likely to intensify the determination of the Nationalist Party. On the contrary, it appears to have given food for reflection to the half-hearted among the followers of Mustafa Kemal, who fear more than anything else the permanent loss of the capital—in their eyes the only desirable residence in the world. It has, in fact, encouraged the Opposition groups rather than driven them into alliance with the Nationalists.

3. On the other hand, I am disposed to regard the handing over of the vilayets of Erzeroum, Van and Bitlis to the independent sovereignty of the Armenian Republic as certain to prove disastrous. The conception of an autonomous Kurdistan in the present state of development of that country is one which is equally impossible to regard without grave anxiety.

4. The suggestion advanced in the memorandum of an administration under Ottoman suzerainty and European supervision commends itself to me as the only practicable solution of the problem presented by these two regions. A period under a régime of this nature should fulfil a double function, both educating the inhabitants up to a standard in which they may be expected to administer their own affairs, and



permitting the Armenian and Kurdish elements to gravitate, the one towards the Armenian home-land, with ultimate absorption by "Russian" Armenia, and the other southwards towards the real Kurdistan.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 190.

*Memorandum by Commander Luke on Future Peace with Turkey.*

(Secret.)

"Ajax," at Constantinople, March 21, 1920.

THE following considerations on the subject of peace with Turkey are submitted:—

The position at present appears to be that there are in contemplation by the Supreme Council certain peace terms which, in the opinion of the Allied authorities in Constantinople, cannot be imposed on Turkey except by force. The territorial clauses of the proposed terms operate primarily in favour of the Greeks, to a lesser extent in favour of the Armenians and Kurds, and, so far as they affect the two former, Greeks and Armenians, they appear to be in conflict, to a greater or lesser degree, with the principle of self-determination.

The provisional Allied military occupation of Constantinople, though professedly and in reality disconnected from the question of the peace terms, is likely, judging by the information hitherto available from Thrace and Anatolia, to intensify rather than to diminish the determination of the Nationalists not to accept a peace which violates the principle of self-determination.

2. It is presumably the intention of the Supreme Council, in framing the Turkish peace terms, *inter alia*, to—

- (a.) Remove from Turkish rule provinces not inhabited by Turks, while preserving the existence of a Turkish State in the residue of the Empire;
- (b.) Assure the safety of non-Ottoman minorities in what remains of Turkey.

It is presumably the desire of the Council that its terms shall be—

- (a.) Be capable of application throughout the areas to which they refer; and
- (b.) Lead to the permanent pacification of those areas.

3. If the above assumptions are broadly correct, I venture to submit that the proposed terms are in several respects at variance with them. It is unnecessary at present to labour the point that the vilayets of Adrianople, Aidin and Erzeroum are predominantly Ottoman; but it may be well to try to envisage the practical effect of alienating them from Turkey in the treaty of peace.

In the first place, so to do renders vain the idea of dividing the Turkish people and of stimulating the growth of an anti-Nationalist *bloc* around the Sultan and the *Entente libérale*. Far from dividing, such a proposal must tend to unite opposing sections of Turks in the common aim of national defence. No Turk, however bitterly opposed to Nationalism or the C.U.P., will fight to secure the loss of Smyrna and of Thrace.

It follows, then, that terms of this nature must needs be imposed by force; and are the Allies able and willing to provide that force? Force is available, no doubt, to impose them on Constantinople, and perhaps on Smyrna; but would that be sufficient? The enforced acceptance of the terms by a Cabinet in Constantinople would scarcely be considered binding by Mustafa Kemal in the highlands of Anatolia, or by Jafer Tayyer in Thrace; without, therefore, a formidable expedition it would seem difficult, in present circumstances at all events, to apply the terms—in the words of the assumption made above—"throughout the areas to which they refer."

Again, until such terms can be enforced, what will be the position of the non-Ottoman minorities in the interior? Marash supplies a sufficient answer.

Thirdly, would the terms proposed lead to the permanent pacification of Thrace, Aidin and Turkish Armenia? It is, I think, the conviction of impartial persons who know the Near East that without the wholesale extermination or expulsion of the Turkish majority the answer must be in the negative.

4. Confining the argument for the moment to Thrace and Smyrna, it is evident, if the above conclusions are accepted, that to impose Greek rule on the vilayets of Adrianople and Aidin will—

- (a.) Run counter to the principle of self-determination, and will therefore be regarded by the Turks of all classes, and probably by many Moslems outside Turkey, as a grave injustice;
- (b.) Will require the assistance of the armed forces of the *Entente*, which in practice would probably mean those of Great Britain, since French and Italian opinion seems opposed to the policy;
- (c.) Will perpetuate strife in those provinces instead of laying the foundation of an enduring and peaceful settlement.

A policy with such serious drawbacks would only seem justifiable by the presence of equally weighty advantages; and it may well be questioned if advantages so considerable exist in the present case. In speaking of advantages, I have advantages to the British Empire in mind. As regards advantages to Greece, that country is presumably the best judge whether it will be to its ultimate benefit to acquire large areas inhabited by a hostile population, and with extremely bad strategical frontiers, even though these areas may be rich and fruitful. In paragraph 10 of my report of the 16th December, 1919, on the situation in Thrace (F.O. print No. 170740), I ventured to forecast the possibility that extensive annexations by Greece in Thrace might tend to unite Turkey and Bulgaria in joint action against Greece. That forecast has received some measure of confirmation from recent reports from Thrace. Probably only those who know the Near East can realise to the full the hatred inspired by Greece in her neighbours—Christian and Moslem alike. It is almost needless to add that the proceedings of the Greeks in Smyrna have been such as to render the Turks more averse than ever from the prospect of Greek rule.

5. While the sacrifice of many things is apparently being contemplated in order that the fullest satisfaction may be given to the demands of Greece, has it ever been thoroughly considered whether it would not be to the advantage of Great Britain in particular, and to the peace of the world in general, if we were to *rallier* the Turks by giving them a peace which, while conforming to the principle of self-determination, and while sufficiently severe to satisfy the claims of justice, would not be vindictive? At present British public opinion is in danger of being diverted from a true perspective by appeals in weighty sections of the press to sentiment which, if thoroughly sincere, is often equally ignorant, and thus easily exploited. Facile cries, such as that the Turk must be expelled from Europe, are used with much effect, as if there were some mysterious virtue in turning the Turk out of Bebek while leaving him in Kandili. It seems to be thought by those whose judgment is stampeded by such cries that there is something essentially occidental in European Turkey, whose manifestation has only been prevented by the blighting presence of the Turk. It is well known, but evidently not sufficiently well, that Constantinople was an oriental city before ever the Turk was heard of, and such persons would do well to ponder the words of Sir William Ramsay, one of the most reliable authorities on the Near East, when he writes: "The Turkish conquest of Constantinople was really the climax of a gradual orientalising of the Byzantine Empire; Isaurians, Cappadocians, Phrygians and Armenians reigned in Constantinople on the throne of the Roman Caesars, and the final stage occurred when a Turkish Sultan sat on the same throne."

Turkey has a "bad press," and it would sound to many like heresy to suggest that Turkey's friendship is possibly as valuable, and even more valuable, to us, than the friendship of Greece. Yet that is what I venture to suggest. Perhaps it would be better to put the same idea inversely by suggesting that a hostile Turkey is more dangerous to us than a hostile Greece. A country geographically situated as is Greece must always be at the mercy of a Power having command of the Mediterranean, whereas Mustafa Kemal in his Anatolian uplands is hardly amenable to sea-power.

6. It is submitted that two dangers in particular now threaten the British Empire from the active hostility of the Turks. One, a general danger, is that the Nationalists will continue to inflame Moslem opinion against the Empire in Egypt, in India, in Central Asia and elsewhere. The other and more immediate danger is that they will ally themselves with the Bolsheviks if the latter enter Transcaucasia, and will then be in a position to work us infinite mischief in our vulnerable eastern marches. The Turk, and, indeed, the Moslem in general, is by instinct opposed to the theory of Bolshevism, which is wholly incompatible with the principles of Islam. Only necessity, as he



understands it, will drive him to this unnatural alliance. Cannot the necessity be avoided? I submit that it is worth avoiding, even if the avoiding involves the non-acquisition by Greece of Smyrna and Thrace and the reduction of the area to be ceded by Turkey to Armenia. A stolid conservative people such as the Turks should prove a valuable buffer against the ferment of Bolshevism in the Middle East.

7. The question now arises as to what terms of peace the Turks would accept. Here it is not possible to speak with any assurance, but, judging from Mustafa Kemal's pronouncements and making allowances for the fact that Orientals (and not only Orientals) generally demand at the outset more than will in the long run satisfy them, it may be conjectured that they will readily assign themselves to the loss of Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia and the control of the Straits and a drastic reduction of their armed forces. They might well be brought to acquiesce in the constitution of an autonomous Kurdistan under their nominal suzerainty and of a similar autonomous and limited Armenia, including, say, the bulk of the vilayets of Van and Bitlis and the easterly extremity of the vilayet of Erzeroum, excluding Erzeroum town. They would probably accept, and even welcome, a fairly wide measure of European administrative and fiscal control, provided it were applied under forms that would "save their face" and preserve their *amour-propre*. The Turk has ever attached a greater weight to the outward form than to the real substance of things.

If present indications form any criterion, they will not peacefully accept the loss of Thrace, Smyrna and the town of Erzeroum.

8. Assuming that the terms roughly sketched above would prove acceptable to the Turks or, at all events, to a certain section of the Turks, would they prove acceptable to the Allies and to those whom the Allies are pledged to protect—the non-Ottoman minorities? As regards the rayahs in the territory remaining under the immediate jurisdiction of the Porte, the Allied administrative control which is envisaged should prove capable of assuring their safety and reasonable privileges. As regards the Kurds, a considerable body of Kurdish opinion demands no more than autonomy, the bonds of religion and of the Khalifate inclining it favourably to the maintenance of a nominal Ottoman suzerainty.

The Kurds are in many ways the Asiatic counterpart of the Albanians, and in the case of a people such as they, whose capacity for independent existence is doubtful and unproved, it might well be prudent to preface full independence with a probationary period of autonomy under external guidance.

In suggesting the constitution of an autonomous Turkish Armenia with frontiers contiguous with the independent Armenian Republic of Erivan, I have in mind the precedent of the Turkish autonomous vilayet of Eastern Rumelia and the principality of Bulgaria. Had Eastern Rumelia been incorporated with Bulgaria at the outset many difficulties would probably have arisen. As it was, the transitional stage gave time for certain transfers of population and rendered the ultimate incorporation of the vilayet with the principality certain, provided that the principality made the prospect of union sufficiently attractive to the vilayet. Similarly in Armenia, the hope of attracting the autonomous Turkish province should provide the Erivan Government with a much-needed incentive to decent administration, while autonomous Armenia, with its Turkish majority, will have time to effect exchanges of population with the vilayets remaining to Turkey, and will have time, too, to weigh pros and cons before making a final decision as to its future.

There remains Greece, who might appear to lose most, or rather to gain least, from the above arrangement. It is important to bear in mind here that Greece was able to realise nearly all her legitimate territorial aspirations in 1913, at the close of the Balkan wars, and that there now remains practically nothing of unquestioned *Græcia irredenta* except the Dodecanese. If, therefore, she now secures the Dodecanese and obtains, as appears to be contemplated, a mandate in South Albania, which will consolidate her position for once and for all in Northern Epirus, she will not be doing so badly. If, further, she is permitted to annex the rich tobacco-growing country now known as "Interallied Thrace," a territory which, despite several years of Bulgarian sovereignty, is still populated by a large Turkish majority, she will be securing a most valuable possession, to which, on purely ethnological grounds, her claim is hardly tenable. She has also, as the result of her participation in the war on the side of the *Entente*, the satisfaction of seeing her credit higher than she could ever have thought possible before the war. It should not, after all, be forgotten that during the Dardanelles campaign one-half of the nation tried to stab the *Entente* in the back, and that she was brought into the right way only with the greatest difficulty and by the efforts of practically one man. The party then in opposition to that man has still many adherents in Greece

and may again return to power. It seems, therefore, but reasonable that their deserts, as well as his, should be borne in mind when the claims of the nation as a whole are under consideration.

Is it then worth while to endanger our eastern frontiers, to incur the risk of a fresh war, and to perpetuate bloodshed in the Near East, in order to impose Greece on two provinces to which, even taking into consideration the forced emigration of Greek rayahs, she can produce no conclusive ethnological claim? And should it be thought that Great Britain will receive any gratitude from Greece for the sacrifices which such a policy would demand of her, I would instance the information lately received from Smyrna concerning the obstacles which M. Sterghiade's administration is placing in the way of British commercial enterprise in that city.

9. Finally, the solution here outlined should make it possible to solve the question of the Turkish Nationalist extremists and the Committee of Union and Progress. The latter are professedly fighting for the retention of an Ottoman Turkey. Create such a Turkey by retaining within the Ottoman frontiers Thrace and Aidin, retain under a nominal Ottoman suzerainty an autonomous Turkish Armenia and Kurdistan protected by Europeans, and their *raison d'être* as a militant organisation disappears. If they then consent to eliminate themselves, well and good; if not, they publicly proclaim themselves to be not patriots, but adventurers seeking their own ends. In that case we can proceed with the policy of rallying around the Sultan the anti-Unionist and pro-*Entente* elements of Turkey, since we will be in a position to offer them terms which they can accept. The policy should then have every chance of success, for the old affection, or rather respect, for the British is not entirely dead among the Turks, though the class among which it survives is not the most articulate.

H. C. LUKE, Commander, R.N.V.R.,  
Political Officer.

[E 3612/47/44]

No. 191.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.*—(Received April 23.)

Sir,

Aden, April 7, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, copy of letter dated the 7th April, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

(For Major-General),  
C. C. J. BARRETT.

Enclosure in No. 191.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal,

Aden, April 7, 1920.

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 25th March, 1920:—

*Tihama.*

Captain Fazluddin, I.M.S., liaison medical officer with the Idrisi, writing to Captain Gordon on the 14th March, states that the Idrisi's reverse at Obal was chiefly due to the shortage of ammunition and food supplies, the transport of which was made difficult owing to heavy rains in the Tihama. Ample supplies of both have since been sent to Zaidia and Bajil. Captain Fazluddin says that the Idrisi, though sanguine of his success, does not underrate the strength of his enemy, the imam, who, he says, has contrived to amass a large force of about 4,000 men by inflammatory proclamations against him and the British. The Idrisi is sending reinforcements in large numbers from the Beni Merwan, Sabiani and Abu Arish countries.

From the reports received from Hodeida during the last week, no fighting appears to have taken place since the retreat of the Zeidis to Jebel Safian, except that an attempt of a force of 600 Zeidis to relieve the garrison of Riqab was frustrated, the Zeidis being driven into Riqab, with the exception of 170 men, who escaped, and 30 taken prisoners. The imam is said to be collecting a large force for the recapture of



Jebel Bura. 1,500 men have already been collected at a place called Zahib-al-Bir. The advance will be made from four different directions, viz., Shataba, Attar, Beni Suleiman and Beni Daud. The Idrisi is prepared for the attack.

The Idrisi is reported to be advancing on Jebel Safan, and the Zeidis are said to have fled to Haraz.

The Idrisi commanders at Obal and Ain are reported to have returned to Bajil, demanding arrears of their pay, and asking to be relieved of their respective commands. A hitch is also reported among the Qubra sheikhs. The cause of this is not known, but Captain Gordon is trying to find it out.

Fighting is again reported at Jebel Milhan. About one-third of the place is said to be in the hands of the imam.

A number of clans in the neighbourhood of Zabeed are reported to have revolted against the imam and have joined the Sheikh of Rikb, Awad Ali.

There is a vague rumour, which lacks confirmation, that Menakha has been occupied by the Idrisi. I cannot believe it.

Sayed Mustafa is due in Aden shortly. The Administrator, Kamaran, has wired that reasons of health are bringing him.

#### Aden Protectorate.

There have been no further encroachments, but the Zeidis are reported to be busy collecting tithes and other taxes from the Amiri people. The tithes are collected at the rate of 1 kela for every 10 kelas of grain. The tax on a goat is  $\frac{1}{8}$  dollar. In addition to this the hakim makes continuous demands for special contributions under various pretexts. Loans are being taken from rich people, and a tax is imposed on jewellery.

There are two customs posts, and transit dues are levied varying from  $\frac{1}{4}$  to  $\frac{3}{4}$  dollars per donkey and camel load.

There are at present two representatives of the imam in the Amiri territory. Their headquarters are at Jalila. Their names are Saiyid Yahia-bin-Mahomed Abbas and Kadi Ahmed-bin-Saleh-al-Ansi. The former, who is a relative of the imam, is the hakim and commandant of the troops. The latter is the amil and is under the hakim. There are 200-300 Zeidis in Jalila. Their rations, &c., are supplied by the people through the akil of the place.

In consequence of complaints submitted by the people of Dala re looting, &c., the imam is said to have sent express orders to the hakim at Jalila to stop the collection of tithes, &c., pending further orders, and to send to him the Zeidis concerned in the looting. The Zeidis, however, continue to collect the tithes, &c.

The Alawi sheikh and the nephew of the Kotaibi sheikh, who had been detained at Dabab, were sent to Sana on the 25th March by order of the imam.

The Zeidis have not carried out their threats to the Haushabi to invade his country. They now give out that they have received orders from the imam not to advance, as the imamic troops are engaged fighting the Idrisi. In fact there is a rumour that the imam has recalled his troops from the Amiri territory and has asked the hakim to leave Abdul Hamid, the Amir's brother, to manage the Amiri affairs.

Indications at present are that no further advance will take place in our protectorate in the near future. The signs of a possible withdrawal are interesting, as showing the effect of the Idrisi's action in the Hodeida neighbourhood.

The imam has written another letter, which is practically a repetition of what he has said before.

Yours, &c.  
(For Major-General Sir James Stewart),  
C. C. J. BARRETT.

[E 3673/3/44]

No. 192.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 496.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 8, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to report that his Highness Damad Ferid Pasha, the new Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on me this morning.

2. Rear-Admiral Webb and Mr. Ryan were present with me during the interview.

3. I enclose a memorandum giving a record of our conversation.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 192.

#### Memorandum of Conversation with Damad Ferid Pasha.

THE new Grand Vizier paid his first official visit to the High Commissioner this morning.

2. After complimentary overtures, Ferid Pasha said he had come into power on a platform of subjugating such adherents of the national movement as would not submit to the will of the Central Government. What was he to do with this object? The Government would use moral force, including the authority of the Sultan, for all it was worth, but physical force would be necessary against those who still remained recalcitrant. He had to contemplate the use of gendarmerie and regular troops, more particularly gendarmerie.

3. Ferid Pasha made it clear that he had in view gendarmerie of a special kind. There were, he said, here and there in the country elements opposed to the Nationalists. In the Panderma area there was a movement already in being under Anzavour. The germ of a similar movement existed in the Ismidt area. A similar germ was said to exist at Bolu. The elements of a movement on the same lines had existed, he thought, and might still exist, at Trebizond. He could not speak confidently of the present position there. Further afield, something might be done between Caesarea and Kharpout, and still further afield in the direction of Kurdistan.

4. The idea of the Government was to utilise elements of this kind. They had decided yesterday to make Anzavour a Pasha and to appoint him Governor of Afion-Kara-Hissar. He was thus transformed from a brigand into a servant of the Government. He perhaps already held Panderma. The Government had a stock of uniforms and wished to put Anzavour's forces into them.

5. The High Commissioner said he would consult General Milne on these proposals. The Grand Vizier promised to submit them in a concrete written form. The High Commissioner suggested for consideration that it might be desirable to avoid the use of the term "gendarmerie," lest difficulty should arise owing to General Foulon's ambiguous position. He urged strongly that, in any direction in which force was used, care should be taken to make it sufficient to avoid the danger of a set-back. The Allies still desired to avoid civil war. The only way to combine repressive action with the avoidance of civil war was to have sufficient forces to crush resistance to the action of the Government.

6. Ferid Pasha said that Anzavour had accomplished much with very scanty resources. He would now be able to give even a better account of himself if he could have some more guns (not a great many) and munitions. The High Commissioner promised to discuss this question with General Milne. He thought the General would probably want to send an officer to see what the requirements were, and what measures could be taken to ensure munitions being put to a proper use. The Grand Vizier acquiesced.

7. Ferid Pasha asked whether the High Commissioner could help him to get news from the interior, with which all telegraphic communication was cut off. The High Commissioner explained that our own information was very meagre, but such as it was it would be at the disposal of the Government. We might get a certain amount through Captain Perring at Samsoun.

8. The Grand Vizier said the Government were preparing a proclamation emphasising the points made in the Hatti-Humayoun, and were obtaining a fetva condemning the Nationalists. They proposed to print these documents and the Hatti-Humayoun itself for general distribution. He asked whether aeroplanes could be used for distribution in the interior. He believed there were three Turkish aeroplanes, and he had in view one very good aviator, the son of a Minister. The High Commissioner promised to enquire about these aeroplanes.

9. Ferid Pasha asked whether he would be allowed to send a supply of the same documents to Ameer Ali for distribution in India. Indian Moslems had been misled into regarding people like Talaat and Enver as champions of Islam, which they were not. He was anxious that matters should be represented in a true light, and that India should know the views of the Caliph, for whom Indian Moslems had so much respect.

10. The High Commissioner said he appreciated the Grand Vizier's motives, but he could not commit himself regarding this proposal without consulting His Majesty's Government, as he would be trenching on the sphere of the Indian Government. He asked to see the text of the proclamation and fetva as soon as possible.



11. Ferid Pasha said the Government would want to send agents to accessible outlying places. He asked for facilities for such agents to travel. He promised to submit their names in such a manner as to ensure the necessary secrecy and only to act with the High Commissioner's approval. The High Commissioner promised to assist in this matter.

12. The Grand Vizier said it would be necessary to prevent a number of persons connected with the Ay-Yildiz Association from doing harm. He specified two or three. He had, he said, a complete list of people of this kind who ought to be rounded up by the Allies or by the Turkish authorities, whichever the High Commissioner liked best. The High Commissioner promised to think this over. Ferid Pasha promised to communicate the list secretly.

13. Throughout the conversation Ferid Pasha emphasised his desire to work entirely on lines approved by the British authorities. He said, *inter alia*, that he would not make the smallest movement of troops without authority.

14. In a preliminary conversation with Mr. Ryan, Ferid Pasha raised three points to which he did not advert in his conversation with the High Commissioner.

15. He spoke of the dissolution of Parliament. He thought it a necessary measure, though it would be necessary to have some sort of Parliament later to ratify peace. He asked whether, if the dissolution led to disturbances, the assistance of the Allies could be relied on.

16. Mr. Ryan agreed that the dissolution of Parliament was desirable. He said that he had no doubt arrangements could be made for the inter-Allied police to be on the alert when the time came. Personally, however, he did not think the measure would cause any immediate disturbance.

17. The Grand Vizier spoke very confidentially of the desirability of removing certain persons from the entourage of the Sultan. He said this was very necessary, but the Sultan was the soul of good nature, and it was difficult to bring him to the point. Ferid Pasha said it would be more easy to get the Sultan to act if he could represent it as the wish of the High Commissioner that the officials in question should be removed. Mr. Ryan said this would be going too far, but he made certain observations regarding the officials in question, which he said might have a good effect if reported to the Sultan as having been made in a conversation with a member of the High Commissioner's staff.

18. Ferid Pasha asked Mr. Ryan whether he would telegraph to the Hon. Aubrey Herbert to ask him to use his influence to moderate the severity of the views of people like Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Asquith regarding Turkey. Mr. Ryan discouraged the suggestion, as, he said, the High Commissioner could only transmit such a telegram through the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office would be sure to turn it down.

*British High Commission, Constantinople,  
April 8, 1920.*

[E 3671/3/44]

No. 193.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 494.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 9, 1920.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 340 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a literal translation of the Turkish text of the Hatt-i-Humayoun or Imperial rescript appointing Ferid Pasha Grand Vizier.

2. This document is remarkable for the outspoken language employed in it. Its significance in this respect is enhanced by the fact that neither Ferid Pasha nor Reshid Bey, the two outstanding members of the new Ministry, came into power with any illusions as to the task they were undertaking. Both realised fully that whatever efforts might be made to disintegrate the national movement by peaceful means, such efforts would almost certainly have to be supplemented by force.

3. The following notes on Damad Ferid Pasha's colleagues may be of interest:—

4. The Sheikh-ul-Islam, Durri-Zade Abdullah Effendi, comes of an ancient family of ecclesiastical dignitaries which has supplied no less than five previous Sheikhs-ul-Islam in the last two centuries. He has himself been Under-Secretary in the Sheikh-ul-Islamate, but he is quite unknown in political life.

5. Reshid Bey, Minister of the Interior, is well known to your Lordship by reputation. He was at one time associated with the *Entente libérale* Party, but now

ranks as an independent politician, strongly opposed to the Committee of Union and Progress. He was Minister of the Interior in Kiamil Pasha's last Cabinet, and was blamed by some of that statesman's followers for having allowed the *coup d'Etat* of January 1913 to be engineered under his nose. From that time up to a few months ago he lived out of Turkey.

6. Reshid Bey is an intelligent man, and is said to possess energy. He is popularly credited with strong French sympathies, but from the eagerness he has displayed to stand well with this High Commission, and the emphasis with which he has frequently pleaded for English support for his country, I doubt whether he is so entirely devoted to the French as is sometimes supposed.

7. Mehmed Said Pa-ha, Minister of Marine and Acting Minister of War, commonly known as Kara or Black Said Pasha, has had a respectable career as a soldier, culminating after the armistice in the command of the Vth Army Corps at Konia. He was in occupation of that post during the early stages of the national movement. Viewed from Constantinople, his attitude towards the movement appeared indeterminate, if not complaisant, but when the national forces invested Konia and forced the *Entente libérale* Vali to flee, Kara Said Pasha accompanied him to Constantinople.

8. Ali Rushdi Effendi, Minister of Justice, has spent practically the whole of his official life in the judiciary, and is little known outside the Ministry of Justice.

9. Fahrudin Bey, Minister of Public Instruction, has for some months past been Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In my despatch No. 226 of the 13th February, 1920, I suggested that he was a person of moderate nationalist tendencies, but I am disposed to think I was mistaken, as he is said to have some connection with the *Entente libérale* Party, and his attitude at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been invariably conciliatory and sensible. In any case, however, he counts for little politically or personally.

10. Dr. Jemal Pasha, Minister of Public Works, is well known in Constantinople as a surgeon and as a successful prefect of the city. He is intelligent, commands respect, and has always been known as an opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress.

11. Hussein Remzi Pasha, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, and Osman Rifaat Pasha, Minister of Pious Foundations, are both generals. Ferid Pasha has shown originality in selecting a military personage for the latter post, but neither is at all known in political life.

12. Of Reshad Bey, Acting Minister of Finance, I know nothing, except that he had previously been Accountant-General at the Ministry of Finance.

13. No member of a Cabinet having for its programme the enclosed Hatt-i-Humayoun can be accused of lack of courage, but it will be evident from the foregoing account of the Ministers that Ferid Pasha, having ruled out the party politicians, has been compelled to choose for his colleagues men respectable in their own avocations and little known outside them. He himself, Reshid Bey, and perhaps Jemal Pasha, constitute the exceptions.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 193.

*Turkish Text of Imperial Rescript on April 5, 1920, appointing Ferid Pasha Grand Vizier.*

(Translation.)

My Illustrious Vizier, Ferid Pasha,

IN consequence of the resignation of your predecessor, Salih Pasha, we have, in view of your evident abilities and merit, confided to you the Grand Vizierate, and to Durri-Zade Abdullah Bey the Sheikh-ul-Islamate.

The new Cabinet, formed by you in accordance with article 27 of the Constitution, has been approved by us.

The disturbances, fomented under the name of "nationalism," have placed in a grave position our political situation which, since the conclusion of the armistice, had gradually approached a satisfactory point; and the corrective measures attempted up to the present to counteract this have remained without result.

As, in view of the events which have recently occurred, a continuance of this state of rebellion may possibly give rise to a still more serious situation (which God forbid!),



it is our firm desire that the prescriptions of the law be applied against those known persons who have organised and encouraged those disturbances, but that, on the other hand, a general amnesty be proclaimed in favour of those who, having been led astray, have joined and participated in this rebellion; that prompt and energetic measures be taken with a view to the restoration and consolidation of order and security throughout our Empire, and that in this way the unalterable bond which undoubtedly unites all our loyal subjects to the Caliphate and the Sultanate may be strengthened. It is also our firm desire that, by striving to establish relations of a sincere confidence with the Allied Great Powers and to defend the interests of the State and the nation, taking as a basis the principles of Right and Justice, you will endeavour to secure a moderation of the conditions of peace and the conclusion of peace at the earliest possible moment, and in the meanwhile to relieve as far as may be possible the general distress by having recourse to financial and economic measures of every kind.

May God crown your efforts with success.

[E 3713/3/44]

No. 194.

*Hear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)*

(No. 429.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, April 23, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 420 of 20th April.

Latest information that Azavour has retired to Guenen, followed by considerable Nationalist forces, and is awaiting arrival of munitions, &c., which must now be sent to Kara Bigha.

I submit that Nationalist threat to Dardanelles, which this retirement entails, must not be overlooked.

Grand Vizier stated, on 21st April, that Azavour force was unbroken, and does not appear to despair of success of policy of combating Nationalists by means of counter-move in areas where moral suasion will be available.

Moral suasion seems to have succeeded in case of Jaffar Tayar (see my telegram No. 245 of 17th March), who returned to Constantinople yesterday. His abandonment of extreme attitude appears to have been due to exhortations of French officers at Adrianople, coupled probably with consciousness that his appeal to Nationalist sentiment in Thrace had not as much success as he hoped.

At interview with Grand Vizier on 22nd April, Jaffar Tayar seemed submissive, but I hear he says the one thing Thrace will not tolerate is Greek occupation.

It is too soon to say whether Azavour's move is broken past repair, or what success, if any, moral suasion will have in Anatolia. Following points are, however, clear:—

1. Azavour has suffered severe defeat in serious conflict with Nationalists, and cannot therefore be relied on as counterpoise to their efforts, even if he recovers himself at all.

2. Other movements on same lines as Azavour's are too inchoate to be counted on for purposes of effective resistance to Nationalists in near future.

3. Announcement of drastic peace terms must inevitably detract still more from effectiveness of anti-Nationalists, many of whom will be thrown into sympathy, if not active co-operation, with Nationalists.

Allies must therefore rely on their own resources to enforce drastic peace, and it is desirable, from political as distinct from military point of view, that Western Powers should be prepared to undertake the task with their own forces. Use of Greek army for enforcement of peace terms in Thrace and Anatolia will involve grave danger of general massacres of civil population, Christians and Moslems alike, and devastation of the country-side.

[E 3726/1/58]

No. 195.

*Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge.—(Received April 24.)*

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

*San Remo, April 23, 1920.*

FOLLOWING sent to Batoum:—

"Following for Admiral de Robeck:—

"Position at Batoum this afternoon subject of anxious consideration at Supreme Council. On one hand it is represented that Bolshevik forces are marching along the coast to attack and capture town, and that British garrison may shortly be in grave peril. On the other hand, nothing is known of strength or armament of Soviet forces, or of their chances of success. The military view is that town cannot be held against powerful or sustained attack, except by forces in excess of any that Allies could provide. On the other hand, the political consequences of withdrawal would be most unfortunate, particularly at a time when representatives of three Caucasian States are on the eve of an agreement here for recognising Batoum as a free port in Georgian territory with qualifications for all States. A Bolshevik success at Batoum would destroy this agreement and imperil alliance of three republics, and it might precipitate Bolshevik capture of Baku and consequent loss of entire Caucasus, beside dealing a heavy blow at Armenian hopes. We shall be glad if you will report at once to me here (please repeat to London) your views of situation with your advice as to necessary action.

"If you find British troops in imminent danger you are authorised to concert with General Milne for their withdrawal, since we cannot contemplate military disaster; on the other hand, the French have agreed to send a white battalion from Thrace at once to Batoum, if it be decided to retain it; and have only suspended orders for its despatch pending your reply. Italians also are prepared to fulfil their original promise to send a battalion if situation can thereby be rendered secure."

(Repeated to Constantinople and Tiflis.)

[E 8622/20/44]

No. 196.

*Memorandum of Agreement between M. Philippe Berthelot, Directeur des Affaires politiques et commerciales au Ministère des Affaires étrangères, and Professor Sir John Cadman, K.C.M.G., Director in charge of His Majesty's Petroleum Department.*

BY order of the two Governments of France and Great Britain, the undersigned representatives have resumed, by mutual consent, the consideration of an agreement regarding petroleum.

2. This agreement is based on the principles of cordial co-operation and reciprocity in those countries where the oil interests of the two nations can be usefully united. This memorandum relates to the following States or countries:—

Roumania, Asia Minor, territories of the old Russian Empire, Galicia, French Colonies and British Crown Colonies.

3. The agreement may be extended to other countries by mutual consent.

4. *Roumania*.—The British and French Governments shall support their respective nationals in any common negotiations to be entered into with the Government of Roumania for—

(a.) The acquisition of oil concessions, shares or other interests belonging to former enemy subjects or bodies in Roumania which have been sequestered, e.g., the Steaua Romana, Concordia, Vega, &c., which constituted in that country the oil groups of the Deutsche Bank, and of the Disconto Gesellschaft, together with any other interests that may be obtainable.

(b.) Concessions over oil lands belonging to the Roumanian State.

5. All shares belonging to former enemy concessions which can be secured and all other advantages derived from these negotiations shall be divided, 50 per cent. to British interests and 50 per cent. to French interests. It is understood that in the company or



companies to be formed to undertake the management and the exploitation of the said shares, concessions, and other advantages, the two countries shall have the same proportion of 50 per cent. in all capital subscribed, as well as in representatives on the board, and voting power.

6. *Territories of the Late Russian Empire.*—In the territories which belonged to the late Russian Empire, the two Governments will give their joint support to their respective nationals in their joint efforts to obtain petroleum concessions and facilities to export, and to arrange delivery of petroleum supplies.

7. *Mesopotamia.*—The British Government undertake to grant to the French Government or its nominee 25 per cent. of the net output of crude oil at current market rates which His Majesty's Government may secure from the Mesopotamian oilfields, in the event of their being developed by Government action; or in the event of a private petroleum company being used to develop the Mesopotamian oilfields, the British Government will place at the disposal of the French Government a share of 25 per cent. in such company. The price to be paid for such participation to be no more than that paid by any of the other participants to the said petroleum company. It is also understood that the said petroleum company shall be under permanent British control.

8. It is agreed that, should the private petroleum company be constituted as aforesaid, the native Government or other native interests shall be allowed, if they so desire, to participate up to a maximum of 20 per cent. of the share capital of the said company. The French shall contribute one-half of the first 10 per cent. of such native participation and the additional participation shall be provided by each participant in proportion to his holdings.

9. The British Government agree to support arrangements by which the French Government may procure from the Anglo-Persian Company supplies of oil, which may be piped from Persia to the Mediterranean through any pipe-line which may have been constructed within the French mandated territory and in regard to which France has given special facilities, up to the extent of 25 per cent. of the oil so piped, on such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed between the French Government and the Anglo-Persian Company.

10. In consideration of the above-mentioned arrangements, the French Government shall agree, if it is desired and as soon as application is made, to the construction of two separate pipe-lines and railways necessary for their construction and maintenance and for the transport of oil from Mesopotamia and Persia through French spheres of influence to a port or ports on the Eastern Mediterranean. The port or ports shall be chosen in agreement between the two Governments.

11. Should such pipe-line and railways cross territory within a French sphere of influence, France undertakes to give every facility for the rights of crossing without any royalty or wayleaves on the oil transported. Nevertheless, compensation shall be payable to the landowners for the surface occupied.

12. In the same way France will give facilities at the terminal port for the acquisition of the land necessary for the erection of depots, railways, refineries, loading wharfs, &c. Oil thus exported shall be exempt from export and transit dues. The material necessary for the construction of the pipe-lines, railways, refineries and other equipment shall also be free from import duties and wayleaves.

13. Should the said petroleum company desire to lay a pipe-line and a railway to the Persian Gulf, the British Government will use its good offices to secure similar facilities for that purpose.

14. *North Africa and other Colonies.*—The French Government will give facilities to any Franco-British group or groups of good standing, which furnish the necessary guarantees and comply with French laws, for the acquisition of oil concessions in the French colonies, protectorates and zones of influence, including Algeria, Tunis and Morocco. It should be noted that the French Parliament has resolved that groups so formed must contain at least 67 per cent. French interests.

15. The French Government will facilitate the granting of any concessions in Algeria which are now under consideration as soon as the applicants have complied with all the requirements of the French laws.

16. *British Crown Colonies.*—In so far as existing regulations allow, the British Government will give to French subjects who may wish to prospect and exploit petroliferous lands in the Crown Colonies similar advantages to those which France is granting to British subjects in the French colonies.

17. Nothing in this agreement shall apply to concessions which may be the subject of negotiations initiated by French or British interests.

18. This agreement had to-day been initialled by M. Philippe Berthelot and Professor Sir John Cadman, subject to confirmation by the French and British Prime Ministers respectively.

J. CADMAN.  
P. BERTHELOT.

*San Remo, April 24, 1920.*

Confirmed:

D. LLOYD GEORGE.  
A. MILLERAND.

*April 25, 1920.*

[E 3789/1729/44]

No. 197.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)*

(No. 439.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, April 26, 1920.*

I WISH to point out that as Senior Naval Officer here I shall be placed in an impossible position if commission at Ministry of Marine is presided over by a French or Italian officer. Moreover, as General Milne is commanding all Allied forces in Constantinople and Anatolia it seems imperative that all heads of commissions should be officers nominated by him or me.

[E 3836/1/58]

No. 198.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Lord Hardinge.—(Received April 27.)*

(No. 447.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, April 27, 1920.*

FOLLOWING for Lord Curzon, No. 1:—

"Your telegram of 24th April.

"Bolshevik forces threatening Caucasus are disposed along line, roughly, from Sochi through Vladikavkas to Derbent. Strength estimated at 50,000 men, 200 guns in all.

"Access to Georgia is:—

"1. By coast road on the west.

"2. By mountain passes from north.

"3. Through Azerbaijan from east.

"1. Coast road in neighbourhood of Gagri can be made impassable by His Majesty's ships and seaplanes backed by moderate Georgian force now in position.

"2. Mountain passes can be held by small number of resolute disciplined troops, but Allied troops could hardly be sent to assist unless Georgian army and populace in rear were held to loyalty by a considerable Allied force in the centre. Without such a force an internal rising would isolate them.

"3. Present attitude of Azerbaijan most doubtful, and occupation of province by Reds may occur at any moment. Baku must capitulate to Bolshevik fleet as soon as it appears before the town. Certain units are already at sea. Bolshevik wave westward into Georgia would require large force to stem. Lines of communication from Batoum are very long to guard, and suppression of risings in rear must be envisaged.

"General Milne is advising that a small area enclosing town of Batoum only should be held, and I infer that he considers it out of the question to hold the whole of Batoum province, much less Georgia.

"For this small area, whose perimeter is about 50 miles, he [? group omitted] heavy artillery.

"Navy can only support flank resting on sea. Reinforcement by one French and one Italian battalion is therefore not sufficient.

"There is, however, no immediate danger in situation at Batoum, as nearest Red forces have great difficulties to contend with.

[4370]

2 T 2



"To summarise. Retention of any portion of Batoum province means considerable reinforcement to meet Red and, probably, Turkish pressure, and involves entire supply by sea. Position of Armenia scarcely ameliorated. Withdrawal is a grave matter politically, means isolation of Armenia, and will be the forerunner of anarchy from which thousands of all nationalities will expect to be saved by us.

"If General Milne's requirements for retention of small area cannot be met there is no alternative to withdrawal, Allied subjects in Baku and Tiflis being called in first, and withdrawal carried out before pressure is applied, and in time to give opportunity for those who must leave country to do so."

[E 3789/1729/44]

No. 199.

*Earl Curzon to Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb (Constantinople).*

(No. 383.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, April 27, 1920.*

ADMIRAL DE ROBECK'S telegram No. 439 of 26th April: Constantinople controls.

We naturally wish to avoid placing Senior Naval Officer in a false position, but we do not understand why this should necessarily be a consequence of arrangement outlined in Foreign Office telegram No. 362. British delegate on Admiralty Commission is presumably appointed by General Milne, and the commission is, we understand, under supreme direction of General Milne. It is most desirable to make some concession, especially in view of General Franchet's withdrawal. What alternative would you recommend?

[E 3845/1729/44]

No. 200.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 28.)*

Sir,

*War Office, April 27, 1920.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward herewith a copy of a report from Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. L. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., British Military Mission to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Allied Armies in the Orient, relative to the attitude of General Franchet d'Esperey towards the occupation of Constantinople.

I am, &amp;c.

B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 200.

*Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. L. Howard to Chief of the Imperial General Staff, War Office.*

Sir,

*Constantinople, March 25, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to report as follows:—

1. The principal events have been concerned with the actions of General Franchet d'Esperey since his return to Constantinople on the 11th instant. Owing to no King's Messenger having arrived here for some time, there has been no opportunity of forwarding a report since General Bridges left here for Novorossisk on the 10th instant. It was unfortunate that General Bridges left the day before General Franchet d'Esperey arrived and was therefore unable to see him; in fact, General Bridges and General Franchet d'Esperey have not met since they parted at Belgrade early in January, as General Franchet d'Esperey left here for Paris on the 7th February, a week before General Bridges arrived back.

2. Before leaving, General Bridges saw General Claudel on the 9th instant. Notes of their conversation are attached as Appendix "A" (Enclosure 2).

3. I attach a diary of events and notes made by me of conversations I have had at different times with General Franchet d'Esperey and Colonel Bouchez.

4. On the 10th instant a conference was held on H.M.S. "Ajax," which was attended by Lieutenant-Colonel Giraud (Acting Sub-Chief of the Staff), who made full notes of points discussed and settled, but who said that, beyond undertaking to

bring everything to General Franchet d'Esperey's knowledge, he could accept no responsibility for any decisions arrived at.

5. The course of events is traced in detail in Appendix "B" (Enclosure 3), but there are certain points regarding General Franchet d'Esperey's attitude during the recent events on which I have telegraphed you information and opinions, and which can now be gone into with more detail, more light having been thrown on them by subsequent events and conversations.

(i.) *General Franchet d'Esperey's attitude towards the occupation.*

Although he appeared to be against the occupation, he naturally did not express himself against it to me in more than general terms.

In view of your 350 H.W., Personal, of the 19th February, it would appear that he had to return to Constantinople before he intended to, and that he had been unable to obtain any decision, let alone one to his liking. This is borne out by the fact that, although he knew after his return here on the 11th instant what had been settled at the conference on H.M.S. "Ajax" on the 10th instant, he took no action at all until the 15th, after the decision to carry out the occupation had been made by the High Commissioners. There must be some reason why he made no move until the last minute, as he could quite well have raised the question of inter-Allied commissions before. It would seem possible that he was rushed and that the decision to carry out the occupation came before he was ready, and, as a last attempt to get the power into his hands, he sent what amounted to a "call to order" to General Milne (*vide* paragraph 3 of Appendix "B"). He may have been trying to bring off a big coup whilst he was in Paris so as to eliminate General Milne from a share in the control in Turkey in Europe and to get the complete control himself, with General Wilson directly under him. Having failed to bring this off he acted as detailed above, and that has failed too. The explanation given by Colonel Bouchez (Appendix "D," last paragraph) is plausible, but there must be more in it than that.

I am not able to say now whether General Franchet d'Esperey was against the occupation itself, or only temporarily, although Colonel Bouchez told me his own opinion was that it must come, but later on.

As stated previously, he waited till the last moment to butt in, and although this may have been because he found he could not stop the occupation, he felt that he had to approve in order to try to control the situation. If he had not done anything, he would, by his passivity, perhaps have laid himself open later on to an accusation of an anti-British attitude; in view of the publication in French papers that the French had brought the British (who wanted to turn the Turks out of Constantinople) round to their view, this would have been awkward for him, especially as one paper here (the "Peyam Sabah") had published this information as emanating from General Franchet d'Esperey himself. As it is, there has been a considerable amount of propaganda to the effect that it was the British who are responsible for the occupation; but General Franchet d'Esperey, although he has not said he approved of the occupation itself, has put in writing that he approved General Milne's dispositions.

(ii.) *General Franchet d'Esperey's attitude as regards the command.*

General Franchet d'Esperey passed the matter off to me, when discussing the question of the commissions, as being entirely due to instructions from the Supreme Council having been "mal rédigé" somewhere. He said he was good friends with General Milne, and there was no difference of opinion between them.

Colonel Bouchez, on the other hand, has been outspoken at times, especially on the 17th instant (Appendix "D"), on which occasion he spoke about the position as between General Milne and General Paraskevopoulos; but I did not point out to him that General Franchet d'Esperey had interfered in detail when he gave orders to General Cot limiting the action of the two French battalions in Stamboul, as I thought that, if I did, it might give him an idea of one of the particular points on which General Franchet d'Esperey's actions have been displeasing to the British Government.

(iii.) *The misquotation of General Milne's letter.*

At first, I thought this was an accidental mistake, especially as Colonel Bouchez as much as admitted it was, but on receipt of General Franchet d'Esperey's letter,



in which he said, in reply to a letter pointing out General Milne's actual wording, that he had done it with full knowledge. I telegraphed to you the verbatim translation of General Franchet d'Esperey's reply. There must be a motive for this, but it is not clear what it is, unless General Franchet d'Esperey wishes to try and confuse the issue, as between the command in Constantinople and the command in Thrace. This may be so, as the chief of the 2nd bureau told me he was drafting a letter asking what dispositions General Wilson was making to cope with possible troubles at Adrianople and in Thrace generally; but this letter has not materialised. General Franchet d'Esperey has now been replied to that General Milne, in accordance with instructions from the British Government, takes no responsibility for dealing with Thrace, and regards it as entirely the sphere of General Franchet d'Esperey.

6. The attitude of the French Staff at the present moment is that they are completely in the dark as to the reasons for all this business and they have no instructions from Paris, but this may well be because an attempted *coup* has failed. In this connection it is interesting to note that months ago Colonel Bouchez told me that they had had no intimation that General Milne was Commander-in-chief in Turkey in Asia, and that he would telegraph to Paris.

When he mentioned having no instructions about the command here I reminded him of the above, and he told me that, to this day, they have had no official notification that General Milne is Commander-in-chief in Turkey in Asia. I have a letter from General Milne, dated the 16th November, 1919, giving paraphrase of a wire from the Foreign Office to the High Commissioners here, in which it is stated that, at a meeting of the Supreme Council, the French delegate said that the resolution of the Supreme Council conferring the command in Turkey in Asia on General Milne had been communicated to the French Commander, and that they undertook to repeat it.

7. To sum up, events such as have recently occurred are bound to cause a great deal of ill-feeling between the Allies here, and so long as the present régime exists, or anyhow as long as General Franchet d'Esperey remains, difficulties are bound to recur at times of stress. General Bridges telegraphed his views on the 29th February, and it is unfortunate that he was away during this last crisis. The presence of both General Franchet d'Esperey and General Claudel is superfluous. A possible solution might be the allotment of clearly defined zones to the French and ourselves, each having our own responsibilities, and, whilst maintaining close liaison, doing away with the present system of command here.

8. As an instance of the trivial sort of incident arising out of the occupation, which Colonel Bouchez brought to my notice (although unofficially), he complained that a sentry had been put on the door of Colonel Mougin (French liaison officer) at the Turkish War Office. Although I told him that our own liaison officer had had a sentry on his door to start with, and that Colonel Mougin's had been taken off directly the officer in charge had been able to go round, he was still dissatisfied, and said that the Turks had said to Mougin: "The British are treating you the same as us!"

9. Regarding the platoon of French infantry for Batoum, both Colonel Bouchez and the chief of the 3rd bureau have impressed on me that the size of the detachment had nothing to do with General Franchet d'Esperey, the latter having received detailed orders from Paris.

10. I have had several talks lately with Colonel Bouchez about the general situation. Assuming that the Greeks will be given Smyrna and Thrace, which he greatly deprecates, he calculates that a large number of troops will be required for an indefinite period to maintain order. The Greeks will have to keep three divisions in Thrace and about four at Smyrna. The situation for the French in Syria and for us in Mesopotamia would be adversely affected, and the maintenance of a large number of troops entailed. He pointed out that France might well, under the circumstances, say that she had had enough of it and clear out of Cilicia and Syria, as she would not get her money's worth out of the country except under the most favourable and peaceful conditions. In this respect the wish may be father to the thought.

As regards a United Armenia, he considers four divisions would be necessary as a garrison, and said, if the Americans are so keen about it, they must find the troops. France could not, and he was quite sure England would not. I telegraphed to you that he was certain we should be attacked soon in Mesopotamia. He said that his information had enabled him to foresee the trouble in Cilicia a month before it came,

and that the information he now had was of such a kind that he could foresee an attack on us. He considers that the Nationalist movement has collapsed in Thrace and Smyrna, but that it is still strong as regards Syria and Mesopotamia and must be seriously reckoned with in those parts.

He ascribes the success of the Greek cause in the Turkish peace negotiations entirely to the influence of M. Venizelos, but says the latter won't have things his own way now with M. Millerand as he did with M. Clemenceau!

I have, &c.

H. C. L. HOWARD,

Lieutenant-Colonel, G.S.

P.S. March 26.—This morning Colonel Bouchez told me they do not understand about the change whereby we take no responsibility for part of Thrace, as hitherto that has been under Allied corps. He told me they were sending a letter asking how and when this change was brought about. I told him that no doubt his Government would inform him about any changes. He also said it was not admissible that General Franchet d'Esperey should remain at Constantinople if the command is not under him. He points out the distribution of responsibility in Turkey in Europe, viz., General Paraskevopoulos in Macedonia, a Serbian general in Serbia, a French general in Bulgaria, and a British general in Thrace and Constantinople, all under General Franchet d'Esperey, as Commander-in-chief. I am telegraphing this to-day.

H. C. L. H.

Enclosure 2 in No. 200.

#### APPENDIX "A."

##### *Conversation between General Bridges and General Claudel.*

AFTER lunch to-day (9th March) I called on General Claudel to enquire after his health and to tell him of the proposed conference to-morrow. I found him considerably shaken and not dressed. He had a black-eye and contused forehead and nose, and has had a somewhat severe injury to his shoulder, and perhaps a broken collar bone, from the fall from his horse that he sustained yesterday. After the necessary condolences, I asked him whether he would be fit to take part in the conference on the "Ajax" to-morrow. He said that he would be unable to do so, but that his Chief of Staff would be present if required. At the same time he made a point of impressing on me that he considered that the conference should not take place until the arrival of General Franchet d'Esperey, who might reasonably be expected to-morrow night or Thursday morning. He said that his own instructions from General Franchet d'Esperey as to the use of troops were solely that he must not break up the 122nd Division. He did not consider himself in a position to decide military matters of the first importance with the Commander-in-chief of the Allied armies so near at hand, and begged that the conference might be postponed until his arrival. I informed General Claudel that I had already told both the High Commissioner and General Milne of the probable time of General Franchet d'Esperey's arrival, and I thought that the reason that the conference was not postponed was that the matter was too pressing and that important matters might, and, indeed, were known to be, leaking out.

I then saw General Claudel's Chief of Staff, Colonel Giraud, and arranged with him that Colonel Howard should take him to the conference on the "Ajax." He, in his turn, likewise tried to impress on me the undesirability of deciding on action until the arrival of his chief. He said, indeed, that under such circumstances the discussion could only be academic. I assured him that I did not think that he would find such was the case.



Enclosure 3 in No. 200.

## APPENDIX "B."

*Diary and a résumé of events in connection with Military Occupation of Constantinople.*

March 15.

GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY was informed by letter that General Milne intended carrying out, on the following day, the decisions taken by the Allied High Commissioners, and that the general measures to be adopted would be those agreed upon at the conference of the 10th March in H.M.S. "Ajax."

2. General Franchet d'Esperey the same day wrote a letter to this mission enclosing a copy of the decision of the Allied High Commissioners to occupy Constantinople, saying that he approved of the measures proposed during his absence by General Milne and that these were to be carried out, but that the supervising commissions were to be inter-Allied with one British, one French and one Italian member, each with equal powers, the senior officer in each commission to direct the working of the commission. General Franchet d'Esperey detailed by name in this letter the French officers who were to represent France on these commissions. He stated that the 122nd French Division would "stand by" ready to assist.

3. Simultaneously General Franchet d'Esperey wrote a personal letter to General Milne stating that he had received letter (1), and that he was much surprised that General Milne had thought fit to take action without his orders and without even obtaining his approval, also reminding him that under decision No. 6 of the Conference of London, dated the 3rd December, 1918, the troops of General Milne which were in Turkey in Europe remained under the general command of General Franchet d'Esperey.

4. General Milne replied to letter (2) and (3), informing General Franchet d'Esperey that in the matter of the occupation of Constantinople he had received direct from the British Government his instructions to carry out orders from the British High Commissioner. He had informed General Franchet d'Esperey's representative of the decision taken at the earliest possible moment, and had notified General Franchet d'Esperey as soon as he received orders from the British High Commissioner.

As the command of the Allied troops in Constantinople was in British hands he could not agree to General Franchet d'Esperey's proposals as regards the conditions governing the commissions, but was referring these to His Majesty's Government.

March 16.

5. General Franchet d'Esperey informed me, at an interview in the afternoon, that he was nonplussed at General Milne's refusal to agree as regards the commissions without reference to His Majesty's Government, for all arrangements had hitherto been inter-Allied.

6. During the day General Franchet d'Esperey was informed, in writing, that the occupation had been carried out, and thereafter verbal and written situation reports were rendered to him periodically.

7. At an interview in the evening I informed General Franchet d'Esperey, in the presence of General Bouchez, that General Milne had decided to start inter-Allied telegraph control at once, without prejudice to future decisions and conditions. General Franchet d'Esperey asked why General Milne had changed his mind regarding forming commissions since the previous evening. I replied that General Milne had not said that he could not agree to the formation of inter-Allied commissions, but only to the conditions, and that General Milne wished him to be quite clear on this point.

March 17.

8. I interviewed Colonel Bouchez at 9 A.M. He stated that he had not yet received the letter which I referred to the previous afternoon, to the effect that General Milne was starting the inter-Allied telegraph control at once; he added "The General Officer Commanding-in-chief will not let Captain Bergeret join until he receives an answer from his Government." The matter was now one which Government only could deal with. On the 15th, M. Defrance, as representative of the High Commis-

sioners had informed General Franchet d'Esperey, as the General Officer Commanding-in-chief Allied armies in the Orient, that the occupation was to be carried out. The latter had immediately written to General Milne saying that he wished that there should be inter-Allied control and certain commissions found accordingly. He pointed out that this was not a proposal, but "directions," in other words "orders"; General Milne had replied that he could not carry this out. I then repeated to Colonel Bouchez my explanation made the night before in his presence.

He queried my explanation, saying, "If General Milne wished to disagree with conditions only, why didn't he put it clearly in his letter?" I replied that I had conceived a doubt as to a possible misunderstanding, and having expressed this to General Milne, had been instructed by the latter to make the point quite clear. Indirectly, I led up to the point that, although General Franchet d'Esperey had been back several days, it was not until the last minute that the question of inter-Allied commissions was raised. Colonel Bouchez replied that no commissions had been mentioned until General Cot brought his orders on the 15th, when General Franchet d'Esperey seeing that no mention was made of any Allies, immediately wrote his letter (*vide* 2).

9. A letter was written to General Franchet d'Esperey informing him that an inter-Allied telegraph commission was to be started immediately, and asking that his representative should attend.

10. A reply was received to (9) misquoting General Milne's letter of the 15th March, and saying that, until General Franchet d'Esperey received instructions from his Government he could not detail an officer for this commission. In the meantime, the officer who had been detailed originally joined the commission and worked with it unofficially.

March 18.

11. I informed Colonel Bouchez that an intimation had been received that His Majesty's Government were agreeable to the inauguration of Allied commissions on the understanding that these would remain under General Milne's control, and that in each case the British member would be president, and that subject to these conditions General Milne would be only too pleased to meet General Franchet d'Esperey's views.

Colonel Bouchez took note of this and emphasised that there was no difficulty as between High Commanders, it was entirely between the Governments, and the responsibility lay on the Supreme Council.

March 19.

12. Confirmation of (11) was sent to General Franchet d'Esperey, the misquotation mentioned in (10) above being pointed out.

13. Colonel Bouchez during an interview at 9 A.M. stated that he had informed General Franchet d'Esperey of (11), and that the reply was that, until the latter had received an answer from his Government, he was not going to take any steps.

March 21.

14. Written confirmation was received of the reply given in (13), and was transmitted to General Milne.

15. General Franchet d'Esperey was informed that the naval and military precautions in Constantinople had been relaxed in view of the situation continuing to be quiet.

March 22.

16. A reply was received to (12), stating that it was with full knowledge that General Franchet d'Esperey had misquoted, asserting that the command in Turkey in Europe was in British hands—Lieutenant-General Sir H. Wilson—and quoting instance of latter's action as Commander of Allied corps in Turkey in Europe in support.

March 24.

17. General Franchet d'Esperey was informed that General Milne, in accordance with instructions received from His Britannic Majesty's Government, took no responsibility for dealing with events in Thrace, and regarded it as entirely the sphere of the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Allied armies in the Orient.



Enclosure 4 in No. 200.

## APPENDIX "C."

*Interviews with General Franchet d'Esperey on March 16, 1920.*

I HAVE had two interviews to-day with General Franchet d'Esperey to report to him from General Milne regarding the situation.

2. He told me this afternoon that he was nonplussed at that part of General Milne's letter, which I handed to him last night, which stated that General Milne could not agree to his proposals as regards the various commissions without referring to His Majesty's Government, as up to now all arrangements here have been inter-Allied. He was certain that the orders had been badly drawn up in London and that, as the Supreme Council was now sitting in London, the matter would soon be cleared up. He pointed out the importance of inter-Allied telegraph control in view of the situation in Cilicia and Mesopotamia, saying that an English officer could not know the degree of importance of Turkish telegrams going to Cilicia nor a French officer of those going to Mesopotamia. He said he had telegraphed last night to his Government.

3. At this evening's interview I told him that General Milne had decided to start the inter-Allied telegraph control at once, without prejudice, pending instructions from London as to conditions. He said: "Why did General Milne say last night he couldn't agree and to-day he does?" As I was not sure that the exact sense of General Milne's letter had been correctly given to him in the translation made by his staff, I pointed out that General Milne had not said he could not agree to the formation of the inter-Allied commissions, but only to the conditions, and that General Milne wished him to be quite clear on this point. He then asked why, if Admiral de Robeck had agreed to the commission at the Ministry of Marine commencing work, General Milne would not start the commission at the War Ministry.

As a result of interviews, I give, as personal opinion, that the line General Franchet d'Esperey has taken with his Government is that General Milne has said that as command is in British hands he cannot, without instructions, agree to formation of inter-Allied commissions, instead of the correct interpretation that he cannot agree to the conditions governing the commissions.

Colonel Bouchez told me to-day that, from information at his disposal, he previously foretold attack on Marash, and that, from information he now had, he was convinced that British would be attacked in Mesopotamia in about a week. He also said that, if the peace terms turned out to be as he expected, he was certain the Turks would not submit to them.

Enclosure 5 in No. 200.

## APPENDIX "D."

*Summary of Interview with Colonel Bouchez at 9 a.m., March 17, 1920.*

COLONEL BOUCHEZ stated that he had not yet received the letter which I had spoken to him about yesterday afternoon, to the effect that General Milne was starting the inter-Allied telegraphic control at once. He said: "The 'Général en Chef' will not let Captain Bergeret join it until he receives an answer from his Government." The matter was now one which Governments only could deal with. The High Commissioners had decided on the occupation taking place on the 16th; on the 15th M. DeFrance, as the representative of the High Commissioners, informed General Franchet d'Esperey, as Commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies in the Orient, that the measure was to be carried out. General Franchet d'Esperey at once wrote a letter to General Milne in which he stated that, whilst approving of all the measures which the latter had prepared in his absence, he wished that there should be inter-Allied control and certain commissions formed accordingly. He pointed out that this was not a proposal, it was "directions," in other words "orders"; General Milne had replied to the effect that he could not carry this out. I then repeated to Colonel Bouchez what I had said to General Franchet d'Esperey in his

presence the night before, that General Milne wished it to be absolutely clear that there was no question of declining the principle of inter-Allied commissions, but that, pending instructions from his Government, he was unable to agree to the conditions governing those commissions, in other words, all having equal powers, with the senior of each commission being given the task of supervising the organisation and working of each commission. He queried my explanation, and said: "If General Milne intended to disagree with the conditions only, why didn't he put it clearly in his letter?"

I said that yesterday, at my first interview with General Franchet d'Esperey and with him, I had got the idea that the letter had not been correctly understood in so far as this paragraph was concerned. Later in the day General Milne had been informed accordingly, and I had been instructed to make it absolutely clear that General Milne disagreed concerning conditions only, and, at my second interview with General Franchet d'Esperey, I had, in his presence, pointed this out, and that I wished again to emphasise this point. He said that he was quite clear on it, but that the matter had now gone so far that it could only be settled by the High Commissioners and the Governments. Colonel Bouchez further pointed out that General Franchet d'Esperey did not in any way interfere with details—he had only given general directions—and drew my attention to the analogous position of General Paraskevopoulos and General Milne, stating that General Milne gave general directions to General Paraskevopoulos at Smyrna, but didn't interfere with details. He also again emphasised the importance of inter-Allied control of the telegraphs in order to supervise the telegrams proceeding to Anatolia; he was sure nothing would happen here, but that we were going to be attacked in Mesopotamia shortly, and it was absolutely necessary for the Allies jointly to know the contents of telegrams emanating from Constantinople.

Indirectly, I led up to the point that, although General Franchet d'Esperey had been back several days, it was not until the last minute that the question of inter-Allied commissions was raised. He gave, as his reason for this, that nothing had been said about it at the conference of the 10th March on board H.M.S. "Ajax," and consequently it was not until the morning of the 15th when General Cot brought his orders, which showed that General Shuttleworth was to control the War Ministry, &c., and that no mention was made of any Allies, that General Franchet d'Esperey wrote the letter containing his directions to General Milne.

[E 3963/1/58]

No. 201.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis).*

(No. 185.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Foreign Office, April 28, 1920.*

IN supplement to negotiations which you have been so successfully conducting at Tiflis between the three Caucasian States with regard to settlement of their future frontiers, a patient and prolonged effort was made at San Remo to induce their representatives there to come to a similar agreement concerning the future of Batoum. Basis of plan was that, upon withdrawal of Allied troops, Batoum should be handed over to the Georgians, subject to guarantees for its future use as a free port for the three States, and railway access to it being secured for Armenia. Azerbaijan and Armenians showed a most conciliatory spirit. Draft agreement was drawn up and provisionally signed, but was afterwards repudiated by Georgians, who were obstinate, unaccommodating and short-sighted to a degree. Presumably they are counting upon getting Batoum subject to no engagement or condition, and then strangling their neighbours at leisure. I let them know that unless they came to terms my interest in the fortunes of Georgia would be greatly diminished, and that I should find small incentive to bestir myself further for their protection. But, in spite of this threat, they refused to sign, and negotiations fell through at last moment. You should remember this in your future transactions with the Georgian Government.

[4370]

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[E 3929/47/44]

No. 202.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 29.)*

My Lord,

Aden, April 15, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 15th April, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 202.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal,

Aden, April 15, 1920.

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of the last letter, dated the 7th April, 1920.

*Tihama.*

Nothing of particular interest has been reported from Hodeida this week. The split among Quhra sheikhs referred to in the last letter appears to have been due to each one of them trying to assume the governorship of Obal after its recapture from the imamic troops. The dispute has, however, been settled by the Idrisi commander at Bajil. There also appears to have been a quarrel between Sheikhs Abu Hadi and Ismail Baghawwi over the division of sheep captured. This, too, has been settled.

Two Quhra akils, who recently visited Hodeida, gave the figures of Zeidi losses as from 400 to 500, against the Idrisi losses of 12 killed and 9 wounded. It is not possible to ascertain the exact figures of the Zeidi losses, and though they seem to have been considerably greater than those of the Quhra-Idrisi, particularly at Jebel Bura, the figures given by the akils are obviously much exaggerated.

It appears that after the capture of Obal the people of Madwal and Taraf went with sacrifices to the Idrisi troops, who then entered Wadi Har.

Riqab on Jebel Bura is still in the hands of the imamic troops. The state of siege must be very incomplete indeed, as the imamic party appears to have ample provision.

Activity is reported to be taking place in this neighbourhood. Captain Gordon thinks that the occupation of Jebel Bura by the imam would not affect the situation greatly, beyond the loss of a strategic point by the Idrisi, and a setback to his possible extension into the Tihama. The fall of Bajil, however, in his opinion, would be of considerably more importance, as it would mean the subjection of the Quhra. In such an eventuality, he does not think it likely that the imam will advance into the plains, but that the Aboos, who are after all half-hearted allies of the Idrisi, would probably desert him, and out of fear assume an unfriendly attitude towards us at Hodeida.

In the event of the Idrisi extension into the Tihama, it will be interesting to see if the Zaraniq wholeheartedly accept the Idrisi.

Their three sheikhs were said to have entered into an agreement with the Idrisi to accept and obey the orders of his commandant when sent, but later there appeared to have been a certain reversion of feeling owing to rumours of heavy Idrisi dues.

Syed Mustafa, who is expected here shortly, has given health as the ostensible object of his coming to Aden, but I understand from Captain Gordon, who recently paid a visit to Medi, that the real object is to ask for pecuniary assistance, as the Idrisi finds it difficult to carry on the local war without getting some revenue from the Tihama.

*Yemen (Upper and Lower).*

Rumours of Zeidi activity in the direction of Mafalis are again current.

The Abdali Sultan has received news from some sheikhs in the Yemen of the intention of the Zeidi commander at Taiz, Ibn'l Wazir, to occupy the Maktari fort and then to attack the Subehis within our protectorate with the ultimate object of taking Lahej. It is said that Ibn'l Wazir will be assisted by the Hakim of An-Nadra in this scheme.

The Abdali Sultan has also received a letter from the Maktari sheikh, enclosing one from Ibn'l Wazir, in which the Maktari people are exhorted to be obedient and

submissive to the imam's representative in their country, and are warned of severe punishment for failure to do so.

The Maktari sheikh asks for assistance to fight against the imam.

The Assistant Resident, Perim, reports a movement of imamic troops towards Moza and Sheikh Said. The object seems to be to remove Turkish guns lying at these places. Sheikh Nasir of Sheikh Said, who was summoned to Taiz, has refused to go and has come to Perim to ask for our assistance. He has collected his men at Sheikh Said.

*Aden Protectorate.*

There has been no change in the situation. The number of the Zeidis at Jalila reported in the last letter was much exaggerated. The number does not appear to be more than 100 at Jalila. According to Abdul Hamid, the brother of the Amir of Dala, there are about 380 Zeidis in all distributed among various places in the Amiri country, including Jalila.

The Audhali Sultan has sent his wazir with a letter he has received from one of the imam's commanders, Syed Mahomed-bin-Ali, in which the syed says he has heard that the Resident at Aden has sent him letters asking the Audhali to send his children to the schools which, he says, we have lately opened. He warns the Audhali against sending his children to these schools, and listening to the Kadi of Behan and the Audhali wazir, who mislead him by advising him to befriend us and by saying that the Yemen is now under the Christians. The syed says that the Yemen is still under the Turks, and that they will shortly return with tremendous forces and will severely punish those who have proved treacherous to the Islamic faith. The syed promises to come himself shortly or send an emissary to explain matters personally. He adds that we will shortly discontinue stipends and presents.

The reference to schools is regarding a proposal to open a chiefs' college at Aden, which has not materialised.

A correspondent in Upper Yafa reports the arrival of 150 Zeidis. Of these, 35 are sayids and cousins of the imam. They have been sent as hakims for newly occupied places. One of the sayids, it is said, will go to Terim as hakim in the Kathiri territory.

The correspondent sends a letter he has received from the imam's hakim at Dala, in which he has been asked to make submission to the imam. Similar letters are said to have been sent to other Yafai sheikhs and sultans. The correspondent says that the Yafai chiefs held a meeting and decided to send the following reply:—

"Know, O Zeidis, that we are believers in God and His prophet. We carry out His rightful orders and act accordingly. We say with every hardihood that the imam will never send you to do what is wrong and prohibit what is right, and to rob people unjustly. You must understand that we cannot tolerate such a thing, and we are prepared to fight you. You have occupied the border of Yafa, but note that it will have to be vacated some day."

Yours, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 3994/3/44]

No. 203.

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 30.)*

(No. 513.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, April 29, 1920.

MILITARY situation up to 27th instant, as stated by Grand Vizier in conversation with me, was as follows:—

1. Loyal Government and volunteers had obtained control over a considerable area of country eastward of Gulf of Ismid. Following places were occupied by them: Adabazar, Duzje, Bolu, Gereede, Zafaranbolu, Beybazar Mudurlu. Government troops were moving on Narlihan.

2. Government wishes to extend its hold southwards along Anatolian Railway, but its troops had not advanced in this direction further than Geive.

3. Telegraphic communications have been restored between Constantinople and Adrianople, and Grand Vizier to-day, 29th, appears to think that Government's control of Thrace was in process of being satisfactorily re-established.



[E 4019/1/58]

No. 204.

*Commander Luke to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 30.)*(No. 223.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Tiflis (via Basra), April 29, 1920.*

NEWS available from Baku tends to show that on receipt of Soviet ultimatum on evening of 27th April Azerbaijan Government immediately resigned.

The same night a meeting of leaders of all parties agreed that executive authority should be placed in hands of Narimanof, a native of Baku, and Soviet Commissar for Oriental Affairs, in meanwhile forming a Soviet administration for conduct of current business.

It is reported that Russian Soviet Government has recognised Azerbaijan Soviet. Also reported that Russian Soviet preparing to send troops across Azerbaijan territory to effect junction with Turks' post in Zangezur region. Joint Turco-Bolshevik attack on Armenia seems probable unless Dashnaks able to secure terms from Bolsheviks, which so far seems questionable.

Still no news of British in Baku. Georgian representative there imprisoned. Learn on reliable unofficial authority that Tchitcherin has asked Georgia to define her boundaries, which he engages to respect, provided Georgia disarms and interns Russian volunteers in Georgian territory. Georgian Government maintain intention of resisting aggression, but internal position at Tiflis showing signs of uncertainty.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 138; Tehran, No. 72; Combat, Batoum, No. 69.)

[E 3308/289/44]

No. 205.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*(No. 315.)  
Sir,*Foreign Office, April 30, 1920.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1721 of the 3rd November, 1919, relative to the exercise by the Turks of jurisdiction over the subjects of Allied belligerent States during the period of the armistice, I have to forward herewith, for your information, copy of a note\* which I have received from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Minister, urging that capitulatory rights should, without further delay, be conferred upon nationals of his Government.

2. I have replied that to raise this question at the San Remo Conference, as suggested, would serve no useful purpose. Meanwhile, I should be glad if you would inform me by despatch what in practice the position of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals is in this connection.

I am, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 3309/289/44]

No. 206.

*Earl Curzon to M. Gavrilovitch.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 30, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the 15th instant, in which you make the suggestion that capitulatory privileges should, without further delay, be conferred upon subjects of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

The view of His Majesty's Government, as you are no doubt aware, is that the subjects of States which in the war were allied belligerents should not be amenable to Turkish jurisdiction during the period of the armistice, and His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople has been authorised to act on these lines in conjunction with his colleagues.

It does not appear that any useful purpose would be served by referring to the Conference now assembled to consider the Treaty of Peace with Turkey the question of the status of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals in Turkey during the period of the armistice.

\* See No. 179.

In view, however, of the considerations advanced in your note under reply as to the disabilities under which Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals in Turkey find themselves, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople has been instructed to report further upon this matter.

I have, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4053/3/44]

No. 207.

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 1.)*

(No. 519.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, April 30, 1920.*

GRAND Vizier called on me on 29th April. He said that he could not go himself to Paris with Turkish Peace Delegation, owing to situation here. He therefore wished to draw attention now to gravity of situation as result from attempt to impose drastic peace, such as published statements regarding proceedings of Conference led public to expect.

Grand Vizier stated that since coming into power he had had very near view of domestic situation in Turkey. There was uneasiness everywhere. He had just seen deputation from Adrianople, who had declared that if Greek invasion of Thrace were permitted, even women and children would be armed to resist it.

Jaffar Tayar has used similar language, and declared that he could count upon Bulgarian assistance.

Grand Vizier said that imposition of treaty would involve "complications," and that he employed that much-abused word advisedly.

I told Grand Vizier that I realised the situation, that whatever terms Conference might fix would have been decided on with full knowledge of position of Turkey based on reports from Constantinople, and that, while I would report what he said to your Lordship, I could myself make no reply or comment.

Grand Vizier mentioned, in the course of this conversation, that treaty would probably be considered in the first instance by Council of Imperial Family, as being most immediately concerned, and then by Grand Council of Notables. I gather that question of ratification, as opposed to signature, is again preoccupying Government. From what passed with Grand Vizier, and remarks dropped by Tewfik Pasha, also in private conversation of [? group omitted] date, it looks as if Government rather foresaw probability of having to substitute Grand Council on above lines for regular Parliament.

[E 4056/37/44]

No. 208.

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2.)*

(No. 523.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, May 1, 1920.*

REFERENCE my telegram No. 295 of 27th March, following two Turkish undesirables have been arrested and sent to Malta: Ahmet Emin Bey and Refet Pasha.

[E 4059/1/58]

No. 209.

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2.)*

(No. 530.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, May 1, 1920.*

FOLLOWING from Tiflis, dated 28th April:—

"2-th April, sunrise,

"Telephonic communication received by Georgian Government, Baku. Town was occupied by Bolsheviks punctually at 2 A.M. this morning, following upon their capture of Balajari towards midnight and bombardment of Baku from the sea.

"Azerbaijan Government understood to have handed over administration to Soviet Commissar Narimanof, no resistance being offered. Georgian Government



determined to take necessary measures for defence, and in the first [group undecypherable] instance [group undecypherable] mobilising two classes to-morrow. They again urge vital necessity for Allied aid, and also their troops should be permitted to occupy villages of Batoum provinces, in order to give their army liberty of action as far as possible to counter Bolshevik threats in the west.

"Have urged Georgian Government to co-operate with Armenia for mutual defence. Am warning political officer at Erivan to hold himself ready to leave if Armenian situation suggests that railway, telegraphic and telephonic communication with Baku is likely to be interrupted [group undecypherable] requested Haskell to endeavour to obtain news of British personnel, Baku, by wireless from his representative there, also to ascertain if naval party was able to reach Enzeli."

[E 4108/757/44]

No. 210.

*Signor Preziosi to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 3.)*

(No. 889.)

My Lord.

*Italian Embassy, April 19, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Senator Scialoja, to whom I communicated the contents of your Lordship's note, has now acquainted me that the Swiss Government has addressed to the Italian Government a request, similar to that made to your Lordship by the Swiss Minister in London, respecting the participation of a Swiss representative in the new council of the Ottoman Debt.

In communicating the foregoing, Senator Scialoja expresses the opinion that the decisions of the Governments concerned respecting the reply to be returned to the above request should be arrived at by the Conference now assembled at San Remo.

I have, &amp;c.

G. PREZIOSI

[E 3836/1/58]

No. 211.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 409.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, May 6, 1920.*

CABINET considered yesterday question of continued occupation of Batoum. While unwilling to run risk of military disaster, and while repeating to General Officer Commanding authorisation to withdraw British troops in event of any such disaster impending, they were so much impressed by arguments contained in your telegram, and by extreme political importance of holding the town, at any rate for the present, that they have called upon French and Italian Governments immediately to fulfil their promises repeated at San Remo to despatch a battalion each to Batoum. It was felt that the distance of the enemy forces, the possibility of substantial resistance by the Georgians, the unlikelihood that the Soviet Government would wish to come into direct collision with British troops while they are hoping for the opening of commercial negotiations with Great Britain, and the unfavourable progress of their arms elsewhere, might tend to postpone and possibly altogether to avert an attack upon Batoum. In any case the next few weeks should show what will happen, and His Majesty's Government concur with the view that every effort should be made to save the situation in the Caucasus, the collapse of which might have very far-reaching consequences.

[E 4320/1/58]

No. 212.

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).*

(No. 184.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, May 6, 1920.*

CABINET decided yesterday that, while authorising General Officer Commanding in last resort to withdraw British garrison from Batoum in order to escape contingency of real disaster, it is most desirable on political grounds to retain hold of the town, which, in view of the distance of the enemy and the likelihood of resistance by the Georgians, should not, with adequate forces, be found difficult. The British troops in

occupation consist of one British and one Indian battalion. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government will be glad if the Italian Government will at once carry out their engagement, originally given in London and repeated at San Remo, to send a white battalion to Batoum. Orders for its despatch were suspended at San Remo until reply received from Admiral de Robeck. Latter has reported that there is no immediate danger in situation at Batoum, but that withdrawal would be a grave matter politically, involving isolation of Armenia and being forerunner of anarchy, from which thousands of all nationalities would expect to be saved.

His Majesty's Government agree with this estimate of the position, and think that a serious effort should be made to save a situation of so much importance to the Allies.

[E 4407/3/44]

No. 213.

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 575.)

My Lord.

*Constantinople, April 22, 1920.*

I PROPOSE in the present despatch to take up the connected narrative of the main developments of the political situation in Turkey from the point to which I brought it by my despatch No. 226 of the 13th February.

2. The despatch just quoted recorded the importation into Ali Riza Pasha's Cabinet of elements which gave the Central Government a more definitely Nationalist character than it had had before, without making it so openly Nationalist as to involve a break with the Allied representatives here. Ali Riza Pasha himself did not long survive this reconstruction. He resigned suddenly on the 3rd March for reasons which have never been fully disclosed. The bad news from Cilicia was at that moment becoming generally known in Constantinople, and there were strong rumours of an important Greek advance in the Smyrna area. These may have been factors in deciding the Grand Vizier to retire, but his resignation was probably fundamentally due to the increasing difficulty of serving two masters, namely, Mustafa Kemal and the Allied High Commissioners, whose demands for satisfaction in connection with specific incidents tended ever to multiply.

3. Ali Riza Pasha himself, while refraining from any pronouncement as to the immediate reasons for his retirement, made no secret in private conversation of the embarrassments in which the uncompromising attitude of the Nationalist leaders had involved him. They had, he said, kept him in office only because it suited them to do so rather than risk the advent to power of an anti-Nationalist Cabinet, but they had no real desire to make his task easy. Certain Nationalist journalists on the other hand sought to represent Ali Riza Pasha to the public as a Minister who had resigned because he found himself in a situation in which no honourable man would do otherwise. This situation, their leaders were left to infer, was created by the Allies.

4. The crisis lasted some days. Its logical outcome would have been the constitution of a definitely Nationalist Cabinet. Logic, however, has little to do with the complicated interplay of Turkish domestic politics, and amusement rather than surprise greeted the accession to power on the 8th March of a Government practically identical with its predecessor, except that Salih Pasha replaced Ali Riza Pasha as Grand Vizier.

5. In the improbable event of Salih Pasha's name being handed down to posterity, it will be as that of one of the most luckless Grand Viziers in Turkish history. He is a man of no strength of character or ability, and he had the misfortune to take office at a moment when compromise was no longer possible. The only singular feature of his tenure of office was that he succeeded in clinging to it for a fortnight after the occupation of Constantinople on the 16th March. That he did so was due to the unwillingness of the Nationalist leaders to take up the challenge of the Allies in Constantinople before they had had time to rally their supporters in the interior, and to the unwillingness of the High Commissioners to take any action expressly aimed at compassing Salih Pasha's fall. The Allied High Commissioners felt that the logic of the situation could no longer be ignored and that Salih Pasha must be succeeded either by a declared Nationalist or by a declared anti-Nationalist. The first alternative presented no advantages. The second presented the disadvantage that it was certain to produce a rupture between Constantinople and the provinces, and any advantages it might otherwise have offered seemed likely to be nullified by the impossibility of

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holding out to any Government, however disposed to work with the Allies, the prospect of a peace tolerable in the eyes of even moderate Turks.

6. Nevertheless, it was the Allied High Commissioners who dealt Salih Pasha the *coup de grâce*. The intimation of the occupation of Constantinople had been accompanied by a demand for the disavowal of Mustafa Kemal and the other Nationalist leaders. I need not recapitulate here the history of the "disavowal incident," which was fully given in my telegrams Nos. 309 and 328 of the 30th March and the 3rd April, and my despatch No. 463 of the 3rd April. It is enough to say that the Government were ready to go far in the direction of a paper disavowal but were not prepared to omit a phrase implying that the national movement was in principle justified by the Greek occupation of Smyrna, and that only its excesses were condemned. The Allied High Commissioners insisted on a categorical and unqualified disavowal and the Government resigned on the 2nd April.

7. During the period between the occupation of Constantinople and Salih Pasha's resignation, the political opponents of the Nationalists had been straining every nerve using every artifice to drive the Grand Vizier from power, and to bring Damad Ferid Pasha back. These efforts were defeated by the tenacity of Salih Pasha, the hesitancy of the Sultan, the difficulty of arranging on what basis a Ferid Cabinet should be constructed, and perhaps by some reluctance on the part of Ferid Pasha himself to assume office without some prospect of being able to obtain a mitigation of the peace terms. On this last point he was left no ground for illusion, for at an interview of the 1st April a member of my staff impressed on him most strongly that no change in the Government could be expected to alter the general lines of the peace, and that the most any Grand Vizier could hope for was to avert developments which might make the treaty even more severe. Reshid Bey, the only other statesman of definitely anti-Nationalist complexion who was in the running for the Grand Vizierate in the expected event of Salih Pasha's fall, had been similarly warned, though in his case the French displayed some anxiety not to discourage him completely.

8. The fall of Salih Pasha owing to causes independent of the internal political intrigues against him ended any hesitation which Ferid Pasha may have felt. He assumed office on the 5th April, but he included Reshid Bey in his combination as Minister of the Interior, and he filled the other posts with men unconnected with any political party, most of them being men distinguished in their professions and little known outside them. It was, in fact, another of those politically neutral Cabinets so dear to the Palace and to all conservative elements here, but it came in with a very definite programme of combatting the national movement by every possible means.

9. The means available were of three kinds, viz., moral influence, physical force, and the purging of public offices in Constantinople, with other measures of a similar kind, such as the dissolution of Parliament. All these have been tried concurrently from the 5th April up to the date of writing.

10. Moral influence was brought to bear by the vigorous condemnation of the national movement in the Imperial decree appointing Ferid Pasha, the Government's declaration, and the fetvas of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, coupled with a promise of pardon to such of the rank and file as should submit within a week. I sent home the text of these documents in my despatches Nos. 494 of the 9th April and No. 542 of the 17th April. Especial importance attaches to the fetvas, owing to the reverence in which such pronouncements are held by the bulk of the Moslem population. The efficacy both of the fetvas and the other pronouncements is, however, impaired by the difficulty of circulating them in the interior and by the possibility of their being countered by rival pronouncements, including fetvas of other ecclesiastical luminaries, representing the Sultan-Caliph as being in duress and incapable of lawfully exercising his functions.

11. Something has also been attempted in the way of persuading individual adherents of the movement of the interior to reconsider their attitude.

12. It is too soon to estimate the effect produced by the methods described in the two preceding paragraphs. Reports reach Constantinople of messages of loyalty from Bafra and Trebizond. One concrete result has been the arrival in Constantinople on the 21st April of Colonel Djaffer Tayyar Bey, of Adrianople, the author of the redomontade reported in my telegram No. 245 of the 17th March. It looks as if this officer had not found the support he hoped for either in Thrace itself or outside, and had elected to retire, with the credit of having submitted to the Sultan, from a position which did not answer his expectations. These signs of weakening on the part of the national movement must not be exaggerated. Djaffer Tayyar may live to fight another day, and in any case the broad fact remains that the first effect of Ferid Pasha's advent to power

was what the High Commissioners had anticipated. The provinces have ceased to regard the authority of the Central Government, and all telegraphic communication between them and Constantinople is cut off. The regular troops in the interior are practically all, so far as is known, committed to the national movement. The Nationalist leaders control the situation in Anatolia, and they still, unless Djaffer Tayyar's withdrawal makes a change, control the situation in Thrace.

13. I turn to Damad Ferid Pasha's second means of action, namely, physical force. He cannot count on regular troops anywhere outside Constantinople. There had, however, been growing up during the earlier part of the period under review an anti-Nationalist movement in the region between Panderma and Balikesser under the leadership of one Ahmed Anzavur, a Circassian, who had previously had some local success against the Nationalists in the same area, but who had apparently collapsed. Anzavur has a considerable following of Circassians, who are numerous in that district, and he had support from anti-Nationalist elements in Constantinople, including, according to some accounts, the Sultan himself. Anyhow, when Ferid Pasha returned to power, his movement had revived sufficiently to be the one definite force opposed to the Nationalists, and it was an essential feature of the new Grand Vizier's programme to utilise this force and to develop any similar embryo forces elsewhere. Anzavur was legitimised by being made a Pasha and an officer of the Central Government, and in due course he occupied Panderma. Unfortunately his success has been shortlived. Within the past few days he has been driven from Panderma, and by all accounts the Nationalists have assembled such forces against him as to make it doubtful whether he can recover himself. This setback deprives the Government of any immediate hope of securing Broussa or the Anatolian railway beyond Ismid, and diminishes the probability of their being able to utilise the germs of other anti-Nationalist movements in the Yalova and Ismid districts.

14. Ferid Pasha's chances of fostering anti-Nationalist movements in more remote areas, where he had counted on them to some extent, such as the north coast of Asia Minor, the Bozkir region south of Konia, and the Kurdish frontier, are obviously very problematical.

15. The Government have in the meanwhile proceeded with their third means of action, viz., the purging of public offices. Four of the high officials in the Sultan's immediate entourage, who were supposed to exercise an evil influence, have been removed. Considerable changes of personnel have been effected in the Ministry of War and other departments, including the appointment of new permanent Under-Secretaries of State in the most important. In order to establish more direct control at the Ministry of War the dilatoriness of which in furnishing supplies for Anzavur is said to be one of the main causes of that leader's defeat. Ferid Pasha himself took charge as Acting Minister on the 21st April.

16. On the 12th April Ferid Pasha dissolved Parliament, which had already gone on strike as reported in my despatch No. 408 of the 25th March, and thus freed himself of a Chamber consisting almost entirely of nominees of the Nationalist leaders.

17. Such has been the evolution of the present situation in Turkey. It remains to consider that situation in relation to the Allies.

18. The occupation of Constantinople marked the culmination of a series of developments, which, as I have insisted in earlier despatches, rendered a conflict inevitable between the Allies and the Turkish national movement. The culmination might have been deferred until the announcement of the Turkish peace terms, had it not been for various incidents of which the most notable were the troubles in Cilicia. These incidents precipitated strong action on the part of the Allies, designed to strengthen their own position where it could alone be made really strong, and to serve as a warning to the Nationalists. The warning was not wasted, but it naturally did not suffice to kill the national movement. The inevitable result ensued in the shape of a rupture between Constantinople, where the Allies were strong, and Anatolia, where the national movement was, if not absolutely strong, at least the only effective force.

19. No Government could stand in Constantinople in open opposition to the Allies and after the occupation no Government could long go on hedging. This brought Ferid Pasha back to power, and brought him back in conditions which made no other course possible for the Allies than to back him in his efforts to repress the national movement. This policy is now being pursued on the lines indicated in my telegram No. 372 of the 11th April. It would be useless, however, to attempt to disguise the fact that Ferid Pasha's first endeavour to repress the movement has met with so severe



a rebuff as to make the chances of ultimate success doubtful in the interior, or the still more important fact that he lacks the one thing which would really justify his anti-Nationalist policy, namely, the ability to hold out to his countrymen any hope of a peace which would leave Turkey in possession of Smyrna, Thrace, and a good part of the eastern provinces of Asia Minor.

20. I crave your Lordship's pardon if I appear to dwell too often and too constantly on the probable effects of a drastic peace. The insuccess of Ferid Pasha's efforts so far to resist the national movement by native means makes it all the more certain that such a peace can only be imposed by armed force, and that that force must be supplied and wielded by the Allies. The present situation in Cilicia affords proof of how unwise and how wickedly unjust to the Christians of Asia Minor it would be to engage in the enterprise without adequate force or without a settled determination to see the thing through to a finish. Past experience in the Smyrna area shows on the other hand how dangerous it would be to entrust the task of imposing the Peace terms to the Greek army. I can only hope that the Powers of Western Europe, having apparently decided irrevocably to impose this drastic peace, will provide for its execution in such a manner as to ensure success, and to secure their object with a minimum of bloodshed, and above all with a minimum of danger to the lives of non-combatants of every creed and race, not to mention that material havoc and devastation which can only help to render illusory any reparation clauses that the treaty itself may contain.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

[E 4435/47/44]

No. 214.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 10.)*

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

Aden, April 21, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 21st April, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 214.

*The Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

My dear Field-Marshal,

Aden, April 21, 1920.

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter:—

Tihama.

No reports have been received from Hodeida this week. A rumour is current here that the Idrisi has occupied Zabeed, and that fighting is in progress at Hais and other places in the neighbourhood.

Aden Protectorate.

With reference to the alleged intention of the imam to advance on Lahej via the Maktari and the Subehi countries, reported in my last letter, the Abdali Sultan has now been informed from the same source that the scheme has been postponed by order of the imam.

The imam has also sent orders to his amil at Jalila, Saiyid Yahya, to postpone further operations in that quarter. The amil is, however, reported to have moved from Jalila to Dala with 150 men en route to Dubyat with the object of confiscating the valuable effects of the Dala people removed to Dubyat. Another report states that the amil sent a letter to the Mansab of Dubyat, Saiyid Ali Radwan, demanding 300 dollars as a tax on the property, and threatening to confiscate the property in case the tax is not paid. The mansab replied promising to pay the amount, and asking the amil not to send Zeidis to Dubyat, as their presence would frighten the people and lower

his own prestige. The families of the Amir of Dala and of his brothers, who had been removed to Dubyat after the occupation of Dala by the Zeidis, are reported to have left for Tai'wa.

The amil is reported to have sent men to bring him information re the number of live-stock in the Amiri, Shairi and Halmin villages. The object is believed to be the imposition of a tax. The amil has imposed the following taxes on articles, &c., sold in the market:—

1 dollar per camel.

$\frac{1}{2}$  " " bullock.

2-4 annas per goat or sheep.

1 anna each from retailers.

1 " " " seller and purchaser of 1 dollar worth of jowari.

The imam's amil is said to have received orders recalling him to Sana, but he has not complied with them.

The Yafais are said to have withdrawn from their border, as they have heard that the Zeidis have given up their intention to attack them.

The imam's amil at Mawia lately sent two sheikhs to the Haushabi Sultan with a letter asking him to come to Mawia. The Sultan sent a verbal reply to the effect that he was under the British protection, and that he had nothing to do with the amil. The Haushabi hastened the departure of the sheikhs by stating that he was expecting the arrival of British troops at Musemir that very day.

Yours sincerely,

J. M. STEWART.

[E 4500/757/44]

No. 215.

*M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 10.)*

PAR une lettre en date du 14 avril dernier, sa Seigneurie le Comte Curzon of Kedleston avait bien voulu faire part à l'Ambassadeur de France d'une démarche faite par le Ministre de Suisse à Londres en vue d'assurer la représentation de son pays au nouveau Conseil de la Dette ottomane.

Le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Étrangères exprimait le désir de connaître l'opinion du Gouvernement français dans cette question.

M. Millerand partage entièrement la manière de voir du Foreign Office et estime que la demande suisse ne peut être accueillie.

M. Paul Cambon saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 8 mai 1920.

[E 4570/3537/44]

No. 216.

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 11.)*

(No. 565.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, May 11, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 406 of 5th May.

I took an opportunity afforded by visit to Grand Vizier on 10th May to speak in sense indicated, but for reason given in last paragraph of this telegram I gave what I said formed simple conversation as expression of my own views.

I found Grand Vizier very depressed over peace prospects. He spoke as though he were now between two minds as to whether Turkish Government could assume responsibility for signing treaty ceding to Greece Smyrna and the whole of Thrace, especially as Government would be assuming responsibility which, strictly speaking, could only be borne by Parliament.

He adverted to possibility of Nationalists in Europe proclaiming independence of Eastern and Western Thrace combined; and to declaration of Nationalists in Asia that they would never accept treaty of kind foreshadowed in recent disclosures, which declaration, he said, had been embodied in telegram from Angora to Peace Conference.

Grand Vizier asked what might be expected to happen if Turkey did not sign peace. He said that if he knew this, it might help him to prepare way for acceptance



and to spare his country from fresh disaster. I said I had no information as to intentions of Supreme Council, but that my own feeling was that, logically, armistice had only two possible ends, viz., peace or resumption of hostilities.

He asked whether draft treaty presented on 11th March would admit of attenuation or would be the last word of Supreme Council. I again expressed ignorance, but said I thought no attenuation would be looked for unless Turkish Delegation could produce new factor, and I could not personally conceive of existence of any factor which had not been fully considered by Council when drafting treaty.

He asked whether time allowed to Delegation for reply would admit of submission of treaty to Sultan and other authorities here.

I said that precedents led me to think that sufficient time would be allowed for this purpose.

Early in conversation Grand Vizier renewed suggestion made by him on previous occasion that Turks could readily sign treaty if they had some assurance that Great Britain would secure revision in their favour eventually as they did after Treaty of San Stefano. I naturally said that I could not give him smallest encouragement [? group omitted] French and Italians did not want to deprive Turkey of places inhabited by Turks. He quoted recent utterances of M. Barthou, and especially M. Nitti, and said that if policy of allies of His Majesty's Government was what these utterances indicated, His Majesty's Government themselves could surely assent to it. I pointed out that draft treaty could alone be taken as reflecting policy of Allies, representing as it did joint production of prolonged deliberations of their responsible statesmen. I confess, however, that I was somewhat embarrassed by citations from M. Nitti's speech.

I also felt some uncertainty as to whether your telegram under reference was intended as definite message to Turkish Government implying that His Majesty's Government expect and intend to play in this country after peace rôle different from and more paternal than that of other Allies. I should be grateful for any further guidance your Lordship could give me on this last point.

[E 4617/1729/44]

No. 217.

*M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 12.)*

L'AMBASSADEUR de France a attiré à diverses reprises l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur les conditions dans lesquelles fonctionnaient les contrôles établis d'un commun accord entre les Gouvernements alliés dans la ville de Constantinople. M. Paul Cambon a fait remarquer au Foreign Office que la prépondérance donnée à l'élément britannique dans ces organismes était une cause de malentendus auxquels nous avions intérêt à mettre un terme en conférant respectivement la présidence des trois commissions à trois officiers alliés : un Anglais, un Français et un Italien.

Au cours d'un entretien en date du 30 mars dernier, sa Seigneurie le Comte Curzon of Kedleston avait répondu à l'Ambassadeur de France qu'il se renseignerait immédiatement sur une situation qu'elle ignorait et qui devait être éclaircie. Le 10 avril, le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Étrangères déclarait à M. Paul Cambon qu'après avoir pris ses renseignements au War Office, il avait télégraphié à Constantinople dont il attendait une réponse.

Au cours d'un récent séjour à Paris, M. Paul Cambon a appris que M. Millerand avait reçu à San-Remo l'assurance que le Gouvernement britannique avait télégraphié à Constantinople pour que la présidence des trois commissions fût confiée à trois officiers alliés.

M. Millerand vient de faire savoir à l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres que, d'après les dernières informations reçues de Constantinople, les Commissions de la Guerre et des Télégraphes fonctionnent toujours sous la présidence d'un officier britannique, et la Commission de la Marine n'a pas de président. Les mesures prises en ce qui concerne les déplacements de troupes et de navires turcs, les envois d'armes, le sont sans que les commissions aient été consultées ou même souvent informées.

M. Millerand insiste donc pour que les présidences soient réparties conformément aux assurances reçues du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, et qu'en outre le Commandement militaire britannique permette le fonctionnement régulier des organismes interalliés établis à Constantinople.

M. Paul Cambon saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 11 mai 1920.*

[E 4645/56/44]

No. 218.

*Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 12.)*

(No. 336. Very Confidential.)

(Telegraphic)

*Washington, May 11, 1920.*

I HEAR on what appears to be reliable authority that President and Secretary of State are extremely desirous of forcing United States to undertake mandate for Turkey and to participate, but this is less sure, in control of Dardanelles and Bosphorus. I am informed that they have asked ex-Ambassador Gerard to suggest means of effecting this without reference to Congress, and have confidentially approached Caldwell and other members of Republican Committee who are interested in Middle East to assist them in carrying out their plan over the heads and in teeth of opposition of both Senate and House of Representatives.

There is to be a meeting here in Washington in a few days' time, provisionally fixed for 18th May, at which President and Colby will meet Gerard and certain Republicans to elaborate the scheme, if any is found to be feasible. I understand officials of State Department are being kept in entire ignorance of this project.

I send you this information, but President's course, if he pursues this line of approach, is so closely surrounded by difficulties, which appear to be insurmountable, that it would, in my opinion, be unwise to count upon his obtaining any results in external affairs. It may be that the whole movement is for internal political effect.

[E 4658]

No. 219.

*M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 13.)*

LA Délégation du Hedjaz a remis au Secrétariat de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs une note protestant contre la décision de la Conférence de la Paix d'attribuer à l'Angleterre et à la France respectivement les mandats sur la Mésopotamie, la Palestine et la Syrie. Une réponse à cette protestation injustifiée paraît indispensable.

2. D'autre part, malgré la patience dont le Haut-Commissaire français en Syrie a fait preuve à l'égard de l'Emir Feysal et des provocations des extrémistes, le Gouvernement français ne saurait plus longtemps accepter que tous les principes d'accord acceptés par l'Emir soient quotidiennement violés et que les soldats français continuent à être massacrés par des bandes mi-turques mi-arabes, commandées par des officiers chérifiens, qui se forment librement sur le territoire non occupé par nos troupes et s'y réfugient après le succès de leurs attaques, sous l'œil bienveillant de Feysal. Que les autorités chérifiennes soient déloyales ou impuissantes, l'impérieuse nécessité du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité s'impose à nous.

3. De Beyrouth à Alexandrette, les postes français s'échelonnent sur plus de 400 kilom. et ne peuvent être atteints que par mer, faute de routes; pour les défendre contre les attaques dont ils sont victimes, il est nécessaire de disposer de la seule voie existante, celle du chemin de fer de Homs à Alep. Cela est d'autant plus indispensable que nos troupes de Cilicie se trouvent également harcelées par des bandes de nationalistes turcs et que, pour leur fournir l'appui et le ravitaillement dont elles ont un besoin impérieux, nous devons également pouvoir relier le chemin de fer des Portes ciliciennes à Nisibine à celui de Syrie. Cette nécessité s'impose non seulement à la France, mais aux Puissances, car, si nous ne pouvons laisser massacrer impunément nos soldats, nous avons également la charge de défendre les minorités chrétiennes et de protéger contre les nationalistes turcs les frontières du Traité de Paix arrêtées par les Alliés.

4. La situation présente et la collusion des extrémistes turcs et arabes présentent aussi bien pour l'Angleterre que pour la France un danger évident; les ménagements conservés jusqu'ici, les concessions successives qui ont été faites n'ont eu pour résultat que d'enhardir nos adversaires et de compromettre nos positions.

5. Ne pouvant laisser massacrer en détail ses troupes d'occupation, le Gouvernement français, après avoir envoyé en Syrie les renforts dont il disposait, va notifier à l'Emir Feysal qu'il occupe provisoirement la ligne ferrée d'Homs à Alep, dont disposaient les troupes anglaises d'occupation et dont le libre emploi lui est refusé jusqu'ici, malgré une nécessité de plus en plus pressante. Ceci ne change en rien les dispositions bienveillantes du Gouvernement français à l'égard de l'indépendance promise aux populations syriennes, ni même vis-à-vis de Feysal, qui a été invité à se rendre à la prochaine



réunion du Conseil suprême à Paris pour réaliser un accord définitif. Le mandat donné à la France sur la Syrie lui fait d'ailleurs non seulement un droit, mais un devoir de maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité.

6. La décision de la Conférence à cet égard modifie d'ailleurs la position respective de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France en Syrie, en Palestine et en Mésopotamie; de même que la France n'interviendra en rien dans l'organisation administrative britannique en Palestine et en Mésopotamie, M. Millerand pense que c'est par l'intermédiaire du Haut-Commissaire français en Syrie que doivent désormais s'établir les rapports du Maréchal Allenby avec Damas. Cela impose également la question du subsidie servi jusqu'ici par moitié à Feysal par les Gouvernements français et anglais, et qui désormais n'incombe plus à l'Angleterre (subsidie d'ailleurs déjà suspendu depuis la fin de février, d'accord entre les deux Gouvernements, en raison de l'attitude équivoque de Feysal). Dans le même ordre d'idées, est-il exact que l'Émir Feysal reçoive et continue à recevoir de l'administration militaire de la Palestine une partie du produit des douanes de Caïffa? Ce serait contraire à notre décision commune de cesser d'entretenir l'Émir dans la phase présente de sa politique.

7. Il serait désirable que les deux Gouvernements n'aient pas à s'adresser pour des mandats différents à un même Émir; telle paraît d'ailleurs être l'idée qui a amené la convocation de l'Émir Abdallah au Caire et sa prochaine venue en Europe; Feysal ne peut rester à la fois le représentant du Roi du Hedjaz, des revendications pan-arabes et le prince de la Syrie, placée sous le mandat français. Sinon, il présenterait, aussi bien pour l'Angleterre en Palestine et en Mésopotamie que pour la France en Syrie, un danger tout à fait sérieux. Un étroit accord dans la politique française et anglaise dans l'Asie occidentale est d'un intérêt incontestable. La communication séparée et différente faite récemment à Feysal en l'invitant à venir à Paris a encouragé sa résistance en lui laissant l'espérance de s'appuyer successivement sur l'Angleterre et la France pour ses ambitions opposées à l'une et à l'autre Puissance.

8. En me priant de m'entretenir en toute franchise avec Lord Curzon de cette situation, M. Millerand me communique :

- (1.) La note de la Délégation du Hedjaz.
- (2.) Le projet de réponse qui y a été préparé. Si le Gouvernement anglais, intéressé spécialement comme le Gouvernement français dans la question, adhère à cette réponse, elle serait soumise à la Conférence des Ambassadeurs.

Copie de ces deux documents est jointe à la présente note.

9. Quant à la notification au sujet de la ligne d'Homs à Alep, elle est si urgente et si indispensable que M. Millerand se propose de la faire, en toute hypothèse, dans un très bref délai.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 12 mai 1920.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 219.

*Hedjaz Delegation to Supreme Council.*

LA Délégation du Hedjaz se permet de faire part au Conseil suprême du sentiment de surprise avec lequel elle a appris par la voix publique la décision prise à la Conférence de San-Remo au sujet des pays arabes détachés de la Turquie.

Tout en rendant hommage aux graves préoccupations qui ont inspiré cette décision des chefs d'État alliés, nous ne pouvons cependant nous empêcher de constater une certaine contradiction entre les principes qu'elle suppose et les promesses de liberté et de "self-determination" solennellement proclamées.

M. le Président du Conseil des Ministres de la République française, à la séance du 28 avril de la Chambre des Députés, a fait la déclaration suivante : "la Grande-Bretagne," a-t-il dit, "a reçu un mandat sur la Mésopotamie et sur la Palestine, et la France sur la Syrie."

La Délégation du Hedjaz fait respectueusement observer que, pour l'attribution de ces mandats, le désir des populations intéressées n'a pas été pris en considération. Le principe même de la consultation formellement stipulé par le Traité de Versailles du 28 juin a été écarté. La Délégation du Hedjaz n'a pas manqué de formuler en son temps ses réserves contre le principe même des mandats sur les pays arabes et depuis elle a eu l'occasion à maintes reprises d'attirer l'attention de la Conférence de la Paix

sur les désirs et les aspirations des populations en question, aspirations nettement exprimées par leurs représentants et proclamées récemment sous une forme solennelle par le Congrès de Damas.

La Délégation du Hedjaz se permet en second lieu d'attirer l'attention du Conseil suprême sur ce fait que la décision de San-Remo détache de la Syrie sa partie méridionale, la Palestine, ce qui est contre le gré et la volonté de sa population, que les liens de sang, de race, de tradition et d'intérêts économiques ont de tout temps unie à elle.

Sa Majesté le Roi du Hedjaz en déclarant la guerre à la Turquie et en ralliant les Arabes à la cause des Alliés ne visait rien moins que leur libération du joug étranger et la création d'un Gouvernement libre et indépendant qui leur permettrait de reprendre leur place dans le concert des nations civilisées. Conscients de leurs droits et de leurs devoirs, les Arabes n'ont pas hésité à prendre les armes contre leurs frères de religion, à donner le meilleur de leur sang pour la défense de la cause du droit et ont réduit ainsi à néant la menace d'une guerre sainte que les Turcs et les Allemands ont voulu exploiter dans leur lutte contre l'Entente.

La décision de San-Remo détruit cette espérance. Les éléments modérés de la jeune nation qui se sont efforcés et qui s'efforcent tous les jours de l'orienter vers une politique de collaboration sincère avec les Alliés se trouvent par là poussés au découragement et à l'impuissance. Le Gouvernement de Damas que les Alliés hésitent encore à reconnaître et qui cependant a témoigné de son entière bonne volonté pour maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité sur tout son territoire se trouve devant une tâche des plus difficiles.

La Délégation du Hedjaz, en attirant respectueusement l'attention du Conseil suprême sur les considérations qu'elle vient d'exposer, ne peut s'empêcher de lui signaler la gravité de la situation. Elle estime de son devoir de formuler ses réserves contre la décision de la Conférence de San Remo, qui porte atteinte aux droits des populations et se trouve être en contradiction avec les principes qui ont déterminé le Hedjaz à participer à la guerre.

*Paris, le 30 avril 1920.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 219.

*Draft Reply to Hedjaz Delegation.*

PAR note du 30 avril 1920, la Délégation du Hedjaz a marqué sa surprise de la décision de la Conférence de la Paix qui attribue à la Grande-Bretagne le mandat sur la Mésopotamie et la Palestine et à la France le mandat sur la Syrie.

La Délégation formule des réserves, estimant que cette décision ne tient pas compte des aspirations des populations et des principes qui ont déterminé la participation des Arabes à la guerre.

Elle ajoute que le Gouvernement de Damas, pratiquant une politique de collaboration sincère avec les Alliés et témoignant son entière bonne volonté pour maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité sur son territoire, se trouvera déçu et placé dans une situation difficile.

La protestation de la Délégation du Hedjaz ne paraît à aucun point de vue justifiée.

Il appartient sans contestation possible à la Conférence de la Paix, constituée par l'union des Puissances qui, au prix de sacrifices immenses, ont libéré les peuples asservis, et en particulier les Arabes, de la domination de leurs oppresseurs, de régler les conditions de la paix et de définir le statut et les frontières des États nouveaux.

Les décisions antérieures des Puissances ont proclamé en même temps que leur ferme intention de reconnaître le droit des populations ainsi libérées à se gouverner à titre de nations indépendantes, la nécessité de confier à une Puissance mandataire le soin de guider leur administration jusqu'au moment où elles seront capables de se conduire seules : l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations, contresigné par la Délégation du Hedjaz, enregistre formellement cette règle, dont le bon sens et l'histoire démontrent par ailleurs le caractère impératif.

Le chef de la Délégation du Hedjaz, l'Émir Feysal, a si bien reconnu le bien-fondé de ces principes qu'il a de lui-même fait appel à la France pour cette mission, au nom des populations syriennes. Il ne saurait donc légitimement protester contre la décision de la Conférence de la Paix.

[4370]

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C'est aux Puissances intéressées, qui ont libéré les Arabes et qui n'ont pas cessé de leur prêter avec le plus grand désintéressement leur appui matériel et moral indispensable, qu'il appartient, au contraire, d'appeler la plus sérieuse attention de la Délégation du Hedjaz et de son chef sur le désordre et l'insécurité maintenus depuis des mois et toujours croissants sur le territoire syrien, sur la collusion d'officiers chrétiens avec des chefs de bandes turcs contre les troupes européennes libératrices et sur la tentative de préjuger des décisions de la Conférence de la Paix en faisant proclamer à Damas un Roi de Syrie par une réunion improvisée sans garanties. Il est évident que les graves inconvénients d'une telle situation ne sauraient se prolonger et que si les autorités arabes de Damas ne voulaient ou ne pouvaient pas maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité sur le territoire, les Puissances mandataires auraient le devoir d'y procéder elles-mêmes pour le bien des populations et la vie de leurs nationaux.

La Conférence de la Paix, qui a attribué les mandats dont le caractère indispensable a été reconnu, a invité l'Émir Fey-al à se rendre à la prochaine réunion du Conseil suprême, dans l'espoir que l'avenir des pays arabes pourrait être réglé d'accord avec lui et les malentendus dissipés.

Paris, le 10 mai 1920.

[E 4679/1331/44]

No. 220.

Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 317.)

My Lord,

United States Embassy, London, May 12, 1920.

PURSUANT to the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Government of the United States has been unofficially informed that the mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine have been assigned to Great Britain; the mandate for Mesopotamia being given subject to friendly arrangement with the Italian Government regarding economic rights.

2. The Government of the United States desires to point out that during the peace negotiations at Paris leading up to the Treaty of Versailles, it consistently took the position that the future peace of the world required that, as a general principle, any alien territory which should be acquired pursuant to the Treaties of Peace with the Central Powers, must be held and governed in such a way as to assure equal treatment in law, and in fact to the commerce of all nations. It was on account of, and subject to this understanding that the United States felt itself able and willing to agree that the acquisition of certain enemy territory by the victorious Powers would be consistent with the best interests of the world. The representatives of the principal Allied Powers, in the discussion of the mandate principles, expressed in no indefinite manner their recognition of the justice and far-sightedness of such a principle, and agreed to its application to the mandates over Turkish territory.

3. The administration of Palestine and Mesopotamia during the interim period of military occupation has given rise to several communications between the United States Government and that of Great Britain relative to matters that had created the unfortunate impression in the minds of the American public, that the authorities of His Majesty's Government in the occupied region had given advantage to British oil interests which were not accorded to American companies, and further that Great Britain had been preparing quietly for exclusive control of the oil resources in this region. The impression referred to has, it is believed, been due in large part to reports of authoritative statements regarding the general oil policy of Great Britain, and of actual work such as the construction of pipe lines, railways and refineries, the operations of certain oil wells, the acquisitions of dockyards, cotton investigations, and permitted researches by certain individuals whose activities, though stated to be solely in behalf of the civil administration, were attended by circumstances which created the impression that some benefit at least would accrue to British oil interests.

4. Certain of the occurrences above referred to have been explained by His Majesty's Government as due to military necessity, and certain others as due to laxity on the part of local authorities. It must be realised, however, that it has been difficult for the American people to reconcile all of these reports with the assurance of His Majesty's Government that "the provisional character of the military occupation does not warrant the taking of decisions by the occupying Power in matters concerning the future economic development of the country," and that the invitation of new undertakings and

the exercise of rights under concessions would be prohibited. The United States Government has confidence in the good faith of His Majesty's Government in attempting to carry out the assurances given by His Majesty's Foreign Office, but desires to point out that the considerations above referred to indicate the difficulty in ensuring the local execution of such undertakings, and the necessity for careful measures to guarantee the practical fulfilment of the principles expressed and agreed to during the peace negotiations at Paris.

5. With this thought in mind the Government of the United States ventures to suggest the following propositions, which embody or illustrate the principles which the United States Government would be pleased to see applied in the occupied or mandated regions, and which are submitted as furnishing a reasonable basis for discussions. In the event of such discussions, it would be assumed that the legal situation as regards economic resources in the occupied or mandated regions would remain *in statu quo* pending an agreement—

(1.) That the Mandatory Power strictly adhere and conform to the principles expressed and agreed to during the peace negotiations at Paris, and to the principles embodied in mandate "A" prepared in London for adoption by the League of Nations by the Commission on Mandatories.

(2.) That there be guaranteed to the nationals or subjects of all nations treatment equal in law and, in fact, to that accorded nationals or subjects of the Mandatory Power with respect to taxation or other matters affecting residence, business profession, concessions, freedom of transit for persons and goods, freedom of communication, trade, navigation, commerce, industrial property, and other economic rights or commercial activities.

(3.) That no exclusive economic concessions covering the whole of any mandated region or sufficiently large to be virtually exclusive shall be granted, and that no monopolistic concessions relating to any commodity or to any economic privilege subsidiary and essential to the production, development, or exploitation of such commodity shall be granted.

(4.) That reasonable provision shall be made for publicity of applications for concessions and of governmental acts or regulations relating to the economic resources of the mandated territories; and that in general regulations or legislation regarding the granting of concessions relating to, exploring, or exploiting economic resources, or regarding other privileges in connection with these, shall not have the effect of placing American citizens or companies, or those of other nations or companies controlled by American citizens or nationals of other countries, at a disadvantage compared with the nationals or companies of the mandate nation, or companies controlled by nationals of the mandate nation or others.

6. The fact that certain concessions were granted in the mandated regions by the Turkish Government is, of course, an important factor which must be given practical consideration. The United States Government believes that it is entitled to participate in any discussions relating to the status of such concessions, not only because of existing vested rights of American citizens, but also because the equitable treatment of such concessions is essential to the initiation and application of the general principles in which the United States Government is interested.

7. No direct mention has been made herein of the question of establishment of monopolies directly or indirectly by or in behalf of the Mandatory Government. It is believed, however, that the establishment of monopolies by or in behalf of the Mandatory Government would not be consistent with the principles of trusteeship inherent in the mandatory idea. His Majesty's Government has stated its conception of the necessity for the control of oil production in these territories in time of national emergency. The Government of the United States does not intend at present to suggest arrangements that shall extend to any consideration not included in an enlightened interpretation of what constitutes its legitimate commercial interests. The question of control in times of national emergencies of supplies which may be deemed essential by Great Britain is a subject which the United States Government deems a matter for separate discussion.

8. The Government of the United States realises the heavy financial obligations which will arise in connection with the administration of the mandatory. It believes, however, that any attempt toward reimbursement by the adoption of a policy of monopolisation or of exclusive concessions and special favours to its own nationals, besides being a repudiation of the principles already agreed to, would prove to be unwise even from the point of view of expediency both on economic and political



grounds. It also believes that the interests of the world, as well as that of the two respective countries, can best be served by a friendly co-operation or a friendly and equal competition between the citizens of the two countries and citizens of other nationalities.

9. The Government of the United States would be glad to receive an early expression of the views of His Majesty's Government, especially in order to reassure public opinion in the United States.

10. I have the honour, further, to acquaint your Lordship that this note is not designed by way of reply to the Allied note from San Remo, which will be answered separately.

I have, &c.  
JOHN W. DAVIS.

[E 4701/3/44]

No. 221.

*Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 13.)*

(No. 581.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, May 13, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 513 of 29th April.

Military situation in area south and east of Ismid has had no important developments during past ten days. Both Government and Nationalist forces have had small local successes and set-backs, but there appears to have been no fighting of importance, and neither side seems inclined to risk decisive engagement at present.

Circassians, upon whom Government largely relies for support in area mentioned, are reported to be earning ill-will of population owing to their looting of horses, &c.

Karamursal and Yalova, on Guemlek Peninsula, have been occupied by Nationalists.

[E 6314/1/58]

No. 222.

*Earl Curzon to His Majesty's Representatives at Paris (No. 609) and Rome (No. 254).*

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, May 13, 1920.*

PLEASE inform French/Italian Government that in view of the fact that the Caucasian situation is assuming definite shape, and that the presence of an inter-Allied garrison at Batoum will not be much longer required, His Majesty's Government are sending out to Batoum Colonel Stokes, recently their political officer at Baku, and intimately acquainted with Governments and peoples of the Caucasus, to conclude an agreement with the Georgian Government, by which the town and province of Batoum will be handed over under suitable conditions to that Government. These conditions are to provide for free transit over the Caucasian Railway and free use of the port of Batoum for the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Upon the conclusion of this agreement the General Officer Commanding will hand over the port and province of Batoum to the Georgian Government, and will then withdraw the occupying forces.

(To Paris only.)

It is hoped that the French Government will issue corresponding orders to the commanding officer of their troops at Batoum.

(To Paris and Rome.)

In the interval, steps are being taken to send out a supply of arms to the Georgians and Armenians to assist them in the maintenance of their independence.

[E 4826/47/44]

No. 223.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)*

My Lord,

*Aden, April 29, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 29th April, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 223.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

My dear Field-Marshal,

*Aden, April 29, 1920.*

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 21st April, 1920:—

*Tihama.*

On the Bajil front the Quhra-Idrisi appear to have cleared the whole of Beni Saad of the imamic troops and occupied Madwal in the Wadi Har beyond Suq Har.

The siege of Riqab continues, but it is said now to have been made more complete, all communication with the place having been cut. The garrison is expected to surrender in about a week's time.

An attempt by the Quhra-Idrisi to take Safaan is reported to have failed. The people of Beni Jurain sided with the imamic troops in this fighting. Jurain was occupied by the Idrisi troops, who were subsequently ejected.

It appears from a report from an Idrisi source that after the reverse of the Zeidis at Obal, Hujjaila and Madwal last month, the imam sent for Sheikh Ramash of the Bilad Bostan, near Sanaa, and asked him for a certain specified number of men and a sum of money, which the sheikh refused to supply. Orders were accordingly issued for his imprisonment, but he managed to escape. This report is confirmed by the intelligence agent at Bajil of the Political Officer, Hodeida, but in a later report from the same agent the Sheikh of Bostan is said to have raised 1,000 men, and it was this force which ejected the Idrisi from Beni Jurain.

Captain Fazluddin reports that the western half of the Jabel Milhan is in the hands of the Idrisi, the eastern half being still occupied by the Zeidis.

Captain Fazluddin also reports that Sheikh Hassan-ibn-Mahomed Yahya Fashiq, the eldest son of the chief sheikh of the Southern Zaraniq, has been in Jizan since the 16th March in company with his cousin, Mahomed-bin-Saghir-bin-Mahomed-bin-Yahya Fashiq. They have gone there with letters from Ivaz Ali, Sheikh of Rakab, and two prominent traders of Zabid—Mahomed Ahmed Abdul Karim and Mahomed Hassan Jamani. The object of the visit is to expedite despatch of Idrisi troops for the deliverance of Zabid. According to them the total strength of the Zeidis in Zabid is 400 men and 2 guns.

The Idrisi representative at Beit-el-Fakih is said to have made arrangements with Syed Ali Ambari and the Sheikh of Rakab for a rising against the imam as soon as the Idrisi troops arrive at Beit-el-Fakih, but the Idrisi is stated to be disinclined to undertake this expedition, mainly on financial ground. The rumour that the Idrisi has occupied Zabid (vide my last letter) was a myth.

A report dated the 15th April, 1920, states that Sharif Abdulla Domain, the imam's chief lieutenant, has been recalled to Sana, together with the Hashid and Arh Arhab troops now in Safaan. No reason for this move has been stated.

Captain Gordon paid a visit to Medi during the first week of this month. He says that he gathered from Syed Mustafa that the Idrisi finds it difficult financially to maintain forces in the field for a prolonged period. The revenues of Zaidiya and Bajil do not meet the cost of his extension of territory.

Captain Gordon says that Medi is a flourishing town, the population of which is about 15,000. He thinks that since trade has been resumed at Hodeida, Medi has materially suffered, and that this will probably become more marked as conditions of trade become normal, the town of Medi being after all a product of the blockade. In the future it will probably fall like Mokha, as the geographical situation of Hodeida lends itself particularly as a distributing centre for Sanaa, Zabid and Zaidiya. Hodeida is also favourably situated as a centre of the export trade.



Akil Omar Saghir of the Quhra tribe has come in to Hodeida for medical treatment. Captain Gordon says that when he went to see him the first thing the akil asked was, "Where is Colonel Jacob? He made a contract with us and has gone away and forgotten about it."

Imports into Hodeida during March amounted to 2,27,777 rupees and exports to 3,10,310 rupees.

Syed Mustafa and Captain Fazluddin arrived here on the 24th instant.

#### *Yemen (Upper and Lower).*

Sharif Abdul Rehman-bin-Hussein-bin-Abdul Rehman-bin-Alawi of Saba and Marib has written expressing his desire to enter into friendly relations with the British Government. He writes that the people of Negran have unanimously agreed to acknowledge the suzerainty of the imam.

The Assistant Resident, Perim, reports that the imamic troops referred to in my letter of the 15th April, 1920, have returned to Sana, with the exception of twenty men who are still in Moza. It appears that the movement of Zaidi troops was connected with the complaints against Sheikh Ali Othman of Khokha, who has been imprisoned by the imam for oppressing minor sheikhs, some of whom have died in prison. The imamic troops were under the command of Abdulla Efeudi, brother of Ali Othman.

Until lately the garrison of Taiz was reported to be 2,500. This has now been reduced to 500 owing to desertions and detachments sent for service in Zabid. It is rumoured that the Amil of Taiz, Iba-el-Wazir, has gone over to the Idrisi with all his men.

#### *Aden Protectorate.*

Reports of arrivals of fresh drafts of Zeidis at Dala continue to come in. According to these reports nearly 500 Zeidis appear to have arrived lately. No definite reason for this massing of troops, if true, has been stated. One rumour states that they will proceed against the Haushabis, while another states that they have come to relieve the present garrison. A special messenger has been sent to Dala to report on the actual situation.

On the 23rd instant a Zeidi officer, named Al Obedi, with twenty-three armed mounted Zeidis, arrived at Lahej and asked for permission, through the Abdali Sultan, to come in to Aden to see me. This I refused, and referred them to my letter to the imam, in which he has been informed that the evacuation of our protectorate was the first essential to any opening of negotiations. I hope to find out indirectly the object of their mission. I hear that the Zeidis were very reticent.

The Mausatta naqibs lately returned from Mokalla, where they had gone to seek assistance of Sultan Ghalib. I have reported the matter officially. The naqibs are still in Aden, and are expected to leave any moment. In the meantime, letters have been received from various chiefs of Yafa, who are opposed to the deputation of an Indian officer to report on the situation there.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 4392/56/44]

No. 224.

*Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)*

(No. 364. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 336 of 11th May.

I have secured drafts of the proposals to be considered at the meeting held on 18th May.

First draft (abbreviated):—

Question: Can method be devised for extending governmental aid to Armenian people without delay and obstacles apprehended from Congressional action?

Proposals are: State Department to open negotiations with representatives of Armenian Republic and with representatives of Cilician Armenians to secure contract.

To supply and deliver arms, munitions of war, railway and other supplies,

Washington, May 16, 1920.

including money or credit, via a given seaport to a given interior point United States to reserve right to safeguard delivery to destination and to supervise use of supplies through commissioner.

Armenian Government to afford right to United States escort to pass and re-pass pending execution of contract.

Then United States to despatch to Black Sea transports with these supplies with necessary marines for escort after landing; transports to be convoyed by warships.

Next notify Supreme Council that, despairing of Turkish Government's good faith, while United States Government is not able to accept mandate formally, it is willing to render friendly aid and support to Armenian Republic and its nationals, in whatever province they may now be found, also advising Council of expedition and saying President accepts duty of fixing boundaries.

At the same time make following declaration to Sublime Porte: "Until boundaries of Armenia are defined and her ultimate territory allotted, United States Government, as friend of the Republic, will view with grave concern and as an unfriendly act any aggression upon Armenian nation, and will hold Turkish Government responsible for any forces within the territories claimed by it." This being done, land supplies and escort; also send, if agreed, officers to train and develop Armenian army; also provide transport for Armenians in United States to Armenia either to serve in Armenian forces or participate in constitutional conventions; finally, appoint staff of military officers with power to veto aggressive military action on the part of the Armenians.

Simultaneously in United States organise public opinion to force the Congress to make the necessary appropriations to carry on.

Second draft: For consideration of [? commercial interests, ? boundary line] and concerned with forms of notifications to Allied Powers, alternatives as follows:—

(a.) United States Government, having recognised Armenia, feels it has a peculiar interest in its citizens, and could not be justified in regarding with indifference a single attempt to oppress them or deprive them of their independence.

(b.) United States Government regards arbitrators of Armenia as occupying a peculiar position and as possessing peculiar claims to friendly consideration of all Christian Powers. It will at all times be prepared to interpose its good offices to prevent any encroachment by republic upon any just right of any nation, and it will be very unwilling to see it despoiled of its rightly acquired territory or improperly restrained in the exercise of its necessary rights and powers.

Men that I know to be primarily responsible for these drafts are Hamilton, Holt and Caldwell. They are working in close touch with Gerard and Morgenthau. In addition, Hoover, Taft and Elihu Root seem to be in the movement, but how far they are familiar with details I do not know.

On the Government's side I am informed that the matter was discussed at the last meeting of Cabinet and that final decision was reserved until after meeting of 18th May. There is, I think, little doubt that oil situation will be of some importance in final decision, idea of controlling Batoum being clearly attractive to certain interests here.

If I am approached, am I authorised to say that His Majesty's Government would welcome participation of United States in work of restoring and maintaining stability of Government and social order in Armenia, even if at present it is impossible for United States Government to accept a mandate under League of Nations?

I still think Administration will have great difficulty in carrying out any such scheme.

Names of men concerned, however, form such an extraordinary combination that it is difficult to estimate possibilities. It is still possible that the whole movement is part of the internal political game.

[E 4890/3/44]

No. 225.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 17.)*

(No. 596.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, May 17, 1920.

RECEPTION of peace terms, so far as they are yet known here, has been calm. Tone of Turkish press in Constantinople is one of extreme depression.



There is so far no note of defiance, but hope is expressed that Conference may still be induced to modify conditions, which are stated to be not only unfair to Turkey, but inimical to future tranquillity.

Public meeting is being arranged to take place during next few days, but precautions are being taken to ensure orderliness and moderate language.

Everything so far is based on very incomplete summaries of treaty. These are conflicting on various points.

I could have wished to receive full and authoritative summary from Foreign Office to enable me to control other sources of information.

I must warn you against drawing any inference as to what will happen in Thrace or Anatolia from calmness displayed here. News arrives very slowly from Anghar, but course of events there up to about 3rd May is now definitely known. National Assembly convoked by Mustafa Kemal met about 23rd April, and assumed all powers, both legislative and executive. Executive powers were delegated to Government also presided over by Mustafa. Assembly passed various resolutions, including one formally denying competency of any persons except delegates to Peace Conference appointed by Assembly itself to take any decision regarding destinies of Turkey. Steps were taken to communicate decisions of Assembly to Governments of Europe, America and Soviet Russia.

Anghar Assembly is reported to have already appointed so-called Peace Delegation, including Ahmed Riza, Ghalib Kemal and Ahmed Rustem Billinsky, all of whom are in Europe. This, however, lacks confirmation.

Central Government is, of course, quite without power over Nationalists at Anghar and over bulk of Asia Minor; Anghar maintains touch with certain persons in Constantinople, who may serve as link between Nationalists and elements here who have hitherto opposed Nationalists, but whom drastic nature of peace is likely to throw into their arms.

Grand Vizier continues to manifest utmost depression, but I think he is awaiting text of treaty before taking any line.

[E 4617/1729/44]

No. 226.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 446.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Foreign Office, May 17, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 383, to which no reply has been received.

French Ambassador has addressed to me a complaint that preponderance given to British element in the three commissions is cause of misunderstanding.

He recalls that at San Remo British Government assured French Premier that presidency of the three commissions would be entrusted to three Allied officers.

He hears to-day that War and Post Commissions are under British presidents, while the Marine has no president, and steps are taken regarding movement of Turkish troops and ships without the commissions being consulted.

Reply urgently if facts are as stated by French Ambassador.

[E 4938/39/44]

No. 227.

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).*

(No. 465.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 17, 1920.*

THE Italian Chargé d'Affaires had asked to see me this afternoon with regard to our refusal at the last moment to sign the tripartite agreement between Italy, France and Great Britain concerning the zones of economic preference in Asia Minor. He pleaded strongly, on behalf of Signor Nitti, that we should still sign.

I admitted quite frankly that I had told him a week ago that I was prepared to accede to this course, but I explained to him that when I did so I had acted upon imperfect information. I had not then seen the final text of the agreement, and I had thought that we were bound by the engagements entered into at San Remo to sign and publish it at an early date. Under this misapprehension, I had given my assent. When, after seeing him, I had received and perused the final text I had discovered in

article 11 that the agreement was not to be published or to come into force until the Treaty of Peace with Turkey made by the three contracting Powers came into force also. In other words, the publication and execution of the agreement could not take place until the Turkish Treaty was ratified, which might not be for several months from now.

In these circumstances I asked Signor Preziosi what was the point or the advantage of signing now? From the Italian point of view I could conceive of no advantage whatsoever, unless Signor Nitti desired to have the Parliamentary advantage of stating or letting it be known that he had obtained this *quid pro quo* for the promises made in the Treaty of London.

Signor Preziosi denied that it was required for this purpose, or that any publicity at all would be given to the signature of the agreement.

I said that I could not reconcile this with the extreme anxiety which Signor Nitti had betrayed in San Remo and elsewhere. He had not concealed in any way that he wished to point to the *fait accompli*, as a vindication of his very earnest and successful defence of the interests of his country. I added, however, that, whether Signor Nitti did or did not observe Parliamentary silence, the fact of signature must at once leak out. It would be known, if not at once, at any rate in two or three weeks' time, that a document of some sort had been signed. In these circumstances publication would be forced upon us, and I could not imagine anything worse from the point of view either of Italy or of France, who were the two Powers particularly affected by the agreement. It was certain, as I had often pointed out at the Conferences in London and in San Remo, that the arrangement would be severely criticised. It would, in all probability, excite the vehement hostility of President Wilson and of American public opinion, though the British Government would be less exposed to such attack because they were the one party who had nothing to gain by the agreement. Further, the Turks would at once be up in arms against a proposal which might render their signature of the Peace Treaty more difficult even than it was already likely to be. In these circumstances, signature at this moment appeared to me, from the point of view of expediency, to be the very worst move that either the Italian or any other Government concerned could make.

There was, I said, an additional reason against signature at this juncture. It was certain that the Turkish delegates to Paris would make strong representations for the modification of the terms of the Treaty of Peace, and if any such modification were considered it might involve an alteration of the terms of this agreement, to which accordingly it would be much better if the signatures of the contracting parties had not previously been affixed. In the other alternative, the Turks might decline to sign the Peace Treaty altogether, in which case the tripartite agreement would fall to the ground and the act of signature would turn out to have been a folly.

From all these points of view I argued to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires that my second thoughts had been the better, and that his Government would be well advised if they desisted from applying any pressure in the matter.

He then changed the subject, and asked me if I would instruct the British High Commissioner in Constantinople to assist the Italian company in opening operations at the Heraclea coal-mines, which, by the tripartite agreement, were to be handed over to them by the French.

I enquired whether the Italian company was already in existence or whether it was a new body proposing to take advantage of the arrangement about to be concluded.

He told me that he believed it to be the latter.

In these circumstances, I suggested to him that it would be the height of imprudence to give away the nature of the agreement in advance by endeavouring to secure its advantages before even it had been signed. I thought that the Italian Government would be wise if they curbed their anxiety with regard to the acquisition of coal from Asia Minor for a little longer, unless, indeed, they could procure or work a concession in the ordinary course of business, as to which I could offer no opinion. The matter was not one, however, in which I could possibly ask the British High Commissioner to intervene.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.



*Note on the Future Control of the Middle East.*

1. Definition of the Middle East.
2. Future Relations of His Majesty's Government with the various Countries of the Middle East.
3. British Advisers.
4. Finance.
5. Existing System of control from London, with possible alternatives for the future.
6. Possible central control by the Foreign Office.
7. Possible central control by a new Department of State.
8. Possible divided control by the Foreign Office and a new Department of State, or by the Foreign Office and one of the existing Departments of His Majesty's Government.
9. Conclusion.

*1. Definition of the Middle East.*

THE areas of the Middle East with which His Majesty's Government will be most intimately concerned after the completion of the settlement with Turkey are Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia and Persia. For the maintenance of order in, and the peaceful development of, these areas His Majesty's Government have undertaken, or propose to undertake, varying measures of responsibility. These areas react upon one another, not only from their geographical position, but from the fact that the majority of their inhabitants speak the same language and belong to the same religion. In the block of territory within which they lie there are two countries, Syria and the Hedjaz, for which His Majesty's Government will not in future be responsible, but in which they cannot entirely disinterest themselves. The independence of the Hedjaz, the provisional independence of Syria, and the freedom of both countries from the domination of the Turk have been secured by the British arms, and with almost exclusively British support. The Hedjaz, in which are situated the Holy Places of Mecca and Medina, is a country in which His Majesty's Government, as the greatest Mohammedan Power in the world, cannot fail to be deeply interested. Syria marches with Palestine and Mesopotamia, and its first ruler is not only the son of the King of the Hedjaz, but also the allied commander by whose assistance the British forces were enabled to complete their victory over the Turks. The future of Syria must always remain a matter of concern to His Majesty's Government, more especially that portion of it which lies across the Jordan to the east of Palestine. The object of this memorandum is to discuss the alternative methods by which His Majesty's Government may in the future most conveniently maintain connection with the countries mentioned above.

*2. Future relations of His Majesty's Government with the various countries mentioned above.*

(a.) *Egypt*.—The position in Egypt is that His Majesty's Government have recently declared a protectorate over that country, which thus forms part of the British Empire. There is an Egyptian Government, advised by British officials acting under the orders of a High Commissioner, who receives his instructions from the Foreign Office. A commission under Lord Milner has recently visited the country with the object of reporting to His Majesty's Government upon the future relations between the British officials and the Egyptian Government. Until the report of this commission has been received, it is assumed, for the purposes of discussion, that the system at present in force will at least form the basis of the future relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt, *i.e.*, that no form of direct British administration will be introduced.

(b.) *Palestine*.—His Majesty's Government have declared their intention of encouraging in Palestine the formation of a national home for the Jewish people, while ensuring that the existing rights and privileges of non-Jews should be scrupulously safeguarded. Over 80 per cent. of the population of Palestine are non-Jews, and hostile to the idea of a Jewish national home. It appears from this that it is not intended to institute a representative government in Palestine, but to set up a British administration which shall make it possible for a Jewish national home gradually to be formed there. The Zionists imagine that Palestine is to become eventually a Jewish State. This could only be reconciled with the principle of self-

government if the country were developed to an extent that would admit of the immigration of Jews in such large numbers that they would form the majority of the population. If this is the intention of His Majesty's Government, it will presumably be found necessary to control immigration and development in Palestine with a view to the eventual establishment of a Jewish majority. This will require direct British administration for a considerable period of time. If, on the other hand, the intention is to set up a Palestinian Government on the analogy of the Egyptian Government, with safeguards for a Jewish minority, the British advisers will have to retain control to a much larger extent than is the case in Egypt, and will practically administer the country.

(c.) *Mesopotamia*.—By the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, the provisional independence of Mesopotamia has been recognised, subject to its control by a mandatory Power, until such time as it is able to stand alone. No term has been placed to the period of this mandate, but it is assumed that steps will be taken to form in Mesopotamia a local constitution in such a form that it will eventually be in a position to stand by itself, and that British officials in that country will, if not immediately, at any rate in the near future, be in the position of advisers rather than of administrators.

(d.) *Arabia*.—His Majesty's Government are endeavouring to secure the acceptance by the other Allied Powers of the predominance of British interests in the Arabian peninsula, exclusive of the Hedjaz. At the same time they are proposing to co-operate with the other Powers in a declaration that they disclaim any desire for territorial aggrandisement in the said peninsula. If this policy is to be pursued, His Majesty's Government will be regarded by the other Powers as responsible for exercising political control over the independent rulers of Arabia, but it will be out of the question to institute any direct British administration. The protectorate of Aden has been excluded from the Arabian peninsula as defined in the proposals quoted above, and it is intended that it shall remain a British protectorate. The position in the Aden protectorate has hitherto been that His Majesty's Government have refrained from exercising any administrative control outside the actual peninsula of Aden. They have entered into treaty relations with the Arab chiefs of the hinterland on lines precisely similar to those concluded with independent Arab rulers in other parts of the peninsula. We may assume, then, that the officials of His Majesty's Government at Aden will be in the future, as they have been in the past, advisers rather than administrators, except in the fortress itself.

(e.) *Persia*.—Persia is an independent country with which His Majesty's Government have recently concluded an agreement by which certain British advisers are accepted by the Persian Government in return for assistance and support in matters of finance and in the preservation of internal order. The relations of His Majesty's Government with Persia are foreign relations.

(f.) *Syria*.—Whether Syria is under a French mandate, or independent, as claimed by Feisal and the Nationalist Party, the relations between His Majesty's Government and Syria will be purely foreign relations. In the event of the area east of Palestine being excluded from the French sphere of control, there are three possibilities. It may either be regarded as part of the Hedjaz (see (g) below), or as a British mandated territory (see (b) and (c)), or as a part of Feisal's kingdom in which the French disclaim interest.

(g.) *The Hedjaz*.—The relations of His Majesty's Government with the Hedjaz will be purely foreign relations.

The position may be briefly summarised as follows:—

(a.) *Egypt*.—A native government is advised by a High Commissioner, who works under the orders of the Foreign Office, though no actual treaty exists. A British protectorate has been proclaimed after forty years of gradually increasing control. This measure is unpopular with the local Nationalist Party, and a commission has been considering the whole question on the spot.

(b.) *Palestine*.—No native government exists, nor can the policy of His Majesty's Government be carried out if such a government is brought into existence without special measures of administrative control.

(c.) *Mesopotamia*.—No native government exists, but the independence of the country has been provisionally recognised subject to the advice and assistance of His Majesty's Government until it can stand alone.

(d.) *Arabia*.—With the exception of the fortress of Aden the whole peninsula is governed by independent Arab rulers with whom His Majesty's Government have established, or propose to establish, treaty relations.



(e.) *Persia*.—A native government exists with which His Majesty's Government are in treaty relations.

(f.) *Syria*.—An unrecognised native government exists for which the French Government will have a mandate if they succeed in coming to terms with Feisal. His Majesty's Government will be in treaty relations either with the mandatory Power or the Syrian Government.

(g.) *The Hedjaz*.—His Majesty's Government will be in treaty relations with an independent native government.

Taking the countries of the Middle East in descending order of independence, Syria and the Hedjaz will be completely foreign countries, Persia and Arabia will be independent countries, advised by His Majesty's Government, Mesopotamia will be provisionally independent subject to a mandate, Palestine will require a greater measure of administrative control to ensure the fulfilment of the Zionist policy of His Majesty's Government, and Egypt will presumably remain actually within the British Empire, while retaining its own native government. There is thus, with the possible exception of Palestine and the fortress of Aden, no area of the Middle East over which His Majesty's Government are likely to institute direct administration. With these exceptions, the areas concerned will be nominally governed by native governments assisted by British advisers.

### 3. British Advisers.

Before turning to the various alternative methods by which His Majesty's Government may in the future maintain connection with these countries, it is necessary to consider the degree of control which British advisers may be expected to exercise and the probable trend of political development in the light of past experience. The two main examples of British control of an Oriental country are Egypt and India. In Egypt, we started by advising a native government and have recently proclaimed a protectorate. This does not necessarily mean that we intend to tighten our control. It is merely another way of saying that the disappearance of Turkish suzerainty leaves us free to establish in law what has for a long time existed in practice, namely, British control over the Egyptian Government. But this is not the effect produced on Nationalist sentiment. The Nationalists regard the proclamation of a British protectorate over Egypt as an indication that we intend to establish over the native government a still closer and more effective control.

In British India, on the other hand, we are attempting to devise a means by which direct British administration shall be replaced by a native government. This step has been rendered necessary by the growth of Nationalist sentiment in India. Even in the Native States of India there is now a demand for a greater measure of independence. But this is not nearly so marked or so difficult to meet. The reason is that our relations with the Native States of India are governed by treaty. We are bound by treaties with the native rulers not to interfere more than is necessary to prevent serious abuse and misgovernment. It is necessary to emphasise this point if we are to profit by past experience. The time has gone by when an Oriental people will be content to be nursed into self-government by a European Power. The spread of Western education, increased facilities of communication, and above all the war, with the resultant emergence of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, have combined to breed in the minds of Eastern agitators a distrust for, and impatience of, Western control. We cannot ignore this universal phenomenon without endangering, and possibly losing beyond recall, our position in the East. It lies at the root of Indian unrest, of Feisal's hatred of the French, and of Mustafa Kemal's determination to resist the Turkish Peace Treaty. It finds a reflection in the spread of the Wahabi movement, in the aggression of the Imam on our Aden protectorate, in the murder of British officers in Kurdistan, and in the demands of the Afghan delegation. It is a ready-made weapon for Bolshevik propaganda and a forcing-house for Pan-Islam. At the same time, we must be careful to distinguish between the wild cries of the extremist, anxious to secure for himself and to deny to the foreigner what he regards as the spoils of government, and the childish vanity of the masses on which he brings his armoury to bear. If we could but descend to tickling that vanity ourselves, we should deprive the agitator of his most powerful weapon. This could be done by recognising the existence of native governments and entering into treaty relations with them. Provisional independence under a mandate is not incompatible with the establishment of treaty relations between the mandatory

Power and the people of the country. It is, however, incompatible with the establishment of direct administration by the mandatory, though this is not yet fully recognised by the peoples concerned. It is not only the people of the East who object to being treated as children or wards. This is the natural accompaniment of any national feeling. The point is that this national sentiment is again awake in those Eastern countries where it has slumbered so long. It is the Western nations who have evoked it, and it is for the Western nations to direct it into healthy channels through the medium of advisers attached to the various native governments—and here a word must be said about the relations between British advisers and Oriental governments, which are the crux of the Middle Eastern question. There is always a tendency for British officials in an Oriental country to be impatient of Oriental inefficiency and to assume direct administrative control. This tendency is enormously encouraged when the executive authority is in the hands of the British official, and the result is that the necessity for promoting the growth of native government is lost sight of under the pressure of demands for efficiency. This is the reason why it has been found so difficult to evolve a workable scheme of Indian reform. Few natives are fit to take upon themselves the duties and responsibilities which have become inseparably connected with administration in India. The standard is too high. Even when the executive authority remains in native hands, as in Egypt, British intolerance of inefficiency, coupled with the demand of the people themselves for the unrecognised advantages of British methods of administration, have resulted in a gradual multiplication of British officials and the consequent relegation to the background of the duty of encouraging native government. If the various countries of the Middle East are eventually to become independent nations, it is essential that such European advice as may be given to them during the period for which they are confessedly incapable of standing alone should be given in such a way that the eventual disappearance of European advisers will be the normal culmination of the measures taken during the time of tutelage. We are now experiencing in British India the difficulties which face a European Government when it attempts to relax direct administrative control. We shall inevitably experience the same difficulties, in proportion to the measure of direct executive control which we now institute, in those areas of the Middle East for which we have assumed, or propose to assume, responsibility.

### 4. Finance.

There is another point which must not be lost sight of in any discussion of our position in the Middle East. If we are to take upon ourselves the burden of developing these countries, and establishing in them the order the security without which development is impossible, we must face the fact that, for some time at least, capital must be found to invest in them. This must naturally necessitate a measure of financial supervision proportionate to the inability of the native Government to secure unaided a reasonable return for our outlay, whether this takes the form of direct expenditure, of a loan, or of a guarantee. The financial position is as follows:—

(a.) *Egypt*.—Egypt would normally be financially self-supporting, though at present the British forces in that country have been increased to such an extent, for strategic reasons, that the expenditure involved is not covered by the fixed contribution paid by the Egyptian Government. This is, however, merely a passing phase.

(b.) and (c.) *Palestine and Mesopotamia*.—It is early yet to expect either Mesopotamia or Palestine to be self-supporting financially. In both countries there will have to be for some time a British garrison paid for by the British tax-payer. If the two countries are to be developed, outside capital will probably be required and it may prove more satisfactory for this to take the form of a loan from, or guaranteed by, His Majesty's Treasury.

(d.) *Arabia*.—It has been found necessary during the war to pay subsidies to certain of the independent rulers of the Arabian peninsula, who were formerly within the Turkish Empire, such as Ibn Saud and the Idrisi. Other rulers, such as the Sultan of Muscat, the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla and the Sheikhs of the tribes in the Aden protectorate, received before the war, and are still receiving, subsidies or stipends from Indian revenues. The fortress of Aden would only be self-supporting if Aden were no longer a free port, though, even so, it could not pay for the British garrison. It appears, therefore, that His Majesty's Government, in possible partnership with the Indian Government and the Governments of colonies from which



Moslems make the pilgrimage to Mecca, will in future be called upon to undertake a certain amount of expenditure in the Arabian peninsula. Without such expenditure His Majesty's Government would be unable to exercise effective political control, and their claim to a special position in the peninsula would fall to the ground.

(e.) *Persia*.—A loan has been supplied to the Persian Government in return for their acceptance of a measure of British advice and control. This loan is secured on Persian revenues, but was found in the first place by His Majesty's Government.

(f.) *Syria*.—The Arab administration of Syria was originally assisted by a solely British subsidy. On the evacuation of the Arab sphere by British troops and the occupation of the coastal area of Syria by the French, this subsidy was shared between the British and French Governments. For the area which is to be under a French mandate, His Majesty's Government will, of course, have financial responsibility; but if that portion of Syria which lies east of the Jordan and south of Deraa is to fall within the British sphere, it will in all probability need some financial support, at any rate to begin with.

(g.) *The Hedjaz*.—Ever since the Arab revolt started, a subsidy has been paid by His Majesty's Government to the King of the Hedjaz to replace that paid to him by the Turkish Government as Emir of Mecca. So soon as the independence of the Hedjaz is finally ratified in the Turkish Peace Treaty it will become difficult, if not impossible, for His Majesty's Government to be the sole providers of financial support to the Hedjaz; but it may prove desirable for them to co-operate with other Allied Powers interested in Islam to provide the King of the Hedjaz with either a subsidy or a loan.

##### 5. Existing system of control from London, with possible alternatives for the future.

Control from London is at present exercised as follows:—

(a.) *Egypt*.—By the Foreign Office, through the High Commissioner, Cairo.

(b.) *Palestine*.—By the War Office, through the Commander-in-chief. The administration of Palestine is military, but a Chief Political Officer, in direct communication with the Foreign Office, is attached to the Commander-in-chief. A proposal is under consideration by which the Chief Administrator of Palestine will assume political as well as administrative functions in direct correspondence with the Foreign Office. He will, however, remain under the orders of the Commander-in-chief so long as Palestine remains under military administration.

(c.) *Mesopotamia*.—By the War Office, through the General Officer Commanding. A civil administration has been set up under a Civil Commissioner, who is in direct communication with the India Office. Questions of policy are discussed by the Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs.

(d.) *Arabia: Persian Gulf Coast*.—By the India Office, through the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

*Nejd and Hail*.—By the India Office, through the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad. Questions of policy are discussed by the Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs.

*Aden and the Hadramaut*.—By the India Office, through the Government of India, the Government of Bombay, and the Resident, Aden, for administration. By the War Office, through the General Officer Commanding, Aden, for military measures in the Aden protectorate. By the Foreign Office, through the High Commissioner, Cairo, and the Resident, Aden, for political questions.

*Yemen and Asir*.—By the Foreign Office, through the High Commissioner, Cairo, and the Resident, Aden. Questions of policy are discussed by the Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs.

(e.) *Persia*.—By the Foreign Office, through His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran. Questions of policy are discussed by the Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs.

(f.) *Syria*.—By the Foreign Office, through the High Commissioner, Cairo; and by the War Office, through the General Officer Commanding, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

(g.) *The Hedjaz*.—By the Foreign Office, through the High Commissioner, Cairo, and the British agent at Jeddah. Questions of policy are discussed by the Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs.

It is evident from the above survey that the present arrangement is merely a makeshift, and it has always been contemplated that, on the conclusion of peace with Turkey, the whole question should be carefully considered with a view to revising

the temporary position created by the war. This revision may take the form of centralised control, either under an existing department of State or under a new department to be created for that purpose; or, on the other hand, it may take the form of a permanent division of the Middle East into spheres of control allotted to existing departments of State, with or without co-ordination by a Middle Eastern Committee or Conference.

It is clear that the only existing department which could exercise control over all the areas of the Middle East, as defined in paragraph 1 of this memorandum, is the Foreign Office. The relations between His Majesty's Government and the independent countries of Persia and the Hedjaz, and their relations with the French Government as mandatory for Syria, or, alternatively, with an independent Syrian State, can only be foreign relations. The intimate connection between the Hedjaz and the remainder of Arabia, coupled with the proposed self-denying ordinance by which His Majesty's Government propose to disclaim all desire for territorial aggrandisement in the peninsula, render it desirable, though not, perhaps, absolutely necessary, that the Foreign Office should also conduct relations with other independent Arab rulers, or, at all events, with those whose territories border on the Hedjaz. Egypt and Palestine are countries in which other European Powers are closely interested and in connection with which questions are continually arising which involve diplomatic correspondence. This is especially so in the case of Palestine, which will become practically an international country if it is to be a national home for Jews from all the countries of the world. This makes it essential that the representative of His Majesty's Government in Palestine should be in a position to correspond direct with representatives in foreign countries. For this procedure to work smoothly, it appears preferable that he should be under the orders of the Foreign Office, even if a special measure of administrative control is found necessary in Palestine. The effect on local nationalist sentiment of Egypt being removed from Foreign Office control and of Palestine and Mesopotamia being entrusted to an administrative, rather than a political, department must also be reckoned with. Another point to be borne in mind is that, as mandatory for Palestine and Mesopotamia, His Majesty's Government will be responsible to the League of Nations, with which body they will presumably correspond through diplomatic channels. We may take it then that if the control of the relations of His Majesty's Government with all the areas of the Middle East, as defined in paragraph 1, is to be vested in a single existing department of State, that department can only be the Foreign Office. The possibility of a new department being created for the whole of the Middle East, including the foreign relations concerned, is discussed in paragraph 7. The possibility of a new department being created for the control of Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia, exclusive of the Hedjaz, while the Foreign Office retain Persia, Syria and the Hedjaz, is considered in paragraph 8.

##### 6. Possible Central Control by the Foreign Office.

There are obvious advantages in the centralisation in the Foreign Office of the control of the representatives of His Majesty's Government throughout the Middle East as defined in paragraph 1.

- (a.) Uniformity of policy.
- (b.) Reduction of inter-departmental correspondence and consequent delay.
- (c.) Facilities for interchange of officials from one country to another.
- (d.) Correspondence with other Powers and with the League of Nations conducted by the Minister responsible for the relations of His Majesty's Government with the local Governments concerned.
- (e.) Effect on extremists and nationalists of what would amount to a recognition of the fact that His Majesty's Government regarded their countries as foreign countries from the outset.
- (f.) Check on undue interference in administrative matters by officials on the spot which would be provided by the fact that the Foreign Office is not normally an administrative department.

Two main arguments may be brought against centralisation of control in the Foreign Office.

- (a.) The first is the usual argument against centralised control, namely, that it leads to the suppression of individuality and to a tendency to force into



uniformity the administration of countries as widely different as Egypt and Mesopotamia. This tendency would be aggravated if central control were set up in one or other of the capitals of the Middle East.

- (b.) The second is that the Foreign Office is not an administrative department, and that such errors as have crept into our administration in Egypt are due to the absence of experienced criticism from London.

These two objections tend to contradict each other.

It is not suggested that the Foreign Office should assume administrative control to the extent that has been found necessary in the India Office. The formation of an Eastern Department of the Foreign Office which should include a small number of officials experienced in administrative work, would be sufficient to ensure that officials on the spot were confining themselves to advisory functions. At the same time, the fact that this organisation remained a part of the Foreign Office would preclude the danger of the department itself becoming unduly administrative. With regard to control on the spot, there would be less danger of undue uniformity if the Foreign Office were represented by high officials at Cairo, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Aden, Jeddah and Tehran, each of whom corresponded direct with the Eastern Department, than there would be if these officials corresponded with the Foreign Office through one centre, which might tend to become executive. (See paragraph 9 below.)

#### 7. Possible Central Control by a New Department of State.

The advantages enumerated under heads (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 6 apply equally to central control by a new department of State, but in order to secure the advantages under (d) and (e), and, indeed, to enable the new department to deal with all the areas of the Middle East, as defined in paragraph 1, it would be necessary for this department to be authorised to correspond not only with the League of Nations but also with almost all the foreign Powers of the world. With regard to (f), the danger of undue interference in administrative matters would be much greater in the case of a department which was created mainly to deal with undeveloped countries. There is no precedent for the foreign relations of His Majesty's Government to be conducted by any department other than the Foreign Office, and the introduction of a system by which two separate departments issued orders to His Majesty's representatives at foreign capitals would be an entirely new departure.

#### 8. Possible divided control by the Foreign Office and a New Department of State, or by the Foreign Office and one or more of the existing Departments of His Majesty's Government.

None of the advantages outlined in paragraph 6 would be secured by divided control, which could only be justified if it were decided that, in the case of one or more of the countries of the Middle East as defined in paragraph 1, the suggested Eastern Department of the Foreign Office could not be expected to exercise sufficiently close administrative control. Division of control would, moreover, present considerable difficulties. It has been shown in paragraph 5 that the relations between His Majesty's Government and the independent countries of Persia and the Hedjaz, and their relations with the French Government as mandatory for Syria, or, alternatively, with an independent Syrian State, can only be foreign relations. If a new department were to be set up, with authority to conduct foreign relations, the necessity for divided control would disappear (see paragraph 7); if not, the Foreign Office must retain control of relations with Persia, the Hedjaz and Syria. The objections to other than Foreign Office control for Arabia, Egypt and Palestine, have been enumerated in paragraph 5. They do not provide insuperable arguments against the formation of a new department with authority to conduct foreign relations, but they apply with considerable force to control by an existing administrative department which has not, and cannot well be, given such authority.

There remains only Mesopotamia. The position of His Majesty's Government in Mesopotamia will be defined by the terms of the mandate which is to be laid before the League of Nations. The French Government are endeavouring to emphasise the "parallélisme exact" between Syria and Mesopotamia, even to the extent of drafting an identical mandate for the two countries. This is an indication in advance of the close scrutiny which they will exercise over our actions in Mesopotamia; their own attitude in Syria has already reacted unfavourably upon the position of His Majesty's Government in the East, and there is reason to fear that it will continue to do so.

The League of Nations, to whom His Majesty's Government will be responsible, will also be in a position to criticise their relations with the people of Mesopotamia. For these reasons alone, it appears desirable that the department responsible for that country should be the department through which His Majesty's Government communicate with the French Government and with the League. Geographical considerations have hitherto rendered it desirable for His Majesty's Government to communicate with the rulers of Central Arabia through Baghdad, and if the Foreign Office are to retain control of our relations with those rulers, they should be in a position to correspond direct with the representative of His Majesty's Government in Mesopotamia.

#### 9. Conclusions.

Of the three possible alternatives—

- (a.) Control by an Eastern Department of the Foreign Office which should include a small number of officials experienced in administrative work,
- (b.) Control by a new department of State, with authority to conduct foreign relations, and
- (c.) Divided control,

the least objectionable appears to be (a); (b) introduces a new departure which raises questions of high policy, and (c) is open to many objections. The subordinate questions of the channel of communication between His Majesty's Government and their representatives in the Middle East, and the provision of the necessary personnel both in London and on the spot, cannot be discussed until a decision has been arrived at on these three alternatives.

The matter is one of considerable urgency, as questions are arising daily which call for early decision.

H. W. YOUNG.

*Foreign Office, May 17, 1920.*

[E 4658]

No. 229.

*Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, May 18, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of the 10th and 12th instant, with enclosures, and to transmit herewith, as requested by your Excellency, copies of the message delivered by Field-Marshal Lord Allenby to the Emir Feisal and of the Emir's reply.

Before dealing with the various points raised in your Excellency's note of the 12th instant, I venture with all possible friendliness to demur to the suggestion made therein that the separate and different communications recently addressed to the Emir have encouraged his resistance by leading him to hope that he can rely alternately on the support of Great Britain and of France for the encouragement of his ambitious designs in opposition to one or the other Power. The communication addressed by Field-Marshal Lord Allenby to the Emir was previously shown by him to General Gouraud with the specific object of precluding any such possibility, and his action in this respect was in accordance with the attitude of frank and loyal co-operation with their French Allies which has consistently been followed by His Majesty's Government.

I am not aware whether the Emir has addressed any reply to the declaration transmitted to him by General Gouraud in the name of the French Government, of which your Excellency did me the honour to communicate a copy on the 10th May. If he has done so, I presume that he has made demands on the lines of those put forward by him in his reply to Lord Allenby, and that he had declined to come to Europe unless those demands are complied with. But whether he has done so or not, I am of opinion that the time has now arrived for the two Governments to make the position perfectly clear to him.

I am in entire agreement with the view expressed by your Excellency as to the necessity of some measures being taken to bring to an end the present state of affairs in the area occupied by the French forces, and I note with satisfaction that the French Government recognise that an early and satisfactory solution of these problems is desirable not only in French interests, but also in those of His Majesty's Government.

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It is for this reason, and since the French Government have been good enough to lay their views before His Majesty's Government, that I venture to make the following observations.

The two Governments are in close accord as to the objects to be achieved. The best means of obtaining them alone remain to be considered. While fully recognising that the French authorities must be the best judges of the military measures necessary to meet the local situation, and recognising also that they have every right to take such measures, I am nevertheless of opinion that the immediate occupation of the Homs-Aleppo railway, desirable though it may be from a tactical point of view, might yet, viewed in its broader aspect, precipitate a crisis which might finally defeat the aims of both Governments.

Such a step, with its consequent added discontent and disorder, might well result in the Emir Feisal definitely and finally throwing in his lot with the Turkish Nationalists, who, as your Excellency is aware, are now in touch with Bolshevik elements through the Caucasus. Such an eventuality would be fraught with obvious dangers both to the French Government and to His Majesty's Government. I do not believe that the Emir Feisal is as yet disposed thus to throw in his lot with the forces of disorder, and I am strongly of opinion that it is in the best interests of both Governments to attempt every available means of obtaining a satisfactory solution before incurring the risk of a Turco-Arab alliance. Such a solution is in the view of His Majesty's Government only to be hoped for if the Emir Feisal can be prevailed upon to come to Europe.

I am in agreement with the views expressed in your Excellency's note as to the anomaly of the Emir being at the same time the representative of the Hedjaz and the ruler of Syria under the mandate of France. I am, however, of opinion that the effect of a notification to King Hussein to the effect that Feisal can no longer be regarded as delegate of the Hedjaz, on the ground that he occupies the position of Emir in a State for which France has the mandate, could not fail to have a most unfavourable effect on the King. The result would be serious to both French and English relations with the Hedjaz, the satisfactory continuance of which are important to both Governments from the point of view of the pilgrimage.

I venture to hope, therefore, that your Excellency will be so good as to suggest the following course to the French Government:—

That the Emir Feisal should be reminded that he has already received an invitation from the Peace Conference to attend at their next meeting, which is now fixed for the end of June. That he should be called upon definitely to accept this invitation without delay, and that it should be pointed out to him that the only conditions by which his position in Syria can be definitely established and his relations with the neighbouring territories and communities determined, are his personal presence and consultation with the Governments of France and Great Britain, who, for their part, are prepared to treat him and his representations with every consideration. Should he fail, however, to come to Europe, the invitation cannot again be renewed and the Emir must be prepared to face the following alternatives:—

1. That he would no longer be recognised as representing the Hedjaz at the Peace Conference of the Powers.
2. That all financial assistance both from the French Government and from His Majesty's Government would cease forthwith.
3. That the French Government would be at liberty to occupy the Homs-Aleppo Railway for the objects specified by them.

A joint communication of this nature, demonstrating equally the close accord of the two Governments, and their opinion that only by a visit of the Emir to Europe is there a real hope of reaching a satisfactory settlement of the questions involved, will hardly fail to impress him with the gravity of the consequences entailed by a continued refusal.

I, therefore, venture to request your Excellency to be so good as to lay the proposal for a joint commission to the Emir on the lines suggested above, before the French Government at the earliest possible opportunity. I would request, at the same time, that the proposed action in respect of the Homs-Aleppo Railway should be deferred until the proposal has been considered.

I have read with care the views of M. Millerand, communicated to me in your Excellency's note, on the question of the channel through which His Majesty's Government can best, in future, conduct their relations with the Emir Feisal. While His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the point of view therein expressed, they are

nevertheless of opinion that such an arrangement would, in practice, be open to very serious objections, particularly in view of the fact that the future boundaries of Syria and Palestine are not yet determined.

In the event of the proposed joint communication to the Emir being carried into effect, His Majesty's Government consider that the danger of Feisal adopting a policy of alternate appeal to England and France will be eliminated.

In these circumstances it appears to His Majesty's Government that the retention of a British liaison officer at Damascus, while essential to British interests from the point of view of Palestine and Mesopotamia, is at the same time in no way prejudicial to the interests of France.

Enquiries are being made into the question of the port dues of Haifa, and I shall have the honour to communicate again with your Excellency on this subject when further information is available.

With regard to the Hedjaz Delegation, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I am in general agreement with the terms of the draft reply which the French Government were good enough to refer to His Majesty's Government in your note of the 12th instant, but I venture to suggest the following minor alterations. I am inclined to the view that the phrase on p. 3 beginning, "Dont le bon sens et l'histoire . . . ." might be regarded as expressing a certain attitude of condescension, and for that reason might be omitted as tending to produce a feeling of irritation. I am unable to express an opinion on the immediately succeeding paragraph, in the absence of official information that the Emir Feisal has actually appealed to the French Government, in the name of the Syrian people, for them to accept the mandate for Syria. Subject to these alterations I see no objection to the proposed reply being returned to the Hedjaz Delegation by the Peace Conference, to whom their letter was addressed, as soon as the Conference is again in session.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 229.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 28.)*

(No. 418.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, April 27, 1920.

MY immediately following telegram [to Emir Feisal]:—

"Your Highness,

"I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to convey to you the following message:—

"As a result of recent decisions taken by Allied Powers in conference at San Remo, provision has been made to recognise Syria and Mesopotamia as independent States, subject to assistance of a mandatory Power, until such time as both States can stand alone.

"In pursuance of these decisions mandate for Syria has been entrusted to France, while that for Mesopotamia has been entrusted to Great Britain. Great Britain has also been nominated mandatory Power for Palestine.

"His Majesty's Government feel very strongly that time has now come to arrive at an arrangement whereby claims of Syrian people can be reconciled with these decisions.

"In your Highness's letter of the 28th March, addressed to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, you express your willingness to proceed to Europe on condition that independence of Syrian people was recognised.

"While, in accordance with decisions now taken, His Majesty's Government are prepared to recognise your Highness provisionally as head of an independent Syrian State, they hold strongly that your claim to Kingship can only be formally established by Peace Conference. They would therefore urge that you should come to Europe without further delay and state your case. There will be a further meeting of Conference in Paris at the end of May, and it is hoped that your Highness may see your way to attend the meeting.

"As regards Palestine you have always been aware that His Majesty's Government were pledged to creating a national home for the Jews in Palestine, an intention in which administration acquiesced. His Majesty's Government will regard themselves



as under an obligation which will be confirmed by terms of mandate to safeguard in fullest manner the interests of indigenous inhabitants of the country.

"In urging upon your Highness the desirability of responding to the invitation of His Majesty's Government to proceed to Paris without further delay, I desire to impress upon you that His Majesty's Government are solely animated by desirability that full consideration should be given to your Highness's aspirations and that you should have the fullest opportunity for stating your case.

"I avail, &c.—ALLENBY, F. M."

Enclosure 2 in No. 229.

*Emir Feisal to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.*

Your Lordship,

IT is with great appreciation that I put on record recognition of Conference at San Remo that Syria and Mesopotamia are both independent States. This decision of Conference has been arrived at, as all the Arabs believe, in accord with desire of independent Syrian nation and in spirit of justice and humanity.

Also I put on record with great justness the preparedness of our great Ally, Great Britain, to recognise me as head of Independent Syrian State.

As regards mandate which your Lordship has mentioned, I feel I have no right to discuss it, the people, being aware of danger which it may entail upon their future safety and independence, have bitterly protested against it and refuse to accept it.

Yet that does not mean that we are self-contented, and are not ready to get necessary help we are in need of by making contracts with our allies in which our national sovereignty is absolutely safeguarded. In former letters both I and my Government have stated that we do not refuse such help.

As regards question of Palestine, I have not noticed in your Lordship's letter enough clearness to suggest recognition that this country is an inseparable part of Syria, though Palestine geographically, ethnographically, traditionally, economically, and from point of view of language and national desire can in no way be separated from Syria. Moreover, there is to be found amongst correspondence between His Majesty Hussein and his Excellency Sir H. McMahon a letter in name of Great Britain, dated the 25th October, 1915, which recognised Palestine to be within Arab Empire, whose limits as therein defined are accepted by British Government.

Moreover, these letters, as notes of meeting at 10, Downing Street show, are considered to be of equal value as engagement with President of French Republic. Even Sykes-Picot agreement, on considering question of Palestine, has clearly stated in third article that in yellow zone an international administration would be established, and form of such an administration should be decided on after an agreement of representatives of Sheriff at Mecca.

There is nothing to be found in this document concerning Zionists or Jews. Being in need of calming people who are in a most agitated state of mind and spirit, I hope I can get from Great Britain some satisfactory declaration which I can also use in keeping in hearts of Arabs confidence which they have in great Ally, and to prove them that any agreement between British and Zionists is in no way to be considered of more value than agreement with King Hussein or President of French Republic.

As regards question of my acquiescence to creation of a national home for Jews in Palestine, I believe there is some misunderstanding; all that I have admitted is to safeguard rights of Jews in that country as much as rights of indigenous Arab inhabitants are safeguarded and to allow same rights and privileges.

Arabs of Palestine, both Christian and Mahomedan, have repeatedly availed themselves of every opportunity against any agreement or pledge that they would make their motherland the national home of Israelites. I am ready to come to Europe quickly to state case of my country, if only I receive a positive declaration to my agitated people stating that Conference does in no way allow Palestine to be separated from Syria. By such means alone I believe we can come to a solution which would safeguard interests of all concerned. In the meantime I am urgently in need of an answer.

I again wish to assure your Lordship of my high consideration and esteem.

[E 4617/1729/44]

No. 230.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 18, 1920.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 19th April relating to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Constantinople, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you copy of a telegram\* which has been addressed to the High Commissioner, Constantinople, in which is embodied a complaint formulated by the French Ambassador as to the non-execution of the assurance given to the French Premier at San Remo by His Majesty's Government that the presidency of the three commissions to be set up in Constantinople would be entrusted to three Allied officers. I am to request that urgent instructions may be telegraphed to General Milne to carry out the instructions given in my telegram of the 16th April, both in the spirit as well as in the letter

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 4984/56/44]

No. 231.

*Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 19.)*

(No. 373.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Washington, May 18, 1920.*

IN continuation of my telegram No. 364 of 16th May, I have been asked by the Secretary of State to-day if Allies thought projected arrangements with regard to control of Constantinople and narrow waters satisfactory. I replied that I believed they regarded them as best of series of bad possibilities which alone were left after America's unwillingness to assume responsibility became known. He then asked me if I thought Supreme Council would reopen question if America were prepared to assume responsibility for Constantinople. He asked, further, if retention of the nominal Turkish sovereignty in Constantinople were desirable, and volunteered the opinion that it would be harmless if Sultan remained there as religious personage. I understand directly from Secretary of State that the President is in favour of America assuming the responsibility for Constantinople as well as Armenia.

United States Government is obviously still doubtful if it can do what it desires to do in [? Armenia] without the consent of the Congress.

They are probably now engaged in attempt to estimate strength of opposition.

[E 5056/1729/44]

No. 232.

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 20.)*

(No. 608.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 27, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a divergence of views exists between my French and Italian colleagues on the one side and General Milne on the other with regard to the functions and powers of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control which were established at the Turkish Ministries of War, Marine and Posts and Telegraphs, in connection with the military occupation of Constantinople, and which were referred to in my telegram No. 277 of the 24th March and your Lordship's telegram No. 362 of the 21st April.

2. My French colleague brought this matter up on the 23rd instant at a meeting of the three High Commissioners, who were attended by their military attachés. I had arranged for this meeting to take place in order to give an opportunity for an exchange of information and views on the subject of the present military situation in Turkey as affected by the operations now taking place between the forces of the Government and those of the Nationalists, and also regarding the change in the state of affairs which might be brought about as a consequence of the communication of the peace terms to the Turks.

3. M. DeFrance (who was supported throughout by M. Maissa) based his

\* See No. 226.



observations on the fact that the French and Italian members of the Control Commission at the Ministry of Marine, had, a few days before, during the course of an inspection of Turkish warships in the Golden Horn, discovered a Turkish ship being loaded with arms and ammunition and getting ready for sea. Upon enquiry, a paper was produced showing that the order for this action emanated from the Ministry of War. The French and Italian members of the Control Commission at the Ministry of War, upon being referred to, stated, however, that they had no knowledge of any such order, and that the matter had not been referred to them.

4. M. DeFrance pointed out that the above incident showed that the control exercised by the commission was either entirely ineffective, or that, if the authority for the despatch of the ship referred to had been given by the British member of the commission at the War Office (who was at the same time president), without previous reference to his colleagues, it was in no way inter-Allied.

5. His Excellency then went on to say that it was in every way unsatisfactory that the High Commissioners were not kept informed by their respective delegates on the Commissions of Control of important occurrences such as the one he had described. He had been given to understand that the French, as also the Italian, member of the Control Commission at the War Office were not informed of what went on, or of any orders issued to the Ministry of War by General Milne, and that, in fact, they were treated as if their function was to pick up for themselves any information they could. He maintained that as the control was inter-Allied, any order issued by General Milne should pass through all the members of the commission, which in its turn was responsible for seeing to the execution of the order by the Turks.

6. M. DeFrance then read certain extracts from the minutes of a meeting of the Control Commission at the War Office, at which the scope of the Allied members was discussed. From this it appeared that the French and Italian members claimed that, as the Control Commission exercised control over the Ministry of War, it therefore exercised control over the Ottoman army; furthermore, that any orders issued by the Allied commander should be seen by them before execution, and not merely be communicated to them for information after they had been carried out. The reply of the president appears to have been that the control of the commission did not extend beyond the actual building of the Ministry of War, and was in no way exercised over the Turkish army; that, the commission being a military body, its members were under the orders of General Milne, under whose orders the military occupation of Constantinople had been carried out, and that the right of any of these members to question or interfere with the execution of any orders issued by General Milne to the Turkish Ministry of War could not be admitted. The matter would, however, be referred to General Milne.

7. His Excellency observed as regards the above that he would not for a moment admit that the French member of the commission was under the orders of General Milne; if he were to be so considered, the commission would have no international character. He would not accept the point of view that the commission's powers were limited to the four walls of the War Office, and he maintained that, although the French delegate on the commission had not questioned, and never would question, any order issued to the Ministry of War by General Milne, it was his undoubted right to be informed of such orders so that he might exercise his functions of seeing that they were executed.

8. M. DeFrance and M. Maissa both stated that they were far from wishing to create any difficulties by bringing these matters forward; they wished, on the contrary, to ensure the harmonious working of these Inter-Allied Control Commissions, so that they might be of assistance to the military authorities; under present conditions, however, such results were impossible, and they therefore wished the system to be altered so as to allow of the French and Italian delegates playing their proper part in the control.

9. In replying to these remarks by my colleagues, I pointed out that I myself, as Acting High Commissioner, was, just as much as they were, without information regarding what went on at the War Office, or what orders were given at any time by General Milne with regard to the Turkish army. Their Excellencies appeared to be under the impression that the French and Italian officers on the Control Commissions acted as delegates of their respective High Commissioners. This, however, I said, was not the case; these commissions were military bodies appointed in connection with the military occupation of Constantinople. The High Commissioners did not come into the matter. Whether the members of the commissions acted under the

orders of General Milne, or, on the other hand, were responsible to their own military chiefs, was a matter upon which I personally could express no opinion, but would discuss the matter with General Milne and inform him of the opinion of their Excellencies on this point. The question whether the commission at the War Office controlled only that Office, or whether its scope included also the dispositions, movements, &c., of the Turkish army, was also a matter upon which I did not feel competent to express any opinion. I stated that I felt convinced that General Milne would be disinclined to agree to the commission exercising functions which he himself had hitherto performed as the Allied commander charged with the execution of the military clauses of the Convention of Armistice, under whose orders all measures connected with demobilisation, disarmament, movement of troops, establishments, &c., had been carried out. Whatever might be the position as regards the Supreme Allied Command in European Turkey, General Milne was indisputably Supreme Allied Commander in Anatolia, and the military occupation of Constantinople was executed by him. It appeared to me unacceptable that his direct control over the Turkish army should in any way be subject to limitation through the possible action of members of a commission who were in turn responsible to their own military authority.

10. Without wishing in any way to anticipate the views which General Milne might express on the subject, I put these considerations forward in order that their Excellencies might understand certain aspects of the question which, it appeared to me, would necessarily have to be taken into account.

11. I asked both my colleagues to be so good as to forward me a memorandum explaining briefly their points of view on the subject under discussion. A copy of M. DeFrance's note is forwarded for your Lordship's information.

12. I saw General Milne the following day and explained to him the opinions of my colleagues with regard to the functioning of the Commissions of Control, more particularly that at the Ottoman War Office. General Milne observed in reply that he, as commander of the army, was independent of any of the Allied High Commissioners and responsible solely to the War Office, by whom he was charged with the execution of the military clauses of the Armistice, and with the adoption of such measures as appeared to him necessary for the safety of his troops. Should any of the Allied High Commissioners consider that his actions or policy conflicted with the interests of the Allies, it rested with them to represent the matter to their Governments. Having been charged by the Allies to carry out their orders to occupy Constantinople, the manner of execution had to be decided by him, and he could not admit that the members of a commission of control at the War Office, who were not to be under his orders, should have the power to question or interfere with his orders to the Turkish military authorities. He had agreed to the appointment of the Inter-Allied Commission at the War Office, but it must be understood that it had no power outside the gates of the War Office, and in no way exercised control over the Turkish army. As for the complaint that the foreign members of the commission were not kept informed of what went on, he pointed out that the members of the commission met at frequent intervals, and at these meetings the subordinate officers charged with the supervision of the various branches and bureaux of the department presented their reports.

13. In view of the importance attached by colleagues to the question of how the Control Commissions should exercise their functions, and the consequent possibility of their making representations to their respective Governments, I have considered it desirable to forward to your Lordship a detailed account of what has taken place up to the present.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 232.

*Memorandum on the subject of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, communicated by M. DeFrance to Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb.*

CONFORMÉMENT aux instructions du Conseil suprême, des Contrôles interalliés ont été, par décision des Hauts-Commissaires, établis au Ministère ottoman de la Guerre, au Ministère de la Marine, aux Postes et Télégraphes.



Le mot "contrôle" implique que toute mesure, quelle qu'elle soit, envisagée par l'une des administrations contrôlées, doit être, préalablement à son exécution, soumise à la commission chargée d'exercer le contrôle.

Le mot "interallié" implique que ces mesures doivent être soumises, préalablement à leur exécution, non pas à l'un quelconque des membres composant les Commissions de Contrôle, mais à chacun des trois membres représentant dans les commissions les Puissances qui ont établi le contrôle.

Or, récemment, un ou deux bâtiments de guerre ou transports turcs ont été envoyés de Constantinople à Panderma; des fusils, des munitions, des officiers, des soldats ont été envoyés de Constantinople à la même destination.

Et ces mesures ont été décidées et exécutées certainement sans que les membres français et italien, et peut-être sans que le membre anglais de Commissions de Contrôle fonctionnant au Ministère de la Guerre et au Ministère de la Marine, en aient même été avisés.

En conséquence, à l'occasion des mesures indiquées ci-dessus, il n'y a certainement pas eu de contrôle interallié, et il n'y a peut-être eu aucun contrôle exercé par les commissions spécialement chargées de ce contrôle.

Les décisions prises par les Hauts-Commissaires en vertu des instructions du Conseil suprême n'ont donc pas, en l'occurrence, été exécutées et pareil fait ne devrait pas se renouveler.

Le 24 avril 1920.

(Translation.)

IN accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Council, Inter-Allied Controls were established by a decision of the High Commissioners, at the Ottoman Ministry of War, Ministry of Marine and at Post and Telegraph Offices.

The word "control" implies that any measure of whatever nature intended by one of the administrations controlled must, before being put into execution, be submitted to the commission entrusted with the exercise of the control.

The word "Inter-Allied" implies that these measures must be submitted, before being put into execution, not to any one of the members constituting the Commissions of Control, but to each of the three members representing on the commissions the Powers who established the control.

Recently, however, one or more Turkish ships of war or transports were sent from Constantinople to Panderma; rifles, ammunition, officers and men were sent from Constantinople to the same destination.

These measures were determined and executed, certainly without the French and Italian members, and perhaps without the British members of the Commissions of Control in operation at the Ministry of War and Ministry of Marine, even having been advised of them.

On the occasion of the above measures, therefore, there was certainly no inter-Allied control, and perhaps no control at all exercised by the commissions specially appointed for such control.

The decisions taken by the High Commissioners in virtue of the instructions of the Supreme Council have not, therefore, in this instance, been executed, and such an occurrence should not be repeated.

April 24, 1920.

[E 4892/56/44]

No. 233.

Earl Curzon to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).

(No. 465.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 364 of 16th May.

Foreign Office, May 21, 1920.

If approached, you should emphatically declare that His Majesty's Government would warmly appreciate American co-operation in support of the Armenian Republic with a view to ensuring its stability.

[E 5230/47/44]

No. 234.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 25.)

My Lord,

Aden, May 6, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 6th May, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 234.

Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.

My dear Field-Marshal,

Aden, May 6, 1920.

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my letter dated the 29th April, 1920:—

Tihama.

No reports have been received from Hodeida during this week.

Yemen (Upper and Lower).

An informant who lately arrived here from Sana reports that, while he was in Mawia, on the 17th April, 1920, Sheikh Mahomed Nasir surrendered two guns and ten camel-loads of ammunition to the imam. These were immediately despatched to Sana. The informant also saw twenty camels being loaded with ammunition at the house of Sheikh Mahomed Nasir. This latter ammunition was intended for despatch to Taiz.

Aden Protectorate.

The Zeidi party referred to in my last letter left Lahej on the 27th April, after the Abdali Sultan had informed them of my reply. The Zeidis did not come to Lahej via Nobat Dakim, but took that route on their return journey.

The officer commanding, Tiban column, writes that the party travelled slowly from Lahej, stopping at different stages reconnoitring. They wished to stay overnight at Nobat Dakim, but he sent them to Al Millah, 5 miles from Nobat Dakim, under escort, within half-an-hour of their arrival at Nobat Dakim. They went marching in fours and singing loudly.

The party did not give out the object of their mission. From the report of a Dala informant, however, it appears that the party was despatched under instructions from the imam to discuss certain matters with me, and to arrange for the meeting of British and Zeidi representatives at Kataba. The imam, at the same time instructed his amil at Dala, Sayed Yahia, to keep down the strength of the garrison at Dala at 100 men, and to stop building work.

A special messenger who was sent to verify reports of arrivals of fresh imamic troops at Dala has returned. According to him the number of Zeidis posted at different places in the Amiri territory is not more than 300 men. These men are periodically relieved. This messenger saw the imamic party which lately returned from Lahej, encamped at Suleik, where they have been levying taxes on kafilas.

Another special messenger who was sent to Dala subsequently corroborates the statement of the above informant, and adds that Sayed Yahia is expected to arrive at Suleik, where a customs post is being erected. According to this messenger the Alawi sheikh and the Kotaibi sheikh's nephew, Mukbil Abdulla, who had been taken to Sana, have been sent back to Dala, and are now with Sayed Yahia.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.



[E 5239/1729/44]

No 235.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon — (Received May 25.)*(No. 621.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Constantinople, May 24, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 446 of 17th May.

Reply to your telegram No. 383 of 27th April was held up pending my return from Malta.

Full statement of divergence of views between my French and Italian colleagues and General Milne on the subject of the three control commissions is given in my telegrams Nos. 276 and 277 of 24th March and in my despatch No. 2864 of 27th April.

As agreed to by Allied High Commissioners pending instructions from their Governments, controls continue working in accordance with conditions required by General Milne (my telegram No. 277).

The War Office and Post and Telegraph Commissions are accordingly under presidency of British officers. At Ministry of Marine there is no president, and, in point of fact, senior Allied officer there is a Frenchman. General Milne is now prepared to hand over post and telegraph control to one ally if I hand over Admiralty to another. In that case, however, he declines all responsibility for former, as officer appoint [here two groups mutilated].

I cannot [five groups mutilated] that, whilst we are still in state of war with Turkey and in military occupation of Constantinople, and unable to foresee result of communication of peace terms, there should be no possibility of interference with or weakening of authority of Supreme Allied Commander, General Milne, who is responsible for military situation to His Majesty's Government and to Supreme Council.

To ensure this it is necessary that both War Office and Post and Telegraph Commission should, as at present, be under presidency of British officers directly responsible to General Milne. As regards Admiralty, the present arrangement works satisfactorily, and any change would be to our detriment (see my telegram No. 439 of 26th April).

Commissions at War Office and Admiralty are kept fully informed regarding movements of troops and ships. What neither General Milne nor I can admit is that junior Allied officers on these commissions should have it in their power to interfere with arrangements which we may consider it necessary to make arising out of political, military or naval situation.

I can only suggest that danger and impossibility, under present unsettled conditions, of divided authority should be pointed out to French Ambassador, and that it should be made clear that present separation of commissions is only practical measure, however much such organisation may be modified on conclusion of peace, when various commissions of control will presumably be responsible to Supreme inter-Allied authority.

French and Italian members of the War Office Commission definitely informed by President that they were in no way under General Milne's orders—an impossible position for General Milne.

[E 5241/3/44]

No. 236.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — Received May 25.)*(No. 624.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Constantinople, May 25, 1920.*

NO doubt General Milne is keeping War Office fully informed as to military situation, but I think following requires urgent consideration.

It is reported that Nationalists have taken Adabazar, capturing two guns and sixteen machine guns, and that Circassians have dispersed and Government troops bolted. I fear that little confidence can now be placed in anti-Nationalist forces, whose moral, which was never strong, has no doubt been adversely affected by Nationalist propaganda and announcement of peace terms.

Information has reached me that leaders of Nationalists at Brussa under Edham Bey is moving against Government forces in Ismid area with force estimated at, at least, 1,500 men.

After clearing Ismid area of Ferid Pasha's troops, his plan is stated to be an advance on Haidar Pass via Shile. Should British troops oppose this movement he intends to attack them.

It would seem that Nationalists having cleared Bigha-Panderma district, Ferid Pasha's forces now propose to clear Ismid area right up to Haidar Pass.

They probably consider Smyrna can be ignored for the present, as they quite appreciate limits placed on Greek offensive action and are making full use of opportunity thus afforded to deal with Turkish opposition piecemeal.

All reports concur in strong anti-British sentiment now prevailing in Anatolia, and especially in Brussa area.

Similar feelings do not apparently exist against Italians, or even against French, in spite of happenings in Cilicia.

Idea is being spread amongst Turks that Turkish Government steps to suppress Nationalist movements are being backed by British alone, and that drastic peace terms are due to British insistence, which has overborne unwillingness of French to deal harshly with Turks.

It is unnecessary for me to point out to your Lordship how serious is situation which may now arise in Ismid area should Nationalists decide to advance to Bosphorus.

While it is obviously not in my province to offer an opinion as to military situation, it is clear that any advance by Nationalists into Ismid peninsula is bound to bring them into direct contact with British naval and military forces.

A decision by His Majesty's Government is therefore urgently required on policy which should be adopted in the event of this forward movement materialising, i.e., are we in fact to engage in belligerent operations against Nationalist forces previous to arrival of latter on eastern shores of Bosphorus?

I doubt whether French and Italian naval and military commanders here would co-operate in active hostilities against Nationalists without direct and categorical orders from their respective Governments, but this again is outside my province.

One question which must also receive consideration, if French and Italians refuse support to British in Northern Anatolia, even though Turkish Nationalists break armistice in every direction, is employment of Greek troops in Ismid area?

This, however, would have disadvantage of leading up to probable massacres of Christians in the interior.

[E 5259/1729/44]

No. 237.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon. — (Received May 26.)*

(No. 371.)

*Rome, May 18, 1920.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith Major-General Duncan's despatch on the subject of Italian brigade at Stamboul—reference Foreign Office telegram No. 184 of the 6th May.

I have, &amp;c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 237.

*Major-General Duncan to Sir G. Buchanan.*

(No. 1781.)

*Rome, May 17, 1920.*

Your Excellency,

ON the 13th May I visited Colonel Carletti, the Chief of the Staff to the Minister of War, and informed him that I had received the following telegram from the War Office:—

*“London, May 11, 1920.*

“General Milne informs War Office that an Italian brigade is expected to arrive within a very few days and that it will be quartered at Stamboul. It is presumed that the Ministry of War knows that this brigade will be under General Milne's orders, but it is wished that this point should be made clear.”

Colonel Carletti informed me that he quite understood that the Italian troops could be under the command of General Milne, but he asked me to delay sending an

[4370]

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answer to the War Office until he had sent a written reply. This reply was received by me yesterday and is as follows:—

"With reference to your *note verbale* of the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you as follows:—

"1. Simultaneously with the despatch of an infantry division, a general command of the Italian troops in the East will be established in Constantinople. For administration and discipline, besides the above-mentioned division, also the Italian troops detached in Asia Minor and in Thrace will, from all points of view, depend from that command.

"Until peace with Turkey is signed, that is to say as long as the present state of armistice lasts, the commander of the inter-Allied troops in Constantinople (General Milne) will have the high jurisdiction over the Italian command, which, however, must always take its orders from the King's Government for measures of a political character. With the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, General Milne's military jurisdiction over the Italian troops will naturally cease.

"I take this opportunity of informing you that the Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople has received orders from this Royal Government to come to an agreement with the inter-Allied authorities of Constantinople with the object of assigning a sector of their own on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus to the Italian troops that are to be despatched to that place.

"2. With reference to the Batoum battalion, I have the honour to inform you that the Royal Italian Government has come to the decision to suspend the despatch of that body, and therefore it will not be furnished by the division appointed for Constantinople.

"CARLETTI, Colonel, G.S."

I have, &c.

J. DUNCAN, Major-General,  
Military Attaché.

[E 5304/169/44]

No. 238.

M. de Fleuriau to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 26.)

LE Chargé d'Affaires de France a l'honneur de remercier son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères de ses deux lettres du 21 et du 30 avril dernier, par lesquelles il a bien voulu lui faire connaître le sentiment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté au sujet du versement de subsides à l'Émir Feysal.

M. de Fleuriau a été chargé de faire savoir à sa Seigneurie le Comte Curzon de Kedleston qu'aucun versement nouveau sera effectué par le Gouvernement français à l'Émir Feysal.

M. Millerand est d'accord avec son Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères pour déclarer qu'il n'effectuera dorénavant aucun versement à l'Émir sans accord préalable entre les deux Gouvernements.

M. de Fleuriau saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 22 mai 1920.

[E 5279/1729/44]

No. 239.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

Sir,

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of Foreign Office letter dated the 18th May, 1920, relative to the presidency of the three commissions set up in Constantinople as a result of the technical occupation of that city.

"2. I am to request that the Army Council may be informed of the exact terms of the French complaint, which at present are unknown to them. According to the records available at the War Office, instructions were sent to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, in War Office telegram dated the

16th April, in conformity with your letter dated the 13th April, after obtaining the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, who are concerned as regards the presidency of the Naval Commission.

I am to say that Lord Curzon will doubtless have observed that in this telegram a proviso was made on behalf of the Admiralty that the concurrence of the High Commissioner should be obtained for the proposed arrangement by which the three presidencies should be taken up by representatives of the three different Allied Powers.

The Foreign Office then covered the War Office instructions in a telegram No. 362, dated the 21st April, to the High Commissioner, who, however, from his telegram No. 439 of the 26th April, does not appear to have concurred in the new arrangement. The Foreign Office next replied to the High Commissioner's objections in telegram No. 383, dated the 27th April, asking what alternative he could recommend. To this query the Army Council observe, from Foreign Office telegram No. 446, dated the 17th May, that the High Commissioner has made no reply.

"3. If the above record of correspondence is complete, I am to suggest that, before any further instructions can be sent by the War Office to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, the Foreign Office should obtain the concurrence of the Admiralty regarding the presidency of the Naval Commission after obtaining the reply of the High Commissioner to their telegram No. 446, regarding the statement made by the French Ambassador.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.

[E 5358/4504/44]

No. 240.

Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 651.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 9, 1920.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 575/M/1031 of the 22nd April, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation, as published in the local press, of a telegram addressed to the Central Government by Colonel Muhieddin Bey, who had been appointed commander of the 1st Corps d'Armée at Adrianople in succession to Jaffar Tayar Bey after the latter returned to Constantinople.

"2. This telegram is very significant as coming from the officer selected by the Central Government to replace Jaffar Tayar Bey. Muhieddin Bey held prior to his appointment to Adrianople a subordinate command in Thrace. He disclaims any connection between the movement in Thrace and the Nationalist movement in Anatolia, but his telegram shows that whatever their position *vis-à-vis* of Mustafa Kemal, the organisers of the movement in Thrace are quite determined to oppose a Greek occupation. If it is true, as reported in telegrams from Europe, that the final decision of the Peace Conference is to extend the Greek dominions up to the Tchataldja lines, it is difficult to see what substantial difference there will be a fortnight hence between the point of view of Muhieddin Bey and that of Jaffar Tayar Bey.

"3. I am credibly informed that as a matter of fact the Central Government were wrong in supposing that Muhieddin Bey's line of action, even before the peace terms were announced, would differ in any way from that of Jaffar Tayar, and that Muhieddin Bey is already completely committed to the movement organised by his predecessor. It remains to be seen whether any section of the Turkish regular forces in Thrace are at variance with the policy of armed opposition to a Greek occupation.

"4. Jaffar Tayar himself returned to Adrianople on the 1st May. He left Constantinople under the auspices of the French military authorities here, and in defiance of the orders of the Grand Vizier. It would appear that the French military authorities, who were mainly instrumental in inducing him to come to Constantinople, considered him as having come in to treat with the Central Government, and as being consequently free to return.

"5. Although Muhieddin Bey retains the command at Adrianople, and although the Central Government have appointed a Civil Governor-General of whom little is known, there is no doubt that Jaffar Tayar will play the leading rôle in Thrace in the immediate future.



6. In the meantime Adrianople continues in relations with the Central Government. The Grand Vizier personally disapproved strongly of Jaffar Tayar's return, but it is not impossible that Jaffar Tayar may have established some working understanding while here with other Ministers, e.g., the Minister of the Interior, on the basis of holding his hand until the announcement of the peace terms, and then devoting all his attention to opposing a Greek advance, while doing as little as possible to embarrass the Central Government.

7. So far as the ultimate object is concerned, namely, to prevent the acquisition of the whole of Thrace by the Greeks, every Turk in Constantinople, including Ferid Pasha himself, must of course be at one with Jaffar Tayar's ideas.

8. I see some indication that if and when Turkey is obliged to sign a treaty ceding Thrace, the policy of Jaffar Tayar may be to declare the whole of Thrace united and independent, and to attempt to raise the country against the Greek invader on a cry of self-determination for the Thracians as such. I indicate this possibility to your Lordship with all reserve, for it is impossible for anyone to foresee the future, except in so far as it may be regarded as certain that a Greek occupation of Thrace up to the Tebataldja lines will be met by considerable attempts at more or less organised resistance.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 240

Colonel Muhieddin Bey to Central Government.

(Traduction.)  
(Télégraphique.)

Andrinople, le 3 mai 1920.  
COLONEL MOUHIDDIN BEY, nommé commandant du 1<sup>er</sup> Corps d'Armée, en remplacement de Djafer Tair Bey, vient d'envoyer au Ministère de la Guerre la dépêche suivante: "Je viens d'arriver en Andrinople et de prendre en main le commandement. Toute personne, civile et militaire, s'occupe de ses affaires."  
Voilà, en résumé la situation:

1. Le siège central du Comité de Défense des Droits de Thrace se trouve dans cette ville. Il n'a aucune relation avec les nationalistes de l'Anatolie, son unique but étant d'empêcher l'occupation de la Thrace par les Grecs.
2. Par suite des décisions prises dans la Conférence de San-Remo, les membres de ce comité sont très inquiets devant la perspective d'une occupation grecque. Ils n'ont d'autres moyens de défense que leur loyauté à leur pays et à leur Sultan.
3. Les officiers et les soldats du corps d'armée n'appartiennent à aucun parti. Ils sont tous dévoués à leur Souverain. Personne ne pourra supporter l'occupation par les Grecs de la ville d'Andrinople, qui a été la capitale de plusieurs Sultans, ancêtres de notre glorieux Souverain.
4. Les communications avec la capitale, qui étaient interrompues, viennent d'être recommencées.
5. Je vous prie de nous communiquer la vérité sur les décisions prises par la Conférence de San-Remo au sujet de la Thrace.

[E 5366/1729/44]

No. 241.

Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 662.)  
My Lord,

Constantinople, May 12, 1920.  
WITH reference to my despatch No. 608 of the 27th April, relative to the divergence of views existing between my French and Italian colleagues on the one side and General Milne on the other, with regard to the functions and powers of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control at the Turkish Ministries of War, Marine, and Posts and

Telegraphs, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter, dated the 1st May, which I have received from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, on the subject.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 241.

General Milne to Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb.

Your Excellency,

General Headquarters, Constantinople, May 1, 1920.

I HAVE received a letter from the British Military Mission to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Allied Armies of the Orient, to the effect that the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Allied Armies, objects to the president of the Control Commission at the Turkish War Office taking upon himself the authority to carry out certain orders issued to him by me.

The General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Allied Armies of the Orient, expressed himself as follows:—

"I am unable to agree with these views.

"Even during the present state of organisation of the commissions, sanctioned provisionally by the High Commissioners at their meeting of the 22nd March, 1920, the authority of the president alone cannot be substituted for that of the commission. Similarly, unless it is to become illusory, the supervision must be carried out not only over the organisation of the Ministry but also over the decisions sent out by it as a whole, among which those concerning movements of troops, arms and munitions are of the first importance."

The General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Allied Armies in the Orient, added that his view was also that of the French High Commissioner, and that the latter declared that it was the intention of the High Commissioners, when they decided on the inter-Allied character of the Control Commission, to give them full powers of investigation and verification.

May I please be informed on what grounds the High Commissioners came to the conclusion quoted in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, and how it is proposed that a civil body, such as the High Commission, should lay down the procedure to be adopted in the military matter under discussion.

G. F. MILNE, General Commanding-in-chief,  
Army of the Black Sea.

[E 5375/47/44]

No. 242.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 16.)  
My Lord,

Aden, May 13, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 13th May, 1920.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.



Enclosure in No. 242.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal,

Aden, May 13, 1920.

THE following is a summary of news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 6th May, 1920.

*Tihama.*

Syed Mustafa has sent me a letter he has received from the Idrisi, in which the latter states that the whole of Jebel Bura has been occupied by his troops after a decisive battle on the 2nd instant, and that there are no Zaidis left in the place. The chief Zaidi concentration at present is said to be at Sa'afan.

The Idrisi states that Ibn Saud has progressed on Shahrān, due to the activities of the King of the Hedjaz in those parts. The Idrisi says that the King of the Hedjaz is carrying on his propaganda—anti-Idrisi and anti-Ibn Saud—amongst the central Arabian tribes, most of whom are either Idrissophiles or partisans of Ibn Saud. The Idrisi views this progress of Ibn Saud with complacency, and extols his treatment of the tribes under his protection. He requests the British Government to advise the King of Hedjaz to stop his propaganda against him and Ibn Saud, which he is carrying out by means of enormous bribes, &c.

Some time ago, Major Gordon, lately Political Officer, Hodeida, expressed his opinion that the Idrisi would be strong enough to hold an extended domain against aggression if he was whole-heartedly accepted by all the tribes, even though he is not stated to be so strong materially or in men as the imam.

Major Gordon in a demi-official letter dated the 28th April, 1920, says that when expressing that opinion he was unaware of the state of the Idrisi finances, which he has since learnt from Captain Fazluddin to be unsatisfactory. He accordingly wishes to qualify the opinion, and states that the revenue the Idrisi would derive from his extension, even including the occupation of Hodeida, would not be sufficient as a set-off against his extended liabilities, unless subsidised by us. As a result of Idrisi occupation of the Tihama, including Hodeida, without British support, and possibly with it, there would probably be continuous guerrilla warfare between him and the Zaidis, and no security in the country.

*Yemen (Upper and Lower).*

The imam's amil at Mawia is reported to have been recalled and to have left for Sana on the 29th ultimo, in connection with complaints against him of maltreatment. His son has been appointed to act for him.

About the 8th April, the son and nephew of Sheikh Mahomed Hassan of Jabel Habashi, who were given as hostages to the imam's amil at Taiz, are said to have escaped from Taiz and returned to their homes in Sarahim. The amil sent 100 soldiers to Sheikh Mahomed Hassan to demand the surrender of the hostages, but the latter declined to comply, and defied the soldiers.

It is said that Syed Ali, the imamic commander at Taiz, is finding great difficulty in obtaining troops for service in the Mokha district. He is offering higher rates of pay, but even this action does not seem to induce the Zaidi soldiers to go there.

*Aden Protectorate.*

From the reports received, it appears that the Koteibi sheikh's nephew, Mukbil Abdulla, has given a hostage to the imam, and he has been allowed to return to his country. The Alawi sheikh is still at Dala. The imam asked for his son as a hostage, but the Alawi refused.

Fifty Zaidis, with one gun, are reported to have left Dala for Sana on the 1st instant.

Referring to the imamic party which came to Lahej last month, the Kadi of Dala, who has lately returned from Lahej, states that the people of Lahej and other places hailed my action in refusing permission to the party to enter Aden. The people think that if the party had been allowed to come in, been entertained and dismissed with presents, it would not only have shown that we were afraid of the imam, but the people would be confirmed in the belief, which they held before this incident, that there was a secret arrangement between us and the imam, under which the protectorate

was to be handed over to him. The people are now convinced that the delay in turning out the Zaidis from our protectorate is due to the fact that we do not wish to resort to force, but that we are trying to turn them out by employing diplomacy.

Yours, &amp;c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 5401/3/44]

No. 243.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 27.)*

(No. 627.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, May 27, 1920.

GRAND VIZIER called on me on 26th May for first time since presentation of peace terms.

Before speaking of peace Grand Vizier explained his situation in regard to repression of Nationalist movement in Anatolia. He complained at difficulties placed in the way of organisation of regular force for the purpose, which difficulties he attributed not to British or Allied authorities. He formally asked me to obtain permission of Supreme Council for equipment and utilisation of force not exceeding 10,000 men. He said he was about to address similar request to French and Italian High Commissioners. He emphasised the fact that force asked for is much less than 50,000 men contemplated as limit of Turkish armed forces after peace, and declared that recent visit to Ismid has satisfied him that with such a force he could suppress the rebel movement within three weeks.

Grand Vizier said that whole country regarded treaty as excessively severe. He urged expediency and injustice [*sic*] of mitigating conditions which deprive Turkey of Smyrna, Thrace and coastal region from Dardanelles to Black Sea. If this part of treaty could be softened it would be possible to secure acceptance by country, but if Constantinople Government signed treaty as it stands Sultan and Government would be placed in extraordinary [*sic*] difficult position seeking to impose on Nationalists in Asia Minor and Thrace treaty which everyone alike considers unjust.

Grand Vizier has not yet received full text, and said it would be materially impossible to produce considered reply by 11th June. He asks for maximum prolongation of one month. He was going to approach French and Italian High Commissioners similarly and confirm in writing.

He asked me whether I could transmit telegram from Sultan to King, entreating His Majesty, in conjunction with heads of other Allied States, to mitigate treaty. I felt I could not refuse, but said I must inform French and Italian colleagues.

Full record follows by bag.

[E 4108/757/44]

No. 244.

*Earl Curzon to Signor Preziosi.*

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 27, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the note which you were good enough to address to me, dated the 19th ultimo, but which only reached me on the 30th ultimo, relative to the request of the Swiss Government that there should be Swiss representation on the new Council of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, and conveying the opinion expressed by Senator Scialoja that the reply to be returned to the Swiss Government should be determined by the Conference held at San Remo.

2. As you are no doubt aware, the question of Swiss participation in the Council of Ottoman Public Debt did not come up for discussion at San Remo, and it is therefore necessary to deal with the question by an exchange of correspondence between His Majesty's, the Italian and French Governments.

3. In these circumstances I would venture to invite attention to the proposals put forward in the note which I had the honour to address to his Excellency the Marquis Imperiali on the 14th ultimo, and to state that I shall be glad to be favoured with an early expression of the views of the Italian Government on the subject. I would wish to add that the French Government share the views which were set forth in the above-mentioned note.

I have, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.



[E 5433/139/44]

No. 245.

*Rear-Admiral Sir R. Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 28.)*

(No. 680.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 14, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a telegram dated the 12th May which has been received from the Eastern Telegraph Company's Office, addressed to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, by the Indian Khalifate Delegation in Paris, expressing their inflexible loyalty to the Khalifate and the cause of Islam.

2. I have not permitted this telegram to be delivered to the Sultan, though His Imperial Majesty will doubtless receive a copy by mail in due course.

I have, &amp;c.

RICHARD WEBB.

*Acting High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 245.

*Indian Khalifate Delegation, Paris, to His Imperial Majesty, Sultan Wahiduddin Mohamed Khalifate Ur.*

(Telegraphic.)

*May 11, 1920*

RASUL Amirul Momineen Khadimul Haramainish Sharifain, Constantinople.

With the name of Allah, the most merciful and the most compassionate. The Indian Khalifate Delegation, representing over 70,000,000 Mussulmans and 250,000,000 of their compatriots of other creeds who stand shoulder to shoulder with them, have been delegated to explain to the Allied Powers and the Peace Conference the religious obligations imposed on every Moslem by his faith, and to express the overwhelming national sentiment of India with regard to the preservation of the Khalifate and the inviolability of the sanctuaries of Islam. The delegation beg to offer in the name of their co-religionists at this grave crisis in the history of Islam and of the Khalifate, their whole-hearted allegiance to your Majesty as the successor of their prophet and the commander of the faithful. Although deeply ashamed that the Mussulmans permitted to the Khalifate however unwilling it be to be reduced to its present distressing condition, we nevertheless venture with all the profound esteem that we entertain for your Majesty, and the great veneration inseparable from your high office, to submit that to-day the eyes of Mussulmans throughout the world are turned towards Islambol, and they confidently trust that in all conceivable circumstances and at all costs your Majesty will uphold the dignity of Islam and will remain steadfast in the defence of the Khalifate and of the sanctity of the Jaziratul arab in its entirety. We were charged to claim for the Khalifate the complete restoration of the territorial *status quo ante bellum* without prejudice to such political changes as guaranteed to non-Turkish nationalities if they so desired autonomous Government within the Ottoman Empire consistently with the dignity of a sovereign State, and we were to explain that this was the irreducible minimum of temporal power inalienable from the sacred institution of Khalifate that could be considered adequate for the defence of our faith.

We were also charged to declare that the Khalifate alone could be the servant of the three sacred harems of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem and the warden of the holy shrines and further, that no Mussulman would or could tolerate any form of non-Moslem control, whether in the shape of mandates or otherwise over Syria, Palestine or Mesopotamia, included as they are in the sacred soil of the Jaziratul Arab that had been entrusted on his death-bed by our holy prophet to our sole care.

We have tried to explain our threefold claims to the Allies to the best of our limited powers, and in spite of the appalling ignorance and tragic indifference even of some of those who are making themselves responsible for a new settlement of the world's affairs we have made it sufficiently clear that the reduction of the Moslem claim by a hair's breadth will not only be a violation of the deepest religious feelings of the Moslems, but will also be a flagrant violation of the solemn pledge given by responsible statesmen representing the Allied and Associated Powers, and given at a time when they were desirous of enlisting the support of the Moslem people and soldiery. Further, we have not hesitated to warn the British Government that if these pledges were not redeemed and effect was not given to the declaration that brought about the armistice it would be futile to expect peace in India, and that an affront put upon the

Mussulmans and in fact upon the entire Indian nation will be incompatible with an expectation of blind loyalty.

Having done everything that was demanded of us by our duty as Mussulmans as loyal subjects of the King Emperor, and as men deeply anxious to secure a just and lasting peace, and charged with a mission of reconciliation and concord, we now await the response of the Allied Powers to our appeals and warnings. But of far greater importance to the Moslem world will be your Majesty's response to the demands of the Allies, and before that response is made we deem it our humble duty to bring to your Majesty's notice that Islam to-day stands solidly by your side as it has never stood since the last of the Khalifat Kashideen passed away.

Every Moslem is now determined without flinching and without fear to do all that Allah demands from him, even to the extent of offering his life as the price of his faith. May the great God give to your Majesty and to your noble and brave but distracted and divided nation the strength and resolution to do your duty not only by Turkey but by Islam, and may the unity of Turkey soon become a true reflex of the unity of Islam.

The Indian Khalifat Delegation finally beg leave to recall what our glorious prophet said in the cave of Thaur to your Majesty's first predecessor, Abu Bakr, when they were only two and their enemies were many, "Fear not, verily Allah is with us."

God willing, we shall yet succeed if only we retain our faith in Allah's omnipotence and serve none but him.

MOHAMED ALL,  
SYUD HOSSAIN,  
SYED SULAIMAN NADWI,  
ABUL KASIM.

*Members of the Indian Khalifate Delegation,  
Regina Hotel.*

[E 5455/289/44]

No. 246.

*Consul Morgan to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 28.)*

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Smyrna, May 26, 1920.*

MY French colleague informs me that Greek High Commissioner told him that when Greece takes over Smyrna, Capitulations and Consular Court will be abolished. May I be instructed whether such is provision of treaty?

[E 5441/3/44]

No. 247.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 28.)*

(No. 628.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, May 27, 1920.*

TO His Majesty the King of England, London:—

"The peace terms communicated to Turkish Delegation, Paris, have plunged whole of Turkey into depths of grief. I am encouraged by wealth of historical ties between the British and Ottoman Empires and by my absolute confidence in the sense of justice and equity of your Majesty and of the English nation, over whose fortunes your Majesty so nobly presides, [groups omitted] recognise a pressing appeal to your Majesty to intervene with other *Entente* Powers in order to alleviate the severity of the treaty in those of its clauses which are incompatible with independent State, and to save from partition at least the Turkish-speaking provinces.

"Turkish and Ottoman dynasty will thus remain eternally grateful to your Majesty.—MEHEMMED WAHIDUDDIN, representative."



[E 5259/1729/44]

No. 248.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 28, 1920.*

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit herewith a copy of despatch No. 1781 from the military attaché to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

Lord Curzon would be glad to receive the observations of the Army Council on the statement in the letter of the Italian Minister of War to the effect that the Italian command at Constantinople will always take its orders from the Italian Government "for measures of a political character."

I am, &amp;c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 5499/1729/44]

No. 249.

*Director of Military Intelligence to Foreign Office.—(Received May 29.)**War Office, May 28, 1920.*

THE Director of Military Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to War Office letter of 20th May, 1920, on the subject of the despatch of Italian troops to Constantinople, begs to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram of the 21st May from the military attaché to His Majesty's Embassy in Rome.

Lord Hardinge of Penshurst will observe from this telegram that the information contained in telegram No. 185 from His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, as to the despatch of an Italian infantry division to Constantinople, was correct.

With reference to the last sentence of the telegram enclosed herewith, Major-General Sir William Thwaites has telegraphed to the British military attaché in Rome, asking by what date it is expected that the move of the Italian troops to Constantinople will be complete.

Enclosure in No. 249.

*British Military Attaché, Rome, to War Office.—(Received May 22.)*

(Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Rome, May 21, 1920.*

THREE regiments of Italian troops are detailed for conveyance to Constantinople. These are concentrating at Taranto, but date of departure is not yet fixed.

[E 5505/1729/44]

No. 250.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 29.)*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*War Office, May 28, 1920*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward, for Earl Curzon of Kedleston's information, a copy of a telegram No. 1782 of the 17th May, 1920, from the military attaché at Rome, and to refer to the question of the command at Constantinople.

2. In the opinion of the Council the time has now come when the inauguration of the permanent international organisation of the demilitarised zone around the Straits should be taken in hand, and the garrison of this zone reduced in the first instance to the two divisions as recommended by the Joint Inter-Allied Naval and Military Committee, of which Marshal Foch was president, on the 16th February last.

3. The British force in the army of the Black Sea at present includes twenty-one battalions, or fifteen battalions in excess of the British share in the after-war garrison, and the Council cannot agree to the retention of so many troops for an indefinite period, bearing in mind the very serious commitments elsewhere. Moreover, they would point out that, as will be observed from the above-quoted telegram, the Italian Government purpose despatching a complete division of nine battalions to the Straits (including one battalion already in Constantinople).

[E 5458/56/44]

No. 248\*.

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 29.)*

(No. 1603.)

THE Earl of Derby presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter from the United States Ambassador to the President of the Peace Conference on the subject of Armenian frontiers.

*Paris, May 25, 1920.*

Enclosure in No. 248\*.

*Mr. Wallace to M. Millerand.**Ambassade des États-Unis d'Amérique,**Paris, le 18 mai 1920.*

M. le Président,

EN me référant à la note relative aux frontières de l'Arménie, rédigée et approuvée à San-Remo à la réunion du lundi après-midi, 26 avril, et dont le texte a été transmis à Washington par les soins de Mr. Robert Underwood Johnson, Ambassadeur des États-Unis à Rome, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que le Président Wilson a pris en considération la requête formulée par le Conseil suprême le sollicitant d'agir en qualité d'arbitre dans la question des frontières arméniennes et qu'il s'est déclaré disposé à accepter ces fonctions.

Je suis chargé d'ajouter que le Président accueille avec satisfaction cette occasion de rendre service au peuple d'Arménie.

En communiquant ce qui précède à votre Excellence, j'ai l'honneur de la prier de vouloir bien transmettre aux Puissances représentées à San-Remo la réponse de Mr. Woodrow Wilson.

Agréé. &amp;c.

HUGH WALLACE.



4. The Council understand that it was the intention of the Supreme Council that the command of the inter-Allied force in the demilitarised zone should be exercised in turn by the principal Allied Powers, and they consider that a decision should now be obtained as to which of the Powers will be the first to nominate the military commander, and what will be the length of the tenure of command.

5. It appears obvious that the Italian Government intends to find at least a fully representative portion of the Allied force, and it may well be that they contemplate securing for an Italian commander the first appointment as Commander-in-chief.

6. The Italian force under orders for Constantinople actually represents half the total Allied force of two divisions or eighteen battalions agreed upon, and the Army Council wish to point out that should the British and French Governments concur in discarding the original agreement by which each Power would be represented in equal proportions, their own military commitments can thereby be lessened considerably.

The Army Council wish me to say that from the military point of view this is extremely desirable as regards British representation.

7. In considering the question of setting aside a special zone for the Italian troops on the Asiatic shore, I am to say that the Army Council are referring this matter to General Milne, but that as long as he remains in supreme command it will obviously be essential that the Italian troops shall conform to such orders as he finds it necessary to give.

The Army Council hope therefore that Lord Curzon will obtain an acknowledgment to this effect from the Italian Government before the troops arrive at Constantinople, in the probable event of their doing so before the after-war organisation of the demilitarised zone is adopted.

I am, &c.  
B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure in No. 250.

*B.M.A., Rome, to D.M.I. War Office.—(Received May 22.)*

(No. 1782. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Rome, May 17, 1920.*

YOUR No. 84823. Minister of War has agreed to Italian army at Constantinople being under General Milne's orders until signature of peace, but will receive Italian Government's orders regarding political questions. General Milne's control over Italians ceases on signature of peace, 4th June. Italians will consist of division. Italian Government wishes distinct zone for Italians on Asiatic side of Bosphorus. Italian Government has decided to suspend sending detachment to Batoum.

[E 5506/3/44]

No. 251.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 29.)*

(No. 631.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, May 28, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 627, paragraph 4, of 27th May.

Request for extension of time in which to reply to peace terms has now been received from Sublime Porte in writing.

Allied High Commissioners at their meeting to-day, 28th May, decided that application for extension of one month to 11th July was reasonable and should be recommended for acceptance. High Commissioner further considered that facilities for sending delegates and couriers between Paris and Constantinople requires immediate attention, as train routine is not functioning satisfactorily at present. I would point out that control of train service between Paris and Constantinople is in French hands.



[E 5525/289/44]

No. 252.

*Consul Morgan to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 30.)*(No. 5.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Smyrna, May 29, 1920.*

FOLLOWING is text of collective note sent in agreement with my French colleague, my Italian colleague and my American colleague:—

"Greek High Commissioner, Smyrna, has declared that treaty provides for immediate suppression of capitulatory régime so far as regards the region in Asia Minor ceded to Greece.

"At their last meeting delegates agreed to address to their Government following remarks on this subject:—

"Immediate suppression of Capitulations seems irreconcilable with maintenance of Ottoman sovereignty over region, for Sublime Porte in ceding its sovereign rights can only transmit them subject to capitulatory obligations. Neutral Powers, such as Spain, Netherlands, &c., which will not be bound by treaty, will doubtless keep their privileges, while Great Powers would renounce theirs.

"Private persons, industrial and commercial establishments and companies of our nationalities protest against abrupt alteration of régime, which will without notice deprive them of guarantees which they have enjoyed for centuries and to which they have adapted themselves; they view with apprehension foreign interference in their affairs, which lawfully now only concerns their own authorities.

"For these chief reasons the delegates pray their Governments, for at least transitional period of five years provided for by treaty, to refuse suppression of Capitulation, so far as concerns the district of Smyrna, in order to avoid regrettable consequences, of which least would be an exodus of their nationals."

(Sent to High Commissioner, Constantinople, No. 64.)

[E 5572/1729/44]

No. 253.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 31.)*

Sir,

*War Office, May 29, 1920.*

IN continuation of War Office letter dated the 25th instant, I am commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, copy of telegram, dated the 22nd May, from the War Office to General Milne, and General Milne's reply thereto in telegram dated the 26th May.

I am to say that Lord Curzon will observe that General Milne awaits the decision of Admiral de Robeck regarding the presidency of the Marine Commission, for which he will have no responsibility, in order to hand over the presidency of the Post Office and Telegraph Commission.

As regards the presidency of the War Office Commission, the Council anticipate that Lord Curzon will see no reason to change the opinion expressed in his letter dated the 1st April, that the presidency of this commission should remain in British hands during such times as General Milne is in supreme command at Constantinople. I am, however, to observe that, in view of General Milne's telegram under reference, it might facilitate matters if Lord Curzon would make the necessity quite clear to the French and Italian Governments of this presidency being occupied by a British officer for the present.

I am, &amp;c.

B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 253.

*War Office to General Milne (Constantinople).*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*War Office, May 22, 1920.*

REFERENCE my telegram dated 15th April, 1920. You should see telegram No. 446, dated 17th May, from Foreign Office to High Commissioner. What is present position re presidencies of commissions? Wire also your comments.

Enclosure 2 in No. 253.

*General Milne to War Office.*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Constantinople, May 26, 1920.*

YOUR telegram of 22nd May.

Allied Commission of Marine is under orders of Volunteer Army Commander-in-chief afloat. At present the other commissions have British presidents, but I should be in a position to hand over telegraphs to the [group undecypherable] power as soon as admiral has decided nationality of the president of Marine Commission, but I have notified High Commissioner that in that case, as the president will not be under my orders, I can accept no responsibility for the control. The Allied members of the War Commission maintain that the control is entirely under them, and have informed me that they do not consider themselves under my control. Especially as the Italians openly show preference for the Nationalist Party, I cannot agree that the control which I formerly exercised should be conducted by three junior officers, who know nothing of either military or political situation.

[E 5598/2/44]

No. 254.

*M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 1.)*

L'AMBASSADEUR de France a l'honneur de communiquer à sa Seigneurie le Comte Curzon de Kedleston la réponse de M. le Président du Conseil français à la note du Gouvernement britannique en date du 18 mai 1920.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 31 mai 1920.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 254.

*Reply of M. Millerand to British Note respecting Syria.*

M. MILLERAND a pris connaissance avec la plus grande attention de la réponse adressée le 18 mai courant par Lord Curzon à M. Paul Cambon relativement aux vues politiques du Gouvernement français quant à la Syrie.

Le Président du Conseil est heureux de constater que le Gouvernement britannique est d'accord sur les lignes essentielles de son exposé: obligation pour la France de mettre fin aux intrigues qui ont créé un état d'insécurité de plus en plus douloureux en Cilicie et en Syrie; utilité d'une communication jointe marquant vis-à-vis de Feysal l'entente étroite et l'intérêt commun des deux Gouvernements; nécessité de définir et de limiter la position de Feysal à son rôle éventuel en Syrie sous le mandat français.

S'il était besoin de prouver l'intérêt que présente une communication jointe et identique des deux Gouvernements, on en trouverait la preuve dans le fait que l'Émir Feysal, interprétant d'une manière tendancieuse la communication du Maréchal Allenby, a écrit récemment au Général Gouraud: "Le Gouvernement anglais, notre Allié commun, m'ayant reconnu comme Chef suprême du Gouvernement syrien, c'est-à-dire d'une région que la Conférence de la Paix a placé sous le mandat français. La France bien que ne doutant à aucun degré de la loyauté d'action des autorités anglaises, a un intérêt de premier ordre à ne laisser aucune échappatoire à l'Émir, qui prend une attitude de plus en plus contraire à ses engagements et qui est en fait, à l'origine de toutes les attaques des bandes chérifiennes contre les troupes françaises.

La nouvelle communication à faire à Feysal pour lui demander pour la dernière fois s'il veut se rendre à la Conférence ne doit lui laisser aucun doute sur les conséquences qu'aurait son refus. Les termes de ses réponses au Maréchal Allenby et au Général Gouraud exigent que les conditions de sa venue soient nettement définies, et ne laissent d'ailleurs pas l'impression qu'il soit disposé à s'y prêter, sa politique ayant été jusqu'ici de forcer la main aux Puissances et de ruiner la situation de la France en Syrie par tous les moyens au mépris de ses engagements.

Dans la réponse au Maréchal Allenby, l'Émir prétend parler au nom de la Mésopotamie comme de la Syrie, en les déclarant États indépendants, se refuse à accepter le mandat donné respectivement au Royaume-Uni et à la France, réclame



l'inclusion de la Palestine dans la Syrie, conteste la position réservée aux Sionistes, et veut obtenir à cet égard des assurances avant de se rendre à la Conférence.<sup>1</sup>

Dans sa réponse au Général Gouraud, l'Émir réclame comme un droit résultant de l'état de fait existant la reconnaissance de l'indépendance d'une Syrie une et indivisible incluant la Palestine, qu'il revendique en réclamant à cet effet l'aide de la France, tout en refusant le mandat donné par la Conférence de la Paix à cette Puissance, et en reniant les termes mêmes de l'accord qu'il a signé le 6 janvier.

On ne saurait laisser l'Émir Feysal continuer son jeu actuel, qui consiste à se faire nommer Roi de Syrie par un congrès improvisé et sans titres, à refuser le mandat français au mépris des décisions de la Conférence de la Paix, à témoigner de toutes manières dans les faits son hostilité à la France en armant des bandes contre elle en liaison avec les nationalistes turcs, tout en cherchant à l'amuser par des assurances verbales et en gagnant du temps pour user les troupes françaises, jusqu'au jour où il pourra résolument se lever contre elles. Il vient encore de se refuser à autoriser quelque espèce de transports que ce soit sur la voie ferrée d'Alep, tant que le Gouvernement français n'aura pas fait droit "aux justes revendications du Congrès syrien," compromettant par là le sort des colonnes françaises du nord et marquant nettement l'appui ainsi donné aux attaques des nationalistes turcs.

Il n'y a plus lieu de reculer devant le risque de voir Feysal se joindre aux nationalistes turcs : dès à présent, il a pris en fait cette position, dont il a tous les avantages, puisqu'il garde en même temps à l'égard de la France des formes hypocrites que nous avons intérêt à démasquer. Nous n'éviterons pas davantage une alliance des bolcheviks et des Turcs et ne pourrions y parer en témoignant de la faiblesse ou de la crainte.

Le Gouvernement français est prêt à adhérer à la suggestion anglaise et à adresser à Feysal une nouvelle invitation à se rendre à la Conférence. Mais il considère comme essentiel que cette communication soit faite au nom des deux Gouvernements par le Général Gouraud : c'est la France qui a reçu le mandat sur la Syrie, c'est elle qui a pris des engagements à l'égard des minorités chrétiennes de Cilicie, c'est elle qui est menacée de la manière la plus directe et la plus grave par les intrigues et l'attitude de l'Émir. Le moment est venu de définir et de limiter la position réelle de celui-ci, qui ne saurait à la fois être représentant du Hedjaz (et même de l'Arabie entière), revendiquant la Mésopotamie comme la Syrie, et prince d'une Syrie placée sous le mandat français et incluant la Palestine contre l'accord des deux Gouvernements. Cela est peut-être plus dangereux encore pour l'Angleterre dans l'avenir que pour la France dans le présent ; dans tous les cas, ce n'est pas plus acceptable pour l'une Puissance que pour l'autre. Le jour où la question aura été réglée, le Gouvernement français sera l'intermédiaire nécessaire du Gouvernement syrien.

Il n'y a pas lieu de craindre que ce refus de considérer Feysal comme le délégué autorisé du Roi Hussein puisse mécontenter ce dernier, car il a fait lui-même la déclaration la plus formelle en ce sens à l'officier français délégué auprès de lui et a ajouté qu'il en informait le Gouvernement anglais ; il dénie toute autorité à l'Émir pour le représenter personnellement, même en Syrie, et pour parler au nom des Arabes. Il serait aisé de s'en assurer en lui posant directement la question.

La réponse à Feysal devrait définir la position de la question par rapport à la Conférence de la Paix, répondre à ses propres déclarations faites au Maréchal Allenby et au Général Gouraud, viser les termes mêmes de ses engagements vis-à-vis du Gouvernement français et indiquer clairement que, s'il ne se rend pas à l'invitation qui lui est faite, il cessera d'avoir, aux yeux des Puissances, une position officielle (que l'attitude du Roi Hussein rend d'ailleurs, en toute hypothèse difficile à maintenir).

M. Millerand a l'honneur d'adresser au Gouvernement anglais un projet de déclaration dans ce sens ; il compte recevoir très prochainement son assentiment, en raison de la situation militaire, qui ne permet pas au Gouvernement français, sans courir les risques les plus graves, de tolérer plus longtemps les agissements des bandes chérifiennes en étant privé de la seule voie pratique de ravitaillement et de transport qui existe pour la défense de nos divisions de Cilicie contre les troupes turques, le chemin de fer dont disposaient les Anglais quand ils occupaient la région et dont l'occupation seule a permis le maintien de l'ordre.

Le Président du Conseil français n'insiste pas sur son projet de réponse à la Délégation du Hedjaz, qui a été différé jusqu'ici et n'aurait plus aucune portée s'il était remis encore à la fin de juin, jusqu'à la prochaine conférence ; il se confondra d'ailleurs avec la réponse adressée à l'Émir.

Paris, le 25 mai 1920.

Enclosure 2 in No. 254.

*Déclaration à l'Émir Feysal.*

LES Gouvernements français et anglais ont examiné en commun les objections faites par Son Altesse l'Émir Feysal à la récente déclaration par laquelle les deux Puissances alliées lui avaient confirmé leurs déclarations antérieures relativement à l'indépendance des populations de la Syrie, de la Palestine et de la Mésopotamie, l'avaient informé de la décision prise par la Conférence de la Paix de confier à la France le mandat sur la Syrie et à l'Angleterre le mandat sur la Mésopotamie et sur la Palestine, et l'avaient invité à se rendre à la prochaine session du Conseil suprême.

Les deux Gouvernements ont également pris connaissance de la protestation de la Délégation du Hedjaz contre la décision de la Conférence de la Paix relative aux mandats, décision qu'elle représente comme négligeant les aspirations des populations et les principes de la guerre et de la déclaration que le Gouvernement de Damas, qui aurait pratiqué une politique de collaboration sincère avec les Alliés et témoigné son entière bonne volonté pour maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité sur son territoire serait placé dans une situation difficile.

Les objections ainsi formulées ne paraissent nullement justifiées. Il appartient sans contestation possible à la Conférence de la Paix, constituée par l'union des Puissances qui, au prix de sacrifices immenses, ont libéré les peuples asservis, et en particulier les Arabes, de la domination de leurs oppresseurs, de régler les conditions de la paix et de définir le statut et les frontières des États nouveaux.

Les décisions antérieures des Puissances ont proclamé en même temps que leur ferme intention de reconnaître le droit des populations ainsi libérées à se gouverner à titre de nations indépendantes, la nécessité de confier à une Puissance mandataire le soin de guider leur administration jusqu'au moment où elles seront capables de la conduire seules : l'article 22 du Pacte de la Société des Nations, contresigné par la Délégation du Hedjaz, enregistre formellement cette règle.

Le chef de la Délégation du Hedjaz, l'Émir Feysal, a si bien reconnu le bien-fondé de ces principes qu'il a de lui-même fait appel à la France pour cette mission dans les termes suivants de l'accord du 6 janvier :

"Le Gouvernement de la République française, se référant d'une part à la déclaration franco-anglaise du 9 novembre 1918, d'autre part aux principes généraux de libération des peuples et de collaboration amicale proclamés par la Conférence de la Paix, confirme sa reconnaissance du droit des populations de langue arabe, fixées sur le territoire syrien, de toutes confessions, à se réunir pour se gouverner elles-mêmes à titre de nation indépendante.

"Son Altesse Royale l'Émir Feysal reconnaît que les populations syriennes ont un grand intérêt en raison de la désorganisation résultant de l'oppression turque et des dommages subis pendant la guerre, à demander les conseils et l'aide d'une grande Puissance pour réaliser leur unité et organiser le fonctionnement de la nation, conseils et aide qui seront enregistrés par la Société des Nations, lorsque celle-ci sera pratiquement réalisée.

"Au nom des populations syriennes, c'est à la France qu'il fait appel pour cette mission."

Il ne saurait donc légitimement protester contre la décision de la Conférence de la Paix :

"C'est aux Puissances intéressées, qui ont libéré les Arabes et qui n'ont pas cessé de leur prêter avec le plus grand désintéressement leur appui matériel et moral indispensable, qu'il appartient, au contraire, d'appeler la plus sérieuse attention de la Délégation du Hedjaz et de son chef sur le désordre et l'insécurité maintenue depuis des mois et toujours croissante sur le territoire syrien, sur la collusion d'officiers chérifiens avec des chefs de bandes turcs contre les troupes européennes libératrices et sur la tentative de préjuger des décisions de la Conférence de la Paix en faisant proclamer à Damas un Roi de Syrie par une réunion improvisée sans garanties. Il est évident que les graves inconvénients d'une telle situation ne sauraient se prolonger et que si les autorités arabes de Damas ne voulaient ou ne pouvaient pas maintenir l'ordre et la sécurité sur le territoire, les Puissances mandataires auraient le devoir d'y procéder elles-mêmes pour le bien des populations et la vie de leurs nationaux."



Les deux Puissances alliées renouvellent à Son Altesse l'Émir Feysal leur pressante invitation à se rendre à la prochaine session de la Conférence de la Paix, dans l'espoir que l'avenir des pays arabes pourrait être réglé d'accord avec lui et les malentendus dissipés. Elles ne sauraient, d'ailleurs, lui dissimuler que, faute de se rendre à la cordiale invitation des Puissances, il cesserait à leurs yeux de conserver sa position officielle de délégué du Hedjaz à la Conférence de la Paix.

Paris, le 26 mai 1920.

[E 5689/47/44]

No. 255.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 2.)*

(No. 17.)

My Lord,

Aden, May 20, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 20th May, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 255.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal,

Aden, May 20, 1920.

THE following is a summary of news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 13th May, 1920:—

#### *Tihama.*

Reports received from Hodeida during this week confirm the occupation of Jebel Bura by the Idrisi. Sheikh Mahomed Zaid (Quhra), who was in command at Jebel Bura, was wounded in the leg. A force of 1,500 to 2,000 imamic soldiers is reported to be concentrated at Shutaba, and another of 700 awaiting the arrival of Commandant Saiyid Mahomed-al-Shami at Reima to advance on Jebel Bura.

The Idrisi, in his letter to Syed Mustafa referred to in my last letter, states that he has made adequate arrangements for the defence of Jebel Bura, and that he is advancing on Zabid.

An agent at Menakha reports that Sheikh Abu Hadi is inclining towards the imam. Captain Gordon says that he has received no confirmation of this report. In a recent letter to him, the Idrisi commander at Bajil, Sheikh Mahomed Tahir, said that the Quhra tribes were absolutely in his hands.

Captain Gordon says that at present the Quhra are mustering in numbers, and it appears that the eve of considerable fighting on a larger scale is approaching. He adds that if this continual fighting is maintained, there is the possibility of the Quhra becoming war-weary, and the Menakha agent's report may be a warning of this in advance.

Sheikh Suleiman Hassan Bukheit of the Aboos, in a recent letter to the Political Officer, Hodeida, states that rumours are afloat that the imam has made a vow to conquer Hodeida, even if he has to pay his soldiers at the rate of 100 dollars per mensem per man. The sheikh has heard the imamic herald cry that it is lawful for every Zaidi to assist in capturing Marawa, Kutai and Hodeida, and behead the Aboos sheikhs and the Political Officer, Hodeida. He says that our interest is identical, and that one party should help the other—the Aboos on land and we on sea. He warns us to be on our guard, and enquires whether we will help him in case of necessity.

Captain Gordon has sent him a non-committal reply.

According to the information received by the Political Officer, Hodeida, on the 23rd April, 1920, the imam's commander, Ahmed Ahsan-ar-Rammah, Sheikh of Beni Matar, came down with 2,200 soldiers and occupied Hujjeila, Attar, Shutaba, Wadi Har, and about five villages at the foot of Jebel Bura; 500 imamic soldiers are stationed at Hujjeila.

#### *Yemen (Upper and Lower).*

An agent at Sana reports that the imam has invited fresh drafts of soldiers from Bustan, Beni Matar and Hamban; 100 to 200 soldiers arrive daily in Sana, and are despatched to the Tihama. Some of the tribesmen of Khaulan and Al Hadda have refused to join the imam's service. They are trying to overthrow the yoke of the imam. Majority of the people of Sana is in favour of the Idrisi. I regard this report with suspicion.

The agent gives the number of Turkish officers and soldiers still remaining in the Yemen as 193.

#### *Aden Protectorate.*

Syed Kassim-ibn-el-Wagi, ex-Amil of Nadhira, is reported to have arrived at Jalila with 200 Zaidis on the 3rd May, 1920, and to have since come down to Sooda (Alawi) accompanied by Muqbil Abdulla and the Alawi sheikh.

I have had no confirmation of this report.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 5631/1331/44]

No. 256.

*Sir A. Geddes to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 2.)*

(No. 687.)

My Lord,

Washington, May 21, 1920.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 436 of the 21st April, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a Message from the President to the Senate dated the 17th May,\* and dealing, in reply to a Senate resolution, with the restrictions alleged to be imposed in various foreign countries, chiefly the component parts of the British Empire, on the acquisition and development of oil-bearing territory by United States citizens.

To this statement the facts contained in your telegram No. 433 of the 7th May would enable me to return an immediate reply. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the chief argument of men like Senator Phelan, who foment this particular form of anti-British agitation, is based on the contention that the oil sources controlled by the United States are rapidly deteriorating, while it is the undeveloped and potentially rich fields which are being monopolised by Great Britain, I hesitate to issue a statement which might be the prelude to a long and bitter controversy.

At the same time, and since it is in my view most improbable that this agitation will die down or that we shall be able indefinitely to ignore it, I would suggest, for your Lordship's consideration, that the subject having now been definitely raised in the Senate here, a reply to the anti-British allegations implied or expressed might most fittingly be made in Parliament. The possibility of including in such a reply a reassuring statement as to the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to oil exploitation in those parts of former Turkey for which they propose to assume the mandate is one which can only be considered in London.

Mr. Lindsay has already, in his despatch No. 54 of the 9th January, referred to the close relations existing during the war between the Standard Oil Company and the Administration, a relationship which there is good reason to suppose extended also to certain members of the Legislation such as Senator Phelan. This rapprochement, which was brought about chiefly by the efforts of Mr. Bedford, president of the Standard Oil Company, who gave his services to the Government in connection with the direction of oil supplies at a nominal salary of one dollar a year, has completely reversed the pre-war relationship under which it was nothing less than courting disaster for any member of the Administration to incur the suspicion of an affiliation with the oil interests. The extent of the influences thus acquired by the company in Administration circles may be gauged by the fact that the former Director of the Bureau of Mines, the department which is directly responsible for oil questions, has accepted, undoubtedly on the recommendation and with the support of Mr. Bedford, a position on the American Petroleum Institute, while it is possibly also not without significance that Mr. Lane, formerly Secretary of the Interior, has joined the board of a

\* Not printed.



large oil corporation on his retirement from the Administration. This new orientation of the oil interest *vis-à-vis* the Administration cannot but increase to a sensible degree the dangers to Anglo-American relations inherent in the whole question.

I need not remind your Lordship of the evidence already in the possession of the Foreign Office showing the connection of the Standard Oil Company with Irish agitation.

I have, &c.  
A. C. GEDDES.

[E 5700/1/58]

No. 257.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 2.)*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*War Office, June 1, 1920.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to bring to the notice of Earl Curzon of Kedleston the attached telegram of the 30th May from the General Officer Commanding, Constantinople.

It will be observed that General Milne points out that in the first place a warning of from ten to fourteen days is necessary to enable shipping to be collected for the withdrawal of the garrison.

Secondly, the present political, industrial and military situation in Batoum is such that a complete upheaval may take place at any moment.

Thirdly, it is only right that fair warning should be given to the inhabitants before the withdrawal takes place.

Fourthly, General Milne must of necessity remain in Constantinople and not in Batoum, with which communication is precarious owing to the fact of the wireless being unreliable.

In these circumstances I am to state that the Army Council cannot agree to be responsible any longer for the safety of the British troops in Batoum, and propose to send the attached telegram to General Milne ordering the necessary preparations for withdrawal to be made forthwith.

I am, &c.  
H. J. CREEDY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 257.

*General Milne to War Office.—(Received May 31.)*

(Secret.) P.

*Constantinople, May 30, 1920.*

YOUR telegram of 22nd May.  
Situation as follows:—

Soviet system has been adopted by Azerbaijan. Russian Red troops have arrived, and communication between Baku and Tiflis is cut. For the present Russian Reds appear content with practical control of Azerbaijan and prospective control of Georgia. Treaty between Russia and Georgia gave town and province of Batoum to Georgia, but any attempted occupation will be resisted by the Adjarian inhabitants, who may invoke the intervention of Turkey. Indecisive fighting between Georgians and Azerbaijan now stopped by armistice. Although it may be desire of Georgian Government to resist Bolsheviks, I do not consider Georgian army capable of resisting any Bolshevik invasion, even if anxious to do so. Armenia states she will resist Bolsheviks, but has apparently sent her delegates to discuss future. Probably unable to resist, even if supplied with arms, and may join Bolsheviks as safety against the Turks. Thoroughly efficient military and pecuniary support is essential before she can be regarded as appreciable military factor. Turkey steadily watching events. Turkey and Russia recollect mutual antagonism, but at present are ready to use each other against common enemy. A bad impression against us is being caused by Bolshevik action in Northern Persia.

Situation Batoum:—

Garrison merely police, and against any attack would be totally insufficient. Trade at a standstill, and labour troubles will shortly arise owing to lack of work. Oil pumping ceased, and twice lately attempts made to fire the tanks, which, if successful,

would have destroyed the docks. No food for inhabitants except such as is brought by British. Owing to Baku occupation currency has now become valueless, hence administration is now being run at a considerable loss. Communication by wireless only, and liable to be impossible for several days at a time in summer owing to atmospheric. Owing to shipping question reinforcement or evacuation of garrison impossible without minimum warning of ten days. No useful military purpose being served by retention of Batoum, and military situation of three battalions occupying indefensible town is unsound, especially as neither town population nor Georgians seem to want us to remain. As events in the Caucasus move rapidly, and should situation become suddenly dangerous, it must be remembered that I am not in a position to intervene for nearly a fortnight, allowing for delays in communication and for collecting shipping. Any evacuation must be carried out *en bloc*, and fair warning to the commercial classes should be given.

Enclosure 2 in No. 257.

*War Office to General Milne (Constantinople).*

(Telegraphic.)

*War Office, June 1920.*

YOUR telegram of 30th May.

In view of the situation described in your telegram, the necessary arrangements should be made to collect shipping, issue warnings, &c., for the withdrawal of the Allied garrison from Batoum forthwith.

[E 5506/3/44]

No. 258.

*Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).*

(No. 236.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, June 2, 1920.*

HIGH Commissioner, Constantinople, telegraphs a request by the Sublime Porte for extension to 11th July of time for reply to the peace terms.

Please suggest to Italian Government that this request should be concurred in.

[E 5700/1/58]

No. 259.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 2, 1920.*

IN reply to your letter of the 1st June, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to draw the attention of the Army Council to the following points:—

1. The Cabinet has three times during the past three weeks reaffirmed the desirability on political grounds of postponing for a short time longer the ultimate evacuation of Batoum, while endorsing the authority given to General Milne to withdraw the British forces in the event of serious disaster impending.

2. The grounds upon which the War Office and the General Officer Commanding have hitherto opposed this decision have been that the Soviet forces were about to attack, that the Georgian forces had made common cause with the enemy, and there was serious danger of the small military garrison at Batoum being either overwhelmed or compelled to withdraw in circumstances of ignominy if not of disaster.

3. None of these contingencies have so far arisen, and indeed for days in succession the War Office telegrams from Batoum have reported the situation as "quiet."

4. The Soviet forces show no signs of advancing, and the Georgians appear to be resisting the enemy. There seems to be no likelihood of anything approaching a disaster, and if Batoum is evacuated before any local settlement is arrived at, the fate of Armenia is sealed.

5. General Milne, who appears to be bent on evacuation in all circumstances, now relies on the instability of the internal and economic situation in Batoum, and for the first time informs us that a minimum period of ten days is required in order to procure the necessary shipping; while the Army Council propose in addition to issue telegraphic instructions for the withdrawal of the Allied garrison from Batoum forthwith.



With reference to this, Lord Curzon wishes to observe, firstly, that the immediate withdrawal of the garrison would be a reversal of the existing Cabinet decision; secondly, that it is not for His Majesty's Government to make arrangements for the withdrawal of the Allied garrison, since a portion of this garrison is provided by the French Government, whose opinion must be sought before a decision is taken which gravely affects themselves; thirdly, that it is not understood why it is now stated for the first time that so long a notice is needed to procure the necessary shipping, a point on which his Lordship would be glad to receive further explanation; fourthly, that his Lordship would be glad to be informed what is the nature of the warning that it is proposed to issue, under what terms and to whom; finally, that if it be a warning that evacuation is to take place forthwith, this would appear to anticipate a decision which, whatever its merits, has not so far been taken by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 5714/289/44]

No. 260.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 3.)*

(No. 649.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, June 2, 1920.*

FOLLOWING received from my representative at Smyrna:—

"My French colleague informs me Greek High Commissioner told him when Greece takes over Smyrna Capitulations and consular courts will be abolished. May I be instructed whether such is provision of treaty? What reply should I send him?"

[E 5858/3/44]

No. 261.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 4.)*

(No. 733. Secret.)

My Lord.

*Constantinople, May 22, 1920.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 596 of the 17th May, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the following papers, which throw considerable light on the activities and policy of the Nationalist leaders at Angora:—

- (a.) A report from a very secret source on the general situation at Angora.
- (b.) A translation of a proclamation said to have been issued by the National Assembly now sitting at Angora. This has also reached me from a secret source. I cannot vouch for its authenticity, though I see no reason to doubt it.
- (c.) A translation of a report issued by the Nationalists themselves of the proceedings at the first sittings of the National Assembly.
- (d.) A translation of a telegram addressed by Fevzi Pasha at Angora to "an important personage" in Constantinople.

2. The last two documents are of particular interest as being official pronouncements by Nationalist leaders of undoubted authenticity. I would draw your Lordship's attention to the following points of interest:—

3. The Nationalist leaders evidently considered the question of setting up a deputy Sultan in Anatolia, and abandoned the idea. It is possible that this decision may have been due to difficulty in getting any Imperial Prince to risk the adventure. However that may be, the theory invented to explain the course actually adopted is interesting. The leaders of the movement profess loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph, but declare him to be in duress, and state that to appoint a deputy Sultan would be to play into the hands of the enemy, whose aim it is, according to them, to separate the functions of Sultan and Caliph. They therefore meet the situation by maintaining that in the abnormal circumstances there is nothing for it but for the National

Assembly to unite in itself all powers, executive and legislative, which are normally exercised by different organs in the State and have their point of contact in the person of the sovereign. The Provisional Government set up at Angora is expressly stated to be merely a delegation of the Assembly, and the Ministers are for that reason called "Vekil," i.e., an attorney or person acting under powers conferred by another.

4. It is characteristic of Turkish methods to seek to invest with a form of legality the most lawless transactions. The National Assembly is being used to enact so-called laws intended to cover the responsibility of the National leaders. Among these is a law making it punishable with death to oppose the will of the National Assembly. This law is already invoked to justify certain "executions" in areas where the Nationalists are at grips with the supporters of the Central Government.

5. The resolution of the Assembly declaring its non-recognition of any agreement entered into since the armistice is probably aimed particularly at the alleged agreement between Damad Ferid Pasha and His Majesty's Government, which has recently been resuscitated for propaganda purposes both in Asia Minor and in Paris. It is interesting to note that this preposterous document has found its way even to South America.

6. I am still without definite information regarding the personnel of the Nationalist "Peace Delegation." It is said to consist of Ahmed Riza Bey and Ghalib Kemaly Bey, who are certainly in Europe, and Ahmed Rustem Bilinsky and Mouhtar Bey. Bilinsky was supposed to have returned to Angora after the occupation of Constantinople, but it is noticeable that his name does not appear in the list of the Provisional Government. From this and certain more positive indications from various sources, I conclude that he has almost certainly made his way to Europe. Mouhtar Bey, sometime Turkish Minister at Kief and a well-known adherent of the Committee of Union and Progress, is also believed to have recently gone to Europe.

7. The Nationalists started some time ago a news agency, which publishes in the interior daily news bulletins. These reach Constantinople after a certain delay. They contain a certain amount of information regarding what passes at Angora. Their most striking feature, however, is violent anti-Entente propaganda, directed to some extent against the French in Cilicia and Syria, but mainly against the British. The British get the whole credit of the occupation of Constantinople and of the harshness of the attitude of the Allies towards the Turk. The British Government's difficulties in all parts of the world, from Ireland to India, are exploited, and they are the object of constant attack, including accusations of the most scurrilous description. Supposed American sympathy with Turks is a good deal advertised in these bulletins. A noticeable feature of recent issues has been the almost complete omission of any mention of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus generally, an omission probably due to a desire to cloak Turkish activities in those regions.

8. The "important personage," to whom the telegram mentioned above under (d) is addressed, is Nouredin Pasha, who was Vali of Smyrna soon after the armistice and who subsequently played a considerable rôle in the organisation of the Nationalist movement in the Balikesser area. The position of Nouredin Pasha vis-à-vis of the Central Government is obscure. His activities are at least tolerated by the Government, and it is conceivable that he may have backing from the Sultan and some elements in the "Entente libérale" Party. It is, moreover, probable that Damad Ferid himself is not unwilling to keep a door open for an understanding with the Nationalists. Damad Ferid is sincerely anxious to re-establish the authority of the Central Government, but there is a growing feeling that he does not wish to push the policy of repression by force beyond a certain point.

9. The Grand Vizier's position is in fact one of increasing difficulty. He is criticised on all hands, and his attempts to bolster up his position are hampered at every turn by the fundamental illogicality of his position. He held a meeting on the 10th May with a number of ex-deputies still in Constantinople. He is reported to have said at this meeting that the Government would never consent to the loss of Thrace and Smyrna, and to have been met with the not unnatural rejoinder that in that case it was difficult to understand why he was fighting the Nationalists. This puts the matter in a nutshell. Should Damad Ferid Pasha sign the Peace Treaty as it stands at present, he cannot hope to carry with him more than a few even of those who at present support him. If, notwithstanding this, he should attempt to remain in power and to continue the struggle against the Nationalists, he will, in effect, be using Moslems to fight the battle of the Greeks.

10. It is quite possible that, notwithstanding all his desire to serve the Sultan and keep things together, Damad Ferid Pasha will find this prospect so intolerable that he



will resign rather than sign the treaty. Whether he signs it or not is, however, merely a detail in a complex situation, for it remains true that the treaty, even if signed, can only be imposed on Turkey, as a whole, by the use of force.

I have, &c.

J. DE ROBECK,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 261.

*Report from Angora.*

THE Nationalist Assembly held at Angora under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal on the 23rd April consisted of 174 members, and included twenty-four deputies who had arrived from Constantinople, among whom were Jelaleddin Arif, Riza Nur, Yonus Nadi and Jani Beys. The meeting, at which I was present, concerned itself with the election of presidents, and Mustafa Kemal made a long speech in which he gave an account of the activities of the Nationalist organisation during the past twelve months. The Assembly then elected Mustafa Kemal, first president; Jelaleddin Arif, second president; Bektashi Abdul Mejid, of Kirshehir, first vice-president;\* Abdul Halim Chelebi, first [sic] vice-president. An executive council was then selected from among the members of the Assembly and included Mustafa Kemal, Jelaleddin Arif, Dr. Adnan, Hakki Behij, Bekir Sami, Hamdullah Subhi, Jami, Fevzi Pasha, and Colonel Ismet Bey as Chief of the General Staff. The Provisional Government thus established is actually republican in form, but in view of the sentiments of the people towards the Sultan this is not openly avowed.

The Government fetwas have made a deep impression upon the population and the prevailing opinion is that if a really efficient force were to be sent to Anatolia from Constantinople the Nationalists would be easily defeated.

The fetwas that have been issued bore no signature, but other Nationalist announcements usually bear the signature of Mustafa Kemal, just as official documents of the Central Government bear the signature of the Sultan. The decision to form a National Assembly at Angora was taken at a meeting of the Nationalist Representative Council held at Karasu on the 28th March.

Mustafa Kemal has been collecting troops and sending them to Geive, but they are not very numerous, as the Nationalists are short of certain supplies. In general the non-Moslem population is at present well treated, but in Gieve and at Ortakuei 1,100 Greek houses have been burnt. In that district many people were killed, including a Greek officer.

Mustafa Kemal's relations with the Italians are excellent. At the Assembly speeches in favour of the Italians were made, and it was stated that the territory occupied by Italian troops had been completely evacuated. Mustafa Kemal himself informed the Assembly that the Italians had now only a few troops at Kush Ada and Adalia. Major Fuad Bey told me that the Nationalists had obtained large quantities of arms and munitions from the above-mentioned places.

Mazhar Bey, formerly Governor of Uskub, Reshad Bey, formerly Commander of the Parliament Guard, and the son of Bekir Sami Bey have arrived here. They escaped from Constantinople with the help of a French officer and went to Mersine, whence they travelled via Eski Shehir and Konia.

The French officer and ten French soldiers who were arrested in Eski Shehir were released on the 23rd April, and were allowed to return to Constantinople via Bilejik and Brusa.

When I was in Konia I saw three British officers and four soldiers who had escaped with the help of a Turk and were caught in Akabad. They were brought to Eski Shehir, and I have seen one of them taking a walk under escort. He was wearing a Scottish cap.

The correspondent of the "Chicago Tribune," Mr. Williams, was in Angora for five or six days, and had a few interviews with Mustafa Kemal, but, as he speaks very little French and no Turkish, he had some difficulty in making himself understood, although an officer acted as his interpreter. On the 27th April Mr. Williams left Angora for the Smyrna front, and I travelled in the same train as far as Eski Shehir.

\* See Report HA/922. Agent may either have given a wrong name, or the full name of this man may be Abdul Mejid Jelaleddin.

He made certain statements about the Turkish peace terms to some journalists, but what he said was mostly nonsense. But he also stated openly that the British had tried to prevent him from going to Angora, and the Anatolian press repeated the statement.

*Eski Shehir, May 6, 1920.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 261.

*Proclamation by the Great National Assembly.*

(Secret.)

THE following is a translation of the text of a proclamation to the nation by the Great National Assembly, taken from a copy which is in the possession of the Sublime Porte:—

"The Great National Assembly, consisting of representatives of the whole nation, taking into consideration all that has been said and all that has occurred, has decided to appeal to the country as follows:—

"Certain enemies and traitors against their religion and their country, bought by the English, have circulated among you stories of revolution against the Sultan and the Caliphate. This is being done for the purpose of fomenting internecine strife amongst the nation which has taken up arms and is sacrificing its blood for the purpose of restoring the power and prestige of the Caliphate and the Sultanate, by driving from the country the enemies of religion, who have occupied with their troops Smyrna, Adana, Marash, Urfa and Aintab, all of which are parts of the Ottoman Empire. We, representatives of the nation, swear by God and His Prophet that there is no revolution against the Sultan and Caliph. What the enemy heartily desires is that there may be discord, in order that our country may suffer the same fate as India and Egypt. Believe not the words of the English spies; refuse absolutely to hear them; for by sowing discord amongst us they desire to enfeeble us, for the sole purpose of enslaving our nation. The dominion of the Turkish Sultanate and Caliphate could no longer exist after the loss of its Stamboul, its Smyrna, its Adana and its Marash. Help those who are striving to save the Empire and our religion from the enemy which is seeking to destroy the country, and assist those who are striving to retake these beloved portions of our country. Continue the holy war for the re-establishment of the power and the prestige of the seat of the Caliphate and of the Sultanate. Trust not the words of traitors and cowards, but assist those who are desirous of punishing them in conformity with the decisions of the National Assembly. May the Grace of God and the divine help of our Holy Prophet be the guide and support of those who devote their lives and their souls to the union of the nation and of the Fatherland! Amin.

"By order of the Great National Assembly.

"MUSTAFA KEMAL, President.

"May 1, 1336."

Enclosure 3 in No. 261.

*National Assembly at Angora.*

(Secret.)

THE following is a translation of an account of the first meeting of the National Assembly at Angora, issued by the Anatolian Press Agency:—

*April 24, 1920. Saturday evening.*

The great National Assembly met at ten o'clock this morning under the presidency of Sherif Bey, deputy for Sinope and doyen of its members.

The Assembly first examined and approved the reports dealing with the election of the deputies.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha then gave an account of important events which had occurred since the Armistice. The speech of Mustafa Kemal lasted two and a-half hours, with an interval of five minutes, and had not ended when the sitting was suspended for the luncheon hour. Mustafa Kemal Pasha continued his speech at three o'clock and explained in full detail all the secret history of events which had



occurred from the days preceding the last fall of Ferid Pasha up to the present time. At the close of this great and historic speech, which was loudly applauded, Mustafa Kemal Pasha declared that the time had arrived to save the destinies of the Caliphate and of the Sultanate, which were enslaved and menaced. He added that the nation itself must take matters in hand. He then read a resolution embodying these principles, the text of which is given below. After a short discussion this resolution was passed, and the National Assembly from this moment has taken charge of national, legislative and executive affairs.

#### *Text of the Resolution.*

"This honourable body must take the necessary steps to save the country from the dangers of destruction and dissolution to which it is to-day exposed. It has, however, been considered advisable to present to this distinguished Assembly our convictions based on our information and on our examination of the matter. To save the country from the risks of division and dissolution, there is no way but that of uniting the general forces of the nation into one fundamental organisation in accordance with the laws of constitutional right. We shall thus follow the courageous course adopted by other nations exposed to the same danger of losing their national existence. The manner in which this should be carried out has now to be decided.

"It is clear that, even if it were possible to unite the strength of the nation and of the Empire under the domination of illegal and irresponsible forces, such a situation could not last. The existence of our honourable Assembly is a proof that the nation has appreciated the necessity for legality and responsibility.

"It is, therefore, necessary that the management of State business should be in the hands of 'forces' supported by your honourable Assembly, which represents the will and conscience of the nation, and which will legalise and define the responsibilities of such 'forces.' The natural form that such 'forces' would take is the creation of a Government. According to the principles of organisation, a Government consists of a responsible head, of a legislative body whose duty it is to control him, and of an executive body which remains in power as long as it enjoys the confidence of the legislative body. The executive body includes the different Ministries, and is nominated by the head of the Government; it must enjoy the confidence of the legislative body.

"The organism of government being based on these principles, it is your duty to reflect whether, in the exceptionally critical situation of our country, these principles recommend themselves to you or not. After a careful study of the situation we have formed the opinion that this form of administration is not exempt from inconvenience, for the Ottoman Empire is not formed on the temporal power of its Sovereign as is every other State. The seat of the Sultanate being also the seat of the Caliphate, our Sultan is at the same time the supreme head of the Islamic world. The first aim of our struggle is to show our enemies, who desire to separate the seat of the Sultanate from that of the Caliphate, that the national will cannot permit this, and that we intend to save from the slavery of strangers these sacred seats and to liberate the authority of the supreme head from the menace of the enemy.

"Following this principle it would not be legal to acknowledge the head of a Government in Anatolia, even though he be a provisional one, or to create a Viceroy. We are therefore obliged to create a Government without a chief; but it is not possible to preserve the harmony of working in a Government without a chief, whose duty it is to maintain the balance. On the other hand, it would be very dangerous to give to anybody the right of meeting and of balancing the forces of the Empire and of the nation, whilst declaring such a body irresponsible. Certainly the Islamic religion does not permit such a solution of the question, seeing that Islamism recognises the principle of responsibility, even in the Caliph.

"After a lengthy study of these difficult and contradictory principles we have finally decided that the national will must take charge of the destinies of this country. This decision is in conformity with the fundamental principles of Islamism. The national will is represented by your honourable Assembly, and enjoys the assistance and confidence of the entire Moslem world. These principles having been widely disseminated during the elections, and the deputies elected having been vested with full powers, it is clear that the nation fully approves of this decision.

"The functions of your honourable Assembly, armed with this exceptional authority, are not therefore limited to those of a legislative Assembly established to control the executive body and to discuss with it questions vital to the nation, but it

has been created to take charge of the general national administration and to assume the defence of the safety and [sic] of the Caliphate. No other force superior to your honourable Assembly exists. When the seats of the Caliphate and of the Sultan will be free, and our Sovereign, the Caliph of all the Moslems, released from menace and oppression of every kind, finds himself free and independent in the bosom of the nation, he will have his high and venerable place within the limits of the law drawn up by your honourable Assembly.

"Your honourable Assembly is not merely a controlling body such as a Chamber of Deputies would be. It is not entrusted with legislation and control alone, but it is responsible for the destiny of the nation.

"We have already seen how, under exceptional circumstances, every nation neglects these principles and gives to its executive bodies extraordinary powers by dissolving the National Assembly, or arrives at decisions by taking the vote of the whole nation. Considering that Islamism recognises the exceptional authority of an assembly of the faithful, we are in favour of placing directly in the hands of this honourable Assembly the management of all the business of the nation. When this has been accepted in principle, in as much as your honourable Assembly cannot satisfactorily deal with minor questions, it will be advisable to arrange for a distribution of work by choosing from among yourselves members who will form the modern organism of government, and by accepting the principle that these persons will be responsible to the Assembly individually and as a body.

"As, therefore, your president necessarily represents your honourable Assembly, it has been decided that he shall be the head of the executive body to be chosen by you. This head will have the right to sign in the name of your honourable Assembly, and to legalise its decisions. He will at the same time be responsible to the Assembly, like all other honourable members, for the administrative affairs. Thus the executive corps will consist of members of the Assembly chosen by the latter and responsible to it. These members will be named 'Vekil.' The responsibility of the head, alike to the executive body and to your honourable Assembly, will be a grave one.

"We believe ourselves to interpret rightly the general awakening by arranging in this manner the work to be performed during the difficult and critical period of our history. This general awakening is due to the lack of foresight in consequence of which our country has passed through grave and disastrous crises. At times attempts have been made to copy European methods, at others the affairs of the State have been conducted from a standpoint of personal interests, whilst at others again the constitutional charter itself has been made the means of gratifying personal ambitions.

"The decision must necessarily depend on your honourable Assembly. I desire, however, to draw your attention once again to the fact that we are in danger of being destroyed, and that the affairs of the Empire and of the nation have for long lacked competent directing authority. I consider it my patriotic duty to declare to you that empty discussion of theories will be worse than bad administration.

"May God grant you success!"

Enclosure 4 in No. 261.

*Translation of Telegram sent by the Representative Committee.*

*From Fevzi Pasha to Nouredin Pasha.*

IN reply:—

I have seen the telegram dated the 2nd May, 1920, received by the Representative Committee.

From the manner in which you addressed it, it is clear that you have not yet been made acquainted with the true situation in Anatolia. In the first instance, therefore, I beg to give you some information for your guidance in order to be able to discuss the important matters which you will have to communicate to us:—

1. A High National Council of 300 members has been formed, composed of ten deputies with extraordinary powers, elected by committees of second degree, electors and members of the administrative and municipal councils of all the sanjaks of the Empire without exception, the representation being five deputies per sanjak, and those deputies who have succeeded in escaping from Constantinople in order to come here. This High National Council has assumed both the legislative and executive powers and undertaken to deal with the destinies of the nation and country.



The High National Council has proclaimed its attachment to the Caliph and Sultan.

The following members have been elected :—

Mustafa Kemal Pasha : President of the High National Committee.  
Jelaleddin Arif Bey (formerly President of the Chamber) : Second President.  
His Excellency Chelebi Abdul Halim Effendi : First Vice-President.  
Haji Bektashi Veli Ghelebi Jemaleddin Effendi : Second Vice-President.

The executive duties of the High National Council have been entrusted to the Cabinet under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

The Ministers forming the Cabinet have one by one been elected and appointed by the High National Council. The following are the Ministers thus elected :—

Religious Affairs : Mufti Fehmi Effendi.  
National Defence (i.e., War Office and Marine) : General Fevzi Pasha, ex-Minister of War.  
Interior : Jami Bey.  
Foreign Affairs : Bekir Sami Bey.  
Justice : Jelaleddine Arif Bey, Second President of the High National Council.  
Finance : Hakki Behij Bey.  
Instruction : Dr. Riza Nur Bey.  
Social Economy : Yussuf Kemal Bey.  
Public Health and Assistance : Dr. Ednan Bey.  
C.G.S. : Colonel Ismet Bey.

2. The council first made a law determining the special method of election of the Ministers and defining their powers.

Then, by the Law for the Protection of the Country, accepted unanimously and published in all parts of the Empire, it decided that any person suspected of participating in disorders or controversy, or anyone showing disaffection, either in speech or act or writing, towards the High National Council, whose object is to rescue the Caliph and Sultan and the Turkish Empire from the hands of strangers and to repel their attacks, will be regarded as a traitor to his country, and, if found guilty, will be hanged accordingly. The council further decided that indirect participants should be tried under paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Penal Code.

Finally, the High National Council passed the necessary resolution with reference to the non-recognition of any agreement entered into, or any concession granted, since the armistice, or to be granted in the future.

The High National Council has further declared that it will refuse to recognise the authority of anyone to make a decision respecting the destinies of the nation except the delegates to the Peace Conference appointed by the High National Council.

The position and the decisions of the High National Council have been communicated to the European and American Governments and to the Soviet Republic of Russia.

3. The source and object of all disorderly movements intended to break up the national unity have been realised and these movements have been repressed by the nation. The responsibility in this world and the next for the blood of brothers shed on this occasion rests with those who provoked it.

4. The nation is convinced that the fetvas issued in Constantinople under enemy pressure are not in conformity with the Moslem law. Fetvas in accordance with the law, signed by all the muftis in Anatolia, have been published and notified to the whole Moslem world.

5. Will you, therefore, kindly state clearly who wishes to negotiate, with whom, and on what subject?

FEVZI, General,  
Minister of National Defence,  
High National Council.

[E 5872/1729/44]

No. 262.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 651.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, June 3, 1920.

GENERAL MILNE informs me that Military Attaché, Rome, telegraphs of the advent of Italian division in Constantinople area. Further, Italians are anxious to acquire zone on Asiatic side of Bosphorus. This presents serious problem to us politically, in view of present Italian activities and methods. After consultation with Milne, I consider efforts should be made to get Italians to take over Asiatic side of Dardanelles and southern shore of Sea of Marmora as far as Panderma, with headquarters at Chanak until such time as peace is signed. Though open to objections, it is least dangerous. This would leave French in Gallipoli, Italians retaining two battalions in Constantinople as they do at present. His Majesty's ships would give necessary support in Straits. Reasons against Italians taking over section on Asiatic side of Bosphorus are obvious. It would at once weaken our position both politically and militarily, excepting Constantinople. British troops hold Ismid peninsula and bar Nationalist advance to Haidar Pasha. Should this occupation pass to Italians that security vanishes. There are many other military objections, of which doubtless Milne will inform War Office.

[E 5874/3/44]

No. 263.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 654.)  
(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, June 4, 1920.

MY despatch No. 732 of 22nd May.  
Admiral Le Bon informs me, and French High Commissioner confirms, that General Gouraud has arranged for armistice with forces of Mustapha Kemal, lasting twenty days and beginning midnight 31st May to 1st June.

Further, it appears that General Gouraud sent envoy to Mustapha Kemal, pointing out that, as French did not intend to retain Cilicia, he did not wish for further bloody fighting for a country in which French interested themselves.

[E 5870/3/44]

No. 264.

Sir G. Grahame to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 663. Very Secret.)  
(Telegraphic.)

Paris, June 4, 1920.

REFERENCE my telegram No. 661 of 4th June.  
I have seen President of the Council.

Following is true statement of case, but please treat it as very confidential.  
French troops were in very precarious situation and one battalion at Birdjik [?] was completely surrounded, and Gouraud said he could not assist them, Feisal having refused him any facilities for military purposes over railways, and there was every fear that they would be massacred.

M. de Caix, passing through Angora on his way home, saw Mustapha Kemal, and agreed with him for a suspension of hostilities for twenty days, during which it is hoped French battalion will be able to make a safe retirement.

President of the Council said there was no other alternative to course now pursued.

[E 5900/1729/44]

No. 265.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 5.)

Sir,

War Office, June 4, 1920.

IN continuation of War Office letter dated the 28th May, relative to the future military command and organisation in the demilitarised zone at Constantinople, I am commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of Earl Curzon of



Kedleston, copies of correspondence from the military attaché, Rome, relative to the despatch of an Italian division to the Constantinople area.

It will be observed from this correspondence that the Italian War Office agree to the Italian troops being under the general command of General Milne "until peace with Turkey is signed, i.e., as long as the present state of armistice lasts," but that they assume that the moment peace is signed with Turkey, by which they presumably imply the moment when the after-war organisation definitely comes into effect, General Milne will cease to act as Inter-Allied Commander-in-chief.

I am to point out that the Italian Government now propose to appoint a high Italian commander in the Middle East, through whom General Milne must issue his orders in so far as Italian troops are affected, so long as he retains the supreme command.

I am to say that the Army Council have no objection to make to the proposal of the Italian War Office, provided that—

- (a.) Covering approval is obtained from the Italian Government for Italian troops to be under the supreme command of General Milne until the after-war organisation comes into force.
- (b.) It is made quite clear that General Milne shall retain supreme command until this moment.
- (c.) The proviso suggested by the Italian War Office that the Italian Government shall be able to give orders direct to the Italian commander for measures of a political character shall in no way interfere with General Milne's freedom to dispose the Italian troops in such a manner as he may consider necessary in his capacity of Inter-Allied Commander-in-chief, and that no operations shall be initiated by the Italian commander without the full concurrence and executive orders of General Milne.

I am to say that this last proviso appears to the Army Council to be one in which the Foreign Office will be deeply interested, and I am to ask that Lord Curzon will obtain from the Italian Government a definite announcement of the dates by which they expect the arrival of the last Italian unit to be completed and upon which they propose that the high Italian commander shall enter upon his duties.

In conclusion, and with reference to my letter dated the 21st May, 1920, I am to point out that the Italian War Office have apparently no intention of sending an Italian battalion to Batoum.

I am, &c.  
B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 265.

*Military Attaché, Rome, to War Office.*

*Rome, May 15, 1920.*

I RECEIVED your telegram on the 12th instant, and asked his Excellency the Ambassador if he had yet received a reply to his *note verbale* to the Minister of Foreign Affairs asking whether the Italian Government would carry out at once the undertaking, given by Hon. Nitti at San Remo, to send a white Italian battalion to Batoum. His Excellency the Ambassador informed me that he had not yet received any reply, and that it would be better to await the result of an interview he was going to have with the Foreign Minister before approaching the Minister of War on the subject.

On the 13th May I received your telegram of the 11th May and at once had an interview with the Chief of the Staff to the Minister of War. I explained to him that it was presumed that the Minister of War understood that the Italian troops proceeding to Constantinople would be under the orders of General Milne. He replied that he understood this, but on my saying that I would wire to you to this effect he said that I had better await his written reply to the message, and promised that he would let me have this by the 14th May. I have not yet received it, and have sent him a reminder.

On my asking the Chief of the Staff to the Minister of War whether the Italian troops moving to Constantinople would furnish a battalion for Batoum he informed me that he had received no information on the subject; on my pressing him he informed me that he knew we had made a demand to the Foreign Minister for a battalion to be

sent to Batoum, but that when the Chief of the General Staff to the army had heard of the request he had formed the opinion that to hold Batoum in case of attack two divisions would be required, and that as they could not send such a large force they would send nothing at all. I at once reported the result of my interview to his Excellency the Ambassador, who is taking the matter up with the Foreign Minister.

During the course of the interview the Chief of Staff to the Minister of War informed me that they were sending sufficient troops to make up an Italian division at Constantinople, and that this meant sending two complete regiments and one, or perhaps two, battalions to make up the 62nd Italian regiment, at present in Constantinople, which consists of only one battalion; he hoped that the Italians would be given a complete zone in Constantinople under their own general, and would prefer to be quartered in Scutari. I have communicated this privately to General Milne.

A few days ago General Albricci, who is going to Constantinople to command all the Italian troops in Turkey, asked me to go to see him. He asked me various questions regarding the situation in Turkey, and appeared to be most anxious to establish friendly relations with the British. He has the reputation of being decidedly Anglophile. He is dining with me on Monday to meet Admiral Calthorpe, our late High Commissioner in Constantinople.

With regard to the question of the despatch of Italian troops to Batoum, it is unlikely that the question can be dealt with until the formation of a new Italian Cabinet, as the Italian custom is that during the interval between the fall of a Cabinet and the formation of a new one only questions of routine can be dealt with, any questions involving a new policy standing over until the formation of the new Cabinet.

J. DUNCAN, Major-General.

Enclosure 2 in No. 265.

*Military Attaché, Rome, to War Office.*

*Rome, May 17, 1920.*

I ENCLOSE herewith for your information copy of my despatch addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador.

J. DUNCAN, Major-General.

Enclosure 3 in No. 265.

*Major-General Duncan to Sir G. Buchanan.*

*Rome, May 17, 1920.*

Your Excellency,  
ON the 13th May I visited Colonel Carletti, the Chief of the Staff to the Minister of War, and informed him that I had received the following telegram from the War Office:—

*"London, May 11.*

"General Milne informs War Office that an Italian brigade is expected to arrive within a very few days, and that it will be quartered at Stamboul; it is presumed that the Ministry of War knows that this brigade will be under General Milne's orders, but it is wished that this point should be made clear."

Colonel Carletti informed me that he quite understood that the Italian troops could be under the command of General Milne, but he asked me to delay sending an answer to the War Office until he had sent a written reply. This reply was received by me yesterday, and is as follows:—

*"Rome, May 14, 1920.*

"With reference to your *note verbale* of the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you as follows:—

"1. Simultaneously with the despatch of an infantry division a general command of the Italian troops in the East will be established in Constantinople. For administration and discipline, besides the above-mentioned division, also the Italian troops detached in Asia Minor and in Thrace will, from all points of view, depend from that command."



"Until peace with Turkey is signed, that is to say, as long as the present state of armistice lasts, the command of the inter-Allied troops in Constantinople (General Milne) will have the high jurisdiction over the Italian command, which, however, must always take its orders from the King's Government for measures of a political character. With the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey General Milne's military jurisdiction over the Italian troops will naturally cease.

"I take this opportunity of informing you that the Italian High Commissioner at Constantinople has received orders from this Royal Government to come to an agreement with the inter-Allied authorities of Constantinople with the object of assigning a sector of their own on the Asiatic coast of the Bosphorus to the Italian troops that are to be despatched to that place.

"2. With reference to the Batoum battalion, I have the honour to inform you that the Royal Italian Government has come to the decision to suspend the despatch of that body, and therefore it will not be furnished by the division appointed for Constantinople.

"CARLETTI, Colonel, G.S."

I have, &c.

J. DUNCAN, Major-General.

[E 5441/3/44]

No. 266.

Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).

(No. 506.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 628 of 27th May.

Foreign Office, June 5, 1920.

Following is reply of His Majesty the King to the Sultan of Turkey:—

"I have received Your Majesty's appeal of 27th May. The future of Turkey is in the hands of the Allied Governments, who have devoted long and patient effort to the construction of an equitable Treaty of Peace, and who may be trusted to act with justice to all parties and interests concerned."

[E 5506/3/44]

No. 267.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).

[By Bag.]

(No. 632.)

(Telegraphic.) En clair.

Foreign Office, June 5, 1920.

HIGH COMMISSIONER, Constantinople, telegraphs a request by the Sublime Porte for extension to 11th July of time for reply to the peace terms.

Please suggest to French Government that this request should be concurred in.

You should also draw the attention of the French Government to delays in the train services between Paris and Constantinople, and request them to do anything possible to improve facilities for communication between Paris and Constantinople.

[E 5982/3/44]

No. 268.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 676.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR despatch No. 1895 of 5th June.

Paris, June 7, 1920.

I saw Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, and questioned him according to your instructions. The position is as follows:—

Troops are being drawn in from outlying posts such as Bozanti, Ourfa, Biridjik and Marash, as they were dangerously exposed. But French have no intention whatever of evacuating districts of Mersina, Tarsus, Adana, Osmanie and Aintab. Reinforcements are being sent there, mostly, I gather, colonial troops, and all should have arrived by beginning of July.

With reference to safety of Armenians in advanced posts now being evacuated, negotiations are proceeding between Gouraud and Mustafa Kemal, which French Government believe will ensure safety of Armenians.

French Government have now made satisfactory arrangements with Feisal for conveyance of troops by railway.

[E 5976/3/44]

No. 268\*.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 7.)

Sir,

War Office, June 7, 1920.

WITH reference to telegrams dated 25th May from the General Officer Commanding, Army of the Black Sea, and No. 627 R† dated 27th May from the High Commissioner, Constantinople, of which copies are attached, I am commanded by the Army Council to say that they adhere to the opinion expressed in their letter dated the 14th May regarding the employment of Turkish troops against Nationalists.

They consider that it would be undesirable to accede to the Turkish request for the equipment and utilisation of a regular force of 10,000 men until the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, provided for in the Treaty of Peace, have been set up if it be intended to persevere with the terms of this treaty.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure in No. 268\*.

General Milne to War Office.—(Received May 25.)

(P.)

Constantinople, May 25, 1920.

A REQUEST has been made by Damad Ferid as Turkish War Minister to be allowed to enrol and equip Turkish troops up to number authorised in the draft Peace Treaty, namely 15,000 regulars and 35,000 gendarmes, in order that the Sultan's authority over certain areas at present occupied by rebel forces may be re-established. I refer this matter to you for the consideration of Supreme Council as it is a matter of great importance.

[E 5872/1729/44]

No. 269.

Foreign Office to War Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 8, 1920.

WITH reference to the letter of the 28th ultimo from this Department, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you herewith, for the information of the Army Council, copy of a telegram, No. 651 of the 3rd June, from the High Commissioner at Constantinople, relative to the undesirability of the Italians occupying a section on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus in the event of their present intention of sending a division to Constantinople materialising, and I am to state that, while Lord Curzon agrees generally with the line of argument followed in Admiral de Robeck's telegram, he would be glad to receive the observations of the Army Council thereon.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 6094/3/44]

No. 270.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 672.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, June 8, 1920.

INFORMATION from same source as that mentioned in my telegram No. 671 of 8th June gives what purports to be verbal communication sent by Tewfik Pasha to

† See No. 243.

[4370]

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Grand Vizier by two delegates who brought text of treaty from Paris. It is briefly as follows:—

"Though Allies have agreed on text of our treaty, French and Italian representatives state that conditions are generally unacceptable and require modification. They believe in necessity for maintaining strong Turkish Government in agreement with them for maintenance of their political and economic interests. Allies have told Greeks that latter must act alone in occupying Thrace and Smyrna and can count upon no support. French Government is attempting to reconcile Turkey and Greece with object of preventing further disorders in Near East. It is hoped we shall be able to extend by one or two months period allowed for our reply."

[E 6161/3/44]

No. 271.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 10.)*

(No. 755.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 25, 1920.

IN the enclosures in my despatch of the 22nd May, 1920, mention is made of a communication alleged to have been addressed to the Allied and to certain other Governments by the Nationalist Congress. No copy of any such communication has reached me direct from Angora, but about a week ago my French colleague received a communication addressed to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, a copy of which I enclose.

2. A Turkish version of the same communication has been published in the interior in one of the news bulletins mentioned in the despatch referred to above.

3. It is a noticeable, though perhaps merely an accidental, detail that this Turkish version describes the document as having been addressed to the *Entente*, the neutral Powers in Europe and the American Government, without any mention of Soviet Russia, whereas in the telegram to Nouredin Pasha, enclosed in my despatch under reference, Soviet Russia was specifically mentioned.

4. I should be glad to be informed whether any copy of this communication has reached your Lordship direct, and, if so, by what channel.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 271.

*Note communicated by Turkish Nationalist Congress to French Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

M. le Ministre,

Angora, le 30 avril 1920.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la haute connaissance de votre Excellence, qu'à la suite de l'occupation injuste et injustifiée de la ville de Constantinople par les forces alliées, la nation ottomane, considérant son Kalif ainsi que son Gouvernement comme prisonniers, a eu recours à la réunion d'une Assemblée suprême nationale, et a fait des élections sur une large échelle. L'Assemblée suprême nationale, dans sa séance d'ouverture du 23 avril 1920, a déclaré par un vote solennel prendre en main les destinées présentes et futures de la patrie, tant que Son Kalif-Sultan et sa ville éternelle resteront sous la domination et l'occupation étrangères.

L'Assemblée suprême nationale m'a fait l'honneur de me charger de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence la protestation énergique de ses membres contre cet acte arbitraire et contraire aux stipulations de l'armistice qui a, une fois de plus, confirmé la nation ottomane dans son pessimisme sur le résultat de la Conférence de la Paix. Le Parlement, sanctuaire sacré, et reconnu comme tel par toutes les nations civilisées, a été violé en pleine séance; du sein de la Chambre, les Représentants de la nation ont été enlevés par la police anglaise comme des malfaiteurs, malgré les vives protestations de la Chambre; des sénateurs, des députés, des généraux, des hommes de lettres ont été arrêtés dans leurs domiciles avec des menottes aux mains et déportés; enfin, nos établissements officiels et privés furent occupés par la force des baïonnettes en se basant simplement sur le droit du plus fort.

Le peuple ottoman, vu la violation de tous ses droits et l'atteinte portée à sa souveraineté, a, par l'ordre de ses représentants réunis à Angora, élu un Comité

exécutif du sein même de l'Assemblée, qui a pris de suite en main le gouvernement du pays.

En soumettant à votre Excellence ce qui précède, j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer les desiderata de la nation exprimés et adoptés à la séance du 23 avril 1920:

1. Constantinople, siège du Kalifat-Sultanat, ainsi que le Gouvernement de Constantinople, est considérée par la nation ottomane comme prisonnière des Alliés, et, par conséquent, les ordres et les fetvas émanant de Constantinople occupée ne peuvent avoir aucune valeur légale et religieuse, et tous les engagements contractés par le soi-disant Gouvernement de Constantinople sont considérés par la nation comme nuls et non avenus.

2. La nation ottomane, tout en gardant son sang-froid et modération, est résolue à défendre ses droits sacrés et plusieurs fois séculaires comme État libre et indépendant, et déclare son désir pour la conclusion d'une paix équitable et honorable, tout en ne reconnaissant qu'à ses propres envoyés le droit de prendre des engagements en son nom et pour son compte.

3. L'élément chrétien ottoman, ainsi que les éléments étrangers établis dans le pays, restent sous la sauvegarde de la nation; cependant ils ne doivent rien entreprendre contre la sécurité générale de la patrie.

Dans l'espoir d'un accueil favorable aux justes réclamations de la nation ottomane, je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien agréer, &c.

Au nom de l'Assemblée suprême nationale ottomane et par ordre,

Le Président de l'Assemblée,

MOUSTAPHA KEMAL.

[E 6180/2854/44]

No. 272.

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 10.)*

(No. 559.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 28, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following remarks on the question of the grant of subsidies to Arab rulers, with reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 532 of the 4th May, transmitting the minutes of a meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 17th April, in which I observe that the Treasury are not yet convinced of the necessity for the continuance of the subsidies.

It appears to me that to arrive at a just decision on this subject it is necessary in the first place to compare the position of the different rulers now and before the war, to weigh the services of each during that period, to examine whether any responsibility rests on His Majesty's Government for the changes which have occurred, and, finally, to consider whether, on grounds of morality or expediency, it is justifiable to impose on the British taxpayer the burden of providing some or all of them with monetary assistance in the future.

The beginning of the war saw an effective, if not entirely efficient, Ottoman administration in the Hejaz and Yemen; Ibn Rashid a mediatised Turkish vassal; the Idrisi in revolt against the ruling power, but already discussing terms of peace; and Ibn Saud, who had not long before ejected the Turks from Hasa and Qatif, showing a disposition to resume his allegiance, provided that he was allowed a free hand as Vali of Nejd, and given an adequate stipend. It will be seen that the feeling of racial consciousness, which is now so marked, was already showing itself even in the more remote parts of the Peninsula, but a study of the records of the time will also show that the Ottoman Government, however unwillingly, was beginning to realise its incapacity to retain by force the Arab countries, and was preparing to grant a measure of self-government which might satisfy the aspirations of its inhabitants.

The consideration of the subject was, however, abruptly broken off by the commencement of the war, and after the Ottoman Government had declared against the Allied Powers, Great Britain, taking advantage of the discontent which already existed, made promise to the Sherreef of Mecca, Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, which induced them definitely to cast off their allegiance and throw in their lot with the Allies. I do not propose to examine and compare in detail the services performed by these three rulers, but I think it may fairly be said that each, according to his capacity, rendered

[4370]

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real and effective assistance at a time when the result of the war still hung in the balance and, by so doing, brought to nought the plans for a Jihad, diverted or rendered innocuous large Turkish forces, and greatly facilitated our task in keeping open to traffic the Red Sea.

It may be said with some show of justice that they have had their reward in gaining their independence and freeing themselves from the Turkish yoke, but the fact must not be lost sight of that, with the removal of the dominant influence, the Arabian Peninsula was left without administrative and financial means or experience for the preservation of order and for the substitution of effective local government in place of what had existed previously.

This applies in particular to the Hejaz, and I cannot refrain from thinking that the promises made by His Majesty's Government impose a certain moral obligation to ensure that the future of these countries is at least as prosperous as their past.

I do not, however, wish to press unduly this point, since sentimental considerations must give way to those of economy at the present time, and I will pass on to the more practical aspects of the case.

As your Lordship is aware, the Arab revolt was not regarded with sympathy either in India or in our other Mahomedan countries. This feeling still exists to-day. The revolt can only be justified by its success, and we shall undoubtedly lay ourselves open to severe criticism if the Peninsula passes into a state of anarchy.

Further than this, the Allied policy with regard to Syria and Palestine is not in accord with the wishes of the local populations, and has already exposed His Majesty's Government to a charge of breach of promise and opened the field to Turkish and Bolshevik propaganda from the north.

The situation in the Middle East to-day gives rise to grave misgivings, and seems unlikely to improve in the near future. On this account I consider it is of great importance that, if we gain a special position in the Arabian Peninsula, His Majesty's Government should so employ it as to earn the gratitude of the people and silence the criticism of those detractors, who accuse us of cynicism and self-interest in our treatment of the Arabs.

At the present moment we are in a favourable position to achieve this, since the factors which have rendered so restless the Arabs in Syria and Mesopotamia have not operated with any great force in the Peninsula itself, and its rulers, with the exception of the Imam Yahya and the new Emir of Hail, who has in point of fact come under the influence of Ibn Saud, have given satisfactory proofs that they are prepared to look to us for help and guidance and protection.

The questions then arise whether we can gain our object without payment, and, if not, whether the results achieved will justify the expenditure.

As regards the former point I consider that the experience of the last four years shows the answer to be emphatically in the negative. I do not advocate any undue interference in the internal and local affairs of the Peninsula, but I presume that we shall attempt to adjust the relations between the different rulers and claim to influence all foreign relations, and it is only reasonable to suppose that the rulers will require some *quid pro quo*. Furthermore, moral influence has its effect in the East, but it will not always prove such a strong deterrent as the threat to cut off supplies, more especially in countries which are far removed from civilisation and where it is impossible to achieve a purpose by armed force.

I do not think it is too much to say that if we attempt to gain a predominant influence in Arabia without being prepared to pay for it our efforts will result in failure.

As regards the advantages to be gained, I place, first and foremost, the chance of recovering and maintaining our prestige in the Middle East.

We have destroyed the Power which, however badly, ruled Arabia. We must put something in its place, and, in so doing, endeavour to re-establish our good name for disinterestedness and sympathy with Moslem races. We are, and shall continue to be, hampered in Syria and Palestine. It is, therefore, the more necessary to seize our opportunity in the Peninsula where the conditions are favourable and where we shall not be exposed to foreign rivalry once our special position is recognised.

Secondly, there is considerable evidence to show that a determined effort is being made to unite Islam against all European Powers. A friendly Arabia will be an important check to this.

Thirdly, it is necessary to have a friendly population in the countries bordering our vital sea routes.

Equal to these in importance is the necessity of keeping open the pilgrimage routes to the Holy Places and of ensuring that the pilgrimage itself is undertaken.

We are under judgment of the Moslems in all parts of the world in this matter, and failure will do us incalculable harm.

Fifthly, I would place the advantages to British trade which the opening up of the interior of the Peninsula will afford, and sixthly, the desirability of preventing other Powers from gaining a predominant position, more especially in South-west Arabia.

I trust that the above considerations will be sufficient to show that the advantages to be won are not small, and that, in the event of His Majesty's Government being granted a special position there, the necessity of affording monetary assistance, until such time as the different countries can make their own way, will be recognised.

I understand that it may be difficult for His Majesty's Government to provide all the money, and that joint subsidies or loans may be necessary. This would be unfortunate from a British point of view, but it would not alter the principle which I am endeavouring to lay down. It would merely mean that the responsibility, and therefore the credit, to be gained would be collective. I am unaware of the reasons which call for a joint loan, and should have thought that the subsidies granted to the rulers of Bahrein, Muscat, and Koweit by the Government of India before the war would have furnished a useful precedent in claiming the sole right to give monetary assistance now.

I do not advocate the permanent continuance of subsidies on the present scale, and I would gradually replace them with stipends and loans.

All the rulers, with perhaps the exception of Ibn Rashid, possess sea ports or tracts of land or other resources which are capable of development, and I consider that loans should be granted where there seems a good prospect of a productive return and where security can be offered.

Stipends should, I think, be granted to King Husein, Ibn Saud and the Idrisi. The case of Ibn Rashid is of relative unimportance, while that of the Imam Fuhya is still so obscure that it is idle to consider it now. Eventually we shall probably find it cheaper to pay than to fight.

I also consider that certain conditions should be attached, such as the maintenance of internal peace, acceptance of our control of foreign relations, and the keeping open of the trade and pilgrimage routes. These would doubtless be embodied in the form of a treaty with each ruler.

With regard to Mr. Phillip's suggestion that it might be more satisfactory to "back one ruler only," I would observe that it has already become evident that the ideal of subsidising the various chiefs through one overlord is an impossible one. There is no ruler who would be accepted by the remainder as paramount, and there is none who could be trusted to make the right distribution of the funds. King Husein, whom, no doubt, Mr. Phillips had in mind, has indeed proved the least likely to be accepted as suzerain and to endeavour to bolster him up as Grand King of Arabia, by paying other subsidies through him, would be a politically unsound, if not an actually dangerous, policy to adopt.

The question as to the amounts of the stipends and loans is one which requires further consideration, and in this despatch I have not attempted to do more than lay before your Lordship the broad considerations which, in my opinion, justify the adoption of the principle that their payment in the future is an investment which is necessary, and which will bring in its due return.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Resident, Aden, the Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, and to the Foreign Department, Delhi.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.

[E 6221/1729/44]

No. 273.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 677.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, June 9, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 446 of 17th May.

My telegram No. 621 of 21st May.

With reference to last paragraph of my telegram quoted above, I wrote asking French and Italian High Commissioners whether they supported claim put forward by French and Italian officers on War Office Control Commission that they were not under General Milne's orders.



Both have replied as well to the effect that they consider commission to be under supreme direction of General Officer Commanding Allied forces in Turkey in Europe (i.e. General Wilson) and that three Allied officers composing it should exercise control, on equal footing. They will not admit commission is under General Milne's orders.

I consider expression "supreme direction" which they employ is so indefinite as to mean nothing and that members of commission would in fact be virtually independent, and thus constitute a separate authority approved by General Milne and Turkish War Office.

I am therefore informing my French and Italian colleagues that as our opinions are not in accord regarding this question it must be referred for a solution to our respective Governments.

Copies of correspondence follow by bag.

[E 6226/289/44]

No. 274.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 10.)*

(No. 679.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, June 10, 1920.*

SMYRNA telegram No. 5 of 29th May.

I venture most strongly to support conclusions of Allied delegates. Consideration advanced in paragraph 4 appears to me conclusive, but in view of the far-reaching importance of matter from the point of view of the extensive material and economic interests involved, I consider it desirable that His Majesty's Government should lose no time in making its attitude in regard to it unmistakably clear, as Allied residents are already seriously perturbed by the declaration of Greek High Commissioner and the prospect of being subjected to Greek jurisdiction and Greek law.

[E 5279/1729/44]

No. 275.

*Foreign Office to Admiralty.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 10, 1920.*

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 28th April enclosing correspondence regarding the question of allied representation on the Commissions of Control established at the Ministries of War, Marine and Posts and Telegraphs at Constantinople, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit herewith, for submission to the Lords' Commissioners to the Admiralty, copies of further correspondence<sup>\*</sup> exchanged with the High Commissioner at Constantinople on the subject.

From Admiral de Robeck's telegram it will be seen that General Milne is now prepared to surrender the presidency of the Posts and Telegraphs Control Commission, provided Admiral de Robeck, in his capacity of Admiral Commander-in-chief, acts similarly in the case of the commission at the Ministry of Marine. Admiral de Robeck, however, is still strongly opposed to any change being made in the present constitution of the Commissions of Control, and is apprehensive of the possible results of the interference of the junior Allied officers on the commissions, and of a consequent weakening of the authority of the General Officer Commanding occupying forces.

Lord Curzon cannot but regard these fears as exaggerated. The overriding authority of General Milne as General Officer Commanding has been admitted by the French and Italian High Commissioners, and it appears to his Lordship that the demand of our Allies for equal representation on the Commissions of Control could in the interests of harmony safely be conceded without in any way undermining the authority of General Milne or Admiral de Robeck. The fact that a French or Italian officer may sit as president of a commission should not, in Lord Curzon's opinion, prevent the British representatives from exercising their proper influence, especially when backed by the overriding authority of the Allied Commander-in-chief.

In spite, therefore, of the arguments employed by Admiral de Robeck against any modification of the present system, Lord Curzon holds that there is no justification for going back on the promises made at San Remo, and that, on the contrary, it is necessary

\* See Nos. 226, 232 and 235.

to insist on the full execution of the instructions originally sent to the High Commissioner and General Milne.

Under these circumstances Lord Curzon trusts that the Lords Commissioners will see their way to instruct Admiral de Robeck to join in carrying out the instructions sent to him in his capacity of High Commissioner in the telegram from this Department, No. 362 of the 21st April, and No. 383 of the 27th April, and to withdraw his opposition to the appointment of a French or Italian president on the Inter-Allied Commission at the Ministry of Marine, it being understood that this commission, just as the other two, will, in executive matters, act under the supreme orders of the General Officer Commanding Allied forces in Constantinople, or the Naval Commander-in-chief, as the case may be.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 5279/1729/44]

No. 276.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 10, 1920.*

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 25th and 29th May with reference to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control established at the Ministries of War, Marine and Posts and Telegraphs at Constantinople. The record of events contained in the earlier letter appears to be correct, but Lord Curzon desires me to explain that, in view of the tenor of the instructions telegraphed to the High Commissioner on the 21st April, he took for granted the concurrence of that officer in the arrangement approved by the Foreign Office, the War Office and the Admiralty, by which the three presidencies were to be divided between representatives of the three different Allied Powers. Subsequent correspondence, however, has made it clear that Admiral de Robeck considered himself justified in raising objections so far as the presidency of the Marine Commission was concerned, apparently not so much in his capacity of British High Commissioner as in that of Allied Naval Commander-in-chief. Indeed, your letter of the 29th May shows that, in spite of the clear intimation of Lord Curzon's wishes contained in telegram No. 383 of the 27th April, Admiral de Robeck has not yet come to any decision as to the presidency of the commission in question, nor has he suggested any alternative to the scheme of partition telegraphed from London.

As requested by the Army Council, I am to forward a copy of the written complaint<sup>†</sup> of the French Ambassador referred to in the letter from this Department of the 18th May, and, for their further information, I enclose copies of two despatches<sup>‡</sup> from Rear-Admiral Webb and of a telegram<sup>§</sup> from Admiral de Robeck—all dealing with the subject of the Control Commissions. From Admiral Webb's despatches it would appear that the divergence of views between the French and Italian High Commissioners and General Milne extends now to the functions and powers as well as to the composition of the Allied Commissions of Control, and Lord Curzon is anxious to learn exactly what the position in this respect is, and whether, in the interests of harmony and of the smooth working of the inter-Allied controls, it would not be possible for General Milne to arrange that the commissions should be consulted whenever practical, or at all events informed, before instructions are issued to the Turkish Department affecting matters in the execution of which the commission is concerned, without diminishing his direct control of the Turkish army as Allied Commander-in-chief charged with the execution of the military clauses of the armistice.

In his telegram No. 621 of the 24th May, of which a copy is enclosed, Admiral de Robeck states that the Commissions of Control are still working under the system provisionally agreed to by the French and Italian High Commissioners pending the settlement by the Governments of the question of principle, and that, in spite of the settlement of this question since arrived at, the commissions at the War Office and Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs are still under British presidency, while at the Ministry of Marine the commission is without a president. General Milne, it now appears, is prepared to surrender the presidency of the Post and Telegraph Commission provided Admiral de Robeck acts similarly in regard to the Marine Commission. Admiral de Robeck, however, as will be seen, is still strongly opposed to any change

\* See No. 217.

† See Nos. 232 and 241.

‡ See No. 235.



being made in the present constitution of the Commissions of Control, and is apprehensive of the possible results of the interference of junior Allied officers on those commissions and of a consequent weakening of the authority of the General Officer Commanding occupying forces.

Lord Curzon cannot but regard these fears as exaggerated. The overriding authority of General Milne as General Officer Commanding has been admitted by the French and Italian High Commissioners, and it appears to his Lordship that the demand of our Allies for equal representation on the Commissions of Control could safely be conceded without in any way undermining General Milne's supreme authority. The fact that a French or Italian officer may sit as president of a commission should not prevent the British representatives from exercising their proper influence, especially when they are backed by the overriding authority of the Allied Commander-in-chief.

In spite, therefore, of the arguments put forward by Admiral de Robeck for maintaining the present purely provisional arrangement, Lord Curzon is of opinion that there is no justification for going back on the promises made at San Remo, and that, on the contrary, it is necessary to insist on the full execution of the instructions originally sent to the High Commissioner and General Milne.

In view, however, of the statement contained in the War Office letter of the 29th May, that General Milne awaits the decision of Admiral de Robeck as to the presidency of the Marine Commission in order to hand over the presidency of the Post Office and Telegraph Commission, Lord Curzon is approaching the Admiralty regarding the appointment of either a French or Italian officer as president of the Marine Commission. A copy of his Lordship's letter to the Admiralty\* is herewith enclosed.

In regard to the point raised in the last paragraph of the War Office letter of the 29th May, viz., the presidency of the War Office Commission, Lord Curzon fully shares the opinion of the Army Council that the presidency of that commission must remain in British hands so long as a British General is in command of the Allied forces in Constantinople, and he will instruct the British High Commissioner so to inform his colleagues. His Lordship proposes further that, as a condition of the acceptance of French or Italian presidents of the two other Commissions of Control, it shall be made clear to the French and Italian Governments that the commissions are dependent on the supreme authority of General Milne as General Officer Commanding occupying army, and that the commissions as a whole, and therefore the individual members, must in executive matters be regarded as working under his orders.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 6238/47/44]

No. 277.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 11.)*

My Lord,

*Aden, May 27, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 27th May, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 277.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal,

*Aden, May 27, 1920.*

THE only item of news to record this week is that Kaid Saleh, nephew of Sheikh Mahomed Kasir Mukbil of Mawia, has run away from his country and taken refuge in the Haushabi country. The cause of this appears to be the demand of the imam's amil at Mawia for the surrender of the sons of Kaid Saleh and Sheikh Mahomed Nasir Mukbil as hostages. Kaid Saleh refused to surrender his son, and, to avoid trouble with the amil, has left the country. The Haushabi Sultan suspects this to be a Zaidi

\* See No. 275.

stratagem to find a pretext for invading his territory. There is rumour that Sheikh Mahomed Nasir Mukbil also intends to leave for the Haushabi territory.

I have advised the Haushabi Sultan not to harbour any such refugees in his territory, but to send them to Lahej or still farther south.

Kaid Saleh is since reported to have returned to Mawia.

The Alawi sheikh is reported to have returned home after leaving his brother as a hostage with the Zaidis. This is not yet confirmed.

Yours, &c.

J. M. STEWART.

[E 6301/3/44]

No. 278.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 11.)*

(No. 681.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Constantinople, June 10, 1920*

MY telegram No. 666 of 7th June.

Grand Vizier has now decided positively to leave by sea for Marseilles on 12th June. He should reach Paris about 19th June.

2. He paid me farewell visit on 9th June. He again made urgent appeal for revision of peace terms in sense which would leave to Turkey all areas in which Turkish language predominated. He covered same ground, to great extent, as in conversation reported in my telegram No. 627 and my despatch No. 766 of 27th May.

3. Grand Vizier prefaced his remarks by assertion of his conviction (which had been confirmed by what passed in Paris last year and by statements of Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour) that Allies did not hold Turkish dynasty or people responsible for Turks' entry into the war, and that they contemplated peace of justice, not of punishment.

4. As regards Thrace, he invoked statistics which, according to him, showed undoubtedly Moslem majority. He said that he did not wish to reopen question of area between Karasu and Maritza, although it contained 1,000,000 Moslems, as against 300,000 non-Moslems of all kinds, and although Peace Conference had, he declared, laid it down last year that this area would share fate of Constantinople. He did urge Turkey should retain the country east of Maritza, where majority was also Moslem, and Adrianople, with which Turkey had so many ties.

5. He added nothing new about Smyrna, but once more insisted that majority of population in that area were Moslem.

6. As regards Armenia, he complained that Turkey was asked to commit herself to a frontier not defined in treaty, and to do this in regard to region in which 95 per cent. of population were Moslem.

7. He again deprecated creation of straits zone, which would be in effect the only sovereign State between Sultan and his dominions in Asia. He urged object of securing free straits could be fully obtained by occupying both sides of straits only and maintenance at sea of as many naval units as Allies chose.

8. Grand Vizier said he would not trouble me with more technical details, which he hoped would be thrashed out in commissions in Paris. He passed to more confidential statements, gist of which was as follows:—

9. Even if Turkey obtained mitigation of peace terms, which he had suggested, she would be so utterly weak internally and so surrounded by hostile neighbours that she could not long subsist unless she had a strong supporting hand. Would England hold out that hand, and would he have means when in Paris of conveying his views to English statesmen?

10. I told Grand Vizier to arm himself with all statistics and data he could, as he would find statisticians at the other end who had gone very deep into the question of population raised by him. I pointed out that his suggestion regarding straits would involve maintenance of large naval forces in these waters at a moment when all the Allies were anxious to reduce armaments of this kind. Essential purpose was, I said, to make waterway absolutely secure, and to achieve this it would be necessary to occupy every part of the littoral from which it would be threatened by gun-fire. I admitted risk of such threat was small in view of disarmament of Turkey, but said that Allies were on their guard, not against people like himself, but against people of the type of Enver Pasha and Talaat.

[4370]



11. Speaking quite personally, I asked whether he was ready with any proposals which would give Turkey access to Anatolia by excluding from straits zone some port, like Ismid or Panderma, to which my gun-fire argument would not apply. Grand Vizier persisted in his view that his first suggestion would guarantee all that was necessary, but said that if it could be agreed in principle that separate zone extending from Dardanelles to Black Sea was unnecessary, detailed solution could be worked out by technical experts.

12. I said I could not even express opinion as to prospect of future support from England, but promised to report all he had said to your Lordship.

13. Grand Vizier urged illusoriness of hope that stable equilibrium could be created by peace now contemplated. England no doubt wanted durable peace, but lesson of history was that Greece could never hold on to great possessions. She had held them under individual great men, but when those men passed away Greece lost her grip in Asia and in Archipelago. In Europe Greece was under perpetual threat from Slavdom.

14. What would happen, he asked, if Sultan and Government made up their minds to sign treaty whatever it might be and Thrace and Anatolia went into revolt? I parried this by saying it would be hard to know whether Thrace was in revolt against Sultan or at war with Greece. He said Thrace had hitherto listened to him, but attitude of leaders there was that they would withdraw their obedience to Central Government if Central Government proved incapable of defending them. Central Government would only defend them by argument, and if Greeks crossed Maritza leaders in Thrace would consider Central Government had failed. Thrace would then be at war with Greece.

15. I said Conference had doubtless envisaged every possibility. They had certainly told Greeks what they had to undertake.

Grand Vizier asked eagerly whether Greeks had been told not to invade Thrace before signature of peace. I said they could not do so without good authority from Conference.

[E 6269/3/44]

No. 279.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 682.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, June 10, 1920.

GENERAL MILNE informs me that Turkish troops in Ismid area who are loyal to Government have now declared their inability to maintain their present positions and have expressed their intention of withdrawing. This will leave British troops at Ismid face to face with National forces, whose avowed intention is to advance to Bosphorus.

One of the main reasons for military occupation of Constantinople by Allies was to put a stop to Nationalist activities in capital and surrounding districts. For our troops to withdraw from Ismid now and to allow the Ismid peninsula to pass under control of Nationalists would render our position in Constantinople impossible with Nationalist forces on or near Asiatic shore of Bosphorus.

Further, the Ismid district is well within area which is to be demilitarised and controlled under terms of Peace Treaty. Any retirement of our troops from Ismid to a line further back would be most undesirable and a clear sign of weakness. I have accordingly requested General Milne to take steps to prevent any of Nationalist forces from coming into Ismid or Ismid peninsula, and to fix a line west of which any Nationalist troops will be fired upon if they advance.

I am arranging for navy to give support to our troops and to control waters of Ismid and northern shores of Ismid peninsula towards Shile.

The maintenance of our control of Ismid peninsula is a matter which is as much in interests of French and Italian as in our own. General Milne estimates that he requires at least a division in Ismid peninsula should Nationalists carry out their intentions.

It is therefore most necessary that French and Italians should take their part by providing their quota of troops required. The French should co-operate by sending a force to Ismid, to be under General Milne's orders there, to show that Allies are agreed as to policy, and Italians by taking over Asiatic side of Dardanelles, as proposed in my telegram No. 651 of 3rd June, and thus releasing British troops now stationed at Chanak.

I would represent most strongly that matter is one of extreme urgency, and it is absolutely necessary that definite orders should be given by His Majesty's Government if it is the intention that we should retain our position in occupation of Constantinople.

[E 5900/1729/44]

No. 280.

Earl Curzon to Signor Preziosi.

Foreign Office, June 11, 1920.

Sir,

ON the 14th May the British military attaché at Rome was informed in writing by the General Staff at the Italian Ministry of War that an Italian infantry division was shortly to be despatched to Constantinople and the Straits area, and that simultaneously it was proposed to establish at Constantinople a general command of the Italian forces in the Middle East. The Italian War Office agreed to the Italian troops being under the general command of General Milne until peace with Turkey is signed, that is to say, as long as the present state of armistice lasts, but they specifically reserved to the Italian Government the right to issue orders direct to the Italian commander for measures of a political character.

With a view to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the future, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government are fully in accord with the proposals of the Italian Government, provided that (a) the latter are prepared to confirm the statement of the Italian General Staff that the Italian troops will remain under the supreme command of General Milne, as General Officer Commanding Allied Forces, until such time as the post-war organisation comes into force; (b) it is made clear that General Milne shall retain supreme command until that moment; (c) the proviso suggested by the Italian War Office, that the Italian Government shall be able to give orders direct to the Italian commander for measures of a political character, shall in no way interfere with General Milne's freedom to dispose the Italian troops in such manner as he may consider necessary in his capacity of Inter-Allied Commander-in-chief, and that no operations shall be initiated by the Italian commander without the full concurrence and executive orders of General Milne.

I have further the honour to beg to be informed of the dates by which the Italian Government expect the arrival of the last Italian unit to be completed and upon which they propose that the Italian High Commander shall enter upon his duties.

I take the opportunity of enquiring whether the Italian Government will reconsider their decision not to send a battalion to Batoum. Although orders have been given and preparations are being made for evacuation in case of necessity, the presence there of a fourth battalion might suffice to induce the Soviet troops to refrain from attacking the town, especially in view of the solidarity between the Allies which it would indicate. The Italian Government will not fail to realise how important the possession of Batoum is if the Allies are to discharge their obligations towards the Armenians.

I have, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 5900/1729/44]

No. 281.

Foreign Office to War Office.

Foreign Office, June 11, 1920.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letters of the 28th May and 4th June relative to the despatch of Italian troops to Constantinople, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to forward, for the information of the Army Council, copy of a letter which his Lordship has addressed to the Italian Chargé d'Affaires on the subject.

In regard to the opinion of the Army Council, contained in your earlier letter under reply, to the effect that the time has now come when the inauguration of the permanent international organisation of the demilitarised zone around the Straits should be taken in hand and the garrison of the zone reduced to its agreed post-war numbers, I am to state that these appear to be questions for the Supreme Council to deal with, but on

[4370]

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general grounds Lord Curzon suggests that it would be advisable to defer any reduction of the British garrison until we see the first results of the presentation of the Turkish peace terms.

I am, &c.  
J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 6344/289/44]

No. 282.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 12.)*

(No. 690.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, June 11, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 320 of 12th April.

My representative in Smyrna asks whether a general authority may be granted under rule 305 of rules [? International] for consular courts in Turkey, 1914, for his dealings with applications for probate made after three years from death, without reference in each case to Supreme Court. What reply should I send him?

[E 6314/1/58]

No. 283.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Vansittart (Paris).*

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 12, 1920.

COLONEL STOKES is proceeding at once to Batoum to conclude an agreement for handing over town and province to Georgians. He will call on you on the 14th or 15th June to obtain copy of the draft agreement between representatives of the three republics which was discussed at San Remo but not signed.

[E 6372/289/44]

No. 284.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 14.)*

(No. 788.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 4, 1920.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 315 of the 30th April regarding the position of Serb-Croat-Slovene nationals in connection with the enjoyment of capitulatory rights in Turkey, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that in practice subjects of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene kingdom are actually in enjoyment of the same immunities and protection as those of other Allied countries; the Porte having been officially informed on the 18th May, when the question arose locally, that no distinction could be admitted between the Serbs and other Allies, and that the jurisdiction of Turkish Courts over them could not be tolerated.

2. I would, however, point out that the desire expressed in the letter from the Serbian delegate, enclosed in your Lordship's despatch under reference, indicates a slight misapprehension in regard to the actual situation here, since it is not possible to apply the so-called "Régime des Capitulations" to the subjects of belligerent States, and it is not in fact in force as regards neutrals, so long as armistice conditions endure.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

[E 6402/3/44]

No. 285.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 14.)*

(No. 701.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, June 13, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 460 of 20th May.

Grand Vizier has put forward several proposals for the formation of a force, of

varying numbers from 7,000 to 50,000 men, to be used to suppress national movement in Anatolia.

General Milne considers that Peace Treaty should be signed before authorisation be given for the formation of such a force.

Have informed my French and Italian colleagues of his opinion.

[E 7516/1729/44]

No. 286.

*Memorandum on Allied Commissions at Constantinople by Mr. Max Muller.*

(Confidential.)

THIS memorandum deals with two questions:—

1. The general question of General Milne's position *vis-à-vis* the Allied High Commissioners; and
2. The particular question of the position of the Allied representatives on the Commissions of Control necessitated by the occupation of the Turkish Ministries of War, Marine, Posts and Telegraphs.

In considering point (1) there is no need to go into the bulky correspondence in regard to the differences between General Franchet d'Esperey and General Milne, as they appear to have been settled, at all events for the moment, by the departure of the former on long leave without any intention of returning, yet I feel that it may be of interest to quote from one despatch a remark made by Lord Curzon to M. Cambon on the 2nd April, 1919, in the course of a conversation on the growing friction between the Allies in Constantinople, in which his Lordship deplored "the absence of any clear understanding as to the lines of division between the authority of the Military Commanders and that of the High Commissioners." The absence of any clear understanding on this point has continued down to the present day, and is at the bottom of much of the friction in Constantinople. As late as the 17th March Admiral de Robeck asked for fresh instructions as to the military command in Constantinople, on the grounds that such instructions might assist him in clearing up the position with his French colleague. At that time he had not even received any reversal of the instructions telegraphed to him on the 21st September, 1918, that any military occupation of Constantinople must necessarily be under supreme French command.

From the beginning there were differences of opinion between the two Governments as to the relative powers of the High Commissioner and the Allied Commander-in-chief. The French Government at first maintained that the functions of the High Commissioners were restricted to matters connected with the fulfilment of the terms of the armistice, and that on other matters the Military Commander was supreme and at liberty to make any arrangements he chose in direct negotiation with the Turkish Government; while His Majesty's Government, on the other hand, held that the Military Commander at Constantinople should devote his attention exclusively to military matters in inter-Allied interests, and should not exercise any civil or political authority or approach the Turkish Government directly on any save purely military questions.

On the 14th May, 1919, however, the French Ambassador in the course of a conversation with Sir R. Graham stated that the French Government were in entire accord with the views of His Majesty's Government on this point, viz., that the military command should deal solely with military matters, and that all questions of administration ought to be referred to the High Commissioners, and all civil matters, such as the Ottoman Public Debt, &c., be left to civilian control. How far this understanding has been observed in Constantinople up to the time of the occupation of the city on the 17th March we need not enquire, as the situation has been entirely changed by that measure. An occupation is a purely military operation, and in the ordinary course of events the responsibility for the administration and for the relations with the Turkish Government would have passed into the hands of the General Officer Commanding. The situation, however, was complicated by the necessity of getting rid of General Franchet d'Esperey if General Milne was to be left in a position to carry out the occupation without constant interference. It was therefore considered expedient to make certain concessions to the French. The French Ambassador in a conversation with Lord Curzon suggested that in return for the withdrawal of General Franchet d'Esperey, the "supreme" command in



Constantinople should be abolished, and a "local" command of the Allied forces substituted for it, and that the administration of Constantinople should, even during the military occupation, be regarded as primarily civilian and left in the hands of the High Commissions, under whose general control the military administration should be placed.

After consultation with General Milne the Chief of the Imperial General Staff agreed that, provided the General Officer Commanding in Constantinople was British, it did not matter whether his command were called "supreme" or "local." Moreover, while maintaining that the military command should not be placed completely under the control of the High Commissioners, as such a control would entail constant reference to the High Commissioners of points of routine and detail such as solely concerned the military authorities, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff agreed that no military action should be taken by the Allied Commander-in-chief, other than measures connected with the immediate security of the Allied garrison, without the authority of the High Commissioners in Council, the decisions of the High Commissioners being conveyed to the General Officer Commanding through the channel of the British High Commissioner. Such an arrangement, it was felt, would satisfy the principle contended for by M. Cambon, that the control of the military forces should be ultimately in the hands of the High Commissioners. The memorandum of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was communicated to M. Berthelot at San Remo on the 26th April, but we have not, so far as I am aware, received any expression of the views of the French Government thereon.

On the 19th May Lord Curzon caused verbal enquiries to be made at the War Office as to how the question of the Constantinople command stood. The General Staff expressed themselves as satisfied with the existing situation in Constantinople, and suggested waiting for the French reply to the memorandum handed to M. Berthelot at San Remo. Personally, I do not share the view of the General Staff. On the contrary, I consider that the question of the command in Constantinople, or at all events of the relative position of the Allied Commander-in-chief of the High Commissioners, should, in the interests of harmony, be definitely decided, and that instructions embodying the decision should be sent to both the High Commissioner and the General Officer Commanding. In that case with a little good-will on both sides, the solution of the problem ought to present no insuperable difficulty.

I annex an extract from a private letter to me from Rear-Admiral Webb, from which it is clear that General Milne does not share the views of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in regard to his position *vis-à-vis* the High Commissioners, but presumably he has not yet received any instructions based on Sir Henry Wilson's memorandum, which was communicated to M. Berthelot, and which no doubt the French Government regard as representing the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government on the subject.

The absence of definite instructions is undoubtedly at the bottom of much of the friction at Constantinople, of which we have had many examples of late, and steps should be taken without loss of time to arrive at a definite agreement on the question of the position of the General Officer Commanding. The question is whether the best method of attaining this end would be:—

1. To ask the French Government for a reply to the San Remo memorandum; or
2. To suggest to the War Office that the contents of their memorandum should be communicated to Admiral de Robeck and General Milne for their guidance and for communication to the Allied High Commissioners.

I submit that course (2) provides the simplest and most expeditious solution.

Apart from the above evidence supplied by Admiral Webb, General Milne has himself furnished proofs of his intention to act independently of the High Commissioners, and his assumption of the roll of Military Dictator cannot fail to confirm the prevalent suspicions as to our ultimate designs on Constantinople.

1. In the course of a conversation with the Acting High Commissioner in regard to the proper functions of the Inter-Allied Control Commissions, as reported by Admiral Webb in his despatch No. 608 of the 27th April (E5056), General Milne stated definitely that "as commander of the army was independent of any of the Allied High Commissioners and responsible solely to the War Office, by whom he was charged with the execution of the military clauses of the armistice, and with the adoption of such measures as appeared to him necessary for the safety of his troops. Should any of the Allied High Commissioners consider that his actions

or policy conflicted with the interests of the Allies, it rested with them to represent the matter to their Governments. Having been charged by the Allies to carry out their orders to occupy Constantinople, the manner of execution had to be decided by him. . . ."

2. General Milne's intransigence is further exemplified in a letter addressed by him to the High Commissioner on the 1st May, 1920 (E5366), in the course of which, referring to the decision of the High Commissioners as to the inter-Allied character and the proper functions of the Control Commissions, he writes: "May I please be informed on what grounds the High Commissioners came to the conclusion quoted above, and how it is proposed that a civil body such as the High Commission should lay down the procedure to be adopted in the military matter under discussion."
3. Again to a long despatch from the High Commissioner dated the 22nd April (E5357), asking for General Milne's views in regard to the arrest and detention of certain Turkish undesirables, the sole reply vouchsafed by the latter officer was "I have no remark to make."
4. On the 21st May Lord Curzon instructed Admiral de Robeck to inform General Milne that a conflict with Georgia was very undesirable, and should be avoided if possible. This called forth a violent explosion from General Milne to the effect that he failed to understand the telegram, that he was in no way under the orders of the High Commissioner, who was not in a position to appreciate the position in Batoum, and that he would only act on War Office orders. We have informed the War Office that Admiral de Robeck being in supreme political control, and the question dealt with being primarily political, the telegram despatched by the Foreign Office was in no sense an infringement of General Milne's military position and authority, and that the Foreign Office were justified in sending the telegram to the Admiral, and the Admiral in communicating it to the General.

These instances are sufficient to show that "the absence of any clear understanding as to the lines of division between the authority of the Military Commanders and that of the High Commissioners," which Lord Curzon deplored more than a year ago, still continues, and is the cause of much unnecessary ill-feeling and friction and even of regrettable displays of bad temper on the part of General Milne. The fact that the terms of the San Remo memorandum have never been communicated to the High Commissioner or the General Officer Commanding appears to be at the root of the misunderstanding, and I therefore return to my proposal that they should be sent to them at once for their own guidance and for communication to the Allied High Commissioners.

The question of the Allied representation on the Commissions of Control is a simpler one, and is governed by the promise made at San Remo that the presidencies of the three Commissions should be divided among the three Allies.

The history of this question may be briefly summarised as follows:—

On the occupation of Constantinople, Commissions of Control were established at the Turkish Ministries of War, Marine, and Posts and Telegraphs. The three High Commissioners agreed that they were to be inter-Allied, but the French and Italian High Commissioners, while admitting that the Commissions must work under the supreme direction of the General Officer Commanding, demanded that the representation on them should be on a basis of full equality among the three Allies, while the British High Commissioner on the contrary supported British Headquarters in insisting, in virtue of orders received from the War Office, that all three Commissions should work under the control and presidency of a British officer. It is true that the French and Italian High Commissioners accepted, pending settlement of the question of principle, the arrangement demanded by the British Headquarters, but this agreement was purely provisional and cannot be insisted on.

We suggested to the War Office that we should accept the inter-Allied Commissions provided we had a British President on the War Office Commission and equal representation on the other two Commissions, thus implying that the other two Presidents might be French or Italian. After a delay of about three weeks the War Office accepted our proposal, and the necessary instructions were telegraphed to the High Commissioner and General Milne. The War Office telegram, however, to General Milne included a proviso on behalf of the Admiralty that their approval was



"subject to the concurrence of the High Commissioner (*sic*)," though it now appears that what was meant was "subject to the concurrence of the Admiral Commander-in-chief," and it was in this latter capacity that Admiral de Robeck has raised objections to our proposals for the internationalisation on an equal basis of the Control Commissions. At the time we took it for granted that Admiral de Robeck would concur in instructions issued to him by the department under whose orders he acts as High Commissioner, if not as Admiral Commander-in-chief.

Apparently this misunderstanding has in some degree been responsible for the delay in carrying out our instructions.

The present position according to the latest information received from Admiral de Robeck and the War Office, is that the Commissions of Control are still working under the system provisionally agreed to by the French and Italian High Commissioners pending the settlement of the question of principle, and that, in spite of the settlement since arrived at and the promises made at San Remo, the Commissions at the War Office and Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs are still under British presidency, while at the Ministry of Marine the Commission is without a President. General Milne, it now appears, has abandoned his former obstructive attitude, and is prepared to surrender the presidency of the Posts and Telegraphs Commission provided Admiral de Robeck acts similarly in regard to the Marine Commission, though at the same time General Milne declines in that event all responsibility for the former Commission. Admiral de Robeck, however, is still strongly opposed to any change being made in the present constitution of the Commissions of Control, and is apprehensive of the possible results of the interference of junior Allied officers on the Commissions, and of a consequent weakening of the authority of the General Officer Commanding occupying forces.

I submit that these fears are baseless, or at all events exaggerated. The overriding authority of General Milne as General Officer Commanding has been admitted by the French and Italian High Commissioners, so that it appears to me that the demand of our Allies for equal representation on the Commissions of Control could safely be conceded without in any way undermining General Milne's supreme authority. The fact that a French or Italian officer may sit as President of a Commission should not prevent the British representatives from exercising their proper influence, especially as they will be backed by the overriding authority of the Allied Commander-in-chief.

I submit that there is no justification for maintaining the present purely provisional arrangement, or going back on the promises made at San Remo, and that on the contrary we must insist on the full execution of the instructions originally sent to the High Commissioner and General Milne.

I have drafted letters to the War Office and Admiralty on the above lines, but in view of the statement that General Milne is now represented as awaiting the decision of Admiral de Robeck, I suggest requesting the Admiralty to instruct the latter officer, in his capacity of Admiral Commander-in-chief, to withdraw his opposition to the appointment of a French or Italian President of the Control Commission at the Ministry of Marine.

I have also included a paragraph in the draft to the War Office indicating that, as a condition of the acceptance of French or Italian Presidents on the Commissions at the Ministries of Marine and Posts and Telegraphs, it should be made clear to the French and Italian Governments that the Commissions are dependent on the supreme authority of General Milne, as General Officer Commanding occupying army, and that the Commissions as a whole, and therefore the individual members, must, in executive matters, be regarded as working under his orders.

By such an arrangement the French and Italians can save their faces, and the cause of Allied harmony be helped, without undermining in any practical degree the supreme executive authority of General Milne. The arrangement would have the further advantage of transferring to the Allies a share of the odium involved in many of the measures which we shall have to take.

*Foreign Office, June 14, 1920.*

[E 6526/3/44]

No. 287.

*Sir G. Grahame to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 15.)*

(No. 710.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Paris, June 15, 1920.*

YOUR Lordship's telegram No. 692 of yesterday's date.

Armistice was drawn up at Angora by M. Decaix, Secretary-General of French High Commissioner, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha. It was signed on 30th May for twenty days. Under it, French troops were to be allowed to withdraw from Bozanti and Sis to Tarsus-Aleppo, and from Aintab to certain distance outside the town and towards railway. Guarantees were given for safety of Armenians at latter place. French soldiers recently made prisoners were to be returned. After signature of armistice about 550 French troops, who were retiring from Bozanti, were attacked and captured. French Government expected their delivery in accordance with armistice condition above mentioned.

[E 6221/1729/44]

No. 288.

*Foreign Office to War Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 15, 1920.*

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 10th June, 1920, on the subject of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control at Constantinople, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit, for the information of the Army Council and for any observations which they may wish to offer, copy of a further telegram\* on this question from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[E 6572/47/44]

No. 289.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 16.)*

My Lord,

*Aden, June 2, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 2nd June, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 289.

*Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal,

*Aden, June 2, 1920.*

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 27th May, 1920:—

*Tihama.*

Sheikh Mahomed Zaid (Qubra), who was wounded at Jabel Bura, is now reported to be almost well. It appears that he only sustained a flesh wound. Sheikh Ismail Bhagawi came to Hodeida to take medicine and dressings for him, but only mentioned that they were required for a friend, without giving his name. The Political Officer, Hodeida, reports that it came to his knowledge that the medicine, &c., were for Sheikh Mahomed Zaid, and that Sheikh Ismail Bhagawi was afraid of our putting poison in the medicine if we knew it was for Sheikh Mahomed Zaid.

A deputation, consisting of the head sheikh and several other sheikhs of Jabel Reima, visited Sheikh Mahomed Tahir, the Idrisi commander at Bajil. They asked to be placed under Idrisi protection, and for help to expel a party of Zaidis, who were

\* See No. 273.



committing excesses in their country. Sheikh Mahomed Tahir responded by despatching a party of Idrisi soldiers from Shutaba and a gun from Attar.

The imam has made no fresh attempt to recapture Jabel Bura. He is reported to have sent orders to stop fighting during the Ramadhan. His soldiers have been under a disadvantage owing to the heat, from which they have suffered a great deal. He has recalled a number of commanders from Menakha, and the majority of the troops there have proceeded to Zabeed.

The Zaidis have destroyed the house and other property of the Sheikh of Rakb, in the vicinity of Zabeed, owing to his recent revolt against the imam. The sheikh has sought help from the Idrisi. Syed Ahmed-al-Ambari of Zabeed has been appointed by the imam army commander, because of his influence with the people of Zabeed.

Syed Mustafa has received a letter from the Idrisi informing him of a fight which took place between the Idrisi and the imam's troops on the Beni Qais front, north of Jabel Milhan, in the neighbourhood of Zaidiya, in which fight the latter were driven out from a place known as Madhaya. A few Zaidis were killed and twenty were taken prisoners. The commander, who has been killed, is said to be a near relative of the imam.

Syed Mustafa and Captain Fazluddin left this morning for Jizan.

The ex-Vali, Mahmud Nadhim, is reported to be giving out that he has received a letter from Constantinople telling him that the Turks are returning to the Yemen shortly, and that Tewfik Bey, the ex-Accountant-General of the vilayet, has been appointed the ex-Vali's assistant.

#### Aden Protectorate.

The imam is reported to have issued orders to his amil and commanders in the Amiri country to withdraw from our protectorate. The amil is said to be suspicious as to the genuineness of these orders, and has despatched a special messenger to the imam to get confirmation.

All is quiet in the protectorate.

Yours, &c.  
J. M. STEWART.

[E 6546/757/44]

No. 290.

*Signor Preziosi to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 16.)*

(Translation.)

My Lord,

*Italian Embassy, June 12, 1920.*

IN reply to your note of the 27th ultimo, which referred to your earlier one of the 14th April last, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Italian Government fully concurs in His Britannic Majesty's Government's views as to the undesirability of complying with the request of Switzerland for the admittance of a representative to the Commission of the Ottoman Public Debt.

I have, &c.  
G. PREZIOSI.

[E 6541/3/44]

No. 291.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 16.)*

(No. 706.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, June 15, 1920.*

AT the present moment we are actively engaged in hostilities with Nationalist forces at the Gulf of Ismid. It is not a satisfactory military position for various reasons, but I have had to urge on General Milne how desirable it is for us to hold the Gulf of Ismid. Further retirement towards the Bosphorus will [? group omitted] our position in Constantinople increasingly difficult and might become impossible. It is obvious, if we are to retain control here and carry through Peace Treaty, our army must be strongly reinforced immediately.

[E 6579/3/44]

No. 292.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 16.)*

(No. 708.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Constantinople, June 16, 1920.*

IN view of serious situation, following appears to be points for immediate decision by His Majesty's Government:—

We are already fighting Turkey; are we to continue a new war observing that Peace Treaty has united practically all Turks?

If we are to have a new war, strong army reinforcements are immediately required. In any case, a considerably larger force than that now at General Milne's disposal is required to ensure safety of Constantinople and Straits.

In order to relieve pressure in that area, should Greek army at Smyrna attack Turks and advance on Panderma?

It must be understood that if we intend to occupy area on either side of Straits set forth in Peace Treaty, it will now require a largely increased army to retake and hold.

Advance of Greek troops will probably mean further massacres of Christians in Anatolia, but if they are not used there appears to be no reason why a large Nationalist concentration against us in Ismid peninsula should not take place at once.

[E 6226/289/44]

No. 293.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 553.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, June 16, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 679 of 10th June.

According to the treaty the Capitulations will lapse on the coming into force of the treaty, and in view of the probably short duration of the transitional period, it does not seem worth while to institute a special judicial régime at Smyrna.

[E 6402/3/44]

No. 294.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 555.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Foreign Office, June 16, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 701 of 13th June.

I agree that signature of Peace Treaty should precede authorisation for formation of force advocated by Grand Vizier.

[E 6635/3/44]

No. 295.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 17.)*

(No. 765.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 27, 1920.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 625 of the 26th May, 1920, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the resolutions adopted by the meeting held in Stamboul on the 21st May under the auspices of the *Entente libérale* Party to appeal for reconsideration of the terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty.

2. These resolutions were brought to the High Commission by a deputation headed by Riza Tewfik Bey, "the philosopher". The deputation did not ask to be received by me, but, in handing the resolutions to Mr. Ryan, Riza Tewfik Bey made a short speech emphasising the fact that the people for whom he spoke recognised how deeply Turkey



had sinned and that what was now put forward was in the nature of an entreaty. He expressed the strongest abhorrence of the conduct and methods of the Committee of Union and Progress, and the present National Movement methods, from which he and his friends dissociated themselves utterly.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 295.

*Resolutions respecting Reconsideration of Turkish Peace Treaty.*

LES résolutions suivantes ont été adoptées à l'issue du meeting qui a eu lieu sur la Place du Sultan-Ahmed, aujourd'hui, vendredi 21 mai 1920 :

1. Les Puissances alliées veulent enlever à la Turquie des territoires dont la majorité des populations est représentée par les musulmans, tels que la ville d'Andrinople, la Thrace, la ville de Smyrne et ses dépendances, ce qui est contraire aux principes de justice et d'équité de même qu'aux principes des nationalités, solennellement déclarés par ces mêmes Puissances. En admettant, par impossible, que la population musulmane de ces contrées soit en minorité, par rapport aux éléments chrétiens, on devrait, selon les principes des nationalités, les doter d'une autonomie locale, à l'instar de ce qui a été pratiqué en Allemagne et en Autriche, et non pas les arracher à la Turquie pour les incorporer dans le domaine d'un État étranger. Les Alliés ont donc agi à l'égard des Turcs avec une sévérité excessive par rapport aux autres nations vaincues, chrétiennes.

2. Après la séparation des territoires arabes de l'Empire ottoman, en vertu des principes des nationalités, les Turcs devraient au moins être libérés de tous liens et obstacles de nature à empêcher leur développement économique, en tant qu'État, dans la voie du progrès et de la paix. L'abolition des Capitulations dans les territoires formant la Turquie nouvelle aurait dû être prononcée en tout justice. Or, c'est tout le contraire qui arrive, étant donné que les Capitulations ont été non seulement maintenues, mais aggravées, et, le bénéfice en a été accordé à d'autres nations, ce qui équivaut à condamner, à l'avenir, les Turcs à la misère et à la servitude.

3. Les Turcs, confiants dans les sentiments d'équité et de justice des Puissances alliées, réclament l'application, à leur égard, du même traitement appliqué aux autres nations vaincues, Mr. Lloyd George, s'adressant à la délégation indienne, avait déclaré ne pouvoir accorder aux Turcs musulmans un traitement supérieur à celui qui a été adopté envers les nations chrétiennes vaincues. Prenant acte des déclarations du Premier Ministre britannique, les Turcs demandent un traitement égal.

4. Il ne peut exister un seul homme au monde qui ne reconnaisse l'injustice qu'on fait aux Turcs par les conditions de paix. Le Premier Ministre italien lui-même n'a-t-il pas, en effet, qualifié de "déplorable" le traité turc, tel qu'il a été arrêté à San-Remo ?

Le peuple turc, convaincu que les conditions de paix communiquées à ses représentants à Paris équivalent à rien de moins qu'à l'anéantissement complet de la nation et confiant dans les sentiments de justice et d'équité des Puissances alliées, s'en remet à elles pour la modification de ces conditions dans un esprit plus conforme au droit à la vie de la nation turque.

5. Ces résolutions devront être soumises aux Hauts-Commissaires des Puissances alliées à Constantinople et communiquées à la Conférence de la Paix.

[E 6636/3/44]

No. 296.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 17.)*

(No. 766.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 27, 1920.

THE Grand Vizier called on me on the morning of the 26th May for the first time since the presentation of the peace terms in Paris. He had not yet received the text of the draft treaty, and, as none of the High Commissioners have received it either, so

far as I can ascertain, the conversation in so far as it related to the peace terms was based upon the imperfect telegraphic summaries which have reached Constantinople.

2. The Grand Vizier spoke first of the position of his Government in regard to the Nationalist movement in the interior. He reminded me of the circumstances in which he had assumed power. The Allied High Commissioners had, on the 16th March, called upon his predecessor to disavow the National movement. Salih Pasha's Government had sought to temporise, and a renewed and categorical demand of the High Commissioners on the 26th March had forced them to resign. He himself had taken office a few days later, and the new Government had complied with all the requirements of the High Commissioners. They had obtained religious pronouncements condemning the Nationalists as rebels. The Sultan had issued a rescript instructing the Government to punish them. This work had been taken in hand at once. Although things moved slowly, as they always did in Turkey, and although the Government had hitherto been on the defensive, because the rebels had all the organisation on their side, a beginning had nevertheless been made.

3. On coming into power the Grand Vizier said he found already in existence an anti-Nationalist movement directed by one Anzavur. This man was, however, an uneducated person, and his operations were mere peasant warfare. He, the Grand Vizier, had set himself to organise something on more regular lines. It was at this point that he found himself tied hand and foot as regards the physical means of action, i.e., men, arms, and munitions. This was not, he hastened to add, due to the attitude of the British military authorities; on the contrary, he was able to cite more than one instance in which General Milne had relaxed the terms of the Armistice in order to enable action to be taken. The Grand Vizier suggested pretty plainly that his difficulties had their origin in the opposition of the other Allies.

4. After this preface and some further observations purporting to be a résumé of a conversation between himself and the British officer at the head of the Allied control at the Ministry of War, Damad Ferid Pasha led up to a definite request that the Turkish Government should be allowed to recruit and equip a force of anything up to 10,000 men for service against the rebels in Anatolia. He observed that in the course of the conversation with the British officer mentioned above, the point had arisen that, as Turkey was to be allowed a total armed force of 50,000 men under the Treaty, the Turkish Government would be justified in asking for authority at once to recruit a force on that scale in order to restore order, but, the Grand Vizier said, he neither needed nor could afford to maintain so large a force. He had recently visited Ismid, which, under the advice of his military experts, he had made the base of his repressive operations, and he had returned with the conviction that the smaller force which he now had in mind would suffice to reduce the whole of Asia Minor to submission in three weeks. The National forces, he said, were in reality inconsiderable. They had concentrations in certain places like Eski-Chehir, Konia and Angora, but they were people of low character—malefactors—who would stick to Mustafa Kemal in order not to fall into the hands of justice. Experience had shown that wherever the Government showed itself in any force the law-abiding inhabitants welcomed the opportunity of declaring their loyalty to the Sultan and his Government.

5. The Grand Vizier definitely asked me to obtain permission from the Supreme Council for the equipment and utilisation of a force of up to 10,000 men, on the lines indicated above. He said he was about to address a similar request to the French and Italian High Commissioners. He did not intend to say anything to them of his conversation with the British officer, which had been confidential.

6. Speaking of the Peace Treaty Damad Ferid Pasha said that it was universally regarded in this country as excessively severe, and was regarded in some quarters as insusceptible of practical application. He had only telegraphic summaries to go on, but according to these, one of the proposals was to create a sort of independent territory stretching along the southern shore of the Marmara and up to the Black Sea. The effect of this would be to cut the Sultan off from his dominions in Asia. Then there were the questions of Thrace and Smyrna. In Thrace there was a highly-organised movement of resistance which he regarded as intimately connected with the larger movement in Anatolia. The only difference was that, whilst the leaders in Anatolia were recalcitrant and refused their submission to the Sultan's Government, Thrace still professed loyalty to the Sultan. If, however, the Greek troops were moved into Eastern Thrace, the guns would go off at once.

7. If Constantinople were to sign the treaty in its present form, said Damad Ferid Pasha, his Government and the Sultan would be in a most embarrassing position, for they would then be called on to enforce, as against the movements in Thrace and



Anatolia, peace terms which all alike considered excessively severe and unjust. If, on the other hand, the treaty could be mitigated in the matter of the three regions he had mentioned, it would, so far as he could judge from the summaries received, be possible to secure acceptance for the rest. The Grand Vizier urged that in these circumstances it would be politic as well as just to modify the treaty. However great Turkey's fault had been, she would be amply punished by the loss of vast lying territories amounting to nearly three-fourths of the Empire.

8. The Grand Vizier turned to the question of the period allowed for the Turkish reply. He said that the delegates despatched from Paris with the treaty had been delayed, and had telegraphed that they only expected to reach Constantinople on the 28th or 29th May. This would leave little time for consideration here. Moreover, Tewfik Pasha reported that he was at work on a draft reply, which would be ready in ten days. This also would have to be examined here. Ferid Pasha assured me that he had no desire to procrastinate, but he asked that the period allowed should be prolonged one month on the understanding that, if it were possible to get the answer sooner, it would be handed in before the prolongation expired. He said he would lay this request before my French and Italian colleagues also, and he stated that it was his intention to confirm the request to the three High Commissioners in writing.

9. Damad Ferid Pasha went on to say that the Sultan desired to address a personal appeal to the King, begging His Majesty in conjunction with the heads of the other Allied States, to mitigate the peace terms. He asked me whether I would transmit this message. The Sultan did not intend, he said, to address himself to the other heads of State direct, as the appeal to the King would be an appeal to them also. I undertook to transmit the message but, I said, I should feel bound to inform my French and Italian colleagues that I had done so.

10. The Grand Vizier mentioned the situation in Cilicia. He had received on the previous day a deputation representing the Mussulman inhabitants of that district, who complained of the extraordinary severity of the measures adopted by the French commanding officer, General Dufieux. The French had, according to the deputation, destroyed fifty villages and this was partially confirmed by official information which spoke of the destruction of thirty villages. The French, he said, were employing those drastic methods because they thought they had to do with the Nationalists. He could not complain of action really directed against the Nationalists, but there was a limit to severity, and, in speaking to me, he was actuated by motives of humanity, and hoped that if the question came up at a meeting of the High Commissioners I might use my influence in favour of less drastic methods. He mentioned, as an indication of the extent to which the French were preoccupied by the situation in Cilicia, that they had asked him to recall the Vali of Adana. He had agreed to do so, but he thought that the French must themselves have begun to realise that severity had been pushed too far, because he understood from the Minister of the Interior that the French High Commissioner was telegraphing to General Gouraud to ask for the recall of the French general whom he had mentioned.

11. The Grand Vizier mentioned incidentally in the course of the conversation that a certain person, apparently a Turk, and the son of a former Minister, had sought an interview with the Sultan as representative, he said, of some Indian philanthropic association. He had been referred to the Porte, and had hesitated to go there. Ferid Pasha mentioned this incident in order to assure me that those now in authority here were in no way disposed to have irregular relations with persons or societies in India. Their desire was to work in a perfectly straightforward and open way with the British representative here, and, if the individual in question had come to him at the Porte as suggested, he would have told him to apply to the Turkish Peace Delegation in Paris.

12. Before the Grand Vizier left me, I reverted to the subject of the treaty, and reminded him that my predecessor, Rear-Admiral Webb, and myself had lost no opportunity since the armistice of impressing on the Turkish Government that they must look for a treaty of the most rigorous description. The Grand Vizier admitted this, but he suggested that it was a question of how the word "rigorous" was employed. He used a simile, and said that a treaty which lopped Turkey of her arms and her legs would be rigorous enough in all conscience even though it left a head and trunk; but a treaty which deprived her of Smyrna and Thrace, struck at vital parts of the head and trunk as well, and such a treaty was something more than rigorous. It meant the annihilation of Turkey. He reminded me that the Supreme Council in their reply to the Turkish Peace Delegation last year, had promised that the Turkish-speaking parts of the Empire would be left. That promise was not being fulfilled. Greece for instance

had no claim to Smyrna except a claim based in memories of Homer. These memories were very ancient. If they constituted a title, they might be invoked in connection with many another place in the Mediterranean besides Smyrna. I promised to report all that his Highness had said faithfully to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,  
High Commissioner.

[E 6721/3/44]

No. 297.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 713.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, June 17, 1920.

FOLLOWING is translation of identic telegram which my colleagues and I have decided to send to our Governments:—

"The High Commissioners of France, Great Britain and Italy, informed by naval and military authorities of very serious situation resulting from forward and offensive movement of Nationalist forces in the directions of Constantinople and Dardanelles, have conjointly examined possible consequences of this situation, particularly from political point of view, and have decided to address to their Governments following identic telegram:—

"1. Constantinople is threatened from side of Asia, perhaps shortly from side of Thrace, and may see its commercial relations and its food supply compromised, if not interrupted, on side of Dardanelles. The Allied forces are insufficient to ward off all these dangers.

"2. Yet Allies must at all costs remain masters of Constantinople and the Straits.

"The High Commissioners therefore urgently support the proposals of naval and military commanders, particularly in regard to immediate despatch of considerable reinforcements.

"3. The High Commissioners note that action of Nationalist forces was set in motion, just as they had foreseen, immediately that peace conditions became known, and that nature of these conditions had made nearly all Turks Nationalists.

"4. In these conditions, it becomes more than ever necessary to consider whether Turkish Delegation will sign treaty, and to consider, moreover, what that delegation actually represents. In any case, the Allies are from to-day on under necessity either of employing force to impose their will, and even to maintain themselves in Constantinople, or of introducing substantial modifications into treaty.

"5. The approach of Kemalists, and their military successes, may have as their consequence provocation of a movement of their partisans at Constantinople for the overthrow of present Government, the Chief of which is absent, and substitute a Nationalist Government in its place. In this event, ought High Commissioners to suppress such a movement and maintain Government of Damad Ferid by force, or ought they to restrict themselves to maintenance of order and allow events to take their course (*laissez-faire*)?

"6. In the former case, the façade of Government, which is all that exists to-day, runs the risk of collapse, and Allies would then be under the obligation of taking Government and administration into their own hands. In the latter case, the High Commissioners find themselves in the presence of a Government representing a party which is declared rebellious, and which has already opened hostilities against Allied troops at several points.

"7. The High Commissioners are of opinion that the former attitude should be adopted if Allied Governments desire to uphold treaty and are resolved to despatch the necessary forces immediately; and that latter should be adopted if Governments are not prepared to undertake a new war against Turkey, and entertain possibility of modifying certain clauses of treaty, notably those dealing with territorial questions.

"8. The High Commissioners desire especially once more clearly to expose this dilemma; the first alternative being a breaking off of armistice and renewal of war; the second being an inevitable change of attitude and opening of negotiations for maintenance of treaty. These negotiations would be begun under disadvantageous



conditions, in consequence of strength of Nationalist organisation, the successes with which their forces have already met and the difficulty of proceeding to disarmament of Turkey.

"9. The High Commissioners beg their Governments to inform them of their intentions, and to send them identic instructions with as little delay as possible."

[E 7101/1136/44]

No. 298.

*Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 19, 1920.*

I HAVE to inform you that the King has been graciously pleased to appoint you to be High Commissioner and Commander-in-chief in Palestine for the purpose of instituting a civil administration to replace the existing military administration in that country.

The Army Council have approved the assumption by you of the title of Commander-in-chief of the troops in Palestine, with the proviso that the possession of this title will not give you any right of interference in details of operations or movements of troops, but will merely allow you to indicate the general policy to be pursued by the military forces.

A formal commission will be issued to you when the terms of the mandate for Palestine have been finally approved by the League of Nations.

I transmit herewith copies of a Message from His Majesty the King to the people of Palestine, and the principles contained therein should guide you in your general policy.

The measures suggested by you in the outline of a statement which you propose to make to assemblies at Jerusalem and Haifa have my approval.

I am, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 298.

*Message from His Majesty the King to the People of Palestine.*

To the People of Palestine.

THE Allied Powers, whose arms were victorious in the late war, have entrusted to my country a mandate to watch over the interests of Palestine and to ensure to your country that peaceful and prosperous development which has so long been denied to you.

I recall with pride the large part played by my troops, under the command of Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, in freeing your country from Turkish rule, and I shall indeed rejoice if I and my people can also be the instrument for bringing within your reach the blessings of a wise and liberal administration.

I desire to assure you of the absolute impartiality with which the duties of the mandatory Power will be carried out and of the determination of my Government to respect the rights of every race and every creed represented among you, both in the period which has still to elapse before the terms of the mandate can be finally approved by the League of Nations and in the future when the mandate has become an accomplished fact.

You are well aware that the Allied and Associated Powers have decided that measures shall be adopted to secure the gradual establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. These measures will not in any way affect the civil or religious rights or diminish the prosperity of the general population of Palestine.

The High Commissioner whom I have appointed to carry out these principles will, I am confident, do so whole-heartedly and effectively, and will endeavour to promote in every possible way the welfare and unity of all classes and sections among you.

I realise profoundly the solemnity of the trust involved in the government of a country which is sacred alike to Christian, Mohammedan and Jew, and I shall watch with deep interest and warm sympathy the future progress and development of a State whose history has been of such tremendous import to the world.

[E 6806/6806/44]

No. 299.

*Sir G. Grahame to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 21.)*

(No. 1908. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Paris, June 17, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies has been engaged for some days in discussing Near Eastern affairs. The day before yesterday a long debate took place which resulted in a proposal being made and accepted that a deputation should be sent to Syria, Cilicia and Constantinople, to enquire on the spot with regard to questions which the commission consider to be so serious and disquieting.

At the same sitting the commission charged M. Louis Barthou, its president, to request the President of the Council to communicate to it reports and telegrams which passed between the Government and General Franchet d'Esperey, Commander-in-chief of the Allied Armies in the East.

I had an opportunity yesterday evening of asking M. Louis Barthou about the proposal to send a deputation to Syria, Cilicia and Constantinople. He told me that the proposal had been made by M. Briand in the commission and had been unanimously approved by all the members present, who numbered over thirty. I asked him whether he thought that the Government would concur, and he replied that it was not to be anticipated that they would oppose the wishes of the commission. Nothing had yet been settled as to the date when the deputation would start nor who would compose it.

M. Briand is evidently being very active behind the scenes regarding all questions dealing with the Near East. It is said that he is extremely anxious to damage M. Clemenceau's reputation and to make it appear that, had his own policy been followed, France would be in a better position in the Near East than she now is. It is necessary, with the object of persuading the public to take this view, to show that England has got the better of France all along the line, in order to lay the blame of such a state of things at M. Clemenceau's door.

I have, &amp;c.

GEORGE GRAHAME.

[E 6817/1729/44]

No. 300.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received June 21.)*

Sir,

*Admiralty, June 19, 1920*

WITH reference to your letter of the 10th June regarding the question of Allied representation on the Commissions of Control established at the Ministries of War, Marine and Posts and Telegraphs at Constantinople, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that they have already expressed the view that they had no objection to relinquishing the presidency of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control at the Turkish Ministry of Marine provided the High Commissioner agreed (*vide* War Office telegram to General Milne of the 16th April, 1920).

1. In view of his strong objection to such a course, their Lordships regret that they do not see their way to instructing him to withdraw his opposition, which is undoubtedly greatly influenced by his desire to minimise the opportunity for French and Italian pro-Turkish intrigues.

3. Their Lordships are unaware of the nature and extent of the promises made at San Remo, to which Lord Curzon refers, but they hope that it may not be found incompatible with these promises to adopt the course suggested by Admiral de Robeck in the last paragraph of his telegram No. 621, especially in view of recent events.

4. I am to add that, in view of active war operations now being undertaken, it does not appear to be desirable to take any steps to weaken the authority of the General Officer Commanding in charge of operations.

5. A copy of your letter of the 10th June and of telegram No. 621 from Admiral de Robeck, together with a copy of this letter, have been sent to the War Office.

I am, &amp;c.

ALEX. FLINT.

[4370]



Enclosure in No. 300.

*War Office to General Milne (Constantinople).*

(Telegraphic.)

*War Office, April 16, 1920.*

YOUR I. 8340, dated the 28th March: Inter-Allied control.

Foreign Office refer to High Commissioner's telegrams Nos. 276 and 277, dated 24th March, and consider this is largely a political question, and are not satisfied that an agreement has been reached with French and Italians. Provided that War Office Commission is under British president and that British officer has place on each of the other commissions, Foreign Office agree to commissions being inter-Allied. Provided High Commissioner has no objection, Admiralty also agree.

Please arrange accordingly and report in due course by which Powers presidencies of Admiralty and Posts and Telegraphs are assumed.

[E 6269/3/44]

No. 301.

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).*

(No. 722. Circular.)

*Foreign Office, June 21, 1920.*

(Telegraphic.)

ADMIRAL DE ROBECK'S telegram No. 682 of 10th June.

French and Italian Governments will certainly agree that any weakening in face of Nationalists in or near the capital would be fatal to Allied policy. We would urge them, therefore, to furnish their High Commissioners and military commanders with all instructions necessary to ensure the co-operation of French and Italian troops in the defence of the Ismid peninsula and in preventing the Nationalists from endangering our position in Constantinople. We also trust that they will send such reinforcements as General Milne may find necessary for his purpose, in accordance with the suggestion contained in the penultimate paragraph of above-mentioned telegram.

(Addressed to Rome, No. 265; repeated to Constantinople, No. 559.)

[E 6948/1729/44]

No. 302.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon. — (Received June 22.)*

(No. 822.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, June 11, 1920.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 677 of the 9th June, 1920, relative to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control at the Turkish Ministry of War, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of the following documents:—

(a.) An identic letter, dated the 25th May, addressed by me to the French and Italian High Commissioners, asking whether they supported the claim put forward by the French and Italian officers on the War Office Commission of Control that they were not under General Milne's orders.

(b.) Replies of the French and Italian High Commissioners, dated the 2nd June, to the above letter, maintaining the attitude of the French and Italian officers concerned.

(c.) An identic letter, dated the 9th June, addressed by me to the French and Italian High Commissioners, proposing to refer the matter to our respective Governments for decision.

2. As regards the matter of cypher telegrams received and despatched from the War Office, I will not fail to inform your Lordship of the outcome of the letter which I have addressed to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, on the subject.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 302.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to M. DeFrance.*

(No. M. 2861.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, May 25, 1920.*

WITH reference to the conversation which took place at the French Embassy after the High Commissioners' meeting on the 21st May between your Excellency, his Excellency M. Maissac, and myself on the subject of the functioning of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control at the Turkish War Office, Admiralty, and Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I took an early opportunity after my return from Malta to discuss this question with the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea.

2. Both General Milne and myself are most desirous that the conditions under which these Control Commissions work should be such as to ensure their being in a position to fulfil in the most effective way possible the objects with which they were instituted, in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Council, at the time of the military occupation of Constantinople by the Allies.

3. General Milne now informs me that the French officer who is a member of the commission at the Turkish War Office informed the president of the commission, Brigadier-General Shuttleworth, that he does not consider himself to be in any way under the orders of General Milne.

4. As the point of view expressed by the French officer is, in the opinion both of General Milne and myself, one which, if admitted, would establish the principle of a divided authority over the Turkish War Office, and would therefore result in a situation inconsistent with the responsibility which devolves upon General Milne, I should be much obliged if your Excellency would inform me whether the claim put forward by the French officer on the War Office Commission that he is not under General Milne's orders is supported by your Excellency.

I have, &amp;c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 302.

*M. DeFrance to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

*Constantinople, le 2 juin 1920.*

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de la lettre qu'elle m'a adressée le 25 mai dernier à la suite de la conversation que nous avons eue quelques jours auparavant avec son Excellence M. Maissac au sujet du fonctionnement de la Commission de Contrôle interalliée au Ministère ottoman de la Guerre.

Au cours de cette conversation, son Excellence M. Maissac et moi avons porté à la connaissance de votre Excellence le fait que plusieurs télégrammes chiffrés avaient été expédiés ou reçus par le Ministre de la Guerre, sans que la traduction de ces télégrammes eût été soumise à la Commission interalliée de Contrôle, et, par conséquent, sans que cette commission fût mise à même d'exercer le contrôle dont elle est chargée et qui est sa seule raison d'être.

Notre collègue d'Italie et moi avons, en conséquence, prié votre Excellence de vouloir bien prendre les mesures nécessaires pour que le fait ne se renouvelât plus et que la commission pût remplir le devoir qui lui incombe.

Dans sa lettre du 25 mai, votre Excellence ne fait pas allusion aux faits qui lui ont été signalés ni à la demande qui lui a été adressée.

Après avoir exprimé son désir, partagé par le Général Milne, de voir fonctionner les Commissions de Contrôle dans des conditions leur permettant de remplir de la manière la plus effective possible le but pour lequel elles ont été instituées, votre Excellence me fait savoir que l'officier français, membre de la Commission du Ministère de la Guerre, a informé le Brigadier-General Shuttleworth qu'il ne se considère pas comme étant sous les ordres du Général Milne, et elle me demande si j'approuve cette opinion, qui, si elle était admise, établirait le principe d'une autorité divisée sur le Ministère de la Guerre, et aurait pour conséquence de créer une situation incompatible avec la responsabilité qui incombe au Général Milne.

Mon point de vue au sujet des Commissions de Contrôle est consigné dans le document signé le 22 mars dernier par les trois Hauts-Commissaires à la suite d'une



conversation dont l'objet était précisément le fonctionnement de ces commissions; ce point de vue n'est pas modifié, et j'estime toujours, conformément aux instructions de mon Gouvernement, que les contrôles doivent, sous la haute direction du Général Commandant en chef les troupes alliées en Turquie d'Europe, être exercés sur le pied d'égalité par des officiers appartenant aux trois nations alliées.

Il s'ensuit que les officiers des Commissions de Contrôle ne peuvent pas être considérés comme étant, dans le sens que votre Excellence paraît donner à cette expression, placés sous les ordres du Général Milne, car il en résulterait que les contrôles seraient exercés non plus par les officiers interalliés sur le pied d'égalité, mais seulement par un officier britannique qui aurait la faculté d'utiliser ou non, suivant qu'il le jugerait à propos, les Commissions de Contrôle devenues de simples instruments à sa disposition.

En ce qui concerne le point précis qui avait fait l'objet de notre conversation, et au sujet duquel il n'a pas été fait de réponse, votre Excellence voudra bien convenir que si des télégrammes chiffrés pouvaient être expédiés ou reçus par le Ministère de la Guerre sans que la traduction en fût communiquée aux officiers de la Commission de Contrôle interalliée, le contrôle que cette commission a le devoir d'exercer serait rendu complètement illusoire.

Je serais reconnaissant à votre Excellence de vouloir bien me faire connaître sa manière de voir à ce sujet, afin que je sois à même de mettre sans retard mon Gouvernement au courant de cette importante question.

Veuillez agréer, &c.  
A. DEFRANCE.

Enclosure 3 in No. 302.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to the French and Italian High Commissioners,  
Constantinople.*

Sir, *Constantinople, June 9, 1920.*  
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 2nd June on the subject of the exercise of its functions by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control at the Ottoman War Office.

2. As regards the matter of cypher telegrams received and despatched from the War Office, which is referred to in the first part of your Excellency's letter, I have forwarded your Excellency's observations to the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, and will communicate further on this subject upon receipt of his reply.

3. As your Excellency and I hold different opinions with regard to the general question of the position and responsibilities of the Commission of Control at the War Office, and as there appears to be no possibility of reconciling our different points of view, your Excellency will, I feel sure, agree with me that the matter had best be submitted to the consideration of our respective Governments.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

[E 7053/47/44]

No. 303.

*Acting Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 23.)*

My Lord, *Aden, June 10, 1920.*  
I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, copy of letter dated the 10th June, 1920, addressed to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.

C. D. FIELD, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

Enclosure in No. 303.

*Acting Political Resident, Aden, to High Commissioner, Cairo.*

(Secret.)

My dear Field-Marshal, *Aden, June 10, 1920.*  
THE report regarding the imam's order to withdraw from our protectorate, referred to in the last week's letter, has not been confirmed, nor is there any sign of the Zaidis preparing to leave the protectorate.

The imam is said to be buying twist, and has sent money to Dala, Yarim, Damar ad Ibb for the purpose.

The imam's amil at Dala has sent word to the Alawi sheikh and Mukbil Abdulla, the Kotaibi sheikh's nephew, to come and see him. They have promised to do so. It will be remembered that they were allowed to return to their homes last month after having been detained by the Zaidis for a prolonged period, during which they were sent to Sana to see the imam. What arrangement, if any, has been arrived at between them and the imam is not known. The Alawi sheikh has written reminding me of his claim against the Turks, but has said not a word in connection with his detention.

A report says that the Zaidis have been making a display of fireworks in order to induce people to believe that they have occupied Jabel Bura and other places in the Tihama.

No reports have been received from Hodeida this week.

Yours, &c.  
C. D. FIELD.

[E 7012/1729/44]

No. 304.

*War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 23.)*

Sir,

*War Office, June 22, 1920.*

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letters, dated the 10th and 15th instant, relative to the Inter-Allied Commissions for Control established at the Ministries of War, Marine and Posts and Telegraphs at Constantinople, resultant upon the technical occupation of that city. The Army Council note that Earl Curzon of Kedleston is addressing the Admiralty regarding the appointment of either a French or Italian officer as president of the Marine Commission, and, upon receipt of reply of the Lords Commissioners to Lord Curzon's letter to the Admiralty, dated the 10th instant, I am to say they will issue the further necessary instructions to General Milne regarding the transfer of the presidency of the Commission for Posts and Telegraphs to a representative of the French or Italian Government, as the case may be.

2. With reference to Lord Curzon's enquiry, in the first of the above two letters, regarding the exact position in respect of the functions and powers of these Allied Commissioners of Control, it appears to the Army Council that some confusion exists in the minds of the representatives of the French and Italian Governments in Constantinople.

As long as General Milne is in co-operation with the Allied Naval Commander and is responsible for military measures in connection with the occupation of Constantinople, which Lord Curzon states has been admitted by the French and Italian High Commissioners, it seems to the Army Council that he must have executive authority over matters controlled by the Commissioners for the War and Postal Offices, and that the presidents of these commissions, which are only part of the organisation set up by General Milne for the better organisation of his control, are merely members of his staff, acting under his orders, in the same way as an Allied officer in command of a body of troops, other than British, in Constantinople is under the orders of General Milne.

Therefore the nationality of the presidents of these committees would be immaterial, provided that they could be relied upon to carry out loyally the policy and instructions of General Milne, and, in the opinion of the Army Council, this is the crux of the matter. If any instructions issued by General Milne should not earn the approval of the French or Italian High Commissioners, the question could be referred by these Commissioners to their Government, and, in this connection, the Army Council would observe that a French or Italian representative on one of these commissions, whether serving in the capacity of president or that of member, presumably has full discretion to inform his own High Commissioner of the instructions actually issued by General Milne. The Council propose, however, to make this point quite clear in a telegram to General Milne, a copy of which is attached for Lord Curzon's approval.

3. I am therefore to suggest that Lord Curzon should explain to the Allied Governments that His Majesty's Government, on their part, are instructing General

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Milne to allow all the Allied High Commissioners complete access to information regarding the proceedings of the commissions, while they, on their part, will be expected to explain the true situation as indicated above to their own representatives, who should adapt themselves in such a manner as to enable General Milne to appoint them to posts of this nature with full confidence in their loyalty and readiness to comply with his instructions.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Admiralty.

I am, &c.  
B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure in No. 304.

War Office to General Officer Commanding, Constantinople.

(M.I. 2.)  
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR I 8767 of 11th June.

French Government have lodged official complaint regarding conduct of business by these commissions. Foreign Office have been asked to inform French and Italian Governments that presidents of Allied Commissions of Control must be under your executive command, as part of the organisation set up by you in your capacity as authority responsible for military measures in connection with the occupation of Constantinople, in exactly the same way as an Allied officer in command of body troops in Constantinople must be under your command. At same time War Office have undertaken that you will ensure full facilities for Allied representatives serving on these commissions, whether as president or member, to inform their own High Commissioners of your instructions without prejudice to loyal execution of them by Allied representatives. If High Commissioners are dissatisfied they must make representations to their own Governments.

[E 7091/3/44]

No. 305.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 752.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Paris, June 23, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 722 of 21st June: Ismid peninsula.

I have received following reply from President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to representations which I made in accordance with your instructions:—

"French Government recognise necessity of defending Ismid peninsula against Nationalists. It is also ready to maintain closest co-operation between Allies in Turkey against Nationalists' attacks.

"But it considers intermingling of British, French and Italian troops presents great inconvenience and difficulties, not only from point of view of command, but also of supplies. It considers it necessary to maintain homogeneous detachments and to divide defence of Constantinople into sectors both on Asiatic and European side. In its opinion it would be practical and logical that defence of Ismid peninsula and of Bosphorus on Asiatic side should be concentrated in hands of British troops, and that defence of Constantinople on European side be ensured by French troops. This would seem the more logical, since command of General Milne in Asia has been formally agreed by France, and since, from point of view of right as well as in accordance with proposals repeatedly made by French Government, command in European Turkey should be French."

The President of the Council insists on fact that he is anxious to maintain close co-operation between Allies in resistance to Turkish Nationalists, and that his reply is solely inspired by anxiety to ensure such resistance under safest and most homogeneous conditions.

President of Council would like to know views of His Majesty's Government as soon as possible, in order that he may lose no time in sending most urgent instructions to Constantinople.

[E 6546/757/44]

No. 306.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, June 23, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the communication which you were good enough to address to me on the 8th May last conveying the intimation that the French Government concurred in the view expressed in my note of the 14th April, that the request of the Swiss Government for Swiss representation on the Council of the Public Debt Administration could not, for various reasons, be entertained.

2. I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that the Italian Government, who were also consulted on the subject, have now expressed the undesirability of complying with the request of the Swiss Government.

3. In consequence of the complete agreement reached in the matter by the three Allied Governments, I have informed the Swiss Minister at this Court that after careful consideration of the question in consultation with the French and Italian Governments, His Majesty's Government have felt that in view of the arrangements which have been made for the eventual disappearance of the Council it was hardly worth while setting in motion the procedure necessary to obtain what could only be a very transient representation of Swiss interests, and I therefore venture to express the hope that a similar intimation may be conveyed by the French Government.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 6546/757/44]

No. 307.

Earl Curzon to Signor Preziosi.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 23, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which you were good enough to address to me on the 12th instant, intimating the concurrence of the Italian Government in the view of His Majesty's Government regarding the undesirability of complying with the request of the Swiss Government for the admittance of a Swiss representative on the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.

2. In consequence of the complete agreement now reached in the matter by the three Allied Governments, I have informed the Swiss Minister at this Court that, after careful consideration of the question in consultation with the French and Italian Governments, His Majesty's Government have felt that in view of the arrangements which have been made for the eventual disappearance of the Council, it was hardly worth while setting in motion the procedure necessary to obtain what could only be a very transient representation of Swiss interests, and I therefore venture to express the hope that a similar intimation may be conveyed by the Italian Government.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 6546/757/44]

No. 308.

Earl Curzon to M. Paravicini.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 23, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to refer to the note which you were good enough to address to me on the 23rd March last, relative to the desire of your Government for Swiss representation on the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.

2. The request which you have put forward has had the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government, in consultation with the Allied Governments of France and Italy, and it has been felt that in view of the arrangements which have been made for the eventual disappearance of that Council, it was hardly worth while setting in motion the procedure necessary to obtain what could only be a very transient representation of Swiss interests.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.



[E 7156/3/44]

No. 309.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 24.)*

(No. 736.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Constantinople, June 23, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 734 of 23rd June.

Reshid Bey and Jemil Pasha called on me this morning, 23rd June. They said that, thanks to preparatory work done in Paris, drafting of Turkish reply by Government here had not involved much labour, and that draft reply had now assumed form so nearly final that it would be easy to put finishing touches to it with Grand Vizier at Paris. They took line that granting further extension of time was foregone conclusion.

They said that they had intended to leave on 26th June, but that steamer for Venice was not now expected to leave before 28th June.

I urged importance of their starting at earliest moment, and, as it happens to fit in with other arrangements, I offered accommodation as far as Taranto in H.M.S. "Caradoc," sailing 26th June.

Delegates expressed hope that Turkish Government's objection to present draft treaty would be considered indulgently. I said that I could not disguise cooling effect likely to have been produced on any sympathy for Turkey felt in England by recent unprovoked attack on our troops at Ismid by so-called National force. I pointed out that observers at a distance must find it difficult to discriminate between Central Government and Nationalists, when latter have started warlike operations against us within stone's throw of capital. I added that Nationalists were not only operating in Asia Minor but also in Paris, where every effort was being made to persuade Allied public opinion that Mustafa Kemal and his associates alone stood for Turkey.

I said that best thing delegates could do was to get quickly to Paris and satisfy Allies that legitimate Government of Turkey have no connection with Nationalists, who are our avowed enemies, and that delegation really represents Sultan and his people and not rebels against his authority.

Delegates denounced Nationalists with utmost fervour, but urged strongly that Turkey should be given just peace, and one likely to assure her future stability. This, they said, could only be assured by placing her under ægis of single Power, and England was the only Power qualified to fill necessary rôle of guide and protector. They did not expect England to undertake task from purely disinterested motives, but at least her motives would not be local economic ones. They would be founded on her interest in regenerated Turkey as element of order and stability in the East generally.

(Secret.)

My offer of transport to Taranto and my language generally were inspired by knowledge that Reshid has since returned here, being engaged in intrigue against Ferid Pasha, and strong suspicion that for some time past he has been tending towards collaboration with Nationalists for peace treaty purposes. Object of intrigue against Ferid is to reduce him to nullity in peace negotiations and perhaps to force his resignation. Game of Nationalists appears to be capture of peace delegation, in subordinate ranks of which they have strong sympathisers.

French have also hand in this game. Reshid Pasha is probably sincere in belief that Great Britain is only Power really capable of helping Turkey, but he is on most intimate terms with French, who dislike Ferid, and who would be glad to see Reshid in his place. Latter might be specially convenient instrument in their hands if pro-Nationalist element in high French circles gain ascendancy, as they seem increasingly likely to do, and succeeded in giving new orientation to French policy in Turkey on lines of establishing understanding with Mustafa.

[E 6372/289/44]

No. 310.

*Earl Curzon to M. Gavrilovitch.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 24, 1920.*

WITH further reference to your note of the 15th April, in which you put forward the suggestion that capitulatory privileges should without further delay be conferred upon subjects of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, I have the honour to inform you that I have now received a despatch from His Majesty's High Commissioner, Constantinople,

in which he informs me that, in practice, subjects of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene kingdom are in enjoyment of the same immunities and protection as those of other Allied countries.

2. The question of the status of the Serbs having been raised by the Turkish Government, the Sublime Porte was officially informed on the 18th May that no distinction could be admitted between the Serbs and other Allies and that the jurisdiction of Turkish Courts over them could not be tolerated.

3. It is not possible to apply the so-called "Régime des Capitulations" to the subjects of belligerent States, and so long as armistice conditions endure, it is not in fact in force as regards neutrals.

I have, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 7230/3/44]

No. 311.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 25.)*

(No. 264.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Rome, June 23, 1920.*

I YESTERDAY addressed note to Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, embodying your telegram No. 265 of 21st June and Constantinople telegram No. 682 of 10th June.

As Minister for Foreign Affairs has not yet returned from Boulogne, I to-day called on President of Council, and, after impressing on him gravity of situation and urgency of immediate action, expressed earnest hope that Italian Government would co-operate with us and at once send troops to take over Asiatic side of Dardanelles.

President of Council said that he fully realised Italy was as much interested as we were in maintenance of their rôle at Ismid peninsula, and that any indication of weakness on the part of Allies might seriously prejudice the position of their forces in Constantinople. Anxious, however, as he was to co-operate in this, as in other questions, with His Majesty's Government, he could not at present moment spare any troops for such a purpose.

I urged in matter of such grave importance it hardly became Italy to stand aside altogether, and that all that General Milne had asked for was that she should send enough troops to the Dardanelles to enable us to transfer British troops who were now at Chanak to Ismid. He said he had at present at his disposal, to meet all eventualities, only some 300,000 men, and he required them, and indeed more than these, to deal with situation in Albania and Tripoli and to maintain order at home, more especially as threatening attitude of railwaymen, if not kept under control, might end by cutting off several important towns from food supplies. It was case of *force majeure*, and he regretted exceedingly his inability to comply with our request.

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[E 7091/3/44]

No. 312.

*Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby (Paris).*

(No. 741.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

*Foreign Office, June 25, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 752 of the 23rd June.

Please convey following as personal message from Prime Minister to President of the Council:—

"I have given careful consideration to your proposal to divide military control in the Constantinople area, and have consulted my military advisers on the point. They point out that, according to every military rule, there must be unity of command in the operations which are now being conducted against the Turks, and which may take place both north and south of the straits. To divide arbitrarily forces into two commands on either side of a line, which, in a military sense, is purely imaginary, would be opposed to all principles of strategy, and would be to deprive ourselves of the advantages of the central position. Further, the base for our operations on the Ismid Peninsula is, and must remain, Constantinople. This in itself would appear to preclude the practical working of your proposal. Finally, supposing the Turks made a general attack and it were accompanied by some kind of rising in Constantinople, I can conceive of no arrangement more calculated to produce confusion, delay, and possibly disaster,



than that in the small common zone which we actually occupy there should be two commands and no Commander-in-chief. There might even be three, for if there is to be no unity of command the Italians would also probably claim an independent command. It is, therefore, impossible for the British Government willingly to give their consent to the abandonment of the principle of unity of command in the Constantinople area.

"The only question, therefore, is whether that command should be British or French. I am most anxious to say and do nothing in this matter which could cause misunderstanding, and I would assure you that the British attitude in this matter is not in the least concerned with prestige or political influence. But I must point out that almost the whole burden of the war against Turkey was borne by the British, that the majority of the troops engaged in this area are still British, and that the troops most liable to serious attack are also British. Further, I would remind you that the British agreed to a French Commander-in-chief both on the Western front and on the Salonica front during the war, and that large British armies loyally accepted and worked this arrangement. I think therefore that it is only reasonable that the French Government should now agree, seeing how strong the other reasons are, to there being a British Commander-in-chief during the present operations. I do not wish to have to meet the criticism in Parliament that unity of command is always interpreted to mean that British troops must be placed under French command, and that it does not mean that French or Italian troops can be placed under British command. I would, therefore, earnestly ask the French Government to take a big view of the situation and agree to there being unity of command in the Constantinople area, and to the supreme command being exercised by a British General until peace with Turkey is established. The French Government, of course, under this arrangement would have a voice in the selection of the General who was to have the supreme command, and if they agreed to my proposal the British Government would consult with them on that subject immediately."

[E 7274/3/44]

No. 313.

*Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 26.)*(No. 751.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Constantinople, June 26, 1920.*

GENERAL MILNE has shown me a telegram from War Office which states that M. Millerand has proposed that French should assume entire military control over Constantinople on behalf of Allies, whilst General Milne should, as hitherto, be responsible for Asia Minor.

I would point out that acceptance of this proposal would mean that our predominant position at Constantinople as Power which defeated Turkey in war, made armistice and executed military occupation of town this year, would be sacrificed, and that French would take our place and play leading rôle.

We are now at war with Turkish Nationalists, and have in addition to ensure execution of terms of Peace Treaty. If we hand over Constantinople to French we give up control of place, which is strictly only possible base for all military and naval operations in Turkish area.

We should also resign to French our present predominant position in being able to influence the Sultan, Turkish Cabinet and Sublime Porte. We are the Power which is determined to execute Peace Treaty in spite of Nationalists; our French Allies may, however, at any time decide that a policy of compromise with Nationalists is more in accordance with their interests. They have been in communication with Mustafa Kemal, and have made an armistice with him in Cilicia. If they controlled Constantinople they would be in a position to bring in a Nationalist Government here, which would create a situation making execution of present Peace Treaty impossible.

I can see no advantage to Allied cause in M. Millerand's proposal, and its only object appears to be to establish French in position of predominance in Constantinople at our own expense.

The argument in favour now put forward, viz., that separate areas of command are necessary to ensure Allied occupation, is diametrically opposed to contention previously maintained that General Milne was in supreme command of Allied armies in Orient.

[E 6721/3/44]

No. 314.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*(No. 581.)  
(Telegraphic.)*Foreign Office, June 26, 1920.*

YOUR telegram No. 713 (paragraph 5) of 17th June.

You will have realised from my telegram No. 559 of 21st June, repeating my telegraphic request to French and Italian Governments for reinforcements, that our policy would require forcible suppression of any political developments in Constantinople tending to strengthen the Nationalist movement in Anatolia and Thrace.

[E 7340/3/44]

No. 315.

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 27.)*(No. 770.)  
(Telegraphic.) D.*Paris, June 27, 1920.*

MY telegram No. 768 of 26th June: Command in Turkey.

Following is summary of reply of President of Council:—

French Government fully concur in necessity of unity of command for future military operations in Constantinople zone. In taking view in its note of 23rd January that for reason of command and supply it would be preferable to maintain homogeneous forces in fixed sectors, it did not exclude the idea of unity of command, but advocated that solution in principle for employment of troops, while admitting that a certain liberty in this respect should be left to various commands.

Unity of command being thus recognised, question arises as to troops over which it should be exercised. Without considering for the moment naval forces, French Government considers it clear that it should be exercised over Greek army (about 100,000 men), British troops (about 30,000), French troops (about 18,000) and Italian troops (about 2,000).

As regards question whether supreme command should be French or British, French Government observe that by right France held supreme command by land and sea since beginning of the war, although certain local [group omitted] were temporarily made at time of occupation of Constantinople and conclusion of armistice with Turkey. Last decision taken as regards land command was that of 3rd December, 1918, in London, which laid down that "British troops in garrison in any part of Turkey whatsoever remain with their general under command of General Franchet d'Esperey." In point of fact, in spite of that decision, General Wilson assumed command at Constantinople, and, more recently, General Milne that over whole of Constantinople zone, although his command had been restricted by Allies to Asia Minor.

British Government, continues President of the Council, now ask France to abandon her right of supreme command in Turkey in Europe, basing that demand on a situation of fact and actual respective military positions in Constantinople district, and asserting that that demand is in no way influenced by political considerations.

French Government, anxious to reply to British demand and to take arguments put forward into account, is ready to agree to supreme military command for defence of Constantinople zone being entrusted to an English general, but only on certain conditions.

French parliamentary and public opinion will be unable to admit that existing rightful situation at Constantinople should be reversed to the detriment of France without equality, which ought to exist between British and French at Constantinople, being at the same time maintained and clearly laid down. Logically, if command by land is attributed to England, command by sea should be French.

Should such a solution be considered hardly practicable, French Government asks that, under supreme authority of British general, command of town of Constantinople itself be entrusted to a French general. Further, French Government asks that at Constantinople question of presidency of three commissions of control, which should be divided amongst British, French and Italians by agreement between their respective Governments, shall now be definitely settled in that sense.

Situation, concludes President of the Council, will then be as follows: General Officer Commanding-in-chief will settle military objections to be attained in accordance with political aims decided upon by Council of High Commissioners. British Commander-in-chief would direct military operations. The two Governments would



settle between themselves on choice of general for the purpose. In principle, troops of same nationality will remain grouped together without entirely binding hands of supreme command in that respect; each of the General Officers Commanding troops of different nationalities will retain right to refer to his Government if he considered that his forces were endangered by orders received.

Such is basis on which French Government consider that cordial co-operation and close agreement between the Allies should remain established.

[E 7466/3/44]

No. 316.

*The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon. — (Received June 30.)*

(No. 776.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Paris, June 30, 1920.

YOUR telegram No. 742 of 26th June.

President of the Council concurs in proposal respecting withdrawal of Allied officers and agents in areas under Nationalist control, and has notified Minister of War with a view to necessary instructions being sent to Constantinople.

[E 6344/289/44]

No. 317.

*Earl Curzon to Admiral Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople).*

(No. 491.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 30, 1920.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 690 of the 11th June, and in confirmation of my telegram No. 585 of the 28th June, relative to the granting of a general authority, under rule 305 of "The Ottoman Rules of Court, 1914," for Consular Courts to deal with applications for probate made after three years of death without reference to the Supreme Court, I have to forward to you herewith, for transmission to your representative at Smyrna, copy of an order, dated London, the 22nd June, granting the required general authority, signed by his Honour Judge Grain, of His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court.

I am, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 317.

*Order made in His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court.**Probate Division.*

In the matter of directions under Rule 305 of Rules of Court for His Majesty's Courts in Ottoman dominions.

WHEREAS under rule 305 of Rules of Courts for His Majesty's Courts in the Ottoman dominions it is set forth that—

"Where application for probate or administration is, for the first time, made to a provincial court after three years from the date of decease, a grant shall not be made except under the direction of the Supreme Court,"

it is hereby directed by His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court that in all such cases referred to in the above-stated rule, where delay in the making of the application for probate or administration is due directly or indirectly to the exigencies of the late war, the provincial court shall have and exercise all the powers conferred under article 107 of "The Ottoman Order in Council, 1910," without further application to or direction from His Majesty's Supreme Court under the above-stated rule.

By order,

Judge,

*His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court.*